Inside this issue ...

Our columnists,
Feature articles by Linsky, Turcon, and Akram,
Reviews by Bruneau and Trainer,
And much more.
Information for New and Renewing Members

Membership in the Society is $45 per year for individuals and $25 for students and those with limited incomes. Add $10.00 for couples. A lifetime membership is $1,000. In addition to the BRS Bulletin, membership includes a subscription to the scholarly journal, Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies (published semi-annually by McMaster University), as well as other Society privileges, such as participation in the on-line BRS Forum, access to a host of Russell-related resources, and eligibility to attend the Annual Meeting.

Renewal dues should be paid by or on January 1st of each year. One’s membership status can be determined by going to http://russell.mcmaster.ca/brsmembers.htm. There one will also find convenient links to join or renew via PayPal and our information form.

New and renewing members can also send a check or money order via traditional post to the treasurer (make it out to The Bertrand Russell Society). Send it to Michael Berumen, Treasurer, Bertrand Russell Society, 37155 Dickerson Run, Windsor, CO 80550. If a new member, please tell us a little about yourself beyond just your name (interests in Russell, profession, etc.). Include your postal address and email address, as well as your member status (i.e., regular, couple, student, limited income). If a renewing member, please let us know of any relevant changes in your contact information.

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Publication Information

Editor: Michael E. Berumen
Mailing Address: 37155 Dickerson Run, Windsor, CO 80550, USA
Email: opinealot@gmail.com
Web production: Kris Notaro

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Letters to the editor may be submitted to the editor’s postal or email address. Please reference the issue, author, and title of the article to which the letter relates. Letters should be concise. Publication will be at the discretion of the editor, and predicated upon available space. The editor reserves the right to truncate letters.

Manuscripts may be submitted to the editor at his email address in Microsoft Word. No PDFs, please. Feature articles and book reviews should be Russell-centric, dealing with Russell’s life or works, and they should be written in either a scholarly or journalistic style. Articles generally should not exceed 7 single-spaced pages, and book reviews should not exceed 2 single-spaced pages. Mathematical, logical, and scientific symbols are fine, but please ensure that they are essential. Footnotes/endnotes should be used sparingly and primarily for citations; the editor reserves the right to convert footnotes to endnotes and vice versa, depending on layout needs. Parenthetical citations and page numbers, with standard reference descriptions at the end of the article, are also fine; but no abbreviations for works, please. Submissions should be made no later than August 31st and December 31st for the fall and spring issues, respectively. The editor will collaborate with the authors, as required, and authors will have the opportunity to review any suggested changes prior to publication. There are no guarantees of publication, and articles submitted may be held for future editions.

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Annual Meeting/Registration Info: Rear Cover
Windsor Bound!
2014 Annual Meeting

The 2014 Annual Meeting of the BRS will be held at the University of Windsor in Ontario, Canada beginning on Friday, June 13th and ending on Sunday, June 15th. Registration information will be found on the rear cover of this issue.

Windsor, which has a population of roughly 216,000 residents, is located on the Detroit River across from Detroit, Michigan, and in the southwestern part of Ontario. The Detroit-Windsor area was first settled in 1701 by the French explorer, Sieur De Lamothe Cadillac. In 1748, the indefatigable Jesuits established a presence to convert the indigenous tribes, and an agricultural settlement was formed shortly thereafter. While predominantly French in its early years, the settlement came under British control in 1760. In 1794 the settlement was named Sandwich, and later, in 1854, it would become Windsor, after the town in Berkshire, England.

The University of Windsor began as Assumption College in 1857. The Ontario legislature incorporated the University of Windsor in 1962, and the newly chartered university assumed responsibly for Assumption in 1963. Today, the university serves nearly 17,000 students enrolled in a variety of undergraduate and graduate programs, including several professional schools.

Michael Potter, a BRS director, will be hosting our meeting at the university, where he is on the faculty. Michael’s background is in philosophy, and he is especially interested in educational development. He is currently Teaching and Learning Specialist at the university’s Centre for Teaching and Learning.

President Alan Schwerin has already issued a call for papers to be presented (about a 20 minute talk) at the meeting. If you have something in mind, be sure to email Alan right away at aschweri@monmouth.edu.

Windsor makes an excellent jumping-off point for further exploration of the United States or Canada. The Ambassador Bridge and the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel connect Windsor and Detroit. For those interested in travelling to McMaster University (in Hamilton, Ontario) to visit the Russell Centre, the drive is about 190 miles over approximately 3 hours.

This promises to be an exciting meeting, and, if past is prologue, it will be chock full of interesting papers, discussions, and great camaraderie. Now would be a good time to register and make your travel arrangements.

100 Years Ago

Bertrand Russell was at Harvard University in the United States in the spring of 1914. His principal charge was to teach epistemology and logic. The philosophy department was headed-up by Ralph Barton Perry, whose neo-realism was then ascendant. Joshua Royce was also a faculty member at the time, and he continued to hold forth on his version of absolute idealism. One of Russell’s students was Victor Lenzen, later a Berkeley physicist, who reported, “To the students, Mr. Russell was an almost superhuman person. I cannot adequately describe the respect, adoration, and even awe which he inspired. He was very kind and hospitable to students.” Lenzen’s full account of his experience with Russell at Harvard, which is very illuminating, can be found at the Digital Commons at McMaster.”

Little did Russell know, then, that his life would change forever in just a matter of months with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, a catalyzing event for the outbreak of World War I, which resulted in nearly 17 million dead and (then)
unimaginable destruction and suffering across Europe. Russell, appalled at the horror of war, would soon take to the world stage, and his prominence as an intellectual and humanitarian would reach well beyond the walls of academia. However, “The War to End All Wars” was merely a precursor to an even more horrible conflagration. While an odious and menacing ideology would eventually challenge some of Russell’s pacific beliefs, his hopes for a peaceful world would never waver. (Editor’s note: the well-known picture is from 1916; but one suspects that his appearance hadn’t changed very much from 1914.)

*http://digitalcommons.mcmaster.ca/russelljournal/vol91/iss3/4

(de)Notations

- In memoriam: Honorary Member President Nelson R. Mandela (1918-2013). The son of Honorary Member Lady Katharine Tait, and Bertrand Russell’s eldest grandson, David A. Tait (1951-2013).
- And the winner is: Susan Vombrack, who won the draw held in January 2014 for an autographed, first edition copy of Mysticism and Logic. The draw was held to encourage timely membership renewals.
- The BRS donated $1,000 to the International Red Cross earmarked to aid victims of Typhoon Haiyan, the deadliest typhoon in the Philippines on record.
- For information on the BRS, recent board minutes, and treasurer’s reports, see: http://users.drew.edu/~JLENZ/brs-organization.html
- Two new directors were elected to the board for the 2014-2016 term: Jolen Galaugher, Visiting Russell Professor at McMaster University, and Donovan Wishon, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Mississippi.
- Mini-financial report for 2013:

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Go Green!

No, we don’t mean buy a hybrid car or support the Green Bay Packers, commendable as doing such things might be. What we do mean is it is time to mark your calendars for Dublin, Ireland in 2015, where the Society will hold its Annual Meeting at Trinity College from June 5-7. Peter Stone, faculty member and BRS vice chair, will be our host, and the meeting will be held jointly with the Society for the Study of the History of Analytic Philosophy, which will run on June 4-6.

Much more information will be provided in the next two issues of the Bulletin. In the meantime, start thinking about the things one might do while visiting the Emerald Isle, and also several Russell sites in nearby Wales and England.

Not Necessarily Trivial

While at Cambridge, Russell befriended two brothers from a well-known family. One of them would later die tragically from drowning, and the other was to be one of Russell’s closest and most enduring friends, as well as his solicitor. Who were these brothers? (Turn to page 18 for the answer.)
Russelliana
By Tim Madigan
TMADIGAN@ROCHESTER.RR.COM

Note to readers: Those of us who recall the wonderful Bertrand Russell Society newsletters edited by Lee Eisler will remember how he would lovingly photocopy articles from various journals that made mention of Russell, no matter how fleeting or obscure the reference might be. In honor of Lee, the Bulletin has incorporated a column called “Russelliana,” which continues his practice of alerting us to references to Russell, often found in the most startling of contexts. I encourage readers to send me any such appearances they come across for use in future “Russelliana” columns:

In a New York Review of Books article on Edward Frenkel’s Love and Math: The Heart of Hidden Reality, Jim Holt writes: “For those who have learned something of higher mathematics, nothing could be more natural than to use the word ‘beautiful’ in connection with it . . . . To Bertrand Russell—who rather melodramatically claimed, in his autobiography, that it was his desire to know more of mathematics that kept him from committing suicide—the beauty of mathematics was ‘cold and austere, like that of sculpture . . . sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection’” (Jim Holt, “A Mathematical Romance”, New York Review of Books, December 5, 2013, page 27; http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/dec/05/mathematical-romance/). Luckily for Russell, as his autobiography also attests, he was able to find a few less cold and austere romances down on earth once he gave up the pursuit of such perfection.

While reading a new biography of the cartoonist Al Capp, of “Li’l Abner” fame, I was shocked to find the following unexpected Russell reference. Capp, noted for his drawings of rather voluptuous women and sly sexual references in what was ostensibly a family strip, created a character named “Adam Lazonga” who was renowned as the world’s greatest lover, and who became a mentor to the naïve Abner, teaching him how to woo the ladies “Dogpatch style.” “Capp”, the authors relate, “modeled Lazonga’s physical appearance after George Bernard Shaw, the playwright and novelist, whose play Pygmalion was built on a similar teacher/student theme, but Lazonga’s eccentric views and behavior were based on English philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell, recently in Boston’s local news because he had accepted a position as a lecturer at Harvard after having been dismissed from the City College of New York. In interviews, Capp refused to connect Russell to his comic strip character, saying only that Shaw had been the model for the way Adam Lazonga looked. In the end, it didn’t matter. Lazonga had become a vehicle for another lighthearted romp” (Michael Schumacher and Denis Kitchen, Al Capp: A Life to the Contrary, Bloomsbury USA, 2013, pages 100-101). Russellians know that he was at Harvard in the fall of 1940, and after losing the CCNY job in March of that year (one that would have started in ’41), Russell did not go on to teach at any other U.S. university. Was there really a connection to Capp’s character? One might have his doubts, given Capp’s denial. Still, the thought of Lord Russell cavorting with Daisie Mae, Moonbeam McSwine, and Stupefyin’ Jones in Dogpatch, USA is an image one can’t easily remove from one’s mind. “Dogpatch Style”, indeed.

As if that salacious connotation isn’t enough, I recently came across yet another unexpected Russell connection, after purchasing at a used book sale The Giant Book of Dirty Jokes, Compiled by “Mr. J.” (Don’t ask why.) It is a three volume work consisting of the following trilogy: World’s Best Dirty Jokes, More of the World’s Best Dirty Jokes, and Still More of the World’s Best Dirty Jokes. These classic volumes were all published, respectively (if not respectfully) in 1976, 1979, and 1981 by Lyle Stuart, Inc. Mr. Stuart, a longtime civil libertarian and free speech advocate, also published long-time BRS member Warren Allen Smith’s magnificent opus, Who’s Who in Hell, which is chockfull of Russell references. Little did I expect to find such a reference in the aforementioned Dirty Jokes collection. But there, as the epigram to Volume III, is the following quote: “Laughter is the most inexpensive and most effective wonder drug. Laughter is a universal medicine.” – Bertrand Russell.

Try though as I might, I have been unable to trace this quotation to any specific Russell source. Warren and I are on the trail to see if we can find out who the mysterious “Mr. J” might be, and from whence he got this attribution. We’ll soon see who gets the last laugh!

And one final Russell reference in the world of erotica. He is featured in the 60th...
Russell, Society and the Media: A Man Ahead of His Time

One of the things so remarkable about Russell was his ability to see things before the rest of society did. He was, as some might say, a man ahead of his time. As Nobel Peace laureate Joseph Rotblat once put it (Perkins, back cover): “Russell was the great dissident of the 20th century. His opinions—many of them thought eccentric at the time ... [are] now part of our culture...."

Part of Russell’s genius was his ability to ferret out information—a trait which required careful attention to the media. I think this was a lifelong practice, but it was certainly obvious in the last decade of his life when the need for accurate information on international events bearing on matters of war and peace was especially important. At a time when few Americans had heard of Vietnam or the (1954) Geneva Agreements, Russell was accusing the U.S. in the pages of the New York Times of using chemical weapons in Vietnam and of violating the Geneva Agreements. This was April 1963, fully 16 months before the U.S. Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, giving LBJ carte blanche on the use of force against Vietnam (Perkins, p. 360). Russell was a vociferous critic of the U.S. war against Vietnam for the rest of the decade and, as we know, convened (with Jean Paul Sartre) an international war crimes tribunal in Stockholm (and Denmark) to hear charges of U.S. atrocities in Vietnam. Although the Russell Tribunal was unfavorably and unfairly reported in much of the Western press, it did encourage the U.S. anti-war movement and hastened U.S. popular (and Congressional) opposition to the war. Indeed, it’s pretty clear that it inspired the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (including John Kerry, later U.S. Senator and Secretary of State) to expose U.S. atrocities and demand an end to that war.¹

How was Russell able to see the real nature of the war in Vietnam? Russell carefully read the Western press—not so much the publishers’ editorials as the accounts of individual reporters in the field. (The U.S. executive restricted the media people much less in the Vietnam War than it did in later military adventures.) Russell tells us in his War Crimes in Vietnam (p. 30) that much of his evidence came from the U.S. press, especially before the Gulf of Tonkin (August 1964), which was soon followed by a 4-year escalation of U.S. involvement. As Russell says, the U.S. mass media was teeming with evidence of atrocities, provided one followed “certain rules that must be observed in reading the newspapers.”

¹. Read between the lines.
². Never underestimate the evil of which men of power are capable.
3. Know the jargon of “terrorists” versus “police officers”, and translate whenever necessary.

Eric Schlosser’s recent book, Command and Control (2013), is a shocking revelation of a long (and ongoing) history of U.S. nuclear weapons accidents, monumental malfeasance, dangerous dereliction and obfuscation. Schlosser weaves a riveting and disturbing account of nuclear weapons and the Cold War around a little known catastrophe at Damascus, Arkansas in 1980 involving a Titan II Missile and its thermonuclear warhead with a yield of nine megatons (the largest in the U.S. arsenal at the time). In the course of his story we learn about nuclear weapons, the preparation for war, and the scores of near misses and accidents over the last six decades. The book is well researched and has made excellent use of the Freedom of Information Act to illuminate reams of long-hidden secrets declassified since the end of the Cold War.

While recently working my way through Schlosser’s 600+ page tome, and reflecting on how important this book will be for the protracted fight ahead for nuclear disarmament, it occurred to me that very similar revelations had been promulgated more than 50 years before in Russell’s highly readable little eye-openers—Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (1959) and Has Man A Future? (1961). Indeed, about the time he was exposing U.S. chemical weapons in Vietnam, he was also engaged in a heated dispute with the editor of Harpers (March 1963) concerning the alleged “elaborate safeguards” on U.S. nuclear missiles (see Perkins, p. 341-45). Russell not only reveals an impressive grasp of nuclear weapons and deterrence, he also cites examples of nuclear accidents from the little known Mershon National Security Report (1960) and quotes authorities in high government positions confirming the dangers of war due to faulty warning systems, i.e. command and control error.

Yes, Russell was truly ahead of his time, and many of his opinions on war and peace—once thought eccentric—are now (becoming) part of our culture.

1. In 1971 Kerry testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee; he also was part of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War’s Winter Soldier Investigation (to publicize U.S. war crimes in Vietnam) in Detroit, at which over 100 vets reported atrocities they had witnessed or participated in. Many of those connected with Winter Soldier had taken favorable notice of Russell’s Tribunal a few years earlier.


References

Perkins, Jr., Ray, Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell: A Lifelong Fight for Peace, Justice and Truth in Letters to the Editor (Chicago: Open Court, 2002).

From the Student Desk

By Landon D. C. Elkind
LANDON-ELKIND@UIOWA.EDU

Russell on Infinity

Mathematicians adopted Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory as the standard axiomatization for mathematics, but the theory admits of numerous independence proofs, which show that a system's axioms, supposing them to be consistent, fail to provide an answer to a well-formed mathematical question. The most well-known example may be the Continuum Hypothesis, which asserts that raising two to the first infinite cardinal, aleph-null, equals the infinite cardinal aleph-one, meaning that no infinite cardinals lie between aleph-null and aleph-one. Kurt Gödel and Paul Cohen showed that neither the Continuum Hypothesis nor its negation can be proven by the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (if its axioms are consistent).

Peter Koellner finds this situation unsatisfactory. “How can I stay in any field and continue to prove theorems if the fundamental notions I’m using are problematic?” he asks in a Quanta Magazine article by Natalie Wolchover (November 26, 2013: “To Settle Infinity Dispute, a New Law of Logic”). Koellner apparently thinks that some questions (for example, the Continuum Hypothesis) must be answered to clarify the notion of set. In the presence of in-
dependence results for important questions, qua the foundational role of sets, opacity plagues the foundations of mathematics.

One might think that this depends on one's notion of "importance." Yet the number of open questions troubles Hugh Woodin. Quanta quotes him saying, "We don't have a clear vision of the universe of sets. Almost any question you write down about sets is unsolvable. It's not a satisfactory situation." This issue, then, truly does concern the notion of set.

As the article notes, some disagree that sets aim at clarifying infinity. Kenneth Kunen's lovely Set Theory: A Guide to Independence Proofs offers the following remark: "By infinitary combinatorics we mean the field that used to be called set theory before there were independence proofs." (p. 47) Some think that independence proofs, not answering questions about infinity, should guide the development of set theory.

Given that some participants in the debate view this as a concern about mathematical foundations, and given that sets provide the current foundational framework for mathematics, this invites the question of what Russell, as one of the chief architects of mathematics' present foundations, would have thought of this whole business.

Gregory Landini argues persuasively that Russell regards the existence of infinitely many numbers as a non-arithmetical, non-mathematical question. (p. 199) Russell adopts Cantor's analysis of number into correspondence by which numbers are not objects. (p. 173) Russell similarly analyzes away sets in Principia Mathematica; he develops a foundational framework independent of any commitment to the existence of sets. (p. 201)

On Landini's reading of Russell, one imagines that Russell would deny that one's qualms related to what sizes of sets there 'are' result from believing in sets' existence, and that the resolution of these qualms involves understanding that sets do not belong in one's ontology, rather than finding new axioms to settle what sets there 'are'. Realizing that sets do not exist resolves Koellner's discomfort. There is no problem.

However, it remains open to a set theorist to offer a novel logical analysis of number. The notion of correspondence may be an inadequate analysis because correspondence leaves open numerous and important questions about infinite correspondences, such as Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis. Perhaps the opacity of infinite structures, considered from a logical point of view, highlights the need for further analytical work.

In that case, the Quanta article misplaces the frame for the search for new axioms. The conceptual underpinnings of sets, e.g., the set membership relation, 'ε', that underlies all of set theory, the iterative conception of set, or the part-whole notion of set, received no mention in the article. To take an example, one might explain the set membership relation in terms of a spatial metaphor, e.g., containment. As another example, one could ground the iterative notion of set in terms of repeating a process.

By Russell's lights, a set theorist grounding his work in some notion creates a demand for an analysis of that notion that bases set theory in logic. If this cannot be provided, then speculation about the Continuum Hypothesis fares poorly: questions like Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis should be eliminated. Answering these conjectures offers as much insight as the answer to how many angels may occupy the head of a pin. Without a logical analysis of sets, questions about infinity become misguided metaphysical speculations about sets as objects that some mistakenly believe underwrite sound reasoning about infinity, just as past theorists mistakenly believed numbers underwrote sound reasoning about arithmetic.

Yet mathematics departments — some of them — happily include set theorists. Mathematics journals publish work on large cardinals, inner models, forcing axioms, and other parts of the ongoing work in set theory that influence the debate highlighted by Quanta. If a logicist declared that set theory and set theorists had no place in mathematics departments, then set theorists could respond analogously to Russell's logicism. Of course, mathematicians likely would ignore such declarations and carry on working.

I think Russell would avoid demanding that mathematicians abide by Cantor's analysis of number or cease working. Russell would recommend that set theorists' search for new axioms center on providing a novel analysis of sets into logic. Correspondence may be adequate to analyze away numbers, but perhaps we require a new analysis of sets to eliminate sets at a level that saves work being done on infinities too large for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory to study. We need a logical analysis of sets to guide the search for a new logical axi-
om for set theory, one that answers such questions as trouble Koellner and Woodin.

But the debate, as the Quanta article frames it, never addresses set theory’s conceptual underpinnings, and thus the logical underpinnings (if set theory has such a logical basis). In seeking metaphysical foundations for set theory, I hope set theorists remain attuned to the logical foundations of set theory.

References


Analytics

By Jolen Galaugher and Katarina Perovic

GALAUGJB@UNIVMAIL.CIS.MCMASTER.CA
KATARINA-PEROVIC@UIOWA.EDU

Russell’s Philosophy of Logical Analysis

The first in the series of columns in this space coincides with the recent publication of Jolen Galaugher’s book Russell’s Philosophy of Logical Analysis: 1897-1905, London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013, xii+218 pages. She has been kind enough to agree to answer a few questions about the central theme of her book.

KATARINA: In your book, you trace Russell’s early understanding of logical analysis. What, according to you, are the main characteristics of Russell’s conception of logical analysis in the period 1897-1905, and in what way does Russell depart from his contemporaries in his understanding of logical analysis?

JOLEN: The emergence of analytic philosophy has often been identified with Moore’s and Russell’s break with idealism and, hence, with anti-psychologism in logic—essentially, with Moore’s theory of concepts and Russell’s theory of terms. This is certainly an important development and goes some way to distinguishing Russell from his idealist and phenomenologist contemporaries. But I think the key feature that distinguishes Russell’s conception of analysis from those of his contemporaries—from Frege, for instance—is the view that the notions of proposition and constituent are analytically basic. It is this view that made Peano logic so readily approvable for Russell’s analyses. It is the attempt to get clear about the constituents of propositions that led him to develop an intensional view of relations instead of treating relations as classes of couples. It is the notion that proposition and constituent are basic that led him to reject Fregean functional theories. The notion of proposition and constituent provides the scaffolding for the theory of descriptions that he puts to use to salvage the substitution theory on which proposition and constituent are retained as basic notions. I find this characterization, once it is elaborated in terms of the various technical developments in Russell’s logic and logicist project, to be more informative than the notion of ‘decompositional analysis’ which is often attributed to Russell, but which is difficult to regard as characteristic of his detailed analyses in mathematics.

KATARINA: In what way, according to you, was Russell’s concern with an adequate analysis of relational propositions an important part of his later logicism?

JOLEN: Around 1900, Russell wanted to analyze relational propositions, but his way of analyzing them produced what he called a ‘contradiction of relativity’. The essential thing is that, like Bradley, he thought relations of difference needed to be grounded in some differing properties in the relata. But in some cases, like spatial and temporal relations, there are no differences in the relata—for instance, if the relata are indiscernible points or instants. It seemed that relations weren’t real. And yet mathematics depended on relations. So the first step was not only to follow Moore in regarding the proposition as constituted by concepts connected by relations of various sorts, but to give an argument that relations connecting constituents of propositions are real and external to their terms. He arrived at this view when working on Leibniz, since he saw that a pluralist metaphysics depended on external relations: if one holds that all differences are differences as to properties, one can’t meaningfully say ‘there are two subjects’. So, Russell’s argument for relations was an argument from the primitive diversity of terms. This view that conceptual differences
are real differences led him to his intensional view of relations, which became central to his early logicism. It was with his intensional logic of relations that he supplemented Peano’s logic to yield the first articulation of his definition of number. In his later logicist project of *Principia Mathematica*, the intensional doctrine of relations had fallen by the way, but the central insight—that mathematics studies relational structures—remained intact.

Sébastien Gandon has done much to show how, for Russell, the various branches of mathematics are characterized by different types of relational structures, and has done so with regard to Russell’s lesser known analyses in geometry.

**KATARINA:** In the final part of your book you argue that Russell’s decompositional understanding of analysis played a crucial role in the evolution of his thought on the theory of denoting. Could you say more about this?

**JOLEN:** Yes, the point is that Russell’s theory of descriptions was heralded as introducing a radically new conception of analysis that solved various puzzles, and it does. But what I wished to point out was that the new conception of analysis was introduced because it was the only means of preserving his old conception of analysis that Russell could envisage. Russell had been wrestling with the contradiction for some time, and though he had entertained functional theories which placed restrictions on functions to block the contradiction, the unpublished manuscripts in the Volume 4 of the *Collected Papers* show he clearly preferred his old conception of analysis. But his old conception ran up against the problems of denoting while, at the same time, no solution to the contradiction was forthcoming from within it. The new theory of descriptions solved all of his troubles at once. That said, I’m still not convinced that the notion of a ‘decompositional’ conception of analysis is particularly helpful: the conception of analysis which was facilitated by the theory of descriptions was that of the substitution theory, on which proposition or complex and constituent were taken as logically basic. Of course, it turned out that the substitution theory gave rise to a paradox of its own, but the theory of descriptions continued to play a crucial role in Russell’s subsequent logicist project and, arguably, the philosophical motivations for the substitution theory carried over to the later program as well, though this point is controversial.

**KATARINA:** In your book, you make use of materials which were not available previously—such as volumes of Russell’s *Collected Papers* and his correspondence with Louis Couturat (1868-1914). What were some of the most memorable and surprising finds for you in these manuscripts?

**JOLEN:** The material from Volumes 2, 3, and 4 of the *Collected Papers* has been available since the early to mid-nineties, but some of the most influential work, for instance Peter Hylton’s book, was published before these came out. I’m not sure that a careful study of the material had really been done. What surprised me in the *Collected Papers* was the duration of time over which Russell continued to be exercised by concerns about idealism. I was pleased, though perhaps not entirely surprised, to find a clear and immediate articulation of the consequences of “On Denoting” in the correspondence with Couturat. The correspondence with Couturat is really very rich and informative. I think less use of it has been made than might have been the case had it been in English. Recently, I’ve attempted a translation of the philosophical, mathematical, and logical aspects of the correspondence. Now I am working on completing a book on the significance of the correspondence for understanding key junctures in Russell’s philosophical development up to *Principia Mathematica*. I think it is *that important*, from an historical point of view. In this new book, I will get to deal with some of Russell’s published and unpublished work written between “On Denoting” and *Principia Mathematica*, which will soon be available in Volume 5 of the *Collected Papers*. The publication of Volume 5 is likely to rekindle recent debates about the interpretation of *Principia Mathematica*, and it will be interesting to see which views are corroborated by this material and what the material implies about the philosophical underpinnings of the logicist project. Thanks for your questions.

**Bertrand Russell Society Bulletin Spring 2014**

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Meet the BRS

A Russelian Family
By Bette Chambers
CHAMBNAUT@AOL.COM

It’s slightly embarrassing to admit it, but my family harbored a household God: Bertrand Russell. We’d often ask one another, “What would Bertrand Russell say?” Or, “What would Bertrand Russell advise?” We were a family of five, including our three daughters. Neither my husband nor I had much schooling in philosophy, other than introductory courses. Our interest in Russell focused primarily on his opinions concerning social policies and religion. My late husband worked as a biological research scientist for the U.S. Department of the Interior for over thirty years.

We lived in many cities west of the Mississippi, and our daughters attended many public schools. All three went on to graduate from The Evergreen State College, here in Olympia, Washington.

As for myself, I served first as president of the American Humanist Association from 1973-1979, and then later as its Director of Planned Giving, retiring in 2004. Like my husband, my primary major at the University of Washington was Zoology. His emphasis: fish, birds, and wildlife; mine: the invertebrates.

It was on September 5, 1965 that our then twelve-year-old daughter came home from her first day of school demanding, “Mom! Must I believe that spiders make their webs perfectly the very first time they try because God has programmed their brains?” We had arrived in Spokane, Washington just the night before, transferring from Portland, Oregon. I suspected that she had wandered into a parochial school by error. But she had enrolled that day in the Jonas E. Salk Junior High School, and her first day in biology class included several films ... supposedly explaining evolution. These were clever anti-evolution tracts made by the Moody Institute of Science in Whittier, California. The school had dozens more, purchased with taxpayer money.

About the same time, Walter Cronkite, speaking on the CBS Evening News, reported about a Supreme Court case brought by a teacher in Arkansas who had been ordered not to teach “Darwinian” evolution in her public school biology classes. Cronkite opined that only in the south could such a dinosaur-like remnant from the Scopes Trial still exist. I wrote him immediately, telling him that schools in Spokane (and as we soon discovered—1,600 entire school districts) utilized these “fiat creationism” tracts daily. Cronkite sent his staffer, Terry Drinkwater, to interview my daughter and me. This report aired about two weeks later. Then all Hell broke loose.

Our daughter was stunned to find she was persona non grata in her biology class. And so she decided to write to Bertrand Russell and tell him about it. Shortly afterward, his secretary sent her the little gold booklet from the Gaberbocchus Press containing Russell’s famous sentence that not since Adam and Eve had mankind ever refrained from any folly of which it is capable. She showed this to her teacher with considerable pride. However, this didn’t stop the verbal abuse she had to endure from her classmates. At the time, Spokane was widely regarded as a cesspit of reactionary politics. The hate mail and the taunts our daughters endured were astonishing. Even my husband was asked to explain the matter for his U.S. Civil Service personnel file.

There were other exchanges of letters between Bertrand Russell and me. Earlier I had written him praising his intervention during the Cuban Missile Crisis. To this day, I am convinced that his letters to Khrushchev and Kennedy offered Khrushchev an opportunity to “blink first” during the eyeball-to-eyeball standoff. Later I wrote to advise him that the Christian Century magazine had opined that he was turning to religion now that he was approaching his century mark. He replied angrily that he suspected “a lie factory on behalf of the afterlife” was at work.

I cherish the Bertrand Russell Society. If it didn’t exist, someone would have to create it if we are to keep interest in Russell alive. I’d like to see Russell always noted among the giants of the 20th century. I’d like to see his books always included in secondary school courses in philosophy and civics, because so many students today do not go on to college. It’s the clarity of his works, never prolix, never difficult reading, which will continue to influence younger generations (Editor’s note: Bette was the well-known polymath and science fiction author Isaac Asimov’s assistant during his early years as president of the AHA.)
Russell in 1948 Compared with 1958

Suggested below is a way of looking at Russell’s life by comparing features and facets of that life at different times, in this case a decade apart. Enterprising researchers might extend the table to cover his whole life on an annual basis, which would aid developmental studies. Are there other aspects? One that might be added is his photograph. Ignored here are changing fashions in his collars and ties, and constants such as pipe smoking and Red Hackle!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGE</strong></td>
<td>Turns 76.</td>
<td>Turns 86.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHYSICAL HEALTH</strong></td>
<td>Still climbing mountains with Conrad.</td>
<td>Throat affliction begins; hair longer; was hospitalized twice in early ’50s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FINANCES</strong></td>
<td>Royalties good, owns Welsh house (deeded to Peter).</td>
<td>Royalties still good, no house and expenses have risen; no pension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EMPLOYED</strong></td>
<td>As Cambridge fellow, BBC darling, and author.</td>
<td>Retired, BBC darling on the wane, and author.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARRIAGE</strong></td>
<td>On the rocks with Peter.</td>
<td>Solid with Edith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHILDREN</strong></td>
<td>John with 2+ children, Kate engaged, Conrad home-schooled and about to become estranged for over a decade.</td>
<td>John gone, raising 3 granddaughters, Kate’s 3+ visiting in between parents missioning in Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOMES</strong></td>
<td>Trinity, London and Ffestiniog (Wales).</td>
<td>Plas Penrhyn (Wales) and London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOME FRIENDS</strong></td>
<td>Colette, Irina, Gamel; Edith (by correspondence).</td>
<td>Woods, Murray, Moore, dead; Crawshay-Williams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER WOMEN</strong></td>
<td>Teaching “Introduction to Philosophy” and “Non-Demonstrative Inference” at Trinity and writing; attends International Congress of Philosophy, Amsterdam.</td>
<td><em>My Philosophical Development</em> written; still critiquing and replying, and meeting philosophers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENRES</strong></td>
<td>Fiction in the future.</td>
<td>Fiction mainly in the past.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPEAKING</strong></td>
<td>Mainly political and anti-nuclear, including to Chatham House. Last 2 US trips coming.</td>
<td>Refusing all but anti-nuclear invitations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAVELS</strong></td>
<td>Holland (twice), Sweden, Norway, Germany.</td>
<td>France, Austria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BROADCASTING</strong></td>
<td>Debate with Copleston; Brains Trust (including French B.T.) and frequent talks on BBC; in German in Berlin.</td>
<td>Still some BBC; other television networks now involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FAME &amp; HONOURS</strong></td>
<td>On the rise: Order of Merit, Nobel Prize to come.</td>
<td>More honours but already a supporter of anti-government movements; more frequently in popular press (interviewed by big name interviewers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspect</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ATOMIC BOMB</strong></td>
<td>Still possessed only by US, though under development by UK; BR frequently broadcasts and writes on it, beginning between the 2 bombs dropped on Japan.</td>
<td>Replaced by hydrogen bomb and its fallout from nuclear testing by several countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMINANT POLITICS</strong></td>
<td>Not to repeat appeasement (of USSR this time) and to build West's strength.</td>
<td>Avoid nuclear war at all costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMESTIC POLITICS</strong></td>
<td>Supporter of all that Labour Government is doing except in Palestine.</td>
<td>In opposition to Gaitskell's Labour policies and especially Macmillan's Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMERICAN POLITICS</strong></td>
<td>Pro-American although already warning of fanatical anti-Communism.</td>
<td>Disillusioned with US effect abroad; resigned Congress for Cultural Freedom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL ASSOCIATES</strong></td>
<td>No longer working with Koestler and Orwell (writers should act as individuals, BR concludes); hobnobs with bishops; Winston Churchill's gargantuan feasts; Gollancz: several overlapping campaigns regarding West European unity.</td>
<td>2 years before Schoenman (who has entered UK); Farley active; Direct Action; Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 1 year old; Pugwash meeting for 2nd year; SANE; Pauling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS</strong></td>
<td>None were mass; rather, formed and led by elites: New Commonwealth (2 meetings), Crusade for World Government, United Europe.</td>
<td>CND a mass movement; works with Direct Action specializing in civil disobedience but also with Labour Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARLIAMENT</strong></td>
<td>Previous speech was 1947. Attends House of Commons meeting.</td>
<td>Speaks in House of Lords, 1958 and 1959.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WORLD GOVERNMENT</strong></td>
<td>Ideal, but defence of West more to the fore given USSR's aggressive behaviour (anti-Marshall, Czechoslovakia, Berlin Blockade, Comintern).</td>
<td>On back burner, though still a chapter in Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REPORTS ON HIS LIFE</strong></td>
<td>By Crawshay-Williams (<em>Russell Remembered</em>); Colette's article; Cambridge Pocket Diary.</td>
<td>Daily dictation provides insight; Cambridge Pocket Diary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LETTERS</strong></td>
<td>About 133 by him, 167 to him, are known for 1948.</td>
<td>1,935 (less duplicates) by him, 1,883 to him, are known for 1958.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARCHIVES</strong></td>
<td>Gathering his letters and starting to annotate them (with a fountain pen as hitherto).</td>
<td>Edith is exemplary; BR has already discouraged Trinity regarding Archives. Continues annotating archives (switching to ballpoint).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIGNATURE</strong></td>
<td><img src="signature.png" alt="Signature" /></td>
<td><img src="signature.png" alt="Signature" /></td>
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</table>

“These eighteen volumes, and eight others at various stages of completion, reflect many years of researchers’ time and sweat, about $3 million worth of research funds—and about one-half of the planned set of volumes that will eventually make up The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell.” (From http://russell.mcmaster.ca/brprojct.htm). Check out the site for interesting information on CPBR history, project plans, participants, and progress. Did you know, for example, that John Slater and our own Ken Blackwell were original proposers for the CPBR project in 1969, and also were its first editors?”
Leonard Linsky’s book *Referring* reported the state of the art in the field of reference when it was published by Routledge & Kegan Paul in 1967. It was organized as an account of Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, and included discussions of Frege and Meinong as the background to Russell’s theory, and then the latest discussions of Strawson to bring the reader up to date. It was quickly superseded as a statement of the state of the theory of reference by the publication of Saul Kripke’s “Naming and Necessity” lectures in 1972. Linsky’s book remained popular as an introduction to the field, however, especially among those without access to the full periodical literature on the subject. The success of *Referring* was due in part to his style. The epigraph for the book is Frank Ramsey’s famous remark: “… that paradigm of philosophy, Russell’s theory of descriptions.” In the preface he comments on the indefinite article in Ramsey’s epigram. It is, of course, only “A paradigm, not the paradigm —nothing can be that.” Linsky states his project in the Preface:

Famous as Russell’s theory is, there does not exist a detailed, critical exposition of it. I have tried to present a complete account of the theory and of Russell’s reasons for accepting it. One thing which emerges from this account is that Russell’s Theory of Descriptions involves doctrines in epistemology, metaphysics, logic, as well as the philosophy of language. Some of what Russell says is true and some of it is not. Some of it is unintelligible. I have done my best to sort these things out. (Linsky, x)

Linsky concludes his preface with the disclaimer that he has kept the exposition to a minimum in order to make the book self-contained, and that the real value of the work must be in the criticism and development of the views he discusses. I think that he was wrong on this point. In 1967, the value of a study of the views of Frege, Russell, and Meinong might have to be defended by showing its importance for its contribution to the theory of reference, whereas, now we see it as of value enough in itself as a study of the history of analytic philosophy.

While *Referring* is best known for its side-by-side presentation of the alternatives of Frege and Russell on referring, Chapter II is devoted to Meinong’s “Theory of Objects.” After concluding a presentation of Meinong’s notorious doctrine of “Ausssersein”, Linsky finds his first example of something that Russell says that is not true:
Some of the things Meinong says here are obscure, but it is certain that Russell's view of Meinong as a man who had embraced chimeras and golden mountains, spirits and round squares, as things which exist in another shadow world is far from true. (Linsky, 16)

Why does Linsky think that this common view of Meinong is mistaken? To see this, we must first change our attention from the logical notion of “denotation” to the act of “referring” in language. As Linsky points out, it is possible to refer to something even though it does not exist:

There is a problem about negative existential assertions because (and, I believe, only because) we are victimized by a tendency to assimilate referring to some kind of physical act. We cannot hang a man who does not exist, how, then, can we refer to such a man? This can be a problem only for one who (absurdly) fails to see the differences between referring and hanging. The crucial difference, for our purposes, is one which Meinong, as a follower of Brentano, was in an especially good position to see. (Linsky, 17)

That is the first part of Linsky's account; referring is unlike hanging in that we can refer to something which does not exist, but we can't hang what doesn't exist. Russell found propositions about what does not exist to be problematic, whether it was the logical properties of “The present King of France is bald”, or, more directly, how it is possible to even say that something does not exist, such as his example: “the difference between A and B does not exist” when A and B do not differ. But, says Linsky, Meinong's view of propositions with non-existing subjects was not mysterious:

The doctrine that the “pure object” is “indifferent to being” (ausserseien) is best viewed as simply recognizing in a rather “pretentious” way such things as that the subject term of a subject-predicate proposition may very well denote something that does not exist, e.g., Santa Claus. For example, “Santa Claus lives at the South Pole” is false. Still it is a proposition about Santa Claus. Meinong's doctrine of aussersein seems to me best interpreted as a recognition of facts such as these: That Santa Claus is denoted by the subject term of the above proposition, that Santa Claus is not Paul Bunyan though neither Santa Claus nor Paul Bunyan exists. …some propositions about Santa Claus and Paul Bunyan are true and some false, though neither Santa Claus nor Paul Bunyan exists. (Linsky, 15)

Linsky concludes his chapter on Meinong as follows:

But if I am right to see this much good sense in the theories of Meinong, how wrong the current, standard interpretation of the work of Meinong must be! This interpretation is well expressed in the following estimate of Meinong's work by Gilbert Ryle. (Linsky, 20)

Linsky then refers to Gilbert Ryle's review of a book by J.N. Findlay, Meinong's Theory of Objects, published in 1933. John N. Findlay was a South African, and was a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College before completing his doctorate under Ernst Mally at the University of Graz in Alexis Meinong's institute. Findlay's book was his doctoral dissertation from Graz.

Linsky quotes the opening paragraph of Ryle's review in the Oxford Magazine in 1933:

Meinong was the sort of reformer who makes revolutions inevitable yet himself stops short of seeing that they are even possible. He was a philosophical Kerensky. Both in epistemology and in logic, with terrifying assiduity and remarkable rigorousness of reasoning, he carried to their extreme conclusions the implications of presuppositions which no one had yet questioned, and which he himself did not question. But of these conclusions he never said what has to be said, “By God, this is impossible”. He was perhaps the supreme entity-multiplier in the history of philosophy, and yet, I suppose, the main service which he really rendered philosophy was to force logicians to see that “wherever possible logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.” (Ryle, 118)

Ryle here states the view, which dominated discussions of “On Denoting” for many years thereafter, that Meinong had attempted to give a theory of reference by introducing an object for each referring expression to
denote, and that Russell's achievement was to see that such objects were not needed, and that, instead, a proper analysis of the apparent referring expressions would show that they were in fact "incomplete symbols", and that the supposed denotations were mere "logical constructions."

Based on what Russell wrote about Meinong and an unpublished letter from Rudolf Ameseder to Russell, written in January of 1905, I have come to think that some of what Linsky says about Russell is right and some of it is wrong.

In his 1904 paper, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", written the year before "On Denoting", Russell says:

Meinong holds --- so it would seem --- that the object of a presentation is sometimes immanent, but at other times not so; while the object of a judgment --- which he calls an Objective, and I call a proposition --- is always purely immanent … Now for my part I do not see how an immanent object differs from no object at all. The immanent object does not exist, according to Meinong, and is therefore not part of the mental state whose object it is; for this mental state exists. Yet, although not part of any mental state, it is supposed to be in some sense psychical. But it cannot be in any way bound up with any particular mental state of which it is the object; for other states, at other times and in other people, may have precisely the same object, since an object or a proposition can be presented or believed more than once. I confess these facts seem to me to show, without more ado, that objects and propositions must always have being, and cannot be merely imaginary relata for what appears as a relation of presentation or judgment. (Papers 4, 461)

In Meinong's book Ueber Annahmen, which is the main target of Russell's 1904 article, the main concern is with the theory of propositions (Objectives) and of our relation of grasping them (Assumption). Meinong held that true objectives, though they do not have being in the external, material world, nevertheless exist as subsistent, abstract entities. It is false propositions that are the “immanent object” of false judgments. Russell rejected this asymmetry, arguing that unlike Meinong, whom he describes as believing, "We may hold that the object is immanent when true". Russell says that holding that the “object” transcendent", whether 464)

Russell doesn't be an immanent object would seem, must be Meinong thinks that round square” are also are those that involve them. As Meinong put it, famously, “There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects” (Meinong, p.83). If we see this as saying that they are objects immanent to the acts of judging in which they are involved, it no longer seems so bizarre a thing to say. Russell, saying “Now for my part I do not see how an immanent object differs from no object at all”, presents more clearly what Ryle's objection really is, and why it stuck. One must have a notion of an intentional object which is immanent to an act in order to make sense of this view.

The distinction that we mark between the act, content and object of an intentional act is a result of a struggle within the Brentano school. It was the subject of Kazimierz Twardowski's Content and Object and accepted by all of Twardowski's school in Lwow and Warsaw, but not by Meinong and his students. Twardowski would have agreed that an “immanent object” is no object at all, but rather part of the “content” of an act. We may well be able to think of the round square, but not by relating to it as an object, but by its being part of the “content” of our thought. Russell shared this view.

Linsky, it seems, is saying that when we turn away from the metaphysics of contents and objects, and instead turn to thinking about people “referring” in their ordinary language, there is no problem with them referring to something that does not exist. On Linsky's view, we might even grant that there is a whole, a proposition or objective, that Pegasus does not exist, but that does not require a Pegasus to exist.

So far I have said what it is that Leonard Linsky says about Meinong that is right, if we take him to be defending what Meinong should have maintained consistently, that is, the view that objects with Aussersein are immanent objects. Linsky simply stated this as an observation about the speech act of referring, rather than with the language of immanence and transcendence.
I think, however, that Russell was right in not seeing this as the actual view of Meinong and his school. Linsky is providing a view that Meinong should have held, if he had distinguished carefully between the speech act of referring and the objects of reference, or between “reference” and “referents”.

That Meinong did not fully grasp the problems with his treating non-existents as transcendent objects, rather than as immanent entities like concepts, can be seen in a letter from Meinong's student Rudolf Ameseder to Russell early in 1905 that is to be found in the Bertrand Russell Archives. In December of 1904, Russell was preparing to write the review of a collection of papers by Meinong and his students that also was published in the same issue of Mind as “On Denoting.” Russell wrote to Meinong first, and then to Ernst Mally and Rudolf Ameseder.

Ameseder responds to Russell’s questions about his contribution in a short, friendly, letter dated January 3, 1905 that includes this:

…When I speak of the “present king of France” (jetzigen König von Frankreich), I still speak of something, that is of something that isn't. Such a something that is not, is still a something (Etwas), that is to say, an object (Gegenstand), and if you won’t allow me that I will gladly use “theory of somethings” instead of “object theory”. In any case it seems to me that “something” is identical with “object”. When one has recognized non-existent objects as objects then it is natural to take the small step to objects that can not be…

We can speculate that in his earlier letter from sometime late in 1904, Russell asked Ameseder about the logical features of these putatively non-existent objects such as the round square. For one thing, he must have wondered, does this theory extend beyond impossible or contradictory objects to simply or contingently non-existents such as “present King of France”? Then, he might have asked, what properties do these objects have? For example, is the present King of France bald or not? For then, it might seem, the treatment of non-existents as genuine objects lands one in contradictions involving propositions, for the present king of France is bald and the present king of France is not bald. That was the moment when Russell decided to formulate his now famous objections to non-existent objects by asking what properties they have. He might even have asked Ameseder to answer whether the present King of France is bald or not.

Russell had learned of Frege's strict observance of the concept/object distinction, which made a vital distinction between empty concepts, such as “is round and square” and an object such as “the round square”, although he differed with Frege over whether these expressions could name these concepts or, indeed, whether any concepts could be named.

I think that Meinong and his school were not able to make the sharp distinction between concept and object and so held on to their view that non-existents, while in some sense “objects of thought” could be immanent to those thoughts, and that referring was different from hanging. For Leonard Linsky there is a big difference between referring to objects and hanging them, but for Ameseder, there doesn't seem to be such a big difference. There is an “Etwas” that we refer to, and an “Etwas” that we hang.

The view that Meinong’s original theory of objects contains the makings of a formally precise notion of non-existent object that would allow a response to Russell’s objections goes back to J.N. Findlay in 1933:

We may briefly consider a theory which has been put forward by Ernst Mally, and which removes many difficulties in Meinong’s theory, without abandoning the general standpoint of the theory of objects. …Mally’s theory rejects entirely the principle of the independence of so-being from being and bases itself on a more careful analysis of the relation of the object to the objectives which concern it. In every objective an object is in some way determined, and the way in which it is determined is called a determination (Bestimmung). … On the view of Mally every determination determines an object, but not every determination is satisfied (erfüllt) by an object. … On the other hand, the determination “being round and square” determines the abstract determinate “round and square,” but it is not satisfied by any object. (Findlay, 111)

One of the passages from Mally that Findlay cites to support this claim is the following:
“the circle” (in abstraction) does not satisfy the hypothesized objectives in the circle concept, …it is not a circle; therefore it isn’t in the extension of the circle concept, it doesn’t belong to the class of circles, but determines them in some sense and represents them when we grasp them: as the concept-object, not as the intended object [target object] of the concept.

As this view has been developed since by Edward Zalta in his “Object Theory”, we must distinguish two modes of predication, the ordinary “exemplification” and a second notion of “determination”, which Zalta calls “encoding.” (Terry Parsons, on the other hand, takes as the basis of his formal system a distinction that also goes back to Ernst Mally, namely that between two kinds of predicates, called “nuclear” and “extra-nuclear”.)

It is easy to see Mally as insisting that their non-existent objects, like the round square or the present King of France, were objects, but immanent objects, namely part of what we would call the content of a thought. That's because as “concept-objects” they are simultaneously immanent, as concepts in the mind, but also objects, as the concept is taken in a certain way, as directing us to an intentional object which may not exist, but is in some way characterized by that concept. I think that Mally was indeed trying to spell out Meinong's theory, but without carefully distinguishing concepts and objects, and so was able to maintain that there could be genuine objects which are nevertheless immanent to thought.

I conclude that Linsky was wrong on one very important claim about Meinong. Meinong was not just saying in a “pretentious” way that there can be uses of referring expressions without referents. Meinong, or at least his student, Mally, insisted that there were genuine objects of reference, even contradictory objects, but that he was not committed to true contradictions because the contradictory properties only “determine” an object and are not predicated of it. Now, it turns out, this theory is based on a confusion of concepts and objects, but that is still consistent with accusing Meinong of being “the supreme entity multiplier in the history of philosophy.”

Ryle concludes his 1933 review of Findlay's book with this paragraph:

Mr. Findlay's book is valuable because Meinong's general theory is important … First, he was very largely responsible for the de-psychologising of logic and metaphysical questions of the nature and status of relations, numbers, facts, universals, negation, possibility, probability, necessity. He also forced philosophers to investigate the whole problem of what is meant by such predicates as 'exists', 'subsists', 'is an object', etc. But thirdly, and chiefly, he accepted the traditional doctrine of Terms in logic, and by generalizing the issues and remorselessly drawing the conclusions from the premises, he showed, though he did not see, that the whole structure was rotten. If the orthodox theories of terms were true almost the whole fantastic hierarchy of Meinong's non-actual entities would have to be accepted. (Ryle 120)

I agree that we can find a source of Meinong's confusion of concept and object in his following “the traditional doctrine of Terms in logic.” That logic had a notorious difficulty with assimilating "Socrates is a man" to one of the categorical forms such as "All men are mortal". Seen this way, Ryle's assessment of Meinong is better than Linsky had thought. Linsky thought it was good to be interested in “logic and metaphysical questions of the nature and status of relations, numbers, facts, universals, negation, possibility, probability, necessity.” Linsky certainly encouraged, though he did not “force” any philosophers "to investigate the whole problem of what is meant by such predicates as ‘exists’, ‘subsists’, ‘is an object’, etc." But Linsky went further when he disagreed with Ryle over whether Meinong accepted “the whole fantastic hierarchy of … non-actual entities….” Linsky says that:

... it is certain that Russell's view of Meinong as a man who had embraced chimeras and golden mountains, spirits and round squares, as things which exist in another shadow world is far from true. (Linsky, 16)

But it's not so certain that Russell's view was wrong. Linsky's pointing to the distinction between referring and hanging is perhaps the right way to think about problems of reference, but it's not a distinction that Meinong would accept. Here, I suggest, in some of what Linsky said about Meinong, Russell was right and Linsky was wrong. I don't think he would have minded my making such a suggestion.

References

17
A “Not Necessarily Trivial” Answer (see p. 3)

Crompton and Theodore Llewelyn Davies (top row: left & center)

Among Russell’s friends at Cambridge were his fellow Apostles, the brothers Crompton and Theodore Llewelyn Davies, the sons of the Rev. J. Llewelyn Davies, a well-known liberal minister, early supporter of women's suffrage, and a translator of Plato's Republic. Their nephews (the children of their brother, Arthur) were the inspiration for J.M. Barrie’s Peter Pan. The Llewelyn boys were preternaturally handsome, and they also were thought by their contemporaries to be quite brilliant. Crompton might well have been the closest male friend Russell ever had, and he was his solicitor until his death in 1935. Theodore later entered the Treasury, but he tragically drowned while swimming in 1905. This was a trying event for Russell, who anguished for the loss of his friend, and for the suffering of the surviving brother, Crompton, with whom Russell stayed for a time to provide solace. Indeed, to read his contemporaneous remarks in letters, and then those written in old age about the tragedy and its effects, it must have been one of the most emotionally trying events of Russell’s life. Crompton was a friend and confidant of Prime Minister Lloyd George. He eventually would marry an Irishwoman, a Sinn Féin activist, Mary Elizabeth O’Conner, who was known by her friends as “Moya.” Crompton soon became very supportive of Moya’s views on a free Ireland. They were both friends of Michael Collins, and they were both surreptitiously involved in supporting various revolutionary activities. Their undertakings were eventually discovered by the authorities, causing Crompton to lose his civil service job, and Moya to serve a brief prison sentence. He became a partner in the legal firm Coward, Chance & Company in London, where he spent the rest of his career as a solicitor. Russell later credited Crompton with having secretly written the peace treaty that established Irish self-government. Moya and Crompton had a son and a daughter.
Russell’s Homes: Bagley Wood
By Sheila Turcon
TURCON@MCMASTER.CA

The house that Alys and Russell had built in Bagley Wood was their first new home. An earlier plan to build one in Churt, Farnham, in cooperation with Gilbert and Mary Murray, had failed. The architect, H.M. Fletcher, who designed the house, had also been consulted with regard to the Churt house. Fletcher had been at Trinity College at the same time as Russell, although he was reading Classics. His wife, Ruth Emerson, was also American, and like Alys was a graduate of Bryn Mawr College. However, his most important tie to Russell was the fact that he was a cousin of Crompton Llewelyn Davies. However, his most important tie to Russell was the fact that he was a cousin of Crompton Llewelyn Davies. One of Russell’s closest friends. Graduating in 1892, he set up his own practice in 1897. Fletcher and his second wife, Ethel Parrish, also an American and another Bryn Mawr graduate, met Edith Finch in the United States in the late 1940s. They sent congratulations to Russell on his wedding to Edith in 1952, and the two couples arranged to meet. Fletcher is described by Hope Bagenal as a “born domestic architect. Many a house he fitted well into the countryside … The organizing of family essentials was a passion … He could be severe both with client and with builder; to build was a discipline. Yet he was always sympathetic and generous-minded.”

The decision finally to settle after their nomadic years may have been a partly practical one. Alys wrote to Russell on 22 March 1904: “… moving is always a terrible expense, and the money seems to trickle away.” She oversaw the choice of the site. Alys wrote to Russell on 1 March 1904 about a location in Bagley Wood: “I should like to bring thee and Harry Fletcher and Crompton [Llewelyn Davies] down to see it on Saturday week. Oxford people are much flattered at thy wanting to come here.” Either this visit did not take place or the site was not suitable. On 21 March she wrote that she had bicycled out to Bagley Wood and looked at two sites: Lower Sugworth and Upper Sugworth Copse. Bagley Wood was divided into different sections “in order to identify specific areas when the woodland was worked by many woodmen” (Joyce Gibbard). Alys liked the Lower Copse site better because it was “higher, has a better view and is more remote from the Abingdon Road. But it is a heavy clay soil … Does thee think it will make it damp? If satisfactory, I will go down with Mr. Fletcher next week and meet the well borer there.” On 28 March she reports that Mr. Fletcher “was charmed with our site and entirely approved my choice, and did not mind the soil.” The well digger is to “begin operations at once” because nothing can go forward “until water is found. Meanwhile Mr. Fletcher is to modify plan II for our inspection.” The well is still on the property in 2013. Since construction began in 1904, that was the date chosen for the motif plaque placed about the window above the front door.

There is no further extant correspondence between them on this subject until 22 April 1905. Alys is eagerly awaiting his arrival on Monday. She writes: “I do love thee very much and it has been the greatest
pleasure getting this house ready for thee. I hope thee will be happy here, and get some good work done." Alas, the happiness was not to be although the work certainly took place. According to the Russells’ friend, Mabel Minturn Scott, Russell "knew nothing of it [Bagley Wood] between the time when they chose the site last August and the day he came back from a walking tour to find his clothes in the bureau drawers and his books on the shelves." It is not clear if Scott is correct about the August date, as there is no correspondence about a delay from March when Fletcher approved the site. On 16 May 1905 Russell wrote to Gilbert Murray about the house: "I reached this house on Easter Monday; I like it and my study is so palatial I feel ashamed of it. The house itself seems to be very pretty, and the surroundings charming." On the same day he wrote to Helen Flexner: "This house is charming – much nicer than any since the Millhangar." The next month he wrote to Lucy Donnelly: "This place is a great success. The house is pretty and comfortable, my study in so palatial that I am almost ashamed of it, and the country round has the typical English charm of fields and meadows and broad open views, with Oxford and the river besides ... I find it a great advantage being in touch with Oxford people – it is easier to keep alive my interest in work when I can bring it into some relation with human interests" (13 June). The river Russell is referring to is the Thames, which is quite close to Bagley Wood. Russell touches on some of the reasons why Bagley Wood had been chosen in his letter. Ronald Clark, in his biography of Russell, writes that they moved there to be close to Alys’s mother who was then living with her son Logan at Court Place, Iffley. It should be noted, however, that Russell had broken off all relations with Alys’s mother.

The following year, he wrote to Margaret Llewelyn Davies: "Our wood is lovely, when it isn’t under snow. It has been almost as cold as the sunny south, but Bagley Wood is full of spring flowers, and we walk in it with a sense of achievement, after all the labour of getting permission" (26 March 1906). Permission must have been needed from St. John’s College, the owner of the land. Robert Sephton, who has published a pamphlet on the house, has seen the indentures at the College signed by Russell. There is also mention of a lease in Crompton Llewelyn Davies’ correspondence with Russell: "The agreement provides that the College shall grant you a lease within three months after their architect has certified that the house has been completed – that lease will contain the provision about insurance" (May 1905). Payments were not complete until 1906; Russell had to sell some investments. In a series of letters to Alys (25, 26 April, 27 May, 1 June) Russell notes them: Fletcher, the architect, got his final payment in May, making his fee £1,415; Kingerlee, the builder, was paid by June (two amounts are listed in document 100540 of £500 and £400) and someone called Gee, whose connection to the house if any is not known, was paid last, £85. Correspondence with Crompton Lewellyn Davies reveals that the house was insured for £1,200.

In the autumn of 1910, Russell returned to Cambridge to lecture on the principles of mathematics at Trinity College. He shared lodgings with Alys in Bridge Street, and he also had rooms in Nevile’s Court. It would appear that they decided to sell Bagley Wood that autumn or winter; the actual sale did not take place until the following year. It was sold to R.E.S. Spender who lived at Quarry Cottage, Northleigh, Witney, Oxon, and also in London at 44 Hyde Park Gate. The estate agent, Joseph H. Stretton, wrote C.L. Davies on 7 March: “My client Mr. Spender is prepared to offer £1,000 for Mr. Russell’s house at Bagley Wood provided the drains are in order and there is sufficient supply of water throughout the year for domestic purposes including the Bath Room especially during the three months of July, August and September.” Thus the Russells were taking a considerable financial loss with this sale. The contract of sale was dated 25 April, although Spender wrote to Alys that he would not be moving in until June. Writing to her sister Mary on 14 June, Alys expanded on her letter of 4 June, telling her that “we had discussed his going [to Cambridge] without me, and my staying at Bagley Wood, and only keeping up nominal relations. We decided, however, to try Cambridge, but it was not a success, and so the separation had to be avowed and not nominal, after all our fuss about a house, etc.” By this point, she knew about Russell’s affair with Lady Ottoline Morrell, which began just before he left to lecture in Paris on 22 March, but it is not mentioned in this letter. In the account in his Autobiography, Russell writes that he threatened suicide if Ottoline’s name was ever mentioned.

The dispersal of their furniture dragged on after they left the house. Their furniture was in storage in more than one location. On 3 October, Alys wrote that the desk belonging to Russell’s father was at 68 Lincoln’s Inn Fields and he could collect it from there. She was going to return a desk that had belonged to Evelyn Whitehead to her. On 23 January 1912, she let Russell know that she would be eventually sending on to him “the little oak table, thy family photographs, china and ornaments, and some papers of thine.” Several
years later, on 29 September 1918, she had to admit that she could not find “that old bundle of thy parents’ letters.”

Bagley Wood has been renamed several times: the Russells formally called it Lower Copse, but informally just referred to it as Bagley Wood. Their printed letterhead changed from “Lower Copse, Bagley Wood, Oxford” to “Bagley Wood, Oxford”. The lack of a more specific name was presumably made possible by the fact that their home was the first and for some time the only one in Bagley Wood. In 1924 it was called Halshanger by the Spenders. When the property was sold to Dorothea Lettice Davenport (possibly Devenport) in 1936, she changed the name to St. Giles. Before moving to Bagley Wood, she had been living with her father in St. Giles, Oxford. Its current name is Nuthatch and the address is 103 Bagley Wood Road, Kennington.

There were two separate pieces published about the house in 1924. One article by R. Randal Philips lists the house cost as between £2,000 and £2,500. Robert Stanley indicates that the house would cost £2,400 to build because building costs had doubled since 1914. Neither of these articles mentions Russell although the owner is described by both authors as literary. The authors’ concern in these articles is the description of the house with its most unique feature being a lack of corridors. Both articles contain images of the house as well as the floor plans. Russell’s study was the largest room on the main floor.

Arthur Russell visited the house in 1907 and sent Agatha Russell photographs of the place. Unfortunately, the photographs do not appear to have survived. One of the photographs that illustrates this article was taken by Ivor Grattan-Guinness ca. 1973 when he visited. At that time the house was called St. Giles; a sign with this name is attached to the brown pump house in the foreground of the photograph Ivor took. The owners Mr. and Mrs. Pedersen gave him a tour. The Pedersens had thoroughly renovated the house and the gardens and added some extensions. Sephton gives the impression that the actual floor plan had been changed. Ivor was also told a delightful story of Russell trying to commander the postman’s bicycle by an employee of the Bagley Wood Sawmills. Russell failed. Ivor learned that Russell and his second wife, Dora, took tea with the Spenders in 1923.

Rear view, courtesy of the current owners, Joyce and Simon Gibbard (taken in 2013).

In 1976 the house was purchased by Ron and Hazel Goldstein, both McMaster University students, to live in while Ron pursued his doctoral studies on William Morris’s socialism. Kenneth Blackwell, the Russell Archivist, and his wife Kadiin, had visited the Bagley Wood home that spring and had learned from Mrs. Pedersen that it was for sale. The Blackwells told their friends the Goldsteins about the opportunity, and they took it. The current owners, Joyce and Simon Gibbard, bought the property from the Goldsteins in 1983. They have restored the house as far as possible back to the original plans. Those plans show a large study on the ground floor, as well a drawing room, dining room, entrance hall, water closet, and a kitchen with associated
rooms (pantry, larder, and scullery). The coals room was attached to the kitchen, but the only entrance was from outside. The first floor had four bedrooms, a dressing room, box room, and bath room. There were two fireplaces downstairs and three upstairs.

The house has been visited more recently by Nicholas Griffin, director of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre. He was there in May 2005 to film the documentary about Russell’s life, “Three Passions”. Alas the company, Red Canoe, who were producing the documentary, folded before the project could be completed. Griffin was filmed on the grounds of the house; inside, Alan Ryan was interviewed. In 2006 Robert S. Sephton, who lives in Abingdon, wrote a research report on the house for the Kennington History Society. He expanded that into a monograph, “Bertrand and Alys Russell in Bagley Wood” in 2007. The current owners write that they “love living in this house in the woods”.

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Nicholas Griffin, “Three Passions”, documentary, rough cuts.

Other

Emails: Joyce Gibbard to S. Turcon, December 2013.

Russell Writing about John Dewey and Ralph Barton Perry in March 1914

When at Harvard, Russell had this to say in a letter to his lover, Ottoline Morrell, about the two well-known American philosophers: “Dewey (the third pragmatist, with James and Schiller) has been here. I met him at lunch yesterday and then had a walk with him. To my surprise I liked him very much. He has a large slow-moving mind, very empirical and candid, with something of the impassivity and impartiality of a natural force. He and Perry and I had a long argument about ‘I’—Dewey saw a point I was making but Perry didn’t—he is a good man but not a very clever one, as the country gentleman said of Dizzy.” According to Nick Griffin, the “Dizzy” comment might refer to a Punch cartoon about Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881). And, in any event, that was most definitely the common nickname for the former PM.

Bertrand Russell had a keen and lasting interest in Chinese civilization, society, politics and way of life. He was one of the first major Western philosophers who travelled to China.¹ He lived in China and taught at the Peking Government University, and gave “innumerable lectures — on Einstein, education and social questions.”² Upon his return to Great Britain, he published *The Problem of China* (1922).³ He retained an interest in China throughout his life, and corresponded with the Chinese leaders during and after the Sino-India war.⁴ This paper examines the major challenges facing contemporary China in light of Russell’s prescient analysis of the country’s problems. Many of the issues that Russell identified still apply to contemporary China, but there are also other issues that are crucial today that were *not* topical when he visited and wrote about China.

Russell understood and appreciated the importance of China in the global economic and political system. Writing in 1922, more than 90 years ago, he presciently observed that “Chinese problems, even if they affected no one outside China, would be of vast importance, since the Chinese are estimated to constitute about a quarter of the human race. In fact, however, the entire world will be vitally affected by the development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive factor, for good or evil, during the next two centuries. This makes it important to Europe and America almost as much as to Asia, that there should be an intelligent understanding of the question raised by China, even if, as yet, definitive answers are difficult to give” (p.3).

China is now the world’s second largest economy, measured in purchasing-power parity terms (see Figure [1]).⁵ Its share of global output has been steadily increasing since the beginning of economic reforms. China has been the most important driver of global growth (see Table [1]) since the turn of the twenty-first century, accounting for 23% of the increase of global output from 2000 to 2012. It plays a key role in international trade and industrial production. China occupies an important position in the global supply chain of various manufactured goods, including electronics and various durable goods. Its share of global exports exceeds that of the United States and Germany. Its share of global imports is second only to that of the U.S. China’s growth in the last three decades has been transformational as the country shifted away from central planning. It has experienced strong *per capita* real income growth (see Figure [2]) and substantial reduction in income poverty since 1980. Nevertheless China is still a lower-medium income country, and the standard of living for the vast majority of the people remains low. It faces problems of rebalancing aggregate demand, environmental degradation, and widening social disparities. It is still a one-party state. Even though one can maintain that its political system has evolved for the better in the past decades, it remains an authoritarian state.
Figure [1]: China’s share of global output has increased steadily and it is now the world’s second largest economy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of Global Growth, 2000-2012</th>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>23.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>14.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>7.6</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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Sources: IMF, ING Investment Management staff estimates

Table [1]: China accounts for nearly one quarter of global economic growth since 2000.
China's political leaders, intellectuals, and citizens will need to address formidable issues of near and long-term economic, political, international, and social challenges in the coming decades. China's importance in global affairs has increased since Russell wrote his book on China, but his observation that Chinese affairs would be of paramount importance to the rest of the world certainly holds today. However, “definitive answers" to a range of questions related to China remain as elusive as ever. This article seeks to shed an “intelligent understanding" of the main challenges of contemporary China, in light of Russell’s analysis of some of the country’s problems. His analysis may be somewhat dated, but it is insightful and can enrich one’s understanding of the challenges of contemporary China.

Russell’s Approach to China

Russell had high regard and respect for Chinese civilization and culture. It is clear from his Autobiography and letters that his affection for the Chinese people was genuine and heartfelt, though he was not free from some of the prejudices of upper-class Englishmen of his times. He admired the Chinese for valuing “contemplative wisdom,” (p.209) and he appreciated many aspect of Chinese life, in particular, “the capacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure in sunshine and philosophical discourse,” and their ability to find “amusement in everything.” (p. 211). He understood that knowledge about Chinese history, traditions, and culture is essential to fully appreciate modern China’s political and economic conditions, its culture and society, and its inherent trends. To his credit, Russell did not regard the Chinese as inferior to westerners, though sometimes he exoticized and romanticized China. He made certain unwarranted and superficial generalizations, but he did not regard Chinese society as static. Rather, he sincerely believed that there is much to learn from China. He was unequivocal about the Chinese people’s right to self-determination. He trusted that an independent China would not only be beneficial for its own citizens, but that it would also make a valuable contribution to the progress of humanity.

Having read much of the available literature, Russell analyzed and discussed the problems that China had with considerable care, with attention to the facts, and with a deep sympathy for the Chinese people, even though he was not a specialist in China. He identified three issues in order of priority as the main challenges for revitalizing China: (1) the establishment of a stable, orderly and sovereign government, independent of foreign domination; (2) industrialization and modernization of the country’s economy with Chinese control; and (3) the spread of education (p.256). He thought these three things must occur concurrently. He also discussed other, related problems that China faced at that time, including (a) foreign domination, particularly the threat posed by Japanese aggression and expansionism, and international relations; (b) population pres-
sures; (c) disparities with other countries in science and technology; (d) military weakness; and (e) the ownership of the means of production. It is quite remarkable that the three main requisites for China’s advancement that Russell identified, and the other issues that he discussed, remain relevant even today. However, there are several other important matters that are quite pertinent, even in any perfunctory analysis of contemporary China’s challenges. These include structural composition of aggregate demand, population dynamics and demographic transition, environmental degradation, social disparities, health standards and food safety, banking and finance, elevated real estate prices, and energy security. Some but not all of these challenges are discussed here briefly.

Understanding Some Problems of Contemporary China

China has experienced transformational growth since the beginning of its economic reforms. A variety of reforms in agriculture, manufacturing, and services … including a shift away from central planning and autarkic policies to a more market-oriented and incentive-based economy … have resulted in sustained and strong growth in China. *Per capita* income has risen sharply. Millions of Chinese have moved out of absolutely poverty. The World Bank’s measure of headcount poverty shows a sizable decline in the rate of poverty (see Figure [3]). Much of the population had been subjected to abject poverty during the time of Russell’s visit to China. Though there were some improvements in the standard of living after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China under Mao’s leadership, most people remained fairly poor. *Per capita* real income was even lower than that of India until the mid-1980s [see Figure [4]). However, China’s economic growth following the reforms has been dramatic. Its share of global output has risen from less than 2% in 1980 to more than 15% as of 2013. China’s annual GDP *per capita* is still low compared to advanced countries, such as the U.S., the U.K., or Japan. Indeed it is still lower than upper-medium income countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, or Turkey.

Figure [3]: There has been a sizable decline in income poverty rates in China.
Russell realized that industrialization would be important for China, but he believed that industrialization would occur only under socialism. Indeed, industrialization and modernization did increase during the socialism of Maoist era, but the economic growth was insufficient to overcome the country’s pervasive and massive poverty, and Maoist rule imposed a heavy toll on the Chinese people. During the Maoist era the combination of erroneous economic policies, lack of democratic accountability, the callous disregard for the peasantry, and natural disasters during the Great Leap Forward, all resulted wide-spread starvation. Post-Maoist economic reforms in agricultural and industry, giving peasants and managers better incentives, and reintroducing private ownership and control, have benefitted growth in China through raising productivity in agriculture and industry, increasing specialization, and enhancing efficiency in the allocation of resources. The transformation of China from a centrally-planned economy to a more market-oriented economy was implemented gradually, unlike in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Chinese economy continued to grow and the people’s standard of living rose during its transition, whereas in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe per capita real income fell and the standard of living declined sharply for many years during the transition phase.

China is a now a “mixed economy.” The state continues to own a substantial share of the means of production, but there is also private ownership of capital. Private, medium, and small enterprises are thriving throughout the country, but the state retains considerable ownership and control of infrastructure, utilities, manufacturing, and financial services. However, central planning has given way to more market-based economic decision making, strategic and indicative planning, with considerably more reliance on market price mechanisms for the allocation of scarce resources. Managers of state-owned enterprises now have considerable leeway, face market incentives, and are no longer guided by central planning. Consumption in China has risen and the pattern of consumption has changed dramatically in conjunction with its economic growth; but rebalancing from an investment-led growth strategy is still elusive. Investment growth has been higher than consumption growth. China has been making substantial fixed-capital investment in infrastructure projects in power generation, transmission and distribution, post and telecommunications, and transportation. Construction of industrial, commercial, and residential real estate has boomed, partly fueled by a sharp and bubble-like rise in real estate prices. The country is planning a massive expansion of its infrastructure, such as urban subways systems. Unlike the time Russell visited, these days Chinese cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, have impressive and world-class skyscrapers! Despite strong growth in consumer spending, household consumption as a share of national income remains low in China. Indeed, household consumption as a share of national income has declined since the early 1990s. The ratio of consumption to national income is lower than the ratio in other countries with similar levels of per capita income. Investment-led growth tends to be much more volatile than consumption-led growth, and is more prone to adverse shocks, bubbles, and financial crisis. China needs to rebalance its economy to boost private domestic consumption, raise the standard of living, and ensure financial stability. Final consumption is responsible for nearly half of the growth in national income. Due to strong growth in per capita income, growth in household consumption per capita has been strong and demand for durable goods and luxury goods have risen notably in China, even as Chinese households continue to save a substantial portion of their income. Russell would
have been surprised to learn that vehicle sales in China now exceed those in the U.S.! (See Figure [5]). Western auto companies, such as BMW and Mercedes Benz, put a lot of effort these days in trying to lure wealthy Chinese buyers. Yes, there are still more bicycles in Beijing than cars,7 but their popularity has declined! Rickshaws are almost nowhere in sight nowadays.

Figure [5]: Vehicle sales in China exceeded sales in the U.S. 2009-2014.

The creation of employment will be a major challenge for China in the coming years. Though China’s income growth has been sturdy, employment growth has been less robust. China’s growth has been driven primarily by an increase in labor productivity and capital accumulation. Economic transition and the restructuring of state-owned enterprises had led to substantial employment retrenchment in urban centers. Rural transition has resulted in dismantling of collective farms and efficiency improvement, leading to an excess supply of labor in rural China. This is has been partly mitigated by the emergence of village and township enterprises and the migration to urban areas. But China will still need to employ workers from a vast amount of surplus labor in the coming years.

Russell must have been aware of the disparities that then existed in China. He did not comment much on these disparities. Today’s China is a country of vast disparities. Since the beginning of China’s economic transition, various forms of disparities have reemerged and widen among the population even as per capita real income and the average standard of living has risen. Income inequality, as measure by Gini coefficient and other indicators of income inequality, has increased as has the disparity in households’ wealth (net worth). Regional inequality between urban and rural areas has increased. Eastern provinces and coastal areas have benefitted disproportionately more than the Western provinces. Initially, as agrarian reforms were implemented, peasants’ incomes rose and rural areas benefited, but reforms in the industrial sector spurred higher income growth among urban dwellers, resulting in the widening of the urban-rural income gap. Disparities are not confined solely to income, but also exist in the public provision of education, health care, and other services. Public policies have contributed to rise in such disparities between rural and urban dwellers and among various social groups. Migrant workers and their families have been particularly hard hit due to limited access to social services and public benefits. Increase in disparities and various social grievances can fuel social unrests and jeopardize social stability and even delegitimize the rule of the Communist Party.

Russell firmly believed that state-owned enterprises would be key to the industrialization and modernization of China (p.260). In particular, he made a compelling case for the nationalization of railways and natural resources in order for the Chinese to exert national control and reduce reliance on foreign powers. While Russell harbored no illusion about Bolshevism, he was committed to some of form of socialism or the other, and more generally favored public ownership and control of the means of production. Today, business ownership of the means of production remains an unsettled issue in China. While farmers and private agents have land-usage rights, land is still formally owned by the state. There has been vast growth in the private enterprises of all sizes, and both inside and outside of China’s special economic zones, state ownership of enterprises still has a large and important role in the Chinese economy. There are many different types of state-owned enterprises: national, provincial, town, and village. There have been both partial privatization and cor-
poratization of state-owned enterprises, and many town and village enterprises, which originated under local
governments or through cooperative ownership, have been privatized. State enterprises continue to have a
fairly stable share of economic activity, but some of these are monopolies or oligopolies. There has been shift
from fully state-owned enterprises to state-controlled enterprises. Many state enterprises in China are highly
profitable and successful. State enterprises either retain the profits or provide it to the appropriate government
entity.

The financial sector has grown drastically in China in the past decade. In recent years growth has relied
substantially on increases in corporate and local government leverage. Total social financing, a measure of
financing by Chinese non-state entities, has been rising rapidly. The reported ratios of banking safety appear
to be sound, but there are questions of about the quality of these statistics. Moreover, local governments “off-
budget” activities have increased. The buildup of leverage in the non-financial corporate sector, in the financial
sector, and in local government is reducing the margins of safety. Non-bank intermediation has grown. In
particular, shadow banking has experienced rapid growth, but it poses a challenge to the safety and the sta-
bility of the country’s financial system. There are many different estimates of the size of the shadow banking
systems, but most analysts agree that it has grown too rapidly. The shadow banking sector has fueled real
estate prices, and can pose the risk of financial instability. During Russell’s time in China there was not a well-
developed financial sector, so banking and finance were not important issues, though Russell knew the im-
portance of foreign financing for China’s development. Today, the issues are largely domestic ones, since
China continues to restrict foreign financial portfolio flows. China’s debt issues should be manageable be-
cause capital flight from China is fairly limited and financial flows are controlled. However, the authorities need
to be vigilant about the rise of private debt and exert control over local government financing practices.

Russell was concerned about China’s vast population. He believed that that the high birthrate threatened
its economic prospects. He was convinced that birth control methods would have to be introduced and popu-
larized in order to ensure food security and prevent famines (p.71). China has undergone marked demo-
graphic changes in the twentieth century. Its demographic transition is continuing. Population growth in China
has slowed considerably due to the government’s policy measures, particularly the so-called “one-child” poli-
cy, and the continued rise in per capita real income. China’s fertility rate has fallen drastically. It is now well
below two children per woman. China’s population is likely to stabilize soon (see Figure [6]) and demogra-
phers project its population may begin to decline in the mid-2030s.

Figure [6]: China’s population is expected to level off and then decline by mid-2030s.

China is benefitting from a large working-age population and low dependency ratio. But this is likely to
change soon as the working population enters retirement age along with the slowing of the population growth
rate. Another important feature of China’s demographics is the distorted sex ratio. The female/male ratio has
been low historically, but this ratio has become even lower following the imposition of the one-child policy, due
to the marked preference of couples for male children and the selective abortion of female fetuses. A distorted
female/male ratio can have harmful effects on a society, and, as a consequence, in recent years the Chinese
authorities have begun to relax the one-child policy.

According to Russell, the spread of universal education in China was necessary, not only for moderniza-
tion, but also for the spread of democracy and the formation of a national political consciousness (p.261).
Though the problem of illiteracy was vast in China at the time of Russell’s visit, he was impressed with the
rapid increase in the numbers of educational schools. He pinpointed the lack of skilled teachers as a major
obstacle to progress in universal education (p.262). He also regarded the Chinese control of its education system and policies as crucial for the development of national self-determination and upholding Chinese interests against foreign influence. China has made ample progress in the spread of literacy and education and in other various indicators of human capital in the ensuing years. It is classified as a country with “medium human development,” according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).^{10} It still has a ways to go in order to match countries with very high levels of human development such as Norway, Japan, and even Chile. It is worth comparing Japan and China to emphasize this. Life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling, and expected years of schooling in Japan were respectively 83.6 years, 11.6 years, and 15.3 years, whereas in China these were respectively 73.7 years, 7.5 years, and 11.7 years, as reported in UNDP’s most recent Human Development Report. Russell realized, correctly, that education, skill formation, the opportunity to pursue knowledge, and investment in human capital and capabilities are absolutely essential for the flourishing of the human potential and the development of a country’s productive forces and economy and standing in the world. Russell held the Western Powers were able to dominate and exploit China primarily because of its lag in modern science and technology. He argued that modern science and technology had given western powers, and later Japan, the military strength and means to embark on imperialism and expansion. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic and the post-Maoist reforms, China has made substantial progress in developing its educational and scientific capabilities. The gap between the western countries and China has narrowed, but continues to exist. Going forward, China will need to invest substantially in developing its scientific and technical personnel and institutions for pure and applied scientific research, to provide an environment conducive to research and development, and to foster collaboration among government departments, educational and research institutions, and businesses in order to promote scientific research, technological development and innovation. Advancements in science and technology not only require substantial financing and infrastructural support but also a culture of open minded inquiry, creativity, and collaboration and the cultivation of scientific spirit. Russell was very enthusiastic about the Chinese people’s potential for meaningful contribution to scientific inquiry and technological advancements (p.204).

Since the beginning of the modern economic reforms, China’s life expectancy and health gains have been far less impressive than its achievements in income growth and poverty reduction.^{11} Improvements in life expectancy were achieved more quickly in other countries with similar income levels and over similar periods of reform. The decline in public health and access to healthcare due to market reforms, erosion of social safety nets, rise in air pollution, and other degradations of the environment have probably all contributed to the unimpressive gains in life expectancy and other important health outcomes. Russell was interested in matters of health and hygiene in China. He probably believed the economic development and the introduction of birth control would be sufficient to improve health outcomes. But going forward, China will have to invest in public health infrastructure, reduce pollution, and impose better water and food safety standards to improve the health outcomes of its people, and especially as the population ages.

China faces many serious environmental problems. In his book on China, Russell did not dwell on the environmental issues. However, he and Dora Black, his second wife, were conscious of the negative effects of industrialization, and they appreciated and respected nature’s gifts.^{12} In recent decades, China’s carbon emissions have been rising sharply due to rapid industrialization, urbanization, and heavy reliance on coal as the primary source of energy. Its total carbon emissions exceeds total emissions in the United States (see Figures 7) even though China’s per capita emissions are still much lower than the U.S. and other advanced countries’ per capita emissions. China has been the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gases and sulfur dioxide. There are many environmental concerns due to the rapid increase in pollution and natural resource depletion. The burning of coal is the main source of air pollution, while vehicle emissions also contribute to it. The air quality in Beijing during Russell’s time may have been pristine, but today, Beijing and other major Chinese cities’ air quality indices and small particulates concentration exceed international standards. There is also a chronic clean water shortage in China. Nearly 300 million rural Chinese lack access to clean and safe drinking water. One third of the major river systems, 85% of its lakes, and nearly 60% of underground water
are polluted. The major river systems have become too polluted to supply drinking water. Overgrazing is leading to desertification. Environmental degradation and pollution pose serious problems to the health and the quality of life for millions of Chinese.

Figure [7]: China’s total CO2 emissions exceeds that of the U.S., but its per capita CO2 emissions are still far below that of advanced capitalist economies (1980-2010).

China is not self-sufficient in energy. Its ratio of oil consumption and energy use to domestic output is very high. It has to import crude oil from the rest of the world. China’s share of world crude oil consumption has risen from 3% in 1980 to 10% as of 2011. In his 1948 lecture "Control and Initiative: Their Respective Spheres", which was broadcast by BBC in 1949, Russell spoke about natural resources with remarkable foresight. China will need to improve its energy efficiency. Meeting China’s energy needs and ensuring its energy security are among the challenges of China in the 21st century. In Russell’s view, a stable and orderly government led by patriotic and progressive officials was absolutely essential for an independent and prosperous China free of foreign domination. He was quite optimistic about Chinese reformers.

Russell understood that “the Chinese must seek salvation in their own energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power” (p.255). China had to wait until the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 to become free of foreign domination. China had to go through plenty of internal turmoil, including a civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists, war with Japan, and after the establishment of the People’s Republic the tragedies of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Millions of people died from the famines that occurred during the Great Leap Forward. Millions of people were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and many were killed, tortured, imprisoned, and humiliated. The Communist Party was able to establish a strong government and ensure regime stability, but given the zigzags of the Little Leap Forward, the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the Great Leap Forward, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Cultural Revolution, and the overthrow of the Gang of Four, it would be stretch to claim that China was able to attain an “orderly government,” … at least not until after the death of Mao and the overthrow of the Gang of Four.
The dispute between China and Japan, and Japan’s increasingly assertive nationalism, does not bode well for peace and security in North Asia. Asian countries need to find mechanisms to peacefully resolve their outstanding disputes, and find better ways to manage conflicts.

International Relations

China’s standing in the global system has risen. However China’s geopolitical power and influence are still less than what would be warranted by the size of its economic output, which in purchasing-power parity terms is the second largest in the world. The foreign domination of China that Russell witnessed ended after the end of World War II and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Following the Sino-Soviet rift after the death of Stalin, the USSR’s influence in China also diminished as the Communist Party of China pursued an independent course. Since October 1971, the People’s Republic of China has been a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and thus can exercise veto power. The People’s Republic is clearly a major power, but its political, social, cultural, and perhaps even its economic influence in the world is still far less than that of the United States and other Western countries.

The United States runs a large and persistent bilateral trade deficit with China. While this large deficit benefits U.S. consumers and multinational corporations, it is a source of occasional conflict because the U.S. alleges that the China keeps its currency undervalued. Due to its large trade surplus with the U.S., China holds large amounts of dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves, including a substantial volume of U.S. Treasury securities. China’s foreign currency reserves amount to over $3.8 trillion, and it holds approximately $1.3 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities. China’s large reserves and its U.S. Treasury securities may appear to give it plenty of leverage in international relations, but it illustrates that China has decided to rely on exports as a vital part of development strategy, and that it needs continued access to the U.S.’s and other advanced countries’ markets to sell its goods. Moreover, the Chinese authorities cannot easily and quickly dump their holdings of Treasury securities without causing a substantial loss of their own portfolio of foreign financial assets. Other things constant, if the Chinese authorities tried to dispose of their Treasury holdings quickly, it would raise interest rates and lower the value of the U.S. dollar, but the Federal Reserve, the U.S. central bank, can respond and counter this with large-scale asset purchases, which would keep interest rates low, while allowing the dollar to depreciate. China is therefore very dependent on access to U.S. markets. Slower economic growth in the U.S. and other advanced countries, and volatility in the global financial markets, are not in the interest of China.

Japan’s relations with China remain complicated and have deteriorated over the dispute over the Senkaku/Daiyou islands since the 2012, and with the ascension of the government led by Shinzo Abe. China has responded by extending its claims and air-defense identification zone. Russell had warned of the danger that Japanese aggression posed to China. He devoted four out of the fifteen chapters of his book on examining Japan’s history, modernization, and its relationship with China. He was definitely much more favorably disposed to the Chinese than to the Japanese. Russell, in retrospect, was correct in pointing out the perils of Japanese expansion. In recent years, bilateral trade between Japan and China has steadily risen, and Japa-
Chinese foreign direct investment in China has also been growing. The dispute between China and Japan, and Japan’s increasingly assertive nationalism, does not bode well for peace and security in North Asia. Asian countries need to find mechanisms to peacefully resolve their outstanding disputes, and find better ways to manage conflicts. Strong growth in China and the rest of Asia provides opportunities for Japan for trade development, investment, and the development of new markets, while Japan’s technological edge, management, and high level of human development can be beneficial for the rest of Asia. Strong growth in Japan can benefit Asian countries and the rest of the world. Russell devoted considerable energy in trying to promote the peaceful coexistence of countries and the resolution of international disputes. Liberal intellectuals and activists in Asia would be well advised to follow Russell’s lead, and urge the leaders of Japan and China to reduce these tensions, develop a framework for resolving disputes, and work for the common good of their peoples.

Conclusion

China’s challenges are still formidable, but the country has made impressive gains in recent decades. Russell strongly maintained that “China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover of mankind.” (p. 266). At the same time, he cautioned that “the future is still problematical” for China (p.270). He knew that the task ahead for the Chinese was not easy, and that it would require an organized social and political force that could appeal to the deep-seated patriotic feelings of the Chinese, and overcome the many entrenched barriers of tradition and conservatism. There are many similarities between the problems that Russell identified years ago and China’s contemporary challenges of improving governance and regime stability; mitigating increased disparities in income, wealth, and opportunities; developing human capital and capabilities, education, and health; managing the demographic transition; safeguarding the environment and reducing pollution; ensuring financial stability; ensuring access to energy and improving energy efficiency; and raising China’s role in international affairs.

Russell hoped that China can develop without resorting to ultra-nationalism and militarism. He hoped for a China that was “free to assimilate” the best of western civilization, while also advancing “an organic growth of their own tradition,” confident that this would “produce a splendid result” (pp.7-8). He realized that modernization and industrialization have costs, but wanted the Chinese to preserve the best of their culture, in particular, their “ethical qualities” (p.224). He was aware of the deep-seated nationalist feelings of the Chinese people (p.213), but he called on the progressive Chinese to develop their country and avoid the perils of nationalism, militarism, and crass materialism.

China has tremendous potential to enrich human civilization. If progressive forces in China can be organized to address the country’s contemporary challenges and avoid the perils that Russell pointed out long ago, his hope for a China that plays “the part in the world for which is fitted,” and able to “devote their freedom to science and art,” and give “mankind as a whole new hope in the moment of greatest need,” still holds true. The impressive progress that China has made in recent decades would attest to its true potential, just as its formidable challenges should inspire collective efforts for human development and universal human rights and dignity.

Endnotes

1 John Dewey, the American pragmatist philosopher, also visited and lectured in China around the time that Russell was in China. Gottfried Leibniz was another major Western philosopher who was curious about Chinese thought and civilization, but he visited neither China nor its vicinities.
3 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes (pages cited parenthetically) are from Russell’s The Problem of China (New York: The Century Co., 1922). An online version is also available from Project Gutenberg at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13940/13940-h/13940-h.htm (accessed Dec 10, 2013).
5 International institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the OCED use purchasing parity methods to compare the national income of different countries because market exchanges rates could be misleading in international comparisons.


Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of inequality. Gini coefficient of 0 implies that everyone has the same income, whereas a Gini coefficient of 1 implies only one personal has all the income in the society and everyone else has no income. A higher Gini coefficient means a greater degree of inequality in an economy.


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Marjorie Senechal. *I Died for Beauty: Dorothy Wrinch and the Cultures of Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. xii + 300 pages, illus., index.

Marjorie Senechal’s colourful study of Dorothy Wrinch (1894-1976) is sometimes disordered, sometimes journalistic in tone, erratic in chronology, and hard to put down.

The book is concerned mostly with the daily life of an inter-war and post-war scientist—the grant-getting, the housing, the travel, the research appointments and adjunct teaching jobs, the finding of friends and family members to do daycare. Wrinch was an able scholar, but also a mother. More than that, she was implicated in a decades-long scientific controversy in English and American university science departments.

Senechal’s account of Wrinch’s long friendships with Bertrand and Dora Russell draws on facts already known to Russellians. Russell noticed her intelligence from the moment Wrinch came to his attention in 1916. The Russells are shown to have been consistently considerate of students, philosopher-helpers, and colleagues in social reform. Wrinch fit all three categories. During Russell’s 1918 imprisonment, it was Wrinch who:

… assisted on the philosophical front, running errands for her imprisoned mentor, visiting when she could, sending him reading material, and writing long letters filled with newsy chatter or discourses on philosophical fine points. (p. 65)

Russell maintained his support for and of Wrinch, considering her a capable, reliable friend.

Dorothy Wrinch was born in 1894 in Rosario, Argentina, where her English father, a talented engineer, lived between 1890 and 1897. Her mother made the trans-Atlantic journey from England to marry Hugh in 1893. Senechal does not say exactly how the parents’ technical and intellectual interests shaped Dorothy and her sister. Yet, although Dorothy’s father did not enter university, he knew enough physics to co-author one of Dorothy’s later papers in mathematical physics. Senechal leaves us wondering.

Dorothy’s other great early influence was the Surbiton High School (SHS) for girls. There must have been enough science, mathematics, along with necessary classics, history, and literature to see Dorothy into Cambridge in 1913—with a scholarship:

Thomas Arnold stalked the halls of Surbiton High School as resolutely as Captain Cook stalked his mansion, but with a Bible instead of a telescope…. (p. 41)

One would like to know more, of course, about what, exactly, Dorothy and the other girls studied—and how it changed them. Senechal says science and mathematics were on the menu, but of what kind, taught by whom, and how? How much did schooling matter and why? Once again we are left guessing.

Dorothy did get to Girton College, Cambridge, befriending Dora Black, soon to be Dora Russell, at meetings of the Heretics Club. She first heard Bertrand Russell lecture in January 1914 on “Our Knowledge of the External World.” By 1916-1917 Wrinch moved on to Moral Sciences at Cambridge, specializing in scientific method and mathematical logic. She came that winter to work with Russell in London, joining three
eager learners (Jean Nicod among them). In just two pages (59-60) Senechal epitomizes *Principia Mathematica* (mentioning the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Logicomix*). She writes, “Type theory: that’s what Dot [Dorothy], Nicod, [Victor] Lenzen, and [Wallace] Armstrong studied with Russell at Gordon Square.” (p. 61)

Having disposed of *Principia Mathematica* Senechal gives us two paragraphs on Russell’s logical atomism and his demolition of monism:

> The sword to slay monism, said Russell [Senechal claims], is a theory of judgment that strips language to its logical atoms and shows there is more than one of them… he came to see that a judgment needs a judge. “A is to the left of B” because John sees it and says so: the proper statement is “John thinks A is to the left of B.” This led Russell to the “multiple relations theory of judgment” he taught in *Principia Mathematica*. (pp. 61-62)

At another point, Senechal added that Wrinch worked also with Russell on general theory of scientific method.

Are Senechal’s chronology and terms quite right? Does logical atomism precede multiple judgment theory? Is monism (neutral or otherwise) slain only in 1918, or in 1921, or earlier, or ever? What about Russell’s developing view that sensations or “events” (neural events, as we might say now) constituted all mental and physical worlds?

Apart from questions about Russell’s views, one wants to know how Dorothy Wrinch actually used Russellian procedures in scientific work. Senechal says there is a substantial archive for Wrinch at Smith College, where Wrinch completed her academic life. There is useful future work here for an historian or theorist of science.

Wrinch married John Nicholson, a physicist at Oxford, in 1922. Their daughter was born in 1927. Her descent into serious mental illness led to a divorce (1938), but by then, Wrinch had turned to mathematically-oriented studies of biology. She was by 1938 part of a remarkable forum—the Cold Spring Harbor Symposium on proteins in Long Island, New York. She moved with daughter Pamela to the United States soon after, taking a one-year appointment at Johns Hopkins, then accepting a post at Smith College in Massachusetts in 1941. She retired from her Smith appointment in 1970, having in the meanwhile married Charles Glaser of the Amherst biology department.

We have the impression that science was, for Wrinch, nearly all that mattered. Her mathematical and crystallographic books and papers appeared regularly until the end of her teaching career. Senechal describes Wrinch’s studies of chromosomal molecules, dealing especially well with her collaboration in England in the 30s with Dorothy Crowfoot, talented X-ray crystallographer and a later Nobel Prize winner.

By the mid-1930s Wrinch had in mind a model for the structure of proteins, a model in which sheets of amino acids (which she called “cyclols”) then “fold” into long series of geometric figures. Senechal gives diagrams at pp. 142-9 and 208, and shows how X-rays passing through metallic lattices and crystallized protein-laden material produce patterns open to interpretations of the kind Dorothy wanted to make. Senechal’s exposition is exact enough that readers can imagine what it was like working with exposed photographic plates, making mathematical calculations, all much improved and speeded-up under computer applications after 1945.

But Dorothy Wrinch was in trouble. Much of her summer travel and research, and some of her teaching, depended on the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, and in particular of Warren Weaver, director of the Division of Natural Sciences. As he did with hundreds of other scientists between 1932 and 1955, Weaver visited not just applicants, but also interviewed applicants’ scientific acquaintances of long or recent standing.

Dorothy’s problem was that her cyclol theory was wrong. It relied on mathematical deduction too much, and careful inference from experimental evidence too little. Weaver was well aware of these difficulties. Dorothy had the steadfast support of Irving Langmuir, another Nobel Prize winner—but the equally steadfast, and sometimes rude opposition of Linus Pauling—*another* Nobel Prize winner.

Senechal suggests that Wrinch’s energy and stubbornness encouraged people to range themselves quickly and firmly on one side of the controversy or the other. (Are these “sides” the cultures mentioned in the title? Or is it family and academic work?)

Senechal presents the longwinded and acrid debate between Wrinch and Pauling as an opera libretto (Ch. 16, “Linus and Dorothy,” pp. 170-176). After a one-page plot outline, we have fragments of imagined (but imaginable) debate between the two, complete with a facsimile of a letter from twelve-year-old Pamela Wrinch to Dr. Pauling asking him nicely to stop quarrelling with her mother. Here the politics of big-money research
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are made visible. Earlier on, Senechal devotes an entire chapter (Ch. 13, “Buzz,” pp. 135-139) to the comments of Rockefeller Foundation operatives (often Warren Weaver) on Dorothy Wrinch’s ideas, intellect, and work. The quoted notes, apparently transcribed from Rockefeller files, begin in 1935:

“1935. Pasadena. B...is very keen for Dorothy Wrinch’s work. London: Mathematical and theoretical people do not have a ghost of a chance to contribute anything to theoretical biology.” (p. 135)

“1937: I again had both sides of the [Wrinch] story. P. at Ithaca...When Dorothy Wrinch’s name was mentioned he blushed furiously and had to draw on the deepest reserves of the English character to keep from being profane in [a woman’s presence] concerning what the Oxford chemistry crowd thinks of her. On other hand, U thought Wrinch an outstanding genius.” (p. 138)

This was a gritty world, a far cry from the peer-reviewed, multi-paneled, multi-level evaluation now common at the National Institutes of Health or Rockefeller Foundation. I end with the connections between Dorothy Wrinch and Dora Russell.

Senechal interjects several sections—upwards of forty pages in all—in which she tells how Senechal came to know Wrinch, how Senechal learned mathematics, biology, and chemistry as a kind of assistant to Wrinch and junior professor in the late 1960s and early 1970s, not to mention the ups and downs of biographical research. These sections interrupt the chronology and the narrative. They eventually are irritating. But they show Senechal’s interest in personality, habit, and character. This turns out to be helpful in discussing the Dorothy Wrinch-Dora Russell friendship. Even as Dora and Bertie published The Prospects of Industrial Civilization (1923), and later as Russell produced his 1926 book On Education, then Marriage and Morals (1929), Dorothy was their frequent guest for lunch or weekends. Wrinch would have noticed Dora’s growing worry about the “enslaving potential” of industrial capitalism, but much more Dora’s insistence that women should have a happy life, not be enslaved by the hard business of raising children.

By 1927 Wrinch was herself a mother, and three years later, writing under the pseudonym Jean Ayling, published The Retreat from Parenthood (1930). This was a plan for the creation of a national child rearing service (CRS) in order that professional women could work in the world, and not be perpetually tied to an endless round of feedings, clothing, and childcare. But the CRS was also a way to ensure intelligent women would be willing to have more children, not fewer. Ayling/Wrinch’s view of childrearing ca. 1930 is encapsulated in the title of Ch. III in Retreat, “Homes are Hell.”

Senechal gives a tidy one-page description of Retreat (pp. 101-102). I wish she had given another page (or three) to show how Retreat fits with the views of Dora and of Bertie: was Dorothy the follower or was she actively helping to shape the Russells’ ideas and practices?

Senechal misses any number of opportunities to explain … not just to describe … the life and work of Dorothy Wrinch. Because she opens a new window on the history of science and of higher education in the last century, I should say the book is a starting point for research to come. Its eccentric style helps the book to succeed, but one regrets the opportunities lost, the roads not taken.

The editor’s favorite Russell words: Wicked and Hitherto.
Submit some of yours and we’ll compile a list of them!
Book Review

The Importance of Sufficient Evidence
By Chad Trainer
STRATOFILPSACUS@AOL.COM


William Kingdon Clifford (1845-1879) has been credited with contributing to the establishment of psychology as a separate academic subject. He was a pioneer in applying Darwinian evolutionary principles to the comprehension of the initial emergence of consciousness, and he appreciated the repercussions of Darwinian evolution for the field of ethics before anyone else. St. John Fisher College’s Timothy Madigan, in his crisp and lucid book *W.K. Clifford and “The Ethics of Belief”*, describes Clifford’s philosophy as a “curious combination of Spinoza’s monism, Kant’s epistemology and Darwin’s evolutionary theory.”

In many respects, Clifford’s work foreshadows Bertrand Russell’s philosophic activity. Clifford and Russell both excelled in mathematics and were completely at home with the most advanced mathematicians of their day. But they also had an interest in sharing their knowledge with the wider public. (Clifford even felt an obligation to do so.) We learn from Madigan’s book that Russell most likely modeled his own clarity of writing style after that of Clifford. Clifford’s goal in *The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences* was to clarify for the layperson modern scientific and mathematical thinking. Russell was among the work’s many admirers, and he wrote a preface to the 1946 reprint.

As significant an achievement as *The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences* was, it is “The Ethics of Belief” for which Clifford is now most famous. Madigan’s book focuses on this latter work. Clifford famously declared: “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” He thought this improper not just for a scholarly elite but for people in every walk of life. For Clifford, as Madigan puts it, “the duty to examine one’s beliefs is the same for the intellectual in the ivory tower as it is for the simple tradesman drinking a beer in the alehouse.”

Like Russell, Clifford saw the scientific method as the best way of determining objective reality’s nature, and thought metaphysical and religious matters merit impartial and candid reflection and discussion. A century earlier, John Locke had been able to be sanguine about the sufficiency of religion’s basis and proclaim: “he that takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both.” Clifford, though, lived during the “Victorian Crisis of Faith,” an era in which there was a “growing feeling that the tried-and-true teachings of the Anglican religion, or indeed of any Christian religion, were no longer relevant to the contemporary world. There was a sense that the scientific perspective and traditional religious faith were becoming increasingly incompatible.”

Clifford delivered “The Ethics of Belief” in 1876 to the London-based Metaphysical Society, which included some of the most influential thinkers of the day. Although an ongoing concern of the Society’s had been a “fear of atheism,” Clifford’s lecture was, in many respects, a “secular sermon, delivered to exhort individuals to live up to their highest epistemic abilities.” As a consequence, Clifford’s essay played a significant role in the Society’s dissolution, polarizing its assorted members with its pugnacity and leaving them unable to agree on a “common ground for reasoned discussion.”

Both Clifford and Russell were convinced that religion’s declining relevance had significant implications for ethics. In 1868, Clifford concluded that religious institutions posed impediments to humans’ cerebral progress in general and scientific advancement in particular. “At a time when those who would hold fellowships or teaching positions in the colleges in Oxford or Cambridge were expected to profess allegiance to the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion, this could be a career-destroying belief.” Clifford’s position was one of “aggressive agnosticism,” maintaining that humanity’s progress and salvation, both pedagogically and
socially, lay in replacing ecclesiastics’ leadership with that of scientific method. Thus, the resemblance between Clifford’s and Russell’s thinking in the realms of religion and ethics are notable.

Madigan’s tract brings to light two noteworthy differences between Clifford and Russell: First, while Russell never believed that people who achieve truth are automatically happier, Clifford believed that an increase in their happiness follows necessarily. Second, Clifford was fearful that “a growing societal dissatisfaction with traditional theological arguments might lead to increasing laxity toward ethical obligations”; whereas Russell thought the repercussions of such a development could only be salutary.

The professionalization of philosophy in our current day and age, along with the consequent emphasis on specialization, all too often result in our culture’s neglect of earlier philosophers’ best general insights. As if this were not bad enough, everything from the way in which our materialistic culture glorifies the accumulation of goods, to the way in which high-tech devices shorten our attention spans, preclude opportunities for a leisurely survey of relevant evidence in the areas of life’s largest questions. The 21st century deems quaint the longing for truth that Clifford and Russell cherished. For this reason, we sorely need reminders of the philosophy behind Clifford’s “Ethics of Belief,” and the priority Madigan’s studies put on it are especially welcome.

Members are invited to submit articles and book reviews that are Russell-centric. Both technical and non-technical articles are welcome.

Bertrand Russell on World War I
(It remains pertinent today)

The objects for which men have fought in the past, whether just or unjust, are no longer to be achieved by wars amongst civilized nations. A great weight of tradition, of financial interests, of political insincerity, is bound up with the anachronism of international hostility. It is, however, perhaps not chimerical to hope that the present war, which has shocked the conscience of mankind more than any war in previous history, may produce a revulsion against antiquated methods, and may lead the exhausted nations to insist upon the brotherhood and co-operation which their rulers have hitherto denied them. There is no reason whatever against the settlement of all disputes by a Council of Powers deliberating in public. Nothing stands in its way except the pride of rulers who wish to remain uncontrolled by anything higher than their own will. When this great tragedy has worked itself out to its disastrous conclusion, when the passions of hate and self-assertion have given place to compassion with the universal misery, the nations will perhaps realize that they have fought in blindness and delusion, and that the way of mercy is the way of happiness for all.

"One should respect public opinion in so far as is necessary to avoid starvation and to keep out of prison, but anything that goes beyond this is voluntary submission to an unnecessary tyranny, and is likely to interfere with happiness in all kinds of ways."

(From The Conquest of Happiness, 1930)
Contributors

Tanweer Akram is an author and Senior Economist, Fixed Income Research with ING, Inc., in Atlanta, Georgia.
Kenneth Blackwell of Hamilton, Ontario, is an archivist, bibliographer, editor, and a founding member of The Bertrand Russell Society.
William Bruneau is a musician and Professor Emeritus of Educational Studies at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, British Columbia.
Landon D. C. Elkind is a graduate student working towards his PhD in philosophy at the University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.
Jolen Galaugher is the 2014 Bertrand Russell Visiting Professor at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario.
Bernard Linsky is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta.
Timothy Madigan is an Associate Professor in Philosophy at St. John Fisher College, Rochester, New York.
Ray Perkins, Jr. is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Plymouth State University, Plymouth, New Hampshire.
Katarina Perovic is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.
Chad Trainer of Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, is an author and independent scholar, and chairs the board of The Bertrand Russell Society.
Sheila Turcon is an author and recently retired from the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University Library, Hamilton, Ontario.

Coming in the Fall Issue

Jack Clontz on Russell and Haldane;
Nancy Doubleday on student research at The Bertrand Russell Archives and social memory;
Kevin Klement on Dummett’s correspondence with Russell on Frege;
Charles Pigden on Russell’s ethics;
Sheila Turcon on Russell Chambers;
And much more.

And last, but certainly not least: Much appreciation and gratitude goes to our retiring board members Warren Allen Smith and David White for their many years of service and dedication to the Society.
Registration Information for the
BRS Annual Meeting in Windsor, Ontario
June 13-15, 2014

Look for more details in the coming months on the email Announcement List and our websites … also, if you wish to deliver a paper, please contact Alan Schwerin right away at aschweri@monmouth.edu. In the meantime, here’s a very general, preliminary agenda:

- Friday, June 13th: Arrival and Registration 3:00-6:00; concurrent, early board meeting. Dinner 6:30. Evening presentations? Location: Katzman Lounge.
- Saturday, June 14th: Breakfast 7:00-8:00. Papers 8:00-4:30 (with lunch). Location: Katzman Lounge. BRS Banquet at local restaurant at 6:30.
- Sunday, June 15th: Breakfast 7:00-8:00. Papers 8:00-11:00; annual members’ meeting and continuation of board meeting 11:00-1:00. Lunch 1:00-2:00, then departure. Location: Katzman Lounge.

University Meeting Room: Katzman Lounge at Vanier Hall, 401 Sunset Ave

Host: Michael Potter (Email: pottermk@uwindsor.ca)

Headquarters Hotel: University Place
Rates: $39-$69 (add $10 for an additional person)
Toll-free phone: 1-866-618-1112
Website: http://windsorexecutivestay.com/
Address: 3140 Peter Street, Windsor, Ontario, Canada N9C 1H3

Please make your own hotel reservations at your very earliest convenience.

Note: University Place is a modest, but quite satisfactory accommodation when compared to most dorm rooms. It is a 10-minute walk to the meeting place. For those preferring a more “up-scale” but reasonably-priced hotel, nearby, we recommend the Quality Suites in Windsor, about which info can be located from: www.qualityinn.com. For a luxury hotel that will involve a longer walk: Caesars Windsor (with a casino if you feel lucky!): http://www.caesarswindsor.com/

Registration Fees (includes all event-related meals *):

Individual Member: $80.00
Student (under 25) or Limited Income Member: $60.00
Couple (one of whom is a member): $160.00
Non-members: (per person): $90.00
Papers Only (no catered or outside meals): $25.00

Pay via PayPal (www.paypal.com) or send a check made out to The Bertrand Russell Society to: BRS, c/o Michael Berumen, 37155 Dickerson Run, Windsor, CO 80550. Please indicate it is for 2014 Annual Meeting.

Good time to pay dues, too, if you haven’t already!

*Windsor University has graciously offered to subsidize our event, which makes the registration fees … inclusive of costs for the meeting facility, equipment, 6 meals (including one off-campus), and snacks and beverages … most attractive to both members and the BRS!