Inside this issue ...

Our columnists;
Feature articles by Doubleday, Klement, Pigden, Turcon, and Berumen;
And much more.
Information for New and Renewing Members

Membership in the Society is $45 per year for individuals and $25 for students and those with limited incomes. Add $10.00 for couples. A lifetime membership is $1,000. In addition to the BRS Bulletin, membership includes a subscription to the scholarly journal, Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies (published semi-annually by McMaster University), as well as other Society privileges, such as participation in the on-line BRS Forum, the BRS email list, access to a host of Russell-related resources, and eligibility to attend the Annual Meeting.

Renewal dues should be paid by or on January 1st of each year. One’s membership status can be determined by going to russell.mcmaster.ca/brsmembers.htm. There one will also find convenient links to join or renew via PayPal and our information form.

New and renewing members can also send a check or money order via traditional post to the treasurer (make it out to The Bertrand Russell Society). Send it to Michael Berumen, Treasurer, Bertrand Russell Society, 37155 Dickerson Run, Windsor, CO 80550. If a new member, please tell us a little about yourself beyond just your name (interests in Russell, profession, etc.). Include your postal address and email address, as well as your member status (i.e., regular, couple, student, limited income). If a renewing member, please let us know of any relevant changes in your contact information.

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Letters to the editor may be submitted to the editor’s postal or email address. Please reference the issue, author, and title of the article to which the letter relates. Letters should be concise. Publication will be at the discretion of the editor, and predicated upon available space. The editor reserves the right to truncate letters.

Manuscripts may be submitted to the editor at his email address in Microsoft Word. Feature articles and book reviews should be Russell-centric, dealing with Russell’s life or works, and they should be written in either a scholarly or journalistic style. Articles generally should not exceed 7 single-spaced pages, and book reviews should not exceed 2 single-spaced pages. Mathematical, logical, and scientific symbols are fine, but please ensure that they are essential. Footnotes/endnotes should be used sparingly and primarily for citations; the editor reserves the right to convert footnotes to endnotes and vice versa, depending on layout needs. Parenthetical citations and page numbers, with standard reference descriptions at the end of the article, are also fine; but no abbreviations for works, please. Submissions should be made no later than August 31st and December 31st for the fall and spring issues, respectively. The editor will collaborate with the authors, as required, and authors will have the opportunity to review any suggested changes prior to publication. There are no guarantees of publication, and articles submitted may be held for future editions.

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2015 Annual Meeting: Précis on Ireland, Dublin, and Trinity College

The 2015 Annual Meeting of the BRS will be held at Trinity College in Dublin, Ireland on June 5-7 in co-sponsorship with the Society for the Study of the History of Analytic Philosophy, which will hold its meeting on June 4-6. Our member and vice-chair, Peter Stone, teaches political science there, and he will be our host. Registration information and details are forthcoming. In the meantime, it seems highly appropriate to say a little something about Ireland, Dublin, and Trinity.

Your half-Irish editor had more than one occasion to visit an Irish pub called Monahan’s in Pasadena, California, where, incidentally, many a Caltech professor might be found, and he has long remembered a sign aloft the bar that said: “God Invented Whiskey to Prevent the Irish from Ruining the World.” Well, time will only tell if that’s true; meantime, author Thomas Cahill offers comfort by suggesting that the world was rescued by them in his little book, How the Irish Saved Civilization. Not a bad legacy, notwithstanding evil spirits, which no Irishman ever viewed as an impediment, anyway. Cahill’s thesis is that Irish proclivities for literacy and learning established the very conditions that allowed Ireland to preserve Western culture during the dissolution of the Roman Empire, and while Europe was being overrun by barbarians in the Dark Ages. No proper Irishman could disagree.

The Emerald Isle is the second largest island in the British Isles archipelago in the North Atlantic, and it is situated to the west of Great Britain, from which it is separated by the North Channel, the Irish Sea, and St Georges Channel. It is divided into Northern Ireland, part of the United Kingdom, consisting of about 1.8 million folk, and the independent Republic of Ireland, the larger part of the island with a population of 4.6 million. Humans first arrived there about 8,000 B.C. Inhabitants were converted to Christianity beginning in the 5th century, and waves of Viking conquests began in the 9th century. Dublin, in fact, was established as a Viking settlement, and it remained under Viking control until the Norman invasion in 1169, which culminated in Henry II of England’s declaration of sovereignty over the island in 1171.

Rebellions and insurrections by native Irish ensued off and on during the English reign, with conquering and re-conquering by the English, punctuated by several periods of quiescence. Ireland achieved its (near) independence from Great Britain in 1921, though an opt-out clause in the treaty allowed Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom, which it immediately exercised. There were upheavals in both areas throughout the 20th century, often fueled by nationalism, political division, and religion. In recent decades peaceful accommodations have been made, and the island has become something of an economic powerhouse and a very inviting place for both investment and tourism.

Irish culture is of course renowned throughout the world, particularly in the realms of literature, religion, philosophy, science, and theater, and its emigrants have been a powerful force in other cultures, perhaps most notably to nations in the British Commonwealth and in the United States, home to tens of millions with Irish roots.

Dublin is both the capital and the largest city in Ireland. With a population of roughly 530,000 within the city limits, the general metropolitan area consists of about 1.8 million residents. Located on the east coast about midway down the island, Dublin is in the province of Leinster at the mouth of the River Liffey. It is directly across from Wales in the United Kingdom, and only a 2-3 hour ferry ride away.

Trinity College was founded in 1592 under the reign of Elizabeth I, and it is the sole college of the University of Dublin in Ireland, making the designations “Trinity College” and “University of Dublin” practically synonymous. Originally founded to cement Tudor rule in Ireland, it is the largest university in Ireland, with roughly 17,000 students, and it offers both undergraduate and graduate degrees. It boasts...
many luminaries as former students and staff, including Jonathan Swift, George Berkeley, Edmund Burke, Oliver Goldsmith, Oscar Wilde, Samuel Beckett, Dionysius Lardner, Bram Stoker, William Rowan Hamilton, E. T. Whittaker, and Ernest Walton, and many others.

The people of Ireland are legendary for their friendliness, frankness, humor, and all-around good nature, and it promises to be a wonderful place for our meeting. Dublin is handily situated for embarking to many destinations within Ireland itself or across the way to Scotland, Wales, and England, and also to all points in Europe. So, Russellians—get out the green and get ready to go Irish!

75 Years Ago

It was not unusual for people of commerce, intellectuals, and politicians in Britain and the United States to espouse pacific views in 1939. Indeed, the predominant view in the United States was one of isolationism, wanting nothing to do with being “over there” yet again. Bertrand Russell was in good company. He was never a radical pacifist, not even in WWI, where he held that there were evils that peaceful means could not overcome; but he saw the Kaiser’s depredations as insufficient to warrant the ensuing bloodbath. Russell has been criticized for his pacifism during the events that led up to WWII. But he was ahead of most Americans in coming to terms with the Nazi threat.

Russell was in the United States in 1939. In between appointments at the University of Chicago and the University of California in Los Angeles, he was on a lecture tour in which he made frequent pronouncements on American neutrality and the avoidance of war. Russell supported Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement, which he saw as the “rational” approach. Unlike men of the clubs and universities: Hitler was not a rational man.

In March of 1939, Russell argued in the journal Common Sense that America should not enter the war if it should come to Europe, even stating that it was the world’s “best hope” that America should remain neutral. A month later he wrote President Franklin Roosevelt, congratulating him on his overtures to Hitler and Mussolini for peace. But letters reveal that his view was changing over the next months, especially after the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August, when it became apparent to him that all of Europe and perhaps England could be swallowed by the Nazi juggernaut.

By December he wrote his friend Robert Trevelyan and said, “…I try hard to remain a pacifist, but the thought of Hitler and Stalin triumphant is hard to bear….” He also wrote to Gilbert Murray and said that the Soviet government was even worse than the Nazi Germany. This is a view that Winston Churchill, who earned his anti-Bolshevik spurs even before Russell, did not share. When later questioned upon alliance with Stalin in 1941, Churchill said, “If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.” By early 1940, Russell’s view had hardened, and he later said that shortly before the war, “…I decided and publicly announced that I wished to support the war in any way that I could. If I were younger I would volunteer.”

Russell did not thereby become enamored of war as a means of solving problems whenever war was avoidable, and it would not be long before he publicly declaimed against nuclear weapons and American involvement in Vietnam.
(de)Notations

- Michael Potter was elected by the directors as Society and Board Secretary, replacing retiring Secretary John Ongley. Congrats to Michael, and many thanks to John for his years of selfless service.
- Speaking of Michael Potter, he hosted a splendid Annual Meeting at the University of Windsor in early June. Great venue, good food, interesting papers and, not least of all, a wonderful opportunity to be with friends sharing common interests.
- Michael Ruse was the 2014 BRS Award recipient, and he spoke about Russell's influence on him at the Annual Meeting.
- For information on the BRS, recent board minutes, and treasurer's reports, see: users.drew.edu/~JLENZ/brs-organization.html.
- Mini-financial report for first half of 2014:

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Not Necessarily Trivial

Russell went through several phases before settling on a prose style that he would use for much of his life. Your editor thinks his more-or-less permanent style of writing was essentially established around the time of *Problems of Philosophy* (1912). Russell said his earlier writing was influenced by the more florid style of the Romantics, and especially the writing of one English poet and essayist of the early 19th century. Perhaps his essay, "A Free Man’s Worship," (1903) best exemplifies his earlier style of writing. Who was the poet and essayist that influenced him the most? (See page 13.)

Amartya Sen: BRS Honorary Member

The economist, philosopher, and Nobel Prize winner, Amartya Sen, is the newest Honorary Member of the Bertrand Russell Society, joining the ranks of other illustrious Honorary Members such as Noam Chomsky, Daniel Ellsberg, and the late A.J. Ayer. Sen was born in West Bengal in 1933 and has taught at leading universities around the world. He is presently at Harvard University, where he is the Thomas W. Lamont University Professor, and Professor of Economics and Philosophy. He was previously Master of Trinity College at Cambridge University, Russell's alma mater.

While Sen is primarily known for his focus on the plight of the poor and so-called welfare economics, the subject matter that resulted in the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (1998), Sen has written on a large range of economic and philosophical topics, and he has been a tireless non-ideological advocate for rational, democratic, and pragmatic solutions to problems.

BRS directors found that he qualified under 3 of the 6 criteria for Honorary Membership (only one is necessary), including supporting of a cause or idea that BR championed; promoting awareness of BR or of BR's work; and possessing qualities of character (such as moral courage) reminiscent of BR.

Secretary Michael Potter notified Sen of his honorary membership. Sen quickly and graciously responded by writing, "I am, of course, delighted—and feel very honoured—by your communication about my being made an honorary member of BRS. I greatly appreciate this kind initiative, and I am very happy to join the Society."

Sen adds considerable luster to the BRS.
Russelliana
By Tim Madigan
TMADIGAN@ROCHESTER.RR.COM

Note to readers: Those of us who recall the wonderful Bertrand Russell Society newsletters edited by Lee Eisler will remember how he would lovingly photocopy articles from various journals that made mention of Russell, no matter how fleeting or obscure the reference might be. In honor of Lee, the Bulletin has incorporated a column called “Russelliana,” which continues his practice of alerting us to references to Russell, often found in the most startling of contexts. I encourage readers to send me any such appearances they come across for use in future “Russelliana” columns:

Soundbites

For this column, I thought it might be good to show how Russell lives on through the internet, a medium that Lee Eisler, alas, did not himself live long enough to see become the vital source for information we all so rely upon today. Thanks to the intrepid efforts of BRS members like Ken Blackwell, Tom Stanley, and David Blitz, as well as countless unnamed individuals who have retrieved from obscurity many interviews done with Russell from the beginnings of the sound era to the end of his long life, it is now possible to see the great philosopher in action in convenient ‘soundbites’ on YouTube and other sources. Most of these are taken from longer interviews he gave during his career. I myself often make use of these clips when teaching about Russell in various philosophy courses. While he may not have approved of having his comments taken out of context, as a master of concise language and a purveyor of witticisms he might well have agreed that such clips do serve the purpose of making contemporary people aware of his views, and might lead them to explore his writings for more details. In fact, a good number of the interviews were originally arranged by short topics, so chopping them up in five to ten minute “bites” usually has no ill effect, and is quite appropriate. In an age where people are conditioned to receive short bits of information, these Russell clips have a peculiar modern resonance, almost as if he anticipated the short attention spans of the denizens of the early 21st century.

Below is just a “taste of Russell” to help lead you into the ever-expanding world of Russell online. Once you start exploring these you are likely to find many others, and I welcome hearing from you about your own personal favorites.

To bring back memories for those who were alive at the time, here is CBS News’ coverage of Russell’s death, with Walter Cronkite and Morley Safer giving a nice summation of his significance as, among other things, “the Father of the Modern Demonstration”. It’s also a good introduction to his overall career for those otherwise unfamiliar with him:

www.youtube.com/watch?v=kY3tJV6G2uY

And that’s the way it was, on Tuesday, February 3, 1970.

Among his many honors, Russell Received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. Here one can see highlights from the ceremony in Stockholm, although, alas, one needs to know Swedish in order to understand the narration:

www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&v=iZEWkFA9okI&feature=endscreen

More scenes, and more details, about Russell’s receipt of the Nobel Prize can found in this clip from a History Channel documentary, narrated by Edwin Newman, author of Strictly Speaking and A Civil Tongue, a reporter who shared Russell’s love for precise language. It nicely gives us Russell’s advice for how to live a happy life:

www.youtube.com/watch?v=HVTKJkKcQeJ4

Here is something that Newman would no doubt have appreciated, a wonderful clip of Russell’s defense of clarity and exact thinking:

www.youtube.com/watch?v=mpJcn0Ok71&feature=related

And for those interested in Russell’s views on religion, here is a concise defense of why he was not a Christian, and why he felt religious beliefs were anathema to good reasoning:

www.youtube.com/watch?v=tP4FDLegX9s&feature=related
On a lighter note, long-time members of the Bertrand Russell Society will recall the wonderful parody of Russell by the great humorist Jonathan Miller (himself the recipient of the 2010 BRS Award), done as part of the famous “Beyond the Fringe” comedy show of the 1950s. Someone has kindly posted the audio of this on YouTube, which will be all the more appreciated by those who are familiar with Russell’s actual speaking voice and his relationship with the philosopher G. E. Moore.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=--JPfVGotIQL

And for a good sense of Russell’s own humor, here is my favorite clip, in which he defends his “favorite vice,” smoking, by pointing out how it actually saved his life:

www.youtube.com/watch?v=80oLTiVW_lc

Of course, as the interviewer points out, it’s been said that smoking shortens one’s life, so perhaps Russell might not have died at the early age of 97 if he’d eschewed this habit.

On a more serious note, in this clip Russell is asked one last question by the interviewer: Suppose this film was to be seen by future generations (such as ours) – what final words of advice would he give to such viewers?

www.youtube.com/watch?v=O8h-xEuLm8

A very nice life lesson, indeed!

For those who’d prefer the entire program rather than just a few excerpts, here in its entirety is the 1959 “Face to Face” interview, conducted by John Freeman, from which the above two clips are taken:

www.youtube.com/watch?v=1bZv3pSaLlY

Bertrand Russell is “alive and well” and living on the Internet. For those of us who wish to make sure he continues to be remembered and have influence on the present day, this is a most fitting way for him to endure.

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Lady Kate on her father: “He needed certainty, he loved clarity with a passion, and he could not bear any kind of muddled thinking.” (Katharine Tait, My Father Bertrand Russell, 1975, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p. 184)
ute, more and more, the danger of nuclear war
to the West, to the U.S., and less to Russia.”
And recall that as early as November 1945 he
publically warned of the dangers of nuclear
annihilation and of the need for effective inter-
national law if humanity was to have a reason-
able chance of survival.

It’s true that Russell himself was very
disappointed with the UN owing mainly to the
veto power of “the big five” and consequent
lack of meaningful enforcement. The World
Court is the UN’s primary judicial body, but it’s
true that even if the Court found all nuclear-
armed nations in violation of international law
and ordered a convening of multiparty negotia-
tions in fulfillment of Art. VI obligations, such an
order would ultimately be vulnerable to veto by
any one of the five permanent Security Council
members (all of whom are nuclear-armed
states and parties to the NPT).

True enough. But Russell did recognize
the moral importance of international law and
its just adjudication, even apart from its en-
forcement. This is mainly a matter of showing
that nations are in breach of agreements to
which they are a party. By itself this can be a
highly educational experience, one raising a
public awareness of the need for enforceable
world law and providing an impetus for eventu-
al change in our perilous system of national
sovereignties. This was, no doubt, Russell’s
thinking in August 7, 1964 when, concerned
that the recently-passed Gulf of Tonkin resol-
tion would be followed by U.S. military escal-
a

This is not very different from the RMI’s
approach to the nuclear threat via the NPT and
the World Court.

To its credit, the BRS is already on rec-
ord as supporting the lawsuit. And even if the
suit is ultimately dismissed in both U.S. federal
court and the World Court, it could still be very
important in increasing public understanding of
the workings of the international legal system
and the importance of strengthening it—
provided, of course, that the lawsuit gets pro-
per media attention. Here, I think, the BRS, its
members and friends, can help.

From the
Student Desk
By Landon D. C. Elkind
LANDON-ELKIND@UIOWA.EDU

The Myth of Russell’s “Com-
mon-sense” Argument
Against Monism

M onism is making a comeback in meta-
physical circles. Jonathan Schaffer
has defended monism in his 2010 arti-
cle, “Monism: The Priority of the Whole”. Be-
fore proceeding further, I caution the reader
that Schaffer’s monism differs from the usual
interpretation. With Schaffer, we can distin-
guish existence monism from priority monism
(Schaffer, 32-33). Existence monism holds that
exactly one concrete object exists—namely,
the entire cosmos. Priority monism allows mul-
tiple concrete objects to exist while insisting
that the whole cosmos has ontological priority
to all other concreta.

What this ontological priority relation
amounts to remains an open question, and I do
not wish to engage that issue here. Both sorts
of monisms have appeared in contemporary
metaphysical discussion, and Schaffer’s argu-
ments especially have been widely discussed
(I include some references below). I broug
this Schaffer’s priority monism to this column be-
cause one of his arguments contains an un-
warranted, though understandable, attribution
to Russell.

You may be surprised to discover
among Schaffer’s arguments for priority mon-
ism the bold claim that common sense actually
favors priority monism (Schaffer, 50). Prima
facie, existence monism sounds contrary to
common sense, and contra Schaffer, common
sense likely has no opinion on ontological pri-
ority relations—but let that pass. Let us focus
instead on his false attributions to Russell of a
“common sense argument against monism.”

Schaffer cites two passages from Rus-
sell’s “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”:

So Russell (1985, 36) declares: “I share
the common-sense belief that there are
many separate things; I do not regard
the apparent multiplicity of the world as
consisting merely in phases and unreal
divisions of a single indivisible Reality.”
Russell (1985, 48) then frames the debate as a debate between the commonsensical empiricist pluralist who can see that “there are many things” and the wild-eyed rationalistic monist who would argue a priori that there is only one thing. (Schaffer, 46)

We have Schaffer’s charge. Let us refute it by having the context for each passage.

Preceding Schaffer’s first passage, Russell writes, “When I say that my logic is atomistic, I mean that I share the common-sense belief...” (Russell, 178) Russell intends to indicate here that his atomistic logic differs from “monistic logic,” which hardly constitutes an argument for or against either logic—as Russell explicitly says, “I do not propose to meet the views that I disagree with by controversy, by arguing against those views, but rather by positively setting forth what I believe...” (Russell, 1789-179) The context, I think, shows that Russell does not offer a common-sense argument for or against anything. The first passage merely clarifies Russell’s position “by way of introduction”. (Russell, 182)

So much for the first charge: Russell explicitly denies offering an argument against the “whole-istic logic” (pardon the pun) of the monists. It seems at best inattentive to accuse him of dismissing monists merely by controverting them when Russell denies doing so in the very paragraph Schaffer uses to support his claim. Russell is just describing his view, which is an outcome of a played-out controversy over a decade old.

Now let us have the full quote for this “empirical person” of Schaffer’s second passage.

**Question:** Do you take your starting-point “That there are many things” as a postulate which is to be carried along all through, or has to be proved afterwards?

**Mr. Russell:** No, neither the one nor the other. I do not take it as a postulate that “There are many things”. I should take it that, in so far as it can be proved, the proof is empirical, and that the disproofs that have been offered are a priori. The empirical person would naturally say, there are many things. The monistic philosopher attempts to show that there are not. I should propose to refute his a priori arguments. I do not consider there is any logical necessity for there to be many things, nor for there not to be many things (Russell, 188)

Nowhere in this section or in these lectures, does Russell suggest that a monist is a “wild-eyed rationalistic” person as Schaffer might have us believe. Nor does Russell allow empiricists to stand on common sense (actually, empiricists, per se, are not discussed here, as empirical persons are not necessarily empiricists; Schaffer conflates the two). “The empirical person would naturally say” what pluralists hold. This does not prove pluralism. As Russell says, evidence for either side lies in empirical observation; Russell only faults a priori arguments favoring monism. He does not prejudice the pluralism-monism controversy; he does not even present the controversy here. He merely assumes his view, for which he has extensively argued before.

So much for Russell’s mythical ‘common-sense argument against monism’. None of this shows that Russell never argued against monism. He argued against Hegel’s absolute idealism, an ontologically monistic philosophy. Russell may have offered a common sense argument against monism elsewhere. But he offered no such argument in Schaffer’s cited passages. If we attribute an argument to Russell, then we should do so accurately. To do otherwise violates norms important to philosophy and common sense.

**References**


For some discussions of Schaffer’s arguments for priority monism, see:


Russell versus Bradley on the Unity of Complexes: A Discussion with Katarina Perovic

Katarina Perovic specializes in Metaphysics, 20th century Analytic philosophy, and Philosophy of Language. Her current work focuses in part on the problems of unity of facts and propositions.

Jolen: Russell and Bradley famously debated the unity of complexes. I was surprised to learn from your work that the problem of the unity of complexes is alive and well in contemporary metaphysics. What are some of the contemporary conversations?

Katarina: Yes, the problem of unity is very much alive in the contemporary metaphysical literature! It plays a prominent role within the debate about the ontological status of properties and relations. Say, for example, that in your ontology you are committed to particulars (such as chairs, persons, electrons, etc.) as well as universals (such as blackness, negative charge, being 2m apart, etc.). Imagine also that particulars and universals are connected only contingently—that is, that you take it that this chair happens to be black but that it could have been some other color. The question about unity then arises as follows: What is the ontological ground of this particular chair having the property of blackness? Or, more generally, what is the ontological ground of the unity of particular and universal? Many philosophers—from Plato, to Peter Strawson, Gustav Bergmann, David Armstrong, and more recently, William Vallicella, to name just a few—have agonized over this issue. The worry has been that by introducing a relation or some kind of relation-like tie to connect particulars with their universals, an infinite vicious regress would ensue. What then would be the ontological ground of the unity of the given particular, its property, and this new relation (which has often gone under the name “relation of instantiation”) or “relation of exemplification”)? Many have taken this problem to be quite a debilitating one for realists about universals, though by no means limited to them (the problem of unity can be formulated for bundle theorists as well). The main strategies for solving the problem have been: to invoke the relation of instantiation but deny that the regress ensues because “the job of a relation is to relate” (Brand Blanshard, Reinhardt Grossman); to deny the regress of relations by denying the status of “relation” to the tie between particular and universal (Bergmann, Strawson); to embrace the regress but claim that it is benign (Armstrong at one point, and Francesco Orilia more recently); to introduce some special external relation to do the unifying job (Vallicella, Meinertsen); and to introduce complex entities such as states of affairs or facts as unifiers of particulars and universals (Armstrong).

Jolen: These issues have historical antecedents, for instance, in the famous 1910/1911 dispute in Mind. Could you explain?

Katarina: That’s right. The infinite regress I just described can be traced back to Bradley, who in chapters II and III of his Appearance and Reality (1893) presents three relational regresses against the bundle view of particulars. Bradley’s misgivings about relational unities also came to prominence in the dispute with Russell in Mind 1910/1911. In the supplementary note to his 1910 paper “On Appearance, Error, and Contradiction”, Bradley engages with some issues he finds problematic in Russell’s 1903 Principles of Mathematics. In particular, he challenges the coherence of Russell’s pluralism. If Russell admits in his ontology only simple terms and external relations, how can he also then be committed to unanalyzable complexes of those terms and relations? Bradley thinks that the two positions are in contradiction with one another. For Bradley, if you believe in unanalyzable complexes, then you cannot be a genuine pluralist. In his 1910 reply, Russell’s response was two-fold: on the one hand, he attempted to clarify his use of the notion of “analysis”, and on the other, he tried to explain the difference between a complex and a mere aggregate of terms and relations. The crucial difference, he argues, consists in the way that that the relation enters into a complex—in a complex the relation relates, whereas in an aggregate it enters as a term, i.e., a mere (non-relating) member of an ag-
aggregate. In 1911, Bradley wrote back and pressed Russell further to explain the difference between a relation which relates and the one that doesn’t. Russell did not reply to Bradley on this, and I am not sure why that is.

Jolen: If I recall, you believe that Bradley and Russell do not fully appreciate the difficulties each one presents for the other’s views, or do not fully respond to one another on certain points; is that correct?

Katarina: I am still not sure what to make of their 1910/1911 exchange. On the one hand, it seems that Bradley is assuming the conclusions of his work in Appearance and Reality, where he takes himself to have provided strong arguments against relational unities. He thinks that relations are incoherent—they are supposed to both relate and differentiate between entities, and they simply cannot fulfill this dual role. Perhaps as a result of this puzzlement over relations, Bradley insisted on the “how relations relate” question that he posed to defenders of relations. Now Russell, I think, found Bradley’s insistence on the “how” question odd and did not know how to engage it. For him, it was a given that relations could fulfill a dual role—as non-relating terms, and as relating relations. Whereas I don’t agree with Russell’s dual role for relations, I do agree with his stance on not further explaining the relating role of relations. I find the “how” questions in bottom level metaphysics misplaced. If an entity is introduced to fulfill a certain role, say relate, I don’t quite understand what further needs to be said about it.

Jolen: What consequences does this have for the debates in contemporary metaphysics?

Katarina: I have argued that contemporary metaphysicians ought to be careful when they talk about Bradley’s regress arguments, as if these are strong and compelling arguments. They shouldn’t concede too much to Bradley, for his actual arguments are quite weak and unconvincing. Perhaps they have thought them to be stronger than they actually are because Bradley’s style of writing and arguing is so obscure and lends itself to exceedingly charitable interpretations. Also, I think that there is space for a revival of a neo-Russellian response to the unity problem.

Jolen: What does a neo-Russellian solution to the unity problem look like on your view?

Katarina: Firstly, I think that we should follow Russell and accept external relating relations. These can act as unifiers of relational complexes of the aRb form. Secondly, with respect to monadic states of affairs of the form Fa, I think that we could follow Russell in taking them to be unanalyzable. In my view, states of affairs, particulars, and universals, are ontologically on a par and are all equally ontologically fundamental. They do differ when it comes to what I call explanatory fundamentality (with respect to which states of affairs are more fundamental than particulars and universals) and constitutive fundamentality (with respect to which particulars and universals are more fundamental than states of affairs). But with respect to ontological dependence, which is to be spelled out in terms of existential dependence, I think that all three—particulars, universals, and states of affairs—are on an equal footing.

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By Andrew Bone
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For the Love of Bertie

To be honest, I was only dimly aware of Bertrand Russell when I was growing up in Manchester and as an undergraduate at the University of Birmingham (class of '85). I'm not sure exactly when Bertie first showed up on my mental radar. It was probably shortly after the rebirth of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the early 1980s—which largely passed me by, I must admit—when I surely saw documentary footage of the Trafalgar Square speeches or the Whitehall sit-ins. I remember being intrigued by, but not overly curious about, these glimpses of the nonagenarian protest leader. But at least I had gained some inkling of who Russell was—his significance as a dissenter if not a philosopher. In explaining to people what I now do for a living, usually to well-educated, professional people, I’m consistently surprised by what is often their first query, namely “Who is Bertrand Russell?”

But that complaint is by-the-bye. In 1986 I applied to take a master’s degree in History at McMaster University, partly because they had one of the few graduate schools overseas from which I would not have emerged bankrupt after a year of study. I was interested in my subject, of course, but I anticipated this experience as an adventure, an interlude, certainly not as a prelude to emigration and still less to a career in Russell studies. Early in that year abroad I remember being taken for a tour of the Russell Archives with the rest of the Modern British History seminar led by Dick Rempel, who was then working on volumes 13 and 14 of the Collected Papers (the First World War years). At that time the Archives were housed above ground in Mills library, in quarters now occupied by the Museum of Art. A youthful Kenneth Blackwell was in charge.

I think some of my fellow students may have used the Russell collection for their term papers. I chose not to. (I think I produced something on the British Communist Party’s political contortions after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.) Nevertheless, I was rather surprised that such a comparatively small institution (McMaster was probably barely half the size that it is now) had managed to snap the private papers of somebody whom I fully appreciated by then was an intellectual Titan of the twentieth century. The story of how the Russell Archives made it to McMaster is much better known (and far more dramatic, I might add) than how I made it there, and has been well told by Nick Griffin in this very journal (“How the Russell Papers Came to McMaster”, no. 123, Aug. 2004).

After I returned to Britain in the fall of 1987, it looked as if my association with Bertie was destined to remain fleeting, vicarious even. But after a dismal “gap” year working in some menial capacity for the recently privatised British Telecom—during which I at least managed to experience pre-Velvet Revolution Prague and Berlin with the Wall still up—I committed myself to the uncertain long haul of doctoral study in history back at McMaster. I understand how it might seem a little odd for a British national to move overseas to study his country’s history. But I liked the idea of keeping one foot back in the UK, as I knew that some lengthy research trips back home would be required. I also got along famously with Dick Rempel, who was going to supervise my work and suggested my thesis topic—“DORA”: not Bertie’s second wife, but the Defence of the Realm Act, the emergency legislation under which Russell was twice prosecuted during the First World War.

Russell featured only briefly in my study, which was really concerned with the administrative and legal evolution of these sprawling and infinitely flexible wartime powers. Most of the documentation was gathered from the Home Office and War Office Papers at the (then) Public Records Office in London. But I did draw upon the Russell Archives (and the Collected Papers) for the first time. The first passage that I ever wrote about Russell quoted one of his editorials in The Tribunal. He was...
commenting upon the usefulness of legal proceedings under DORA for publicizing the plight of the conscientious objectors he so vigilantly defended. Concerning his own trial (in June 1916), quoting from a letter to Ottoline, I wrote that “absolutely the only point of making a speech and defending myself was to have it reported’. His ‘defence’ was a blistering attack on the Government and an impassioned justification of absolute freedom of conscience”. The point I was making was that, because of formidable adversaries such as Russell, British officialdom was often reluctant to deploy the draconian powers which had been vested in them.

I wrote those words in 1993 or 1994, without any inkling that they would be prefatory to a long, by now almost twenty-year, professional association with the world of Russell studies. Indeed, this transition was not exactly seamless. I got “on board” courtesy of Dick Rempel when I was a destitute overseas student desperately trying to finish off his thesis. At first I was just checking quotes and references and doing other tasks that our very able students do under my supervision today. But then I wrote the odd annotation and showed some kind of facility for this and other aspects of the editorial work, thanks also to the expert tutelage that was on hand. I’ve since written countless annotations to Russell’s writings and hundreds of headnotes in five or six volumes of Collected Papers (some not yet published). Of course, Russell is perennially fascinating, and never ceases to throw up surprises given the huge range of his preoccupations extending over many decades. But more than that, I enjoy the layered architecture of the editorial work. I get that it is not everybody’s cup of tea. (The material dictates to you rather than vice versa). But I find it agreeable and think that I am temperamentally suited to it. So there you go: how I got a job and learned to love Bertie.

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Hollams. He later joined the firm of Sir John Withers, MP, where Davies became Russell’s lawyer and where Russell remained after Davies left to join the civil service. Postmaster-General Sir Herbert Samuel offered Davies the position of solicitor to the Post Office sometime after March 1911. He held this position during the Marconi scandal of 1912–13. He was eventually dismissed, in 1921, because of the support he shared with his wife, the former Moya O’Connor, for the Sinn Féin movement.

Moya Llewelyn Davies (1881–1943), daughter of James O’Connor, Irish journalist, nationalist and MP for West Wicklow 1892–1910, lost her mother and four sisters to seafood poisoning. When he was engaged to her, Davies reminded Russell that Moya had met him “walking over the mountains of Killarney” (in southwest Eire). Furry Park had become a safe-house for Michael Collins, the Irish revolutionary. More details on this connection have emerged since Davis’ 1980 study of Russell and his connections with Ireland.¹

Moya Llewelyn Davies was deeply involved in the struggle for Irish freedom. Early in 1920 she was arrested and imprisoned. Supporting correspondence from her husband was discovered. It was then that he was dismissed, in June 1921, from his position as Solicitor to the Post Office. Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s truce in the Irish troubles soon followed. Davies’ viewpoint was well known to Michael Collins. Collins was a plenipotentiary for the Irish Republic. Davies provided him with capsule insights into the characters of Lloyd George and his Secretary of State for War and Air, Winston Churchill, in the ensuing negotiations for the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 6 December 1921. It is now generally known—contra Russell’s claim in the portrait, where he says the opposite—that Davies drafted, or helped to draft, the treaty. He also drafted speeches for Collins until opponents in the Irish Civil War killed Collins. Davies was appointed Arbitrator and Inspector General in Land Matters in the Irish Free State created on 6 December 1922. During this period Russell and Davies did not meet, but from the scattered references at the time it is clear that Russell sympathized with the Sinn Féin cause, though not with the “appalling outrages by all parties”, as he termed them in 1922 (Collected Papers 15: 379).

On Davies’ dismissal as Solicitor to the Post Office, Russell vacillated over the political aspect of the event. He expressed the dismissal in very different ways. In the 1931 draft of his autobiography, he wrote that Davies “threw up his job in indignation when his wife was imprisoned.” In the 1949 revision it became “but was dismissed at a moment’s notice for sympathy with Sinn Féin”, which was shortened when published to: “He was dismissed at a moment’s notice” (Auto. 1: 59). Yet the outline for the portrait of Davies puts it this way: “he disagreed with the policy of suppression in Ireland, and therefore reverted to private practice” (RA1 220.017270)

The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 gave Ireland, except for the six northern counties which quickly opted out, its near-independence from Britain in the form of dominion status. Although it ended the Anglo-Irish War (or Irish War of Independence) of 1919–21, the treaty triggered an eleven-month civil war. Russell did not comment on the Irish Civil War or, to my knowledge, on the terrorism of the 1939 “England Campaign” of the original IRA or Ireland’s neutrality in World War II.

Answer to Not Necessarily Trivial Query (p. 4): Who Influenced Russell’s Early Writing Style and Was Also His Favorite Poet?

The English Romantic poet, Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822), is one of the finest lyric poets in the English language. Russell wrote to Ottoline Morrell (11 Sep 1911, #199): “Shelley was a wonderful discovery. I remember the moment now. I was alone in my Aunt Maude Stanley’s room at Dover Street, and by accident I took out the Golden Treasury Selections from Shelley and began reading Alastor—it utterly carried me away, and I couldn’t understand how grown-up people, who admired Shakespeare and Milton could fail to care about Shelley. I got a passionate personal love of him—more than for anyone I knew.” Shelley was married to Mary Shelley, the author of Frankenstein and daughter of William Godwin. Also a brilliant essayist and playwright, Shelley held radical political and social views. He drowned in Italy at age 29.

Engaged Peer-to-Peer Learning: A Pilot Archival Research Project

By Nancy Doubleday
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McMaster University is well known in the international community of Russell Studies as the home of the Bertrand Russell Archives. In addition, it is host to over thirty peace archives from a wide range of individual, institutional and other sources, and many more archives with direct and indirect connections to peace and peace movements.

When I came to McMaster in 2009 to take up the HOPE Chair in Peace and Health, it was exciting to see the remarkable opportunity for primary research that the Russell Archives presented. I was surprised to find that the Archives were generally lightly used by our Peace Studies undergraduate students, and that the student body seemed largely unaware of the special value and significance of the Bertrand Russell Archives. This became a consideration as we thought about new course activities for Peace Studies, and one that would seem to align well with Russell’s view of the role of teachers:

It should be one of the functions of the teacher to open vistas before his pupils showing them the possibility of activities that will be as delightful as they are useful, thereby letting loose their kind impulses and preventing the growth of a desire to rob others of joys that they will have missed.

Although Russell was thinking mainly of children in primary or secondary education as he wrote, surely the “reverence” toward the learner that he advocates as an antidote to authority, and the necessity of an attitude of humility, as a teacher, apply in institutions of higher learning? The idea of a project-based learning course initiative also seemed to align with our institutional goals, when in 2011, our new President, Patrick Deane initiated a discussion of McMaster’s future direction under the guiding vision of his letter to the McMaster community titled “Forward with Integrity.” This document flagged student experience, community engagement, research and internationalization as matters of key importance, and identified a number of aspects for special emphasis. Under “student experience” in this document, these aspects included: “experiential learning, self-directed learning, and interdisciplinarity”. The account of integrity in education contained in the Presidential letter states in part:

... the success of McMaster has been the success of an integrated and balanced model of the academic mission—one that seeks not merely to do both undergraduate teaching and advanced research, but that sees the two as vitally connected and indeed seeks to extend the methods and assumptions of first-class research into the creation of outstanding educational programs, naturally allowing for discrepant levels of experience and differing goals. If, like any human institution, we sometimes fall short of our own ideal, this means only that we have more work to do, not that the ideal itself is vitiated.

How better to share this “vital connection” with undergraduate students than to bring them into contact with one of the great thinkers and strategists of the peace movement of the 20th century, through examples from his own letters and papers?

Then, thinking of peace itself, and the need for communication and collaboration at all scales of human endeavour, the idea of forming a peer-to-peer learning community became part of the course design. This thinking also served the emerging vision of peace studies at McMaster as an engaged, interdisciplinary field that demands the linking of theory and practice, through active learning and research. Such an approach empowers learners by encouraging their desire to learn, and by fostering the seeds of early intellectual independence.
On reflection, this approach also seems much in sympathy with Russell’s views of the purpose of education as the nurturing of intelligence:

I regard the cultivation of intelligence, therefore, as one of the major purposes of education. This might seem a commonplace, but in fact it is not. The desire to instill what are regarded as correct beliefs has made educationists too often indifferent to the training of intelligence. To make this clear, it is necessary to define intelligence a little more closely, so as to discover the mental habits that it requires. For this purpose, I shall consider only the aptitude for acquiring knowledge....The widespread interest in gossip is inspired not by a love of knowledge, but by malice: no one gossips about other people’s secret virtues, but only about their secret vices....Curiosity properly so-called, on the other hand, is inspired by a genuine love of knowledge.7

But intelligence alone is not enough to realize Russell’s vision as to what is good in education, it seems, and he emphasizes the importance of vitality, courage and “sensitiveness”8, a quality that would enable us to avoid creating much misery through nurturing empathy. We know that Russell took a broad, developmental view of education, writing that the role of impulse and goal of education should not be the stifling of impulse but rather “the direction of impulse toward life and growth rather than toward death and decay.”9 He also argues the importance of offsetting authority with reverence, and an attitude of humility.

We also know that Russell takes care to distinguish education as a special case within social reconstruction, as “liberty...is...essentially negative: it condemns all avoidable interference with freedom, without giving a positive principle of construction. But education is essentially constructive, and requires some positive construction of what constitutes a good life.”10 Russell does not shrink from asserting the potential of humans for developing capacities for thinking and feeling through education, in order to avoid causing suffering and to be happy, and therefore good:

I should wish to persuade those to whom traditional morals have gone dead, and who yet feel the need of some serious purpose over and above momentary pleasure, that there is a way of thinking and feeling which is not difficult for those who have been trained in its opposite, and which is not one of self-restraint, negation and condemnation. The good life, as I conceive it, is a happy life. I do not mean that if you are good, you will be happy; I mean that if you are happy, you will be good....It is not by making others suffer that we shall achieve our own happiness....11

In this way we come to understand a view of education as having the potential to lead us to thinking and feeling in ways that enable happiness, and thus lead us to a good life, rather than to the darkness of suffering.

When I took up the challenge of teaching the first year Introduction to Peace Studies, PS 1A03, initially to a class of just under two hundred students, then two years later, to four hundred students; I began to look for ways to create unique engaged learning experiences involving primary sources and discovery. Discussions with librarians and archivists Rick Stapleton and Wade Wyckoff, and with Russell experts, Ken Blackwell and Nick Griffin, encouraged formulation of the idea of an archives module within the introductory Peace Studies class. In Fall Term 2012, we added the equivalent of a six-lecture unit on Russell, aspects of his work on peace and war, and a consideration of trauma.

This module gave first year students an introduction to archives and archival research, and to Russell and his views of the First World War, and then provided an exposure to the troubling case of Siegfried Sassoon.

Rick Stapleton, Library Archivist, presented an inspiring guest lecture, featuring an introduction to the Russell Archives and to archival research generally, including the thirty-plus peace and war archives that Mills Library at McMaster holds. Two further lectures expanded on elements of Russell’s concern with war and its consequences, including nuclear war. One lecture was given by Kevin Blaker, a Masters student in History, who explored Russell’s later work for Peace, including the creation of Pugwash and the first international conference held under the sponsorship of Cyrus Eaton.

Another lecture followed where we looked at the experience of Siegfried Sassoon, a British officer and poet, who fought under the dreadful conditions in the field in France during World War I. In brief, Sassoon’s experiences and his writing presented a challenge to conventional views of courage, duty and mental health
of the day, as well as to the military and civilian authorities managing the war effort. Sassoon was deeply affected by the agonies suffered in the trenches in France by the men under his command, and he was further provoked by the attitudes of the military commanders and their apparent indifference to this suffering. As well, Sassoon perceived that the war was in fact one of aggression, and not, as was publicly portrayed, for purposes of defense. Suffering from dysentery in 1916, Sassoon was sent back to Britain to convalesce. During this period he made connections with the British pacifists, and so came into contact with Bertrand Russell and Ottoline Morrell. This was a period of very active organizing by the pacifists in Britain. As an officer whose background included “natural advantages” of wealth and status, Sassoon had access to very public channels to make his objections known, and did so, publishing his views in a statement, titled “Finished with the War: A Soldier’s Declaration” (also referred to as “Sassoon’s Declaration against the War”), “in willful defiance of military authority” in June 1917. This action led to his being relieved of his duties, and through the good offices of his friend and fellow poet, Robert Graves, installed in a British medical institution, the Craiglockhart War Hospital.

We examined one of Russell’s letters to Ottoline Morrell to introduce Russell’s commentary on some of the prevailing attitudes toward Sassoon and his protest. In it, Russell writes to Morrell saying “The last I heard from S.S. (Siegfried Sassoon) they were still treating him by kindness. I suppose soon they will begin saying he is mad.”

Thanks to the Bertrand Russell Archives, and to Rick Stapleton, we were able to share copies of original documents, as well as typescripts, with the students.

Student interest was piqued. It seems likely that Sassoon was accorded some consideration arising, at least in part, from class distinctions, when he was sent to hospital rather than to prison. The case also allowed questions to be asked about the perception of mental illness at the time. Neurasthenia, more commonly known as “shell-shock”, was a persistent condition which would fall within the ambit of the syndrome that we now call “post-traumatic stress disorder”, or PTSD. Students began to grasp some of the nuances concerning social justice in relation to norms imposed by the conditions of war, and to some extent, appreciation of Russell’s role more generally in pro-peace, anti-war processes at the time.

At the end of introductory course, I found myself standing long after the final evening lecture concluded with a small but enthusiastic group of students discussing the possibilities for continuing the exploration of the importance of archival research as a form of the forensic reconstruction of memory and truth, so necessary to the realization of peace and justice, in conflict zones. From this discussion, and consultation amongst Russell mentors, we developed a proposal for an independent archival research course, based on a peer-to-peer learning model.

The course was approved, and offered on a Dean’s letter of permission in Winter Term 2013. The new course was delivered at two different course levels, PS 2E03 for first and second year students, and PS 4E03, intended for third and fourth year. This inclusive design allowed us to make the opportunity available to the widest constituency possible, and to form a multi-level “learning community” centred on a shared interest in archival research, and containing varying levels of expertise, to the benefit and mutual enrichment of all.

All class activities were common to both 2E03 and 4E03 sections, and consisted of three parts: 1) an introduction and orientation to the McMaster archival collections related to Peace Studies, with a special focus on the Bertrand Russell papers; 2) an introduction to digital archives and related digital research with The Sherman Centre for Digital Scholarship; and 3) an independent archival research project on a topic of the student’s choice, with a final product, to be agreed upon. This could consist of a paper, a presentation, or other scholarly contribution. We acknowledge with thanks the many, valuable, collegial contributions, particularly the direct contributions to part 1 by Rick Stapleton of the William Ready Archives; to part 2 by Sandra Lapointe and Dale Askey of the Sherman Centre for Digital Humanities and their staff; and to part 3 by Nick Griffin and Ken Blackwell, of the Russell Centre and Archives. Without such collegial cooperation, the course could not have taken place.

The first and second parts of the archival course built upon the lectures in PS 1A03 in the previous term (described above), expanded with site visits to the Russell Archives, and to the Sherman Centre for Digital Humanities. The third component, the research contribution, was the student’s own individual opportunity to be curious and determine his or her path. On the basis of affinities and timetables, small peer-to-peer units were then formed within the class, for the purpose of mutual support and peer review. All students were required to keep a log of their research activities.

Eleven students participated in Winter Term in 2013, with four being registered in PS 2E03, and seven in PS 4E03, all with a clear commitment to archival research, and many with an interest in Russell or his contemporaries. Approximately half chose a topic directly connected to Russell. The highly-condensed academic, on-line McMaster calendar description gives little indication of the possibilities of student...
creativity in response, and it was gratifying to receive student works on a wide range of topics, including the internal financial workings of a peace group, the contributions of Vera Brittain to peace literature and the role of personal experience in shaping her views, and, of course, contributions concerning Russell and his work for peace. One lovely paper examined the efforts of Dora and Bertrand Russell to provide educational opportunities in keeping with their views of cultivating children as people. Another thoughtful contribution considered the role of the Spanish civil war on Russell’s views of pacifism. The contributions were diverse and interesting. (Some were also wonderfully ambitious—one proposed to investigate the contents of 58 boxes of documents.) All of the students enrolled in 2013 completed the course. Many then presented their work at the 2013 Peace Studies Symposium at McMaster in April.

In Winter Term 2014, a second Peer-to-Peer archival course was offered. Of the seventeen students enrolled, twelve pursued a sustainable urban design challenge, while the remaining five chose topics of historical interest, involving archival research either at McMaster or in the Hamilton Public Library Archives. Two students focused on Russell and his work, in particular: one investigated the Sino-India boundary dispute and Russell’s role in attempting to resolve it; while another examined the scope and subject matter of Russell’s *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*. All students presented their work during the 2014 Peace Studies Symposium. Two students from this class also participated in our panel of student work at the Pegasus Conference on Peace, Health and Sustainability, held in Toronto in May.14

Student feedback over the two-year period indicates that students very much appreciated this course for the freedom that it offered to explore, and to make their own discoveries. For some, it was the only opportunity the individual had had during university to freely select a topic with which to work.

Does this matter? Yes, I believe that it does—if we value curiosity, as Russell does. In connection with intelligence and knowledge, it must matter very much. To go further, if we respected the autonomy of the learner, surely we would allow the learner greater freedom to engage? Again, we find Russell has already charted the way in his chapter on “Education” in his *Principles of Social Reconstruction*:

> Instead of obedience and discipline, we ought to aim at preserving independence and impulse. Instead of ruthlessness, education should try to develop justice in thought. Instead of contempt, it ought to instill reverence, and the attempt at understanding; toward the opinions of others it ought to produce, not necessarily acquiescence, but only such opposition as is combined with imaginative apprehension and a clear realisation of the grounds for opposition. Instead of credulity, the object should be to stimulate constructive doubt, the love of mental adventure, the sense of worlds to conquer by enterprise and boldness in thought.15

In this pilot project, we may not have achieved Russell’s greater aims for education fully, nor could we hope to, but perhaps we have succeeded in incorporating some of the values he espouses. Russell writes, parenthetically, in his autobiography that: “I have come nearest expressing myself in the chapter on Education in *Social Reconstruction*. But it is a very long way from a really full self-expression. You are hindered by timidity.”16 To the extent that the course has spun off ideas for further studies sustaining continuing interest among the students, encouraged a deeper appreciation of the value of the Russell Archives at McMaster, and established the foundation of a young learning community with surprising cohesion and durability among the undergraduates who participated, I hope it has made some modest contribution to what Russell terms “the direction of impulse toward life and growth rather than toward death and decay.”17

As an instructor and relative newcomer to the world of Russell, this exploration has given me fresh sources of argument to add to those of Paulo Freire, and others who position education centrally within our search for justice: for example, when Russell writes in 1951 at the end of *New Hopes for a Changing World* of the significance of the convergence of heart and mind, leading to a harmony amongst humanity “not only understood, but deeply felt”, he foresees it leading to a melting away of “all the problems of the world politics, even the most abstruse and difficult”. Poetically, Russell proclaims in the closing paragraph of this work: “Suddenly, as when mist dissolves from a mountain top, the landscape would be visible and the way would be clear. It is only necessary to open the doors of our hearts, and minds to let the imprisoned demons escape and the beauty of the world take possession.” Linking undergraduate learning to original research offers many opportunities to encourage greater degrees of what Russell calls “…constructive doubt, the love of mental adventure, the sense of worlds to conquer by enterprise and boldness in thought”18. How much more worthwhile a goal is there for those who love learning and research?
Endnotes

1 http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/russell.htm
4 Russell, 1921, 147.
5 http://www.mcmaster.ca/presidentsoffice/fwi.html
6 http://www.mcmaster.ca/presidentsoffice/fwi.html
8 Russell, 2009, 403.
9 Russell,1921, 18.
10 Russell, 1921, 145.
12 Russell, to Ottoline Morrell BRA Collection: RA3 Class: 69 Document #: 001523 Source if not BR: TXU 1st Recipient: Morrell, Ottoline
1st Sender: BR Date: 1917/07/12* Form of letter: ALS(M) Sheets of paper: 1 Record was last changed: 19901207 Record # in BRACERS: 0018727
13 McMaster University Peace Studies PS 2E03 Course Description: “Selected problems of evidence in archival research investigated by student-led, peer-to-peer problem-based inquiry, emphasizing use of primary sources such as the Russell Archives and other peace-related archival collections at McMaster.”
15 Russell, 1921, 155–56.
17 Russell, 1921, 17–18.
18 Russell, 1921, 155–56.

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A Reason for Everything (with a Response to Anything)

Excerpt from Russell’s New York Times Obituary by Alden Whitman, 3 February 1970:

Although he wrote a book about the mysteries of relativity, he humorously admitted that he could not change a light bulb or understand the workings of an automobile engine. However, he had a reason for everything. William Jovanovich, the American publisher, recalled that as a Harvard student he ate in a cafeteria where the food was cheap and not very good. "I would sit at a long public table where on many occasions also sat the philosopher Bertrand Russell," Mr. Jovanovich said. "One day I could not contain my curiosity.'Mr. Russell,' I said, 'I know why I eat here. It is because I am poor. But why do you eat here?' 'Because,' he said, 'I am never interrupted.'
Emotivism, Error, and the Metaethics of Bolshevism

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I. The Metaethic Russell Renounced

In 1913 Russell gave up on the Moorean Good.¹ He ceased to believe in a non-natural property of goodness, which it is somehow the business of all rational or moral beings to promote. This had been his belief since at least 1903 when he enthusiastically reviewed G.E Moore’s Principia Ethica², though his conversion probably dated back to the 1890s (Russell on Ethics: 9, 73, 87).

Moore’s idea of a non-natural property is a little hard to explain, but basically a non-natural property is a property that cannot be reduced to or identified with the properties posited by science or common-sense. According to Moore (and, for at least a decade, Bertrand Russell) goodness and badness are fundamental and mind-independent features of reality which cannot be explained any further. They are just there, instantiated by some states of affairs but not by others. This is not to say that goodness and badness are inaccessible to us or that we don’t know quite a lot about them. On the contrary, we do. Goodness and badness have elective affinities for some natural properties as opposed to others, a sort of metaphysical tendency to hang around with them (so to speak) so that states of affairs exemplifying friendship tend to be good and states of affairs exemplifying lasciviousness or cruelty tend to be bad. Furthermore, these elective affinities are cognizable. By contemplating a state of affairs involving friendship and/or the enjoyment of beautiful objects in the mind’s eye, we can tell not only that it would be good but roughly how good it would be likely to be. Of course people can make mistakes. But this is because they have not focused on exactly the right entities, confounding one property with another that usually accompanies it or failing to distinguish between different but similar states of affairs. Once we are clear as to what we are thinking about, the unaided intellect can disclose which things are good and which bad, which better and which best.

It is not perhaps surprising that a philosopher like Russell who valued ‘that feeling for reality which is somehow the business of all rational or moral beings to promote’⁴ would eventually abandon such a theory. But not believing in non-natural goodness still leaves you with a wide range of meta-ethical options.

II. Four Meta-Ethical Options

1) You can be a naturalist, founding morality on supposed natural facts of some kind such as facts about what we would approve of under certain circumstances (as with Hutcheson and Hume in the Eighteenth Century) or facts about what we desire to desire or what we are ideally disposed to desire (as with Russell himself in an earlier incarnation and his unwitting disciple David Lewis about eighty years later).⁵ The advantage of this approach is that it promises to give you moral truths without metaphysical spooks. Good and bad, right and wrong can be objective (or at least intersubjective) affairs, but we don’t need to postulate anything metaphysically weird in order to back them up. To use the convenient jargon of the up-to-date philosopher, the truthmakers for moral claims are natural facts of some kind, and because (so it is claimed) there are natural facts of this kind, it follows that some moral claims are actually true. Thus the various brands of naturalism are species of moral realism as defined by the philosopher Geoffrey Sayre-McCord.⁶ They claim that moral judgments are in the true/false game and that some of them are winners since they are actually true. Furthermore, we can get moral truth without the aid of anything as uncanny as non-natural properties of goodness and badness or the Platonic Form of the Good. Note, however, that naturalism does not guarantee you moral truth, since the facts on which you propose to found morality may turn out to be non-facts. For example, if you try to base morality on supposed facts about what we are all disposed to approve of under certain circumstances, many moral judgments will come out false if it turns out that there is nothing (or nothing much) of which we are all disposed to approve. The meta-ethical systems of Hutcheson and Hume were founded on the hypothesis of a shared moral sense (a disposition to approve of some things and to disapprove of others) which was hard-wired by God according to Hutcheson, and part hard-wired and part socially-evolved according to Hume. They collapse into relativism if there is no shared moral sense.
2) You can be a non-cognitivist or (as it is nowadays somewhat coyly called) an expressivist. The idea is that moral judgments are not in the true/false game (or at least not in the hard-core true/false game), that they are not rea-lio-trullo true or false. Their function is not to represent reality or to say how things are— rather their function is to express emotions (as with the emotivists Ayer and Stevenson), to convey imperatives (as with the prescriptivist R.M. Hare\(^5\)) or to express wishes (as with Russell himself from 1935 onwards, at least with respect to ‘good’). Non-cognitivism is an anti-realist view according to Sayre-McCord’s taxonomy, as it denies that moral judgments are in the true/false game and consequently denies that any of them are genuinely true.

3) You can be an error theorist. Here the idea is that moral judgments are in the true/false game, that they do purport to represent a moral reality, but that there is no answering realm of reality for moral judgments to represent. Consequently they are all of them false. (This isn’t quite right. The correct thing for an error-theorist to say to avoid tricky counter-arguments is that all non-negative atomic moral judgments are false, but these niceties need not concern us here.) Thus if you think a) that moral judgments are indeed in the true/false game; b) that morality presupposes a non-natural property of goodness; and c) that there is no such property, then the error theory looks like the right option for you. Moral judgments – at least moral judgments involving the word ‘good’ – are systematically false. This was famously the view of the Australian philosopher J.L. Mackie as expressed in well-known book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.\(^7\) What is less widely known is that Russell himself developed a version of the error theory in a brief but brilliant paper ‘Is There an Absolute Good’, which he delivered to the Apostles in 1922 (RoE: 119-124).

4) Finally, you can adopt a hybrid theory, emotivist or error-theoretic in some parts, naturalistic in others. This is what Russell eventually did. (RoE: 131-144.) His predominant theory from 1935 onwards went something like this: judgments about what things are good or bad in themselves (as opposed to good or bad of a kind, or good or bad for this or that purpose) express the speaker’s wishes. When I say that a life inspired by love and guided by knowledge is good, what I mean (according to Russell) is ‘Would that everyone desired a life inspired by love and guided by knowledge’. This is, as Russell puts it, in the ‘optative mood’, since it expresses a wish or a desire (a desire as to what everybody should desire). When Russell opines that a life inspired by love and guided by knowledge is good, he is not stating that he desires that everybody should desire this, so the theory is not a form of subjectivism as narrowly conceived (subjectivism being roughly the view that ‘X is good’ means ‘I, the speaker, approve of X’). Thus judgments about good and bad are neither true nor false, and Russell’s theory thus far is simply a variant of emotivism. But instead of expressing approval and disapproval (as with the emotivism of A. J. Ayer)\(^6\), moral judgments express desires about what everyone should desire. (To say that possessiveness is bad is either to say ‘Would that everybody did not desire possessiveness’ or perhaps to say ‘Would that everybody desired the opposite of possessiveness’.) But that’s only judgments about ‘good’ and ‘bad’. What about right or wrong? In Russell’s view, ‘the right act, in any given circumstances, is that which, on the data, will probably produce the greatest balance of good over evil’, and the right rule or policy is likewise the one that can be expected to produce the best effects. But if ‘Y is good’ is really in the optative mood, amounting to the exclamation ‘Would that everyone desired Y’; then ‘X is right’ would appear to be optative too, since it comes down to something like ‘X leads to more of what [would that everyone desired!]’. Here, the clause in square brackets, which is obviously in the optative mood, seems to infect the entire sentence with its optative character which means that it is neither true nor false.

However, Russell thought that judgments about what is right or what ought to be done can be given an analysis which gives them a sort of ersatz objectivity and hence the possibility of truth. If Dmitri has a coherent set of opinions about which things are good and which bad, then, although Dmitri’s opinions themselves are neither true nor false — since, despite appearances, they are not really opinions at all but optative expressions of Dmitri’s desires — it can nevertheless be true or false that X is good in Dmitri’s opinion, that is, good-according-to-Dmitri. This means that although there are no facts-of-the-matter about which things are good and which bad, there are facts-of-the-matter about what people believe to be good or believe to be bad and, consequently, facts about whether a given action or policy is likely to promote what somebody believes to be good or to minimize what they believe to be bad.

Now, suppose we define the right act or policy with respect to group or person B as ‘that which, on the data, will probably produce the greatest balance of what B believes to be good over what B believes to be evil’. Then, so long as B has a reasonably coherent set of ideals, claims of the form ‘X is right wrt B’ will be...
either true or false. And if ‘B’ stands in for us (whoever ‘we’ may be) and if we share a reasonably coherent set of ideals, then there will be a fact of the matter about whether X is right or wrong with respect to our ideals. To use Russell’s example, so long as we are agreed that minimizing murder and other crimes is good and that inflicting unnecessary pain is bad, then it can be true for us that we ought to have a graduated scale of penalties enforced by an efficient police force, which is what Bentham effectively argued for at the beginning of the 19th century. Furthermore, the truthmakers for Bentham’s claims will be perfectly natural facts a) about our preferences and the policies likely to promote them which hold in virtue of b) facts about how potential criminals are likely to behave under the influence of different incentive-structures. Thus we have a form of non-cognitivism with respect to good and evil but a queer sort of relativized naturalism when it comes to right and wrong. However despite the naturalistic elements, Russell’s theory is really a non-cognitivist or indeed an emotivist theory. The most basic moral judgments are neither true nor false, and judgments about right and wrong only have a truth-value if they are ruthlessly relativized. For there are no truths about what is really right or wrong (indeed presumably such claims would lack a truth-value) but only truths about what is right or wrong with respect to somebody’s moral preferences.9

III. Two Questions

But I am jumping ahead of myself. For what I have just been explaining is the theory that Russell arrived at in 1935, that is, twenty-two years after abandoning the Moorean Good.10 In the interim he vacillated between the error theory and some kind of emotivism (though the details remain rather underdeveloped). This raises two questions:

A) Why not naturalism? And,

B) Why did he eventually choose a sophisticated form of emotivism rather than the error theory?

The answer to A) is a technical matter to do with Russell’s philosophical commitments. The answer to B) is more speculative, but I am inclined to think that it has a great deal to do with Russell’s adventures as anti-war activist and his traumatic encounters with Bolshevism. Let’s take them in order.

IV. Why Not Naturalism?

Why didn’t Russell plump for naturalism? Because he continued to accept a large part of Moore’s argument. Moore’s key argument that it is a fallacy – the Naturalistic Fallacy – to identify goodness with a natural property is the Open Question Argument or the OQA. As I reconstruct it, it goes something like this:

(1*) ‘Are X things good?’ is a significant or open question for any naturalistic or metaphysical predicate ‘X’ (whether simple or complex). [A question is significant or open if an understanding of the language does not suffice for an answer. Thus ‘Are bachelors unmarried?’ is not an Open Question.]

(2*) If two expressions (whether simple or complex) are synonymous, this is evident on reflection to every competent speaker.

(3*) The meaning of a predicate or property word is the property for which it stands. Thus if two predicates or property words have distinct meanings, they name distinct properties.

From (1*) and (2*) it follows that

(4*) ‘Good’ is not synonymous with any naturalistic or metaphysical predicate ‘X’ (or ‘goodness’ with any corresponding noun or noun-phrase ‘X-ness’).
If ‘good’ were synonymous with some naturalistic predicate ‘X’, then this would be obvious on reflection to every competent speaker. Hence there would be some question of the form ‘Are X things good?’ which would not appear to be open to competent speakers, since an understanding of the words involved would suffice for an affirmative answer. Given (1*), there is no such question; hence ‘good’ is not synonymous with any naturalistic predicate ‘X’.

From (3*) and (4*) it follows that

(5*) Goodness is not identical with any natural or metaphysical property of X-ness.

This argument is valid (and not question-begging as some philosophers have alleged it to be). So if you want to consistently reject the conclusion, you must reject one of the premises. Russell subscribed to this argument down to 1912 but rejected its conclusion thereafter. So which premise did he deny? Well, he continued to accept Premises (1*) and (2*) and hence sub-conclusion (4*). That is, he continued to believe that ‘good’ is not synonymous with any naturalistic or metaphysical predicate ‘X’. The premise that Russell rejected was Premise (3*), though even this he continued to accept albeit in a modified form:

(3**) The meaning of a predicate is the property for which it stands, so long as that predicate is a) a complete symbol and b) factually meaningful. Thus, if two complete and factually meaningful predicates have distinct meanings, they denote distinct properties.

For Russell, the meaning of a complete symbol in a factually significant proposition is the entity for which it stands, from which it follows that the meaning of a complete predicate (in a factually significant proposition) is the property for which it stands. Hence if ‘good’ is a complete predicate in a factually significant proposition, then Moore’s argument would follow through. But ‘good’ (or even ‘is good’) is either not a complete symbol (in which case the error theory is true) or not a constituent of a factually significant proposition (in which case some kind of non-cognitivism must be correct). A complete symbol for Russell is a Russellian name, that is, an expression whose meaning consists in the entity for which it stands. An incomplete symbol is something like a definite description that refers only in the context of a sentence and can continue to function meaningfully even if there is nothing for which it stands, ‘the King of France’ being a paradigm. We can talk meaningfully about the King of France, even though there is no such person, because sentences involving ‘the King of France’ can be analyzed in such a way that the phrase ‘the King of France’ completely disappears. In ‘Is There and Absolute Good?’ Russell suggests something similar for the predicate ‘good’. Like the ‘the King of France’, it is an incomplete symbol which can function meaningfully in the context of a sentence even if there is no corresponding entity – in this case a property. As Russell himself explains ‘my point is that the word “good” does not stand for a predicate [that is, a property] at all, but has a meaning only in the sense in which descriptive phrases have meaning, i.e. in use, not in isolation; further that, when we define it as nearly as possible in accordance with the usage of absolutists, all propositions in which the word “good” has a primary occurrence are false.’ But if sentences involving ‘good’ are not factually significant – if, for instance, they serve to express wishes about what everybody should desire – then again, there is no need to posit a non-natural property of goodness to account for the fact that ‘good’ is not synonymous with any naturalistic or metaphysical predicate ‘X’. Either way, naturalism is out since ‘good’ is not synonymous with any naturalistic predicate, but some form on anti-realism is in, since sentences involving ‘good’ are either systematically false or neither true nor false. That left Russell with just two choices: the error theory or emotivism. Why was it emotivism that he eventually plumped for?

V. Humanistic Amorality

There are technical difficulties with Russell’s version of the error theory that I don’t want to go into in this paper. For now I want to consider the moral consequences of these rival meta-ethics. If emotivism is true, does this mean that we should give up moralizing or give up morality? Obviously not. Russell faced up to the issue in ‘Reply to Criticisms’ in 1944. ‘I am accused of inconsistency, perhaps justly, because, although I hold ultimate ethical valuations to be subjective [that is, neither true nor false], I nevertheless allow myself emphatic opinions on ethical questions … I am quite at a loss to understand why any one should be sur-
prised at my expressing vehement ethical judgments. By my own theory, I am, in doing so, expressing vehement desires as to the desires of mankind; I feel such desires, so why not express them? (RoE: 147-148.) If the moral vocabulary has evolved to express our desires—specifically our desires about what everyone should desire—it is hard to see how there could be anything objectionable about using it for its express purpose. By his own lights (as of 1944), Russell was simply using the language of good and evil to do what it was designed to do—that is to express his wishes as to what mankind should want.

But if the error theory is true, then everything a bit more problematic. Of course, if morality is systematically false, it does not follow that we morally ought to give up moralizing or to give up morality, since if the error theory is correct there really isn’t anything that we morally ought to do. Mackie argues that although morality is systematically false, it is a myth we need to believe, reserving the error theory for moments of meta-ethical clarity, since morality reinforces social cooperation. Even the error-theorist himself is probably better off succumbing to the illusion in his off-duty hours, for the most part acting and thinking like a true believer even though the doctrine that he defends in his study is inconsistent with his everyday moral beliefs. But if morality consists of falsehoods, then moralizing looks like lying, and living by one’s moral beliefs (or make-beliefs) looks like allowing one’s life to be governed by a fiction. Such a course of action would have seemed repulsive to Russell, who confided to his brother that he would rather be ‘mad with truth than sane with lies’ (RoE: 122). There is the further problem that morality sometimes seems to be pernicious in its effects, justifying war, cruelty and social subordination. As Russell wrote to the philosopher Samuel Alexander:

My H[erbert] S[pencer] lecture was partly inspired by disgust at the universal outburst of righteousness in all nations since the war began. It seems the essence of virtue is persecution, and it has given me a disgust of all ethical notions, which evidently are chiefly useful as an excuse for murder (RoE: 107).

And as he noted in Power: a New Social Analysis:

Among human beings, the subjection of women is much more complete at a certain level of civilisation than it is among savages. And the subjection is always reinforced by morality.\(^{12}\)

Thus Russell was inclined to think that if morality is systematically false, then it is sensible, rational and humane to give it up. I call this view ‘humanistic amoralism’, and it is a thesis that Russell hints at in ‘What is Morality’, a review of a book by BM Laing (RoE: 184-188), though he is careful not to own the idea himself, putting it in the mouth of an advocatus diaboli. But this opens up the way for the converse inference. If it is not sensible, rational and humane to give up morality, then perhaps morality is not systematically false. This suggests either moral realism (whether natural or non-natural) or some kind of emotivism. Since naturalism and non-naturalism were both out of the question for Russell, that left only emotivism. This inference I suggest may have prompted Russell’s preference for emotivism over the error theory. For in the 1920s and 1930s Russell was preoccupied with some amoralists who were anything but humane, namely the Bolsheviks as personified by Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin\(^{13}\), and Stalin.

**VI. Error Theorists in Action: Bertrand Russell and the Bolsheviks**

The Bolsheviks were not analytical philosophers, and their pronouncements on meta-ethics are not completely clear. But they were obviously moral sceptics of a fairly radical kind. ‘In what sense do we reject ethics, reject morality?’ asks Lenin. ‘We reject any morality based on extra-human and extra-class concepts. We say that this is deception, dupery, stultification ... there is no such thing as a morality that stands outside human society; that is a fraud’ (Lenin, 1920: 416-417).\(^{14}\) This sounds remarkably like the error theory combined with some variant of amoralism. When he adds that ‘to us morality is subordinated to the interests of the proletariat’s class struggle’, this is clearly intended as a stipulative definition. For a communist, the moral words are to be defined with respect to the class struggle. But this is a linguistic (as well as a moral) innovation. The communist definitions are not supposed to conform to common usage. Lenin, therefore, is an error theorist about the current moral concepts and an amoralist in that he rejects any demands arising from these bourgeois delusions. This meta-ethnic was used to defend the terroristic acts of the Bolshevik state. After all, if nothing is really wrong, it cannot be wrong to shoot hostages. Indeed, shooting hostages may actually be right if we define ‘right actions’ as those which advance the cause of the proletariat or the classless society.
I need not enlarge on the resulting catastrophe since Russell wrote about it himself in *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*. I will only say that recent research suggests that Russell vastly underestimated the murder and mayhem instituted by the early Bolsheviks. My point is that Russell was well aware of the Bolsheviks’ ideas and at least dimly aware of their catastrophic consequences. Now, for Russell at this time there were two meta-ethical alternatives: emotivism and the error theory. He was inclined to think that if the error theory were correct it would be sensible, rational, and humane to give up morality. The Bolshevik experiment indicated that the consequences of consciously giving up morality were anything but sensible, rational and humane. This suggested that the error theory was false, leaving some form of emotivism as the only alternative. Russell never expressed this argument in print and he might not have assented to it if asked, but something like this inference probably lay behind his eventual conversion to emotivism.

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13 For Russell on Bukharin see *RoE*: 194-203.

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**Russell on Hegel’s philosophy: “This illustrates an important truth, namely, that the worse your logic, the more interesting the consequences to which it gives rise.” (*A History of Western Philosophy*, 1945, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 746)**
The Russell–Dummett Correspondence on Frege and His Nachlaß

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Sir Michael Dummett (1925–2011) was a noted philosopher, logician, political activist, and tarot card expert. Apart from this last description, as well as his devout Catholicism, he and Russell had a lot in common. When he was knighted in 1999, it was for “services to philosophy and to racial justice”; he was someone who combined an interest in abstract philosophical issues with a passionate interest in improving the political situation around him. He was also one of the first researchers to take analytic philosophy seriously as a topic for historical study. In particular, he was one the first serious scholars of Frege’s philosophy, and remains perhaps the best known and most influential, at least in English, and quite possibly in any language. Before his death, he published several books on Frege’s philosophy, the first of which, a 708-page tome entitled Frege: Philosophy of Language appeared in 1973 and was influential not only in historical circles, but then-contemporary philosophy of language circles as well. Dummett’s researches on this book began two decades before it was published and it was in those initial researches that he came to correspond with Russell, primarily through his interest in the Frege–Russell correspondence.

Dummett first wrote to Russell on 6 October 1953, introducing himself, claiming to be writing a book on Frege, and asking to see their correspondence. Frege’s Nachlaß had not yet been published at that time, and Dummett was particularly interested in what light their correspondence might shed on Frege’s reaction to Russell’s paradox, which Frege admitted rendered the logical system of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik inconsistent in an Appendix hastily prepared and added to the 1902 second volume of Grundgesetze. Dummett conjectured that Frege’s “virtual silence between 1904 and 1917” was likely due to his having been preoccupied by attempts to solve Russell’s paradox.

By the end of 1953, Russell had not only shown Frege’s letters to him to Dummett, but had provided him with photostats. However, in his first letter of 10 October 1953, he cautioned Dummett not to get his hopes up:

But I am afraid they do not throw much light on Frege’s attitude to the paradox. They are mainly concerned in refuting suggestions of my own, which turned out to be inadequate.

While it is true that the correspondence deals more with suggestions made by Russell than suggestions made by Frege, Frege’s letter to Russell of 20 October 1902 does contain a summary of the proposed solution Frege would make in the Appendix, according to which two non-coextensive functions F and G may nonetheless have the same extension if they differ from each other only with regard to whether that extension itself falls under them (Frege, 1980).

In a reply of 12 January 1954, Dummett graciously replied that Russell did himself an “injustice” in describing Frege’s letters as nothing but refutations, and points to their discussion of a certain paradox of relations. (This is the third contradiction Russell discusses at the opening of his 1908 paper “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types.”) Consider the relation \( T \) which holds between relations \( R \) and \( S \) just in case \( R \) does not hold between itself and \( S \). Does \( T \) hold between \( T \) and \( T \), i.e., between itself and itself? It does just in case it does not. Frege at first thought that this paradox could not be formulated given his function/object distinction. A relation, for Frege, is understood as a first-level function with two argument places whose value is always a truth-value. A first-level function can only take objects as argument, and thus cannot take itself as argument. In the correspondence, however, Russell points out that Frege is committed to a “double value-range” \( \alpha, \epsilon \), for every relation \( R(\alpha, \epsilon) \), and these double-value ranges can play the role of relations thought of as objects. A version of the paradox of relations is then formulable in Frege’s system, as Russell eventually got Frege to admit.

Dummett goes on to ask Russell if he ever studied in any detail Frege’s proposed “solution” to Russell’s paradox put forth in the Appendix mentioned above. He mentions an article by Boleslav Sobociński 1949–1950 in which it is proven that Frege’s solution does not work: it simply leads to a more complicated contradiction. (For more recent discussion of Frege’s “way out”, see Landini, 2006.) Sobociński credits this discovery to Stanisław Leśniewski, but Dummett wonders whether or not anyone prior had known about the failure of Frege’s solution.
of Frege’s approach, including Frege himself. He adds, “…if so, he must surely have worked on another solution. I think he must have done, because of those years from 1904 to 1918 when he produced practically no work at all”. Dummett credits Russell for relating the contradiction to Cantor’s diagonal proof of his powerclass theorem, adding in a P.S.:

P.S. I have thought for some time that your original intuition that the contradiction is closely connected with Cantor’s proof that is the root of the whole matter. I think that if he had realised this, Frege would never have produced his bogus solution. But in the letters he brushes your suggestion aside on what seem to me flimsy grounds.

I have argued elsewhere that the simple class form of Russell’s paradox is not the only Cantorian problem discussed in their correspondence about which Frege should have concerned (Klement 2001, Klement 2002, chap. 6).

Russell’s reply (14 January 1954) was relatively short:

I do not remember Frege’s solution of the contradiction, but must at the time have examined it and thought it inadequate. … I note with pleasure what you say about $\aleph_0 > N$.

In fact, Russell for awhile specifically endorsed a version of Frege’s theory as evinced by the note added to the end of Appendix A of The Principles of Mathematics (p. 522), but then later, as he told Jourdain in 1906 came to the conclusion that it “wouldn’t do” (Grattan-Guinness, 1977, p. 78). Although manuscripts have survived in which Russell explores Frege’s proposed solution (see especially Russell, 1994), it is not known whether Russell discovered its formal inconsistency, or just found it philosophically inadequate or technically cumbersome.

In the summer of 1954, Dummett travelled to Münster, Germany, Heinrich Scholz had kept those copies of portions of Frege’s Nachlaß which had not been destroyed in World War II. (For the history of Frege’s Nachlaß, see Frege, 1979, pp. ix–xiii.) There he was also able to acquire copies of Russell’s side of the Frege-Russell correspondence. After he returned, he sent Russell two reports on what he had found there, a shorter one and then a longer, much more detailed one. Already in the first short report (30 July 1954) he mentions having discovered regrettable features of Frege’s political opinions:

There was also a copy of diary Frege kept in the last year of his life, mostly about politics. His political opinions were – at least at time – very distasteful; he was a strong nationalist, a Bismarckian conservative who believed that Bismarck’s one mistake was the introduction of parliamentarianism into Germany, and worst, of all, an anti-Semite. There is a hint that he had held more liberal views at an earlier period of his life.

Russell wrote in reply (3 August 1954) that he was “Sorry to learn what you tell me about Frege’s political opinions”.

On 2 September 1954, Dummett followed with a wonderfully detailed and quite generous letter, five-typed pages, in which Dummett goes into detail about the contents of Frege’s Nachlaß, both in terms of its philosophical content, as well as Frege’s distasteful political opinions. Although Frege’s Nachlaß has now been published (in both German and English), and any reader can make up his or her own mind about its contents, I hope that Dummett’s summary will itself one day be published. If nothing else, it illuminates the development of Dummett’s own scholarship, crucial to the historiography of Frege studies in English. Here is a crude summary of what Dummett put in the letter:

1. He reported that W. V. Quine had accompanied him for a few days on his visit, and that the two of them had different impressions about whether Scholz was showing them all there was to see.
2. He noted Frege’s career-long intention to write a book on the philosophy of logic, which never came to pass.
3. He noted that Frege maintained the sense/reference (Sinn/Bedeutung) distinction till the end of his career, and applied it not just to proper names of objects, but concept and other function expressions.
as well.

4. He claims that Frege came close to “Wittgenstein’s Tractatus idea that to know the sense of a sentence is to know in what circumstances it is to be called true”. (Presumably the basis for this claim is merely Frege’s claim that the sense of a complete sentence is a sense which picks out the truth-value of the sentence as reference.)

5. He notes that Frege thought that “the whole of logic is a development of the concept ‘true’” and the distinction between truth and falsity.

6. He notes that Frege did not think that the reference of part of an expression is a part of the reference of the whole expression, giving as an example that the reference of “Denmark” is not a part of the reference of “the capital of Denmark”.

7. Dummett claims, rather boldly, and no doubt controversially, that “in his last two or three years, he [Frege] appears to have been very much under Wittgenstein’s influence”; as grounds for this he notes:
   - Frege no longer believed that there were logical objects, and thought there were no logical grounds for believing in an infinity of them; cf. Tractatus §§4.441, 5.535.
   - Frege thought philosophy should involve a “struggle with language”; cf. Tractatus §4.0031.
   - He claimed that set theory was a spurious subject; cf. Tractatus §6.031.

In his book, Dummett was much more reserved, claiming only that these things “may indicate the influence of Wittgenstein on Frege” (Dummett, 1973, p. 663).

8. He noted that in the last few years of his life, Frege ceased to think arithmetic could be grounded in logic, and sought a geometric ground instead, with Kantian intuitions of time and space playing a central role.

9. He claims that Frege was “scornful” of elementary arithmetic, claiming that it deals with “children’s numbers”, now believing that geometry was the more central mathematical discipline.

10. He notes that nothing survived after his correspondence with Russell having to do with Russell’s paradox or the inconsistency of his logical system; Dummett reports Scholz as having claimed that there were a few documents dealing with the topic which did not survive, and that although Frege never found the formal defect with the solution given in the Appendix, he became unsatisfied with it because of its lack of “intuitive evidence”.

11. He reports that no additional draft material of the planned third volume of Grundgesetze can be found.

12. He claims that Frege claimed that there is a single true geometry, and that it is either Euclidean or non-Euclidean, and notes that in his correspondence with Hilbert, Frege seems to reject independence proofs for the parallel axiom. (This issue has been the subject of much debate in the recent secondary literature; Blanchette 2012 is perhaps the most up-to-date resource.)

13. He reports a number of biographical facts about Frege, his marriage and children.

14. He notes that Frege had been “a supporter of something called the Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei, which I gather was a precursor of the Nazi party”; he also notes that Frege “thought that Jews ought to be expelled from Germany, or at least deprived of political rights” but that Frege’s anti-Semitism seems to have been limited to the final few years of his life.

15. Dummett writes “I find it very disheartening that a man for whom I have always felt such admiration and respect could at any time have held such opinions”, a sentiment he repeated years later when his first book on Frege was finally published (Dummett, 1973, p. xii).

16. He makes note of a “touching letter” Frege wrote to his adopted son when bequeathing him his unpublished manuscripts, in which he claims that there was gold in them still to be found.

17. He expresses his disappointment that Frege’s correspondence with Wittgenstein was not found with the materials he found, but claims that it is “clearly not the case” that Frege was completely unable to understand Wittgenstein. (Their correspondence has since been found, but the extent to which they
truly achieved any understanding, or influence, remains controversial; see, e.g., Floyd 2011.)

Compared to this long, generous letter, Russell’s reply, on 16 September 1954, was rather brief. After thanking Dummett for the letter, he wrote that “I am pained by his political opinions but still more by his wishing to base mathematics upon geometry,” and goes on to express surprise that Frege rejected alternative geometries. After Dummett confirms Frege’s attitude about geometries, Russell wrote again, on 17 December 1954 with a similar message, going on to tell a story about the Pythagoreans.

What interested me most was what you have already told me of, the geometric foundations of mathematics. This pained me much more than his anti-Semitism. It was evidently the result of despairing reflections on the contradictions. It’s a curious and rather close parallel to the history of the Pythagoreans, the arithmetical philosophy of Pythagoras, having apparently been refuted by irrationals, the Pythagoreans developed the geometrical theory of proportion which is set forth in Euclid books V–VI. But I think they were more excusable than Frege.

Russell relates this story about the Pythagoreans in more detail in notes made for History of Western Philosophy—on this, see Vianelli 2001.

Their correspondence trails off for a few years, and picks up again when Dummett wrote to Russell on 6 October 1957 reporting that most of Frege’s Nachlaß and correspondence was being prepared for publication, first in German, then in English. He asks Russell if he would be willing to translate his letters to Frege for the project. In reply (9 October 1957), Russell at first agrees, though cannot remember what language the originals were in, and is unsure whether he would be translating from German to English for the English publication—or English to German for the German publication. On 12 October, Dummett clarifies that it is the first of these, and assures him there is no hurry, as the German edition is due first.

Indeed, it was not until 1963 that Dummett sent Russell copies of his letters to translate. By this time, now in his 90s, Russell felt unable to undertake the translation himself, citing among other reasons his ongoing work for nuclear disarmament. He also despairs at their contents, writing on 4 August 1963:

In any case, they seem to be very confused and unsatisfactory. I was bewildered by the contradiction and floundered about like a man who is out of his depth and cannot swim.

In response to this (on 7 September 1953), Dummett confesses that he too, ever since the bombing of Hiroshima, had come to regard “the use and even the conditional intention to make use of nuclear weapons as absolutely indefensible”. He also claims that the interest in the correspondence with Frege is “now largely historical”, but wisely adds that “one can never be certain that there is not to be found an idea which can still be made fruitful”. (And indeed, there are thoughts in the correspondence which have been made use of in later researches; to give just one example, Russell’s “zig-zag theory” of 1903–04, mentioned in these letters among other places, has been reconstructed into a number of interesting logical theories in Cocchiarella 1987.)

However he claims that the “chief reason” for pressing Russell into his own translation is the following.

... it would be absurd to make any selection of Frege’s Nachlaß which did not include that correspondence [given] its very great historical interest. ... I should not ask you if it were not that your English is so celebrated. I could, indeed, easily produce a faithful version of the letters; but I think it would be absurd to publish anything by you in English which did not display that stylistic elegance which your other writings possess and which I could not achieve.

Dummett then asked if Russell were still unwilling to undertake the translation himself, whether he would be willing to look at his translation, to which Russell agreed on 11 September 1963. To my knowledge, however, Dummett never produced his own translation of the Frege–Russell correspondence, which was only published in English in 1980, translated by Hans Kaal (in Frege 1980).

There is much here about which more could be said. The Frege–Russell Correspondence is indeed one of the most historically interesting correspondences in the history of philosophy, and it is a shame Russell was unable to do the translations himself. Much more can be said about Russell’s reaction to Frege’s attempted solution to the paradox. We might also puzzle over Russell’s priorities in finding Frege’s change of
heart over the foundations of arithmetic more troubling than his anti-Semitism—but at least he was troubled. Part of what I like most about the Dummett–Russell correspondence is how Dummett assumes that Russell will be most interested in the details of Frege’s views in philosophical logic, 30 and more years after Russell had ceased contributing to that field, and that Russell in no way proved this untrue.

References


This cartoon from the *Evening Standard* refers to the week-long prison sentence served by Russell in September 1961, following his conviction on public order charges brought after a large central London peace demonstration in commemoration of Hiroshima Day (6 August). Our Russell—the notorious crime Lord.
Russell's Homes: Russell Chambers, Other London Flats, and Country Homes (1911-1923)

By Sheila Turcon
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Russell moved into unfurnished flat no. 34 at Russell Chambers in November 1911 to be close to his lover Lady Ottoline Morrell, the literary society hostess, who lived in Bedford Square in Bloomsbury. Ottoline had first met Russell at his home in Bagley Wood in September 1909. She and her husband Philip were taken there by Alys's brother, Logan Pearsall Smith. Their affair did not begin until 1911. Much of the Bloomsbury area of London has been owned by Russell's cousins, the Dukes of Bedford, for centuries. Russell's grandfather, Lord John Russell, had been a younger son and thus inherited no property. The Bedford Estates still own large sections of Bloomsbury. Many of the names of the streets, squares, hotels, apartment buildings and a tube stop reflect the family: Russell is the family name; Bedford the ducal title; Tavistock a courtesy title used by the oldest son of the Duke; and Woburn Abbey the name of the family's country home. Russell, however, was not renting from the Bedford Estates; despite its name the archives assistant at Woburn Enterprises confirmed that they have never owned Russell Chambers on what was then called Bury Street and is now known as Bury Place. There is no extant correspondence between Russell and the landlord of Russell Chambers. However, in a list of references that Russell provided when he was trying to rent a flat in the early 1920s, he notes The City [?]] West End Properties, Bush Lane House, as his landlord at Russell Chambers.

After leaving Bagley Wood, Russell had mainly been at Trinity College but he did take lodgings in Ispden to be near Ottoline at Henley on Thames in August and September of 1911. Ottoline “helped Bertie furnish his flat in Bury Street near the British Museum. I enjoyed making it pretty and nice for him; he was happy to have these rooms and a few of his old family possessions in them, such as his mother's portrait and his grandfather's desk.” The reason he only had a few was because his wife Alys still had possession of several of them. Despite his happiness, the main emotions that Ottoline recalls in her diary were “intense, burning and very tragic!” She remembers going round to visit him. “I dreaded looking up seeing his face pressed against the panes looking for me.” Her dread originated in her inability to meet his intense desires.
In the early days, however, all was joy. Russell chose the flat himself after looking at flats on Wells Street, off Oxford Street, that were dismissed because the neighbourhood was too slovenly, and others that were too expensive. The added delight to this choice was the name of “Russell Chambers!” (letter no. 231, 23 Oct. 1911 to Ottoline). He was thrilled to have the flat, writing it almost “seems like play-acting to me to have a place of my own – except college rooms I have never had any place that was mine” alone (letter no. 254, 13 Nov. 1911). He added, “What a deliciously absurd time we had in the flat—I don't know when I have felt more silly.” The next day he was at the flat and wrote, “your chairs were there. They were very nice indeed. I sat in one of them and thought it is just the sort of chair I like ... the electric light had not been done. Also, tho' the curtain-rod were up, the curtains were not.” On 20 November he thanked her for making the flat so charming: “it is a wonder how nice it is. I love everything—I am longing to give you tea in it. But I do feel just like a child with a doll's house” (letter no. 263). Although Ottoline recollected that it was his grandfather's desk in the flat, Russell wrote her to say that he was going to get his wife Alys to send him his father's desk (letter no. 257).

The flat is 754 sq. ft, a walk up on the fourth floor of the red brick building. The floor plan shows a reception room and a main bedroom—both with fireplaces, a bathroom, kitchen, and a small room off the kitchen which was used for different purposes over the years, including a study, a sitting room, and a bedroom. In 1915 Russell let T.S and Vivienne Eliot use the room off the kitchen because they were “desperately poor”. The flat was heated by coal. The block of flats had a porter and Russell also employed a char. The panes that Russell would have pressed his face against were in a bay window that faced Bury Street.

In 1916 Russell was dismissed from Trinity College and lost his main source of income. His affair with Ottoline was also ending, although they remained close friends, and his affair with Constance (Colette) Malleson was beginning. In April he took over H.T. J. Norton's rooms in Clive Bell's townhouse at 46 Gordon Square. He moved into his brother's nearby grand townhouse at 57 Gordon Square in August. Very little is known about Gordon Square; Frank did not write about it in his autobiography. In 2012, the street address on the building was 55-59. When Russell writes to Colette about 57 Gordon Square, the details included are mainly about the butler, Smith, who drank to excess, prevented him from dining there on Sunday evenings, and listened in on their telephone conversations (letters 200093, 200124, 200174).

While staying in his brother's house, Russell sub-let his Russell Chambers flat. The name of his first tenant is not known, but he was an Italian. In early September the flat was searched by Scotland Yard; Russell was regarded with suspicion by the authorities because of his opposition to World War I. The search was reported in The Guardian on 5 September 1916. The day before he had written to Lady Ottoline that “there is lots of sport to be got out of this matter—I am enjoying it” (letter no. 1419). The tenant was not amused, however, noting that search had given him “much trouble and annoyance.” Russell wrote an open letter to the press about the arbitrariness of the police (Collected Papers, 13, pp. 497-8; C16.23). The Italian moved on.
The next known tenant was his Chicago lover Helen Dudley who had followed him to London. She lived there with her younger sister. He did stay at the flat for brief periods when his tenants were away. The Home Office asked the police to watch the flat. In his report, Inspector Buckley writes: “He has not been known to stay [at the flat] during the girls’ residence there, but he has visited them, and dined with them, and it is said that, like him they are pacifists” (6 Feb. 1917, Rec. Acq. 903h). Dudley sub-let the flat to Colette's sister, Clare, in May 1918 just as Russell was entering Brixton Prison. Dudley returned to America later that summer. Russell urged Colette to move into his flat. Colette helped her sister find another flat and moved in on 9 September 1918. She stayed until the end of June 1919. Colette, of course, was familiar with the flat, her first visit there occurring in 1917. Although their plans varied over the summer that he was in prison, the gist was that Colette was to live in the flat but not for very long. Instead she was to find another flat in the same building, preferably off the same staircase, to facilitate their trysts while Russell would return to no. 34.

Colette prepared the flat for his return, writing on 2 Sept. “Voltaire is looking wildly bacchanalian on his perch above the fire. I've put clusters of glowing rowan berries behind his witty old head. He doesn’t mind at all. He's quite enjoying himself in honour of your return.” Russell replied on 11 September: “How amusing to think of old Voltaire so bacchanalian! When those things come from Marlow, you can put the Persian bowl on its ebony stand in the place where Voltaire is now. And there should also be 2 candlesticks from Marlow to go on the mantelpiece. I feel Voltaire is not appropriate to you so much as the Persian bowl, which always was there for years until I got Voltaire. But of course you will have which you like best. I love to think of you there only.” On 11 Sept. she entertained T.S. Eliot to tea in the kitchen of the flat. “I love the dear place, its austere grey walls, the Ottoline hangings in the front room, and the square Amberley table (so solid and sensible) .... There's no speck of dust anywhere now. The only thing I don’t approve is your Indian bedspread: not nearly gay enough for you, Beloved.” On September 13 she wrote that the only thing she had brought from her previous flat was “your old friend ... [a] bearskin rug which is now on the floor in front of the bedroom fire. I walk from room to room, loving it all.” Alas, their anticipated happiness was not to be. Russell got an early release from Brixton and, consumed with jealousy over Colette’s lack of faithfulness, imagined or real, ended their relationship although their estrangement did not last.

With no place to live, Russell moved around that autumn spending time at his brother’s country house, Ottoline’s country house, with Clifford Allen at Lemon’s Farm, Abinger Corner, Dorking and at a London bolt-hole, The Studio. Lemon’s Farm is described in idyllic terms by Colette who visited there. Although Colette had had her own flat before moving to Russell Chambers, she still shared it with her husband Miles who did not object to her affair with Russell. But Colette and Russell did not consider her flat private enough. On 8 November 1917 the couple decided to rent a small place at 5 Fitzroy Street, Soho near Howland Street, which they called the Studio. It had a gas fire with a ring for cooking. The water tap and lavatory were in the outside passage and shared with a cobbler whose workshop adjoined. With these minimal amenities, the rent was very cheap. Still it had to be covered, so Miles, after he and Colette separated, lived there while Russell was in prison. On 17 February 1919 Russell began to share a flat with Clifford Allen at 70 Overstrand Mansions, Prince of Wales Road, Battersea. Allen’s new flatmate had broken his agreement to share; Colette had suggested that Russell take his place. The Studio had been rented to Frank Swinnerton in December 1918. He had been found as tenant by Mollie McCarthy—Russell was pleased because Swinnerton’s “Nocture” had given him much pleasure. After Colette left Russell Chambers, Swinnerton moved in. But Swinnerton was not always there, thus allowing Colette and Russell to use it for assignations in 1919.

Colette decorated the Battersea flat for Russell. She purchased a comfortable armchair and a floor-cushion to match from Heal’s for his room there (28 Jan. 1919). Further belongings were moved from the Studio, including books (1 Feb.). The flat was painted white and there was a view of trees from the window (19 Feb.). On 17 Feb. Russell thanked her for making “everything so lovely here—it all full of your loving thoughts. The peacocks give me infinite delight.”

Also during the time period when Russell leased Russell Chambers, he had some financial obligations for a country cottage leased by T.S. and Vivienne Eliot, at 31 West Street in the village of Marlow, Bucks, beginning 5 December 1917. He contributed furniture as well. The lease was terminated on 15 November 1920. How much time he stayed there is not clear; there is no known letter written by Russell from Marlow. His affair with Vivienne Eliot has been the subject of much speculation. At one point he suggested to Colette that: “It is fairly nice house, but in a street (nearly the last house before the country). The river there is lovely, and there are hills and woods. The house is badly furnished—most of the things hideous. But I fancy Eliot would like to be rid of it — it would be no expense, as one could let it half the year. It is very hard to get anything, and unlikely one would get anything better. It would be very nice to have a place to go to—hotels will come expen-
sive, and are not as nice in the long run. Whenever we were tired of it we could let it. What do you say?” (6 Feb. 1919). Colette nixed the idea.

So instead of Marlow, Russell spent the entire summer of 1919 at Newlands Farm near Lulworth which he rented with John Edensor Littlewood, a mathematician. The two men invited many of their friends to visit. Colette was there occasionally. Dora Black who would become Russell's third wife spent time there as well; she writes about that summer of “good company and talk, the sea and the sky” in her autobiography. The house was run by Mr. Randall, who collected the rents, and Mrs. Watts, who either cooked, cleaned or did both. The farmhouse is an imposing two-storey structure with two large chimneys and is mostly covered in ivy.

Frank Swinnerton, an author and editor at Chatto and Windus, was an excellent tenant at Russell Chambers staying on until 1923. He had the flat redecorated to his own taste. Russell offered to renew the lease – the rent was then £112 per year unfurnished -- and allow Swinnerton to continue to live there. He was paying Russell 3 guineas a week for the furnished flat. Instead Swinnerton decided to leave at the end of October. Russell may have sub-let it to a Mr. Miracea for November and December 1923 when the lease expired. This formally ended Russell's involvement with the first and the last home that was his alone. His last visit to the place was in the autumn of 1923 when he and his then wife Dora decided what furniture they wanted to sell and what they wanted to keep. Russell Chambers was too small for them and their new baby. Swinnerton must have asked Russell about specific pieces. His side of the correspondence is not extant for 1923. Russell replied on 6 September 1923 regarding a table: “I don't want it now, but do want it some day. It was one of a set made of Doomsday oak at Alderley by my grandfather Lord Stanley, one being given to each of his children.” Perhaps the table had been at the flat when Swinnerton moved in but it was not there then because Russell noted that it was currently at Cranleigh. Russell does not elaborate further. This is the table on which he is said to have written Principia Mathematica.

Russell Chambers was selected from all the London places that Russell lived in over the years by English Heritage for a blue historical plaque. The plaques dot various structures around London. The press release reads in part: “Russell may have done most of his writing in Cambridge, but this was his London residence at a time when he was at the height of his powers (the Principia Mathematica was being published at this time), and during an emotionally intense period too.” English Heritage could provide no further reasons for the choice apart from noting that his son Conrad was happy with the selection. I think this article demonstrates what an appropriate choice it was. The plaque was unveiled on 6 June 2002 by Conrad Russell. The text of the plaque reads: “Bertrand Russell, 1872-1970, philosopher and campaigner for peace, lived here in flat no. 34, 1911-1916”. The latter date as we have seen is not correct.

I first visited the outside of Russell Chambers in 1992, but for some unknown reason did not photograph it. I returned in 2012 to do just that. I went up to the front doors which have large glass windows and gazed up the stairs that Russell, Ottoline, Colette, and many others had climbed to reach the fourth floor. The leasehold for the flat sold in 2009 for £413,000; the images in the advertisement show a bare, austere flat.
The new owners have done it over completely and now offer it as a holiday let. So if you wish to do more than just look through the doors, the opportunity awaits.

References


Correspondence in the Russell Archives: Constance Malleson, Frank Swinnerton, Ottoline Morrell.
Email exchanges with the Bedford Estates and English Heritage.

Web:
Advertisement for the sale of the flat in 2011 with images and floor plan:
www.rightmove.co.uk/house-prices/detailMatching.html?prop=25599803&sale=40898717&country=england

Private Homes advertisement with images:

Image and information on Newlands Farm:
www.westlulworth.org.uk/newlands_farm.html

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**A Russell Quote for the Day—umm, Era**

There is indeed more than a little relevance to today in what Russell said in 1950 in his Nobel Lecture.

“But acquisitiveness, although it is the mainspring of the capitalist system, is by no means the most powerful of the motives that survive the conquest of hunger. Rivalry is a much stronger motive. Over and over again in Mohammedan history, dynasties have come to grief because the sons of a sultan by different mothers could not agree, and in the resulting civil war universal ruin resulted. The same sort of thing happens in modern Europe. When the British Government very unwisely allowed the Kaiser to be present at a naval review at Spithead, the thought which arose in his mind was not the one which we had intended. What he thought was, “I must have a Navy as good as Grandmamma’s.” And from this thought have sprung all our subsequent troubles. The world would be a happier place than it is if acquisitiveness were always stronger than rivalry. But in fact, a great many men will cheerfully face impoverishment if they can thereby secure complete ruin for their rivals. Hence the present level of taxation.”

Grandmamma, of course, refers to the German Kaiser’s grandmother, Queen Victoria of England (1819-1901), who herself came from a very long line of Germans.
Bertrand Russell: A Man in Full in Brief

By Michael E. Berumen

The following is from a public address for general audiences to promote interest in Russell and The Bertrand Russell Society, and delivered at several venues including The California Club, The Humanist Fellowship, and California State University East Bay.

I should like to make a bold assertion, one with which some might argue, but one I believe I can substantiate. The assertion is this: not only is Bertrand Russell the most important English-speaking philosopher since David Hume, but he is the most important philosopher in the western tradition since Immanuel Kant.

In other words, I submit that Russell is the greatest philosopher of the last 200 years. I measure this greatness by the remarkable content, scope, and originality of his ideas, along with the revolutionary impact and influence of his work, an influence that is nearly systemic, and sure to continue for the centuries to come. There is hardly an aspect of contemporary philosophy unaffected in a significant way by Russell.

Russell was more than a great philosopher, though; he also was a remarkable man, a man of many parts. A flawed man, but a great man, too. Kant was a great philosopher; some might argue Wittgenstein was, too, although I am not among them. But no one could argue they were particularly remarkable or memorable for the lives they led or for their good effects on humanity, quite apart from their work in philosophy. Not only did Russell do some noteworthy things outside of philosophy, he led an extraordinarily interesting life. And it is no exaggeration to say he is one of the finest writers, ever, of English prose, not to mention one of the most prolific, having written on the order of several thousand words each day for much of his long life, leaving behind a vivid record of his thought and personality.

I will begin by speaking of his life, then I will encapsulate, as best I can, some of his work and ideas, realizing this is difficult to do, for the scope of his work is not only immense, he changed his position on central issues several times, and we are just now discovering some things about his unpublished work through the incredible treasure trove at his archives at McMaster University. Finally, I will conclude by remarking on his sustained influence on philosophy as a whole.

Russell also commented on many things outside of philosophy; indeed, I would say he is chiefly known by non-philosophers, and even by some professional philosophers, for his for his popular writings and his political activism. I shall have some things to say about these things, too. Do keep in mind, however, that I am limited here to an overview, and not the kind of full treatment necessary for someone as complex and prodigious as Bertrand Russell.

Let me begin by getting some of the negatives out of the way in summary form, negatives that have recently obscured his many achievements, and, I think, have been given undue attention primarily as a result of a recent multi-volume biography by Ray Monk (Monk, 1996 and 2001). In many ways, Monk’s work is excellent for its detail and careful research, and it has the merit of having been written by a philosopher, whereas some of Russell’s biographers were not. While not a philosopher, I believe Caroline Moorehead presents a more balanced and impartial view in her biography of Russell, with equal attention given to his flaws and his virtues (Moorehead, 1992). While Monk’s biography is illuminating on matters concerning Russell’s life, his disdain for Russell’s human frailties drips through his work, and as a consequence, he exaggerates their overall gravity in proportion to Russell’s other, positive attributes. So let me put those negatives out front: Russell was a serial philanderer for much of his life, and he was not always sensitive to the negative consequences his actions had on others; he could be detached, indeed, sometimes even cold or irresponsible, in his personal relations, though on many other occasions the opposite was true; he was not always an astute observer of practical politics, and he was sometimes naïve in his judgments about such matters; and he was nothing if not occasionally self-absorbed, particularly as a young man. And he could be quite vain at times (Durant, 1977; Hook, 1987). That sums up, I think, his major flaws, flaws which form the subtext of much of Monk’s work, especially his second, later volume.

But then Russell had virtues, too. He could be very generous with both his money and his time in order to come to the aid of others. He was always willing to credit others for their work, and he would even go to some lengths to bring attention to the discoveries of others. Russell was morally courageous, and quite unafraid to defend unpopular opinions and suffer the consequences. He was considerably ahead of most of his contemporaries in terms of social issues, declaiming then unconventional ideas that we now take for granted, and when it was much more likely to cause ignominy. Russell was one of the world’s most eloquent and per-
quential advocates for the principles of individual liberty and justice. And aside from having the courage of his convictions, his intellectual prowess has had few equals in history.

Born in 1872 in Wales at the height of Britain’s power, Bertrand Russell had deep roots in the English aristocracy. Several family members were historically significant, including his grandfather, Lord John Russell, who was prime minister in the mid-19th century. Russell’s parents died when he was very young. Reared by his paternal grandmother and educated by a series of private tutors, he was a bookish and lonely boy, and he wrote that only his love of mathematics kept him from suicide. Once he reached Trinity College at Cambridge, he found others with similar interests, whereupon his life took on new meaning. His interest in philosophy soon blossomed. At Cambridge he came under the influence of another student, G.E. Moore, with whom he would later co-founded the analytic movement, inspired in part as an antidote to, indeed, apostasy from the philosophy of Hegel, who had achieved considerable prominence not only on the Continent, but also in both Britain and America. It was also at Cambridge that he met and was influenced by his mathematics professor, Alfred North Whitehead, with whom he would later write Principia Mathematica, a multi-volume monument to abstract reasoning.

Cloistered in the academic world and dedicated to scholarly pursuits at Trinity, Russell found time in 1894 to marry an American Quaker, Alys Smith. This would be the first of his four marriages. Early on, it seemed happy enough, but he later became miserable in marriage for the better part of a decade prior to their finally agreeing to divorce. Alys never fell out of love with Russell, and pined for him even in old age.

Russell wrote a book on German democracy in 1896, soon followed by another on geometry, one with a decidedly Kantian orientation, which he would soon abandon. Russell’s political activism emerged in supporting the women’s suffrage movement, and he even stood for Parliament, though he lost. He and Alys were both supporters of the “free love” movement early in marriage, though they were not practitioners of what they espoused. Russell’s extramarital flings began later, most notably with the socialite, Lady Ottoline Morrell, and with the actress, Lady Constance Malleson. He sometimes carried on affairs with several women at a time, while married, and others report that it was not uncommon for him to brag about his prowess with women (Hook, 1987). He was flirtatious with more than one wife of the men with whom he associated.

One of Russell’s first important philosophical works, some might argue his greatest one, was The Principles of Mathematics, published in 1903. This firmly established Russell as a philosopher and logician of the first rank. That was followed in 1905 by his famous essay, “On Denoting”, where he detailed the Theory of Descriptions, which was once touted as a “paradigm of philosophy.” And then, of course, he and Whitehead co-authored the colossal Principia Mathematica, published from 1910-1913, and which many believe to be the most important and influential axiomatic analysis and survey of symbolic logic ever written. Had Russell written nothing more than these three things, he would have still ranked among the most important philosophers of the age. But that was only the beginning, and he wrote much, much more.

Early on, Russell discovered and wrote about the importance of language in philosophy, the supposed link between facts as denoted by propositions and reality. Prior to WWI, Russell became mentor to the other titan of 20th Century philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who took Russell’s early interest in linguistic analysis to another level, and whose work would for a time eclipse Russell’s with many professional philosophers. It is unlikely that we would have ever heard of Wittgenstein, the philosopher, had Russell not sensed his unusual genius and taken a personal interest in him, and had he not helped the unknown philosopher with the publication of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus after WWI. Russell wrote the introduction to the Tractatus, and this gave it instant credibility. As an aside, Wittgenstein often said of Russell and of others that they didn’t truly understand his philosophy; it apparently did not occur to him that this might have been a result of his own failure to make his ideas clear. My own view is that Wittgenstein’s reputation for genius is overstated, and that while he had some insights, his chief value was to make epigrammatic pronouncements. He was a charismatic, egocentric, intolerant, ungrateful, and a bully of a man. Mysteriously, Monk approves of him more.

World War I seemed a tragic folly to Russell, and he joined the anti-war movement. He was thrown in jail in 1916 for his polemics against the war, and specifically because the government held that he had insulted Britain’s ally, the United States. Owing to his antiwar activities, he was also dismissed by his beloved Trinity College, though he was eventually invited to return. While in jail for six months, he began and completed the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, which remains a fine primer on the subject.

Russell wrote over sixty books, hundreds of essays, and thousands of letters. Most of his important work on philosophy and logic was completed before 1930, though he continued to write occasionally on philosophy until the late Forties. From 1950 onwards, he devoted himself largely to political and social matters, with occasional replies to critics and some biographical work. He began to distance himself from the several schools of thought that germinated from his own work, especially the later ideas of Wittgenstein, who Russell
thought had become too mystical and sidetracked by the importance of language over what actually obtained in the world.

Russell yearned for eternal truths early in his life. For a time he had a decidedly religious bent, as evident in his Hegelian idealism followed by his Platonism. His disappointment in not finding greater meaning to life is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in his 1903 essay “A Free Man’s Worship”, which he later thought to be too overblown with florid prose. Having as a young man rejected belief in god as unsupportable, Russell also became increasingly critical of religion, which he thought largely destructive. His most popular work in this regard is probably Why I Am Not A Christian, written in 1927. By 1940, his unorthodox and liberal views, views detailed in books such as Marriage and Morals, quite radical in 1929, led to his being barred from teaching an advanced course in mathematical logic at City College of New York some years later.

When Russell’s elder brother, Frank, died in 1931, he became the 3rd Earl Russell … Lord Russell. He said his title was mostly good for getting hotel rooms.

In terms of political outlook, Russell was essentially a democratic, guild socialist. Along with H.G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw, and other prominent intellectuals, he was for a time a supporter of the Fabian Society. Though at first he was sympathetic with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, he soon became an anti-Bolshevik and anti-communist, particularly after his visit to the young USSR, one that included a personal interview with Vladimir Lenin. He also had a number of difficulties with Marxist doctrine.

His second wife, Dora, with whom he had two children, John and Kate, was very involved with him in political activities and in the formation of a school for early education. Russell had taken quite an interest in education, and he thought many of the world’s problems were attributable to mistaken pedagogy, and that if the young were only exposed to a proper education, many of these problems could be solved. He quickly learned, however, that theory and practice can be very different matters, and the school became a both a burden and a failure.

Russell’s son, John, lived a sad and difficult life, one beset with emotional problems, while Kate, who adored her father, seemed to find happiness and is alive today and in her nineties. I might add, she is an esteemed and honorary member of the Bertrand Russell Society. Dora and Russell were eventually divorced, and he married Patricia Spence. She was his children’s former governess, and she bore him his third and last child, Conrad Russell, who later became a prominent historian and political figure.

It is evident from Russell’s autobiographical material and correspondence that he had bouts with melancholia (not in a clinical sense), and that they diminished in frequency and intensity only after reaching his fifties. Perhaps, then, it is not altogether surprising that he would write in 1930 about happiness in his popular work The Conquest of Happiness, given his own struggles for contentment at that time. The subject was also in keeping with his general outlook on ethical matters, informed partly by the writings of his godfather, John Stuart Mill, a leading representative of the utilitarian school. There are several species of utilitarianism, but the most common holds that the main goal of ethics is to spread the greatest amount of happiness to the greatest number, an outlook that Russell more or less held all of his life.

While he believed most wars are unnecessary, Russell was not a radical pacifist. He strongly favored defeating the Axis powers in World War II, for example, though he came to that view reluctantly. After the Allied victory, he briefly advocated belligerence with the Soviet Union to preclude the dominance of Soviet-style communism, and as a prophylaxis against the further spread of nuclear weapons. He soon abandoned his hawkishness, however, and in subsequent years he became a principal in the nuclear disarmament movement and an advocate of world government.

Russell’s most popular work, A History of Western Philosophy, was published in 1945. It is an entertaining and well-written book, and certainly worth reading; however, it is not in my view the best history of its sort. In any event, for the first time, the proceeds enabled Russell to live a life that was financially secure. Shortly thereafter, in 1950, Russell was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature.

Russell and Patricia, or Peter, as she was called, divorced in 1952, and he married Edith Finch in the same year. This proved the happiest of his marriages, and it lasted until his death some eighteen years later. After an acrimonious divorce from Peter, he did not see his son, Conrad, until 1968, a reunion which apparently then resulted in the estrangement of mother and son.

Russell became something of a secular saint to the “New Left” in the 1960s. He was an ardent and outspoken critic of America’s military involvement in Vietnam, and he fell under the influence of Ralph Schoenman, an American activist who many believe took advantage of the elderly Russell by making pronouncements in Russell’s name that were sometimes uncharacteristic of Russell. But though elderly and physically feeble by his nineties, those who knew him well said he never lost his faculties, and in the end, he denounced Schoenman and quit his association with him (Russell, 1969). Russell died of influenza in 1970.
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Russell’s work in philosophy is broad in scope, sometimes very technical, with parts of it only now being fully understood and appreciated; and it is often difficult to categorize, since he frequently abandoned his positions for new ones. For our purposes, today, I shall broadly classify his philosophy in five major phases, namely, Early Analysis and Realism, Logicism, Logical Atomism, Neutral Monism, and Scientific Realism. I shall ignore his Hegelian period, which he abandoned very early in favor of starting the analytical movement with Moore. Indeed, analysis as a philosophical genre, a style that permeates nearly all of the strands of philosophy in the West, today, is due largely to Russell’s influence. That is not to say that others weren’t involved, or, as in the case of Gottlob Frege, that some hadn’t developed important ideas independently. But it is due to Russell, almost entirely, that the analytical style received its widespread attention and soon came to dominate much of philosophy. I should also say that aspects of each phase of his evolving philosophy remained with him to the end, though he continually refined his outlook and abandoned things that he came to believe were false; therefore, the categories I use are not strictly chronological or demarcated. Time permits us to discuss just one or two of his main ideas in each phase, and even then, not in detail. Perhaps the best synopsis of his work is his own My Philosophical Development, published in 1959.

In what I call his Early Analysis and Realism phase, Russell came to believe that the world depicted by Hegel’s idealism and its fashionable variants defied common sense. Idealists contended that everything was mental and an idea in the mind of God or the Absolute; that to know one thing, fully, one had to know all it was related to, meaning essentially everything else, the so-called doctrine of internal relations; and all other kinds of unsupportable nonsense. Russell and Moore, in contrast, said no, there really are tables and chairs, what we see is real and it exists independently of our thoughts, and that when we stopped seeing it, it was still there, and that we need not know everything in order to know one thing, and that the world consists of many, separate, unrelated things. The proper method of philosophy was analysis, which is to say, breaking down our thoughts and language to the simplest level. As much as anything it is a way of doing philosophy, aside from what it may eventually assert. Clarity of expression and ideas, in particular, was important, as opposed to the obscurity that characterized much philosophy, and certainly that of Hegel and his followers (Russell, 1912).

In his Logicism phase, Russell sought to reduce mathematical truths to the truths of deductive logic, and the latter rested on a small number of premises and primitive ideas. The primary works of this period include The Principles of Mathematics and Principia Mathematica, along with his famous article, “On Denoting”. In the Principles, Russell reduced the concept of number to classes; however, through a study of Cantor, he came across a serious antinomy having to do with the class of classes that are not members of themselves. The paradox arises when we ask whether this class is in itself, as by definition it should be, but it is only if it is not, which is clearly contradictory. When Frege learned of this contradiction from Russell, he said the edifice of his own work had been shattered, which caused him to abandon his own program of logicism. Russell solved the problem, along with other antinomies (such as the famous Liar’s Paradox), through his theory of types, a hierarchy of propositional functions, which we need not go into here. The Principia was a further effort to explicate and systematize logic and discover its most fundamental features, which I take to be more about the structure of mathematics, indeed, of reality itself, more than a mere reductionist program as it is often depicted. Much of mathematical logic today has its roots in these two works (Russell, 1903, 1910-13).

Russell’s famous “Theory of Descriptions” is an outgrowth of the Principles and was the focus of his article (by that title) in Mind in 1905. In brief, Russell found a way to dispose of the idea that certain kinds of names denote objects, and the notion that even absurd entities such as Pegasus or round-square copulas and the like have some sort of real status or being. Some even thought that when we denied the existence of such entities, we granted them a kind of existence. If we examine the statement “The Present King of France is Bald,” the law of the excluded middle (p v –p) should tell us that “The Present King of France” should appear on either a list of all the present non-bald kings or the present bald kings. But he’s nowhere to be found on either list. Russell dealt with such predicaments by structuring the proposition thusly, and as Russell might have also written it on the board:

1. There is an x such that x is Present King of France (∃x (Fx));
2. for every x that is Present King of France and every y that is Present King of France, x equals y (i.e., there is at most one Present King of France) (∀x(Fx → ∀y(Fy → y=x)));
3. for every x that is Present King of France, x is bald. (∀x (Fx → Bx)).

In so doing, by making x a variable seeking a predicate, as it were, we avoid asserting the existence of x, and we keep the entities populating our universe to a much more manageable level. Indeed, it suggests
that any nominative expression that is not a proper name can be analyzed into simple predicates, thereby enabling us to dispense with names altogether, a world of predicates, if you will (Russell, 1905).

This is in no small way related to Russell’s theory of Logical Atomism, an ensuing phase, in which he suggests that the world consists of simple constituents comprised of simple qualities and relations. Put another way, the world consists of facts, and these facts consist of objects or particulars that can be broken down into simple units. There are beliefs in relation to these facts that are either true or false. Heavily influenced by the early Wittgenstein in this phase, Russell thought that one could achieve a kind of one-to-one correspondence between language and the facts of the world, and that through analysis we could get at the bare fundamentals, kind of the ultimate, simple facts, thus the appellation “atomism.” In Russell’s view at the time, the world we apprehend is essentially a logical construction. Later, he came to believe otherwise, but what remained was the methodology, whereby one arranges or defines more complex ideas or vocabularies (including those of logic and science) in terms of simpler ones. Indeed, this is perhaps the common thread amongst the several analytical schools even today (Russell, 1956).

We come now to Russell’s Neutral Monism phase. While short-lived, he continued to borrow heavily from it in his later thought. Russell was troubled by the problems of perception versus reality, and he sought to solve some of these difficulties. Previously he had been a dualist, believing the world consisted of mental and physical stuff, unlike the monists, such as idealists or materialists, who thought the world one or the other. Neutral monism is not an original doctrine, for others, such as William James and Ernst Mach, held similar ideas before him, though Russell gave it his own twist through his scientific structuralism and a logical framework, and, it also might be said, he revived its popularity. Indeed, others are taking some of the views Russell formulated in this period very seriously even in the present day. Roughly speaking, with neutral monism, Russell held that the world consists of neither mind nor matter, but neutral sensibilia making up both minds and bodies. Thus, mind and body consist of common elements, but they are merely arranged in different ways, much like a phone book could be arranged either by name or by address, and yet consist of the same elements. Psychology and physics have their proper spheres, but in the final analysis, our sensations and desires are located in the brain; and whether we call them mental or physical, they consist of the same stuff and we need not bifurcate them ontologically (Russell, 1921 and 1927).

I call Russell’s final phase Scientific Realism. This is his mature outlook depicted primarily in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, his last, great technical work, and one in which he borrowed heavily from his friend John Maynard Keynes on the matter of induction. Here he says physical objects are inferred entities as opposed to the logical constructions that he once thought they were. Coming full circle to an almost Kantian outlook, he asserted that we are unable to know their intrinsic natures, and, indeed, after years of considering the anomalous aspects of sensation and perception, he believed they probably have only a structural resemblance to our percepts, not the kind of direct correspondence that he and the earlier proponents of realism believed. He continued to maintain, however, that the difference between mental and physical states is not fundamental, but only a matter of how the stuff is arranged (Russell, 1948).

Previously, Russell had implicitly abandoned particulars, holding that only universals remained, an outgrowth of both his theory of descriptions and analysis. But even universals give way in his mature philosophy to qualities or events apprehended in a temporal-spatial framework he called “compresence.” In the end, though, Russell thought that science remains our best hope for understanding the world. He said, “It is at no moment quite right, but it is seldom quite wrong, and has, as a rule, a better chance of being right than the theories of the unscientific. It is, therefore, rational to accept it hypothetically” (Russell, 1959, p 13).

I will make some brief remarks about Russell’s views on ethics. Essentially, he agreed with David Hume, which is to say that there are matters of fact as distinguished from matters of value. There are no moral facts. Ethical propositions are expressions of our feelings and desires. But this is not to diminish their importance. He was very passionate about a number of social and ethical issues. He had longed for something more satisfying than the positivist-emotivist view, and he rejected the idea that ethical propositions were, in effect, meaningless. But he nevertheless did believe that ethics is outside the proper sphere of philosophy, and when he commented on social or ethical matters, he was careful to point this out. He had some important things to say about ethics, and I personally disagree he was acting outside of his capacity as a philosopher. Some, including Wittgenstein, believed he was too glib and should not be taken seriously on ethical matters. In truth, a great deal of what he has said about ethics has considerable value from a philosophical standpoint, as has been argued very persuasively by Charles Pigden, a fellow BRS member (Russell, 1999).

And now I turn to an area of particular interest to many, Russell’s views on god and religion. Russell abandoned his belief in a supreme being early in his career when he concluded that all of the arguments for its existence were fallacious. He said if he were addressing a group of philosophers, he would say he was
technically an agnostic (I would say, more accurately: a non-believer) and that he could not prove the non-existence of god, though he found no evidence to support it, either, and quite a bit to suggest it was hokum. For all practical purposes, however, he said he was an atheist. Moreover, Russell held that religion was almost wholly destructive and without merit, and that it was based largely on fear and superstition, contrary to the scientific attitude he promoted. He believed religion was inimical to progress, liberty, human dignity, and unworthy of free men. He frequently railed against the policies of the Roman Catholic Church on divorce, which he believed caused unnecessary pain and suffering, and on sexuality, which he thought anachronistic and unnatural. Interestingly, Russell included communism among the major religions, believing it shared many of the same characteristics as a religious doctrine, and that it merely substituted dialectical materialism for god. It is fair to say that Russell eschewed dogmatic creeds and ideologies altogether, along with the authoritarian regimes they often inspire (Russell, 1957).

Bertrand Russell’s work has had a profound and lasting effect on philosophy, more than any other philosopher of the 20th century. While there have been changes and improvements to what he originally did in logic, no philosopher since Aristotle has had as great an influence over the subject matter, and most of what we do today in logic is an outgrowth of his work, whether it is in support of it or even in opposition to it. This has had a wide range of effects, and not least of all in computer science. Russell was not the first to understand the importance of language to philosophy; but his early work is undoubtedly what gave the philosophy of language its major impetus early in the century—and its several strands today owe much to him, even though he himself came to question the importance of what philosophers of language were doing. Various other schools of philosophy, including logical positivism and the various strains of realism, owe much to Russell, of course. It is barely conceivable that thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Kurt Gödel, Rudolf Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, and W.V.O. Quine, among many others, would have found the same prominence without Russell’s considerable influence. However, I suspect the thing that philosophy, generally, owes him is a rejection of obscurantism, a preference for clarity and rigor of expression, and its embrace of logic and science as its handmaidens. And all of us owe him a great deal for his clarion call for rational discourse, and his eloquent and passionate defense of liberty, justice, and tolerance, even on occasions when these ideals were viewed unfavorably and under attack.

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not put in a plug for the Bertrand Russell Society, a group devoted to the study of Russell’s work and his ideals. The Society has regular annual meetings, publishes a newsletter, and has an e-mail group for Russell discussions; and members receive a complimentary copy of the periodic journal, Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies. The BRS also has a relationship with the Bertrand Russell Research Centre and Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University, which boasts several members of the BRS, including some of the world’s foremost Russell scholars. Let me know if you have any interest in becoming a member of the BRS, and I would be happy to provide you with information.

References and Sources (Note: the references/sources were inserted later, and for the purpose of the Bulletin, and were not part of the original address, unless a work is specifically mentioned in the text.)

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In the Next Issue

Tim Madigan on Russell and Ireland; Annual Meeting Information; Our Columnists; and Much More!

Last but not Least: A New Drawing!

Renew for 2015 before or by midnight 31 December 2014 for a chance to win a copy of the first volume of the Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell: Cambridge Essays (1888-99) ... signed by two of its editors and our esteemed members, Nick Griffin and Ken Blackwell (not pictured, here; well, the one on the left looks a little like ... oh, never mind)! Don't miss out; renew now via PayPal or by sending a check made out to the Bertrand Russell Society to the treasurer, Mike Berumen, at 37155 Dickerson Run, Windsor, CO 80550. The draw will be held sometime later in January, 2015.
