Inside this issue ...

Our columnists;
Feature articles by Landini, Madigan, and Turcon;
And much more.
Information for New and Renewing Members

Membership in the Society is $45 per year for individuals and $25 for students and those with limited incomes. Add $10.00 for couples. A lifetime membership is $1,000. In addition to the BRS Bulletin, membership includes a subscription to the peer-reviewed, scholarly journal, Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies (published semi-annually by McMaster University), as well as other Society privileges, such as participation in the on-line BRS Forum, the BRS email list, access to a host of Russell-related, multi-media resources, eligibility to run for the board and serve on committees, and eligibility to attend the Annual Meeting.

Renewal dues should be paid by or on January 1st of each year. One’s membership status can be determined by going to russell.mcmaster.ca/brsmembers.htm. There one will also find convenient links to join or renew via PayPal and our information form.

New and renewing members can also send a check or money order via traditional post to the treasurer (make it out to The Bertrand Russell Society). Send it to Michael Berumen, Treasurer, Bertrand Russell Society, 37155 Dickerson Run, Windsor, CO 80550. If a new member, please tell us a little about yourself beyond just your name (interests in Russell, profession, etc.). Include your postal address and email address, as well as your member status (i.e., regular, couple, student, limited income). If a renewing member, please let us know of any relevant changes to your contact information.

The BRS is a non-profit organization, and we greatly appreciate any extra donations or bequests that members choose to give. Donations may be tax-deductible in certain jurisdictions. Please check with your tax or legal advisor.

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Publication Information

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Institutional and individual subscriptions to the Bulletin are $20 per year. If in stock, single issues of the Bulletin may be obtained for $10 ($15 outside of North America) by sending a check or money order, payable to The Bertrand Russell Society at the address above. For availability of recent issues, query Michael Berumen by email at opinealot@gmail.com, and for back issues, query Tom Stanley, tjstanley@myfairpoint.net. Electronic versions of recent issues also may be found at the BRS website at www.bertrandrussell.org/.

Letters to the editor may be submitted to the editor’s email address. Please reference the issue, author, and title of the article to which the letter relates. Letters should be concise. Publication will be at the discretion of the editor, and predicated upon available space. The editor reserves the right to truncate letters.

Manuscripts may be submitted to the editor at his email address in Microsoft Word. Feature articles and book reviews should be Russell-centric, dealing with Russell’s life or works, and they should be written in either a scholarly or journalistic style. Articles generally should not exceed 7 single-spaced pages, and book reviews should not exceed 2 single-spaced pages. Mathematical, logical, and scientific symbols are fine, but please ensure that they are essential. Footnotes/endnotes should be used sparingly and primarily for citations; the editor reserves the right to convert footnotes to endnotes and vice versa, depending on layout needs. Parenthetical citations and page numbers, with standard reference descriptions at the end of the article, are also fine; but no abbreviations for works, please. Submissions should be made no later than August 31st and December 31st for the fall and spring issues, respectively. The editor will collaborate with the authors, as required, and authors will have the opportunity to review any suggested changes prior to publication. There are no guarantees of publication, and articles submitted may be held for future editions.

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- The following members were re-elected to the BRS’ board of directors for the term January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2017: Michael Berumen, Nicholas Griffin, Gregory Landini, John Ongley, Michael Potter, Cara Rice, Thomas Riggins, and Peter Stone. The Elections Committee of Thomas Stanley, Ray Perkins, and Michael Potter superintended the balloting and voting process.

- The 2015 Annual Meeting of the BRS will be held at Trinity College in Dublin, Ireland on June 5-7. The meeting is co-sponsored by the Society for the Study of the History of Analytic Philosophy, which will hold its meeting on June 4-6. BRS Vice Chair, Peter Stone, who teaches political science there, will be our host. A.C. Grayling will give the keynote address. See page 32 herein for more information.

- President Alan Schwerin has called for papers for the 2015 Annual Meeting, June 5-7. If you are interested in presenting a paper, forward an abstract to aschweri@monmouth.edu. A number of interesting presentations are planned; updates can be found here: https://sites.google.com/site/alanschwerinsphilosophycorner.

- The BRS is a coalition member in support of the Secular Policy Institute, a new think tank and lobbying organization for the separation of church and state and other secular rights. For more info, go to: www.secularpolicyinstitute.net.

- Help the BRS recruit members by referring to our website, bertrandrussell.org, on your social media, blogs, etc., and even consider adding it to your automated email signature line. Help spread the word of the Lord—Lord Russell, that is.

- The bertrandrussell.org site has recently been updated by Dennis Darland and Kris Notaro to include much information relevant to the Society. Go there for general information on the BRS, its organization, treasurer’s reports, Forum access, and board minutes, as well as links to other Russell-related sites.

- Phil Ebersole won the recent renewal drawing (for those who renewed on or before Jan 1st). Well known for his love of books and book reviews for BRS members, Phil won Vol. I of the CPBR series signed by two of its editors, our own Ken Blackwell and Nick Griffin.

- Honorary BRS member Ivor Grattan-Guinness died at the age of 73 on 12 December 2014. Grattan-Guinness specialized in both the philosophy and history of logic and mathematics, and he wrote extensively about Russell’s work. According to his obituary in The Guardian (Dec. 31, 2014), “Ivor looked like Russell, and could give a faithful imitation of Russell’s rather strangulated speech.”

- Mini-financial report for 2014:

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News to Use: Chapter and Verse

The BRS is committed to the idea that promoting Russell scholarship and increasing awareness of his ideas and ideals ought to reach beyond the confines of BRS membership, and, with these ends in mind, we believe that some of our resources could be utilized more effectively to access a larger audience. Thereby, we might also plant the seeds for future member growth in the BRS, and, at the very least, we can help to continue interest in Russell’s life and work, a substantive part our Society’s mission.

One way of doing this is to encourage the formation of on-campus and community-based chapters formed to undertake the study and discussion of Russell. Of course, we have a chapter, today, in India. Several smaller, independent Russell groups already exist, notably in Northern California and New York. Nothing would prevent an existing group with a Russelian bent from applying to become a BRS chapter. A natural setting for a BRS chapter would be a university, whereby, for example, a professor or student with an interest in Russell could attract likeminded colleagues and promising students into forming a club to
meet and discuss Russell. One could imagine several scenarios, maybe meeting over pizza once a month to discuss a particular work or idea, for example. It need not be heavily structured or formal. The important things from a BRS perspective are that it has a stated Russellian purpose and that it does not conflict with the Society’s general mission.

More specifically, what we envision is the formation of BRS chapters that we would approve as affiliates and, in return, we would extend certain benefits to chapter members. The requirement would be that the chapter have at least 3 chapter members, hold periodic meetings, report on activities once each year, and that at least one member (most likely the founder, at least, initially) must also be a dues-paying member of the BRS. There would be no other financial obligation to the BRS. Of course, chapter members could also join the BRS, proper. A professor or graduate student who is already a member of the BRS might be the obvious candidate to form a chapter.

Some universities may have requirements on the formation of "clubs" and such, and this should of course be examined by anyone seeking to form an on-campus chapter. Community-wide chapters would presumably be exempt from such restrictions, and any member could form one.

The dues structure for the BRS allows students and members of limited financial means to receive full membership for only $25 USD, today. This, for example, would make forming a chapter in a developing country more tractable, as the required member would only be obligated to pay this amount if he or she were of limited means or a student.

At the present time, chapter members would be accorded certain benefits, including, among other things, a digital copy of the current Bulletin, participation in the BRS Forum, and public recognition of the chapter on our member-in-good-standing list. The BRS member of the chapter would be encouraged to share his or her hardcopies of Russell and the Bulletin with fellow chapter members.

Please consider, therefore, whether or not forming a chapter might make sense on your own campus or in your community. It could be at once useful and fun for everyone involved! And if you like talking and learning about Russell's ideas, anyway, why not create a regular forum to do so? Consult a director of the BRS for guidance or to seek approval.

100 Years Ago:
Russell’s Lonely War

WWI began in the summer of 1914. It was in full effect on both land and sea in 1915. By April 1915, in violation of the Hague Convention, the first use of chlorine gas would appear at the Second Battle of Ypres. Also in that year, the outlook on war that Russell would continue to hold for most of his life had been shaped. It was formally stated in his piece in the International Journal of Ethics (January 1915) in his essay, "The Ethics of War." Russell's position is encapsulated in the first sentences: "The question whether war is ever justified, and if so under what circumstances, is one which has been forcing itself upon the attention of all thoughtful men. On this question I find myself in the somewhat painful position of holding that no single one of the combatants is justified in the present war, while not taking the extreme Tolstoyan view that war is under all circumstances a crime."

In February 1915, Russell wrote to the Cambridge Review: "Behind the rulers, in whom pride has destroyed humanity, stand the patient populations, who suffer and die. To them, the folly of war and the failure of governments are becoming evident as never before. To their humanity and collective wisdom we must appeal if civilization is not to perish utterly in suicidal delirium."

H.M. Butler, Master of Trinity, would call Russell’s outspoken opposition to the war a "dereliction of duty." The 83-year old Butler would soon lead the effort resulting in Russell’s dismissal from Trinity in the following year, after Russell had been convicted and fined £100 plus £10 costs for writing a pamphlet "likely to prejudice the recruiting and discipline
of his Majesty's forces”. This would not be the last time he was dismissed from a position for his views.

There were many others at Cambridge who disagreed with Russell’s position on the war, not least among them, his friend and colleague, Alfred North Whitehead, whose son, Eric, later would be killed in the war. While outwardly cordial, Whitehead was critical of Russell behind the scenes, and their once close relationship would never be the same. Russell did have several allies, though, most notably the mathematician G.H. Hardy and the classicist F.M. Cornford.

In May 1915, Russell wrote Ottoline Morrell, “It is such a comfort to be away from Cambridge. I suffer there from the close contact with people who think me wicked. They are much more fierce this term than they were before” (244, Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years 1914-1970, ed. N. Griffin). It was not easy to oppose the war amidst the patriotic fervor that dominated England as a whole. Russell was in his forties, and not in any danger of having to serve. But he could not remain silent. In the process he lost his moorings with many erstwhile friends, and he was estranged from the environment he loved the most, Trinity. But he never wavered in principle. Simon Blackburn, the first Bertrand Russell Professor of philosophy at Trinity, wrote in The Fountain (Spring 2014), “In the heated, bellicose atmosphere of the time Russell’s unswerving devotion to that principle itself required a great deal of heroism.”

Losses in WWI

(Estimated)

- Military Deaths: 8,539,804 to 10,822,343.
- Civilian Deaths Caused by Battles: 2,235,457.
- Civilian Deaths Caused by Disease or Starvation (Excluding Influenza Epidemic): 4,661,000 to 5,350,000.
- Total Deaths: 15,436,261 to 18,407,800.
- Total Injured/Wounded: 21,000,000.
- Total Casualties: 36,436,261 to 39,407,800.


\[ \vdash \Lambda \neq V \]

i.e. “nothing is not everything.” This is useful as giving us the existence of at least two classes. If the monistic philosophers were right in maintaining that only one individual exists, there would be only two classes, \( \Lambda \) and \( V \), \( V \) being (in that case) the class whose only member is the one individual. Our primitive propositions do not require the existence of more than one individual.

Russell as a newly-minted BA

**Progress and Advances in Morality**

Russell delivered a paper to the Cambridge and Westminster Club in 1893 on advancing technology and the law of diminishing returns in relation to society and morality. He was in his early twenties at the time, and in his paper, “Mechanical Morals,” he suggested a direct relationship between economic and technological advances and moral progress, and he suggested that the law of diminishing returns would be replaced by a law of increasing returns. He further submitted that the Spencerian notion of the “survival of the fittest” was increasingly anachronistic. He optimistically argued that settling disputes by arbitration would become the order of the day instead of war (he did not well anticipate impending events of the 20th century). He remarked, “Hence the morality which Nelson taught his midshipmen: Tell the truth, never be afraid, and hate a Frenchman as you would the devil. The second precept to the modern mind is unimportant: the third grotesque. Though the in-
distinctive and unthinking of all countries continue that hatred of foreign nations which was formerly a virtue, those who have grasped the principles of reasoned morality advocate international arbitration and laugh at the mutual hatreds of civilized nations. The modern love of arbitration is a direct outcome of the law of increasing returns."

In the same paper, Russell argued that equal rights and more social participation for women would have increasing utility and acceptance as the ordinary vicissitudes of existence became more manageable, along with the decreasing need for military preparedness. He wrote, "Another outcome is the advocacy of women's rights. War being no longer of supreme importance, the less warlike sex may become as useful for the new end of living well, and as capable of realizing that end, as men are: they may therefore attain an equal respect, an equal position in the state, and an equal share in advancing, not the art of keeping alive, but the art of living." This predated full equality in voting rights in Britain (1928) by over 30 years. (Quotations from: Bertrand Russell. 1983. "Mechanical Morals and the Morals of Machinery." 1896. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume I: Cambridge Essays 1888-99. Edited by Kenneth Blackwell, Nicholas Griffin, et al. London: Allen and Unwin. p. 327.)

**Not Necessarily Trivial**

Russell finished his Moral Sciences Tripos at Trinity in the spring of 1894. He had not made up his mind on the topic for his fellowship dissertation. We now know that he wrote on philosophical aspects of geometry (no one has found a copy of the dissertation), which in 1897 ended up being the topic of his first philosophical book: An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, where he defended his then-Kantian view—especially in light of various non-Euclidian developments—developments that eventually would lead Russell to believe the Kantian position was no longer tenable. What, then, was the other subject that Russell entertained writing about for his fellowship dissertation, but that he finally rejected in favor of philosophy? (See page 21 for the answer.)

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**Russell and Society**

By Ray Perkins

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**A Cultural Influence**

Russell devoted much of his last two decades to the cause of world peace, and his work has touched many of us, who, in turn, have been inspired to work toward that same goal. Most of those so inspired are unknown. But some have gone on to do their work in areas that not only promoted peace, but also reshaped and enriched our cultural heritage in ways quite remarkable.

A few years ago, I read an interview by Jonathan Power (Prospect Magazine, 2008) with Paul McCartney of Beatles' fame. McCartney told of an occasion in the mid-1960s, when the Beatles were becoming known worldwide, when he heard that the famous philosopher and peace activist, Bertrand Russell, was living in the London area. So he decided to pop by for a visit. (Russell and his anti-nuclear activism had been in the UK news for several years, so it's hardly surprising that the young McCartney would know of him.) He was graciously received by Russell, and in the course of the visit, Paul was informed of the US war of aggression in Vietnam, not yet widely known. Paul returned to the group and reported his philosophical visit and the shocking account of the US war with great effect, especially for John Lennon, who became deeply concerned and went on to become a peace activist in his own right—not only with rallies, marches, and an 8-day "bed-in" (with his wife Yoko Ono in the Queen Elizabeth Hotel in Montreal), but especially with his powerful anti-war music that inspired millions at the time, and continues to inspire millions today.

I had the good fortune to come across a YouTube clip of McCartney on the US TV show, "The View" (2009), where he told this same story, saying that it was John, not himself, that was the real activist, but that he (Paul) was the catalyst, via the Russell encounter, for John's politicization and peace activism.

Russell and Lennon (and his wife Yoko Ono) had some communication, although I doubt they ever met. I have noticed on BRACERS [Bertrand Russell Archives and Catalog and Retrieval System] that Russell, Lennon,
and Yoko exchanged letters on several occasions in the late ’60s. And I was especially pleased to see, thanks to Ken Blackwell, a posting on the BRS Forum (Sept. 22, 2014) from Bill Conrad—longtime BR fan and friend of Yoko Ono—saying that she and John “loved Bertrand Russell,” and would “stay up for hours talking about him.” It occurred to me—especially after refreshing my memory on the lyrics of some of Lennon’s peace songs— that Lennon’s lyrics may well have been influenced by some of Russell’s popular anti-war writings.

Notice, for example, the opening words of the internationally known “Give Peace A Chance”:

Everybody’s talking about/ Bagism, Shagism, Dragism, Madism, Ragism/ Tagism, this-ism, that-ism/ Ism Ism Ism/ [CHORUS]

All we are saying is give peace a chance.

[Listen at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=RkZC7sqImaM]

A disdain for “isms” is an oft repeated Russellian theme, for example, in his preface to Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (1959), Russell says: “What is needed is not an appeal to this or that-ism, but only common sense” [my italics]. And in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto it’s the appeal to the “isms” of “communism and anti-communism,” in particular, which need to be de-fanaticized before “the titanic struggle” between them kills us all.

Again, notice Lennon’s vision of a world without war in his 1971 hit song “Imagine”. It includes:

“no heaven”, “no hell”; “no religion”, “no countries”; “a brotherhood of man”; “the world living as one”.

[Listen at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=XLgYAHhkPFa]

It’s not much of a stretch to see here familiar Russellian themes on: traditional religion (e.g., in Why I Am Not A Christian, 1957); his view of national sovereignty as an obstacle to a united peaceful world (e.g., in Has Man A Future?, 1961); and his reverence for humanity and its vast importance by comparison with all our relatively trivial concerns: “remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can ... the way lies open to a new paradise” (again, the Manifesto).

Did Lennon really read Russell? Could be. I wonder if Yoko knows. But whatever the answer, we’re grateful for the great philosopher’s life and work, and for the remarkable influences he has had and continues to have.

*Probably 1964, since he describes Russell as 92 years old. This was the year that US presence in Vietnam began rapid escalation, shortly after the US Senate approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, thereby giving LBJ carte blanche to respond to N. Vietnam’s alleged attack on US ships—a claim we now know to have been fabricated.

**Lennon’s famous “Give Peace A Chance” was first recorded in their Montreal hotel room in May 1969. It quickly became the theme song for the anti-war movement. Five months later, fellow BRS member Jack Clontz and I escorted 100 South Carolina University students to Washington DC, not far from the White House, where we sang this powerful song with a half million protestors.

Meet the BRS
By Chad Trainer
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Russell’s Lobbyist

I was born March 22, 1963 and raised in the area of Philadelphia’s western suburbs known as the “main line.” Both of my parents, Reggie and Phil Trainer, were Pennsylvania natives. I was the third of four children. During the 1970s, when I first started reading philosophy, my exposure to the subject had been limited primarily to overviews and collections of canonized texts about philosophy’s large questions and history. The excerpts featuring Bertrand Russell were among my favorites, so I started reading Russell’s books.

The Catholic environment in which I had been raised was stifling, especially for a skep-

Chad Trainer
tic. I found the urbanity and erudition of Russell refreshing.

I have always believed that I learn differently from most people. This made formal education unengaging and tedious for me. I found Russell’s ability to make almost any subject interesting especially encouraging. I was also becoming increasingly interested in learning about the history of philosophy—a subject about which Russell wrote extensively. In April of 1981, I started a history of philosophy project. Originally, I envisioned a twenty-six year program corresponding to philosophy’s twenty-six century history. The idea was to devote two hours a day to the project and select seven-hundred hours’ worth of translated, primary source material from each century. In the mid-1990s, when I was up to modern philosophy, the stricture of finishing philosophy’s four most recent centuries in a mere four years increasingly seemed gratuitous, so I decided to prolong the project for an as yet undefined amount of time. I am currently reading Immanuel Kant. Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy was one of the books on which the project was based, along with other histories, such as Frederick Copleston’s nine-volume survey and, more recently, Anthony Kenny’s four-volume history. Side-by-side with the history of philosophy reading, I continued to read Russell, and, as of last count, I have read over fifty of his books.

After high school I worked for three years at a local restaurant. I then found a job as a clerk on the railroad. For the next three years I was employed in the regional rail division of the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority. Then, for the next two decades, I worked for Amtrak. During my tenure at Amtrak, I was nominated and elected to a variety of positions within the union, most of which dealt with politics and lobbying. It was during the years I was lobbying in Washington, DC that I met Cara Rice, whom I married in 2002, and by whom I had a daughter, Colette, in 2008.

For some time, prospects of a full-time job as a lobbyist for my railroad union seemed strong, but this all changed when the union’s leadership decided to merge with another union, which basically put a freeze on hiring. Fortunately for me, I was able to find full-time work last year with the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO in Harrisburg as the state federation’s lobbyist.

Although I had heard of the Bertrand Russell Society (first in Al Seckel’s edition of

Russell’s writings on religion), I had surmised—wrongly, it turns out—that it would probably be closed to people lacking credentials. In the late 1990s, the first few years Cara and I were dating, Cara took it upon herself to contact the BRS and provide me with a membership to it as a holiday present, a membership we cherish and retain to this day.

In addition to Russell’s critique of religion, I have also been interested in his theory of knowledge, philosophy of science, his ethics, and his politics. Each year, I have looked forward to being a presenter at the BRS’s annual meeting where others can help to vet my ideas. I have enjoyed both discussion with fellow enthusiasts and writing for the Society about a diverse range of topics. I have made presentations on several of my interests, including how I believe Russell’s actual philosophy of knowledge falls between skepticism and dogmatism; his empiricist propensities in his later philosophic activity; the problematic aspects of his Platonism; the respects in which language is for him both a leading and lagging indicator of truth; how he resorts to extra-philosophic considerations in exalting the philosophy of Spinoza over Locke’s; the Hobbesian aspects of his views on foreign policy versus the Lockean aspects of his domestic politics; his aversion to space exploration; his celebration of the leisurely (or “idle”) life, his days in Pennsylvania; the late U.S. Senator Pat Moynihan’s (Dem NY) marginalia in one of Russell’s books; and what I imagine would be Russell’s hostility to high-tech communication and the internet.

For the last decade I have been honored to serve as a BRS director, as well as the chair of its board of directors.

From the Student Desk
By Milan Soutor
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The Unity of a Misconception

Richard Gaskin’s book The Unity of Proposition (2008. NY: Oxford University Press) gives an impression of an amazingly comprehensive study. This impression, sadly enough, quickly vanishes if we look into details of Gaskin’s argument. In this short
entry, I will focus on Gaskin’s discussion of Russell’s early propositional realism in sections 10 and 11 of the first chapter of his book.

Gaskin, in the first place, exaggerates the importance that the unity problem has for Russell in The Principles of Mathematics (PoM). Everything substantial that Russell has to say in PoM about it is given by his appeal to the distinction between a relation actually relating and a relation in itself (see §54 and §99). Whether we like it or not, the unity problem was not among main concerns of Russell’s in PoM.

In section 10, Gaskin focuses on §52 of PoM. Reading the unity problem into the agenda of this paragraph, he misreads Russell at many points. For example, Russell says that ‘it is difficult to see how “Caesar died” differs from “the truth of Caesar’s death,” or “the falsehood of Caesar’s death” in the other case. Yet it is quite plain that the latter, at any rate, is never equivalent to “Caesar died”.’ Gaskin takes this passage as implying that ‘we can have a redundancy theory of truth, but not of falsity; truth is, in that sense, prior to falsity’ (p. 48). Quite on the contrary, Russell rejects the redundancy theory for the concepts of truth and falsehood in PoM. Concerning the concept of truth, this is clear when we look into the appendix A, §478. (And there is no reason that the concept of falsehood should be treated differently.) However, Russell accepts the redundancy theory of truth qua logical assertion; in §478, we read: ‘But [logical, MS] assertion does not seem to be constituent of an asserted proposition, although, it is, in some sense, contained in an asserted proposition ... no concept can be found which is equivalent to p is asserted, and therefore assertion is not a constituent of p asserted.’

Returning to §52, logical assertion is treated as a quality that belongs to every true proposition and is lacked by every false proposition. But logical assertion is labeled by Gaskin as ‘bogus’. Why? Because he thinks that Russell introduced this notion to explain propositional unity, and, on this assumption, only true propositions are united, which, no doubt, is an untenable view. But since it is a quality of propositions, logical assertion cannot be identified with the status of being a relating relation, i.e., with the feature that is to provide the unity. Hence, Russell did not introduce the notion of logical assertion to explain the unity. Although in §99 of PoM Russell takes the ability to relate as a sort of assertion, however unhappy Russell’s terminology may be, it is clear that this assertion cannot be logical assertion discussed in §52 and the appendix.

In the section 11, Gaskin continues his unjust critique of Russell. Referring to Russell’s saying in ‘On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood’ (1910) that, on the binary theory of judgment, one cannot get rid of false propositions while keeping true ones, on pain of making it possible to verify whether a judgment is true or false by mere analysis, Gaskin writes:

Actually his proffering this reason evinces Russell’s notoriously unreliable memory: for given ... that the propositions of 1903 theory were officially held to be composed (normally) of worldly objects, rather than of linguistic signs or mental intentions, there ought to be nothing absurd, on that theory, in supposing that we should discover the truth or falsehood of a judgment by inspecting the judged proposition (p. 49-50).

Gaskin claims that, on Russell’s 1903 binary theory of judgment, analyzing a proposition cannot be distinguished from inspecting reality.

But what do ‘reality’ and ‘worldly’ mean in the terminology that Gaskin chooses for his exegetical purposes? The world (which is a part of all embracing reality) is for early Russell the totality of true propositions. It is not the totality of all propositions, let alone false ones. To say that propositions, true or false, are worldly is misleading. One should use rather the terms ‘objective’ or ‘epistemically independent’ here.

Moreover, the trivialization of verification threatens Russell’s position only if the truth or falsehood of a proposition as an object of a propositional attitude put forth with a commitment to its truth is taken to be its intrinsic feature. Unknown to Gaskin, Russell categorically refuted the trivialization of verification in ‘The Nature of Truth’, a talk delivered in 1905 at a meeting of the Jowett Society in Oxford. Still defending propositional realism at that time, Russell says:

Generally, if true and false propositions differ in any property, this property must consist in the presence or absence of some relation to something else, not in an intrinsic quality discoverable by analysis; for if there were a difference in any
intrinsic quality, we could, as soon as we knew this quality, discriminate true from false propositions by mere analysis, which in general is plainly impossible (Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 4, p. 504).

Russell’s realism of propositions, perhaps, may be shown, eventually, to be unable to satisfy the desideratum that verification is not in general trivial. But to arrive at this conclusion, one has to present detailed arguments.

Russell’s works discussed in Gaskin’s book are canonical texts of philosophy. Although not without problems, they deserve to be treated with appropriate care. Gaskin offers a poor and often careless exegesis, and even a lack of due modesty in his critique, and despite its apparent comprehensiveness, he fails to make his case against Russell in several major respects.

References


Analytics

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Russell’s Objection to Bare Particulars

Bare particulars have received a fair amount of bad press recently. Contemporary metaphysicians, just like many of their predecessors, find bare particulars puzzling and often unacceptable. How can there be property-less property-bearers? What might the nature of such particulars be? Are they truly without any properties, and if so, can such entities be characterized at all? And why even contemplate having such entities in one’s ontology? These are just some of the questions that a proponent of bare particulars must address.

Seventy-five years ago, in his An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (1940), Russell briefly contemplated the existence of bare particulars before rejecting them. For Russell of this period, ordinary particular things such as chairs, tables, and towers were to be considered as nothing more than bundles of qualities. His previous two-category ontology of particulars and universals was at this point replaced with a one-category ontology of universals alone. Universals come in the guise of qualities and relations, and what we take to be ordinary, particular things are just bundles of such universals. But for Russell, as for any bundle theorist, the following problem presents itself: if universals are entities that have multiple instances, and if ordinary particulars are to be constructed as bundles of such multiply-occurring universals, what will serve as the ontological ground of the difference between two exactly resembling bundles? As Russell puts it in the Inquiry: “If there were in New York an Eiffel Tower exactly like the one in Paris, would there be two Eiffel Towers, or one Eiffel Tower in two places?” (p.119). The bundles of universals making up the Eiffel Tower in Paris and the one in New York would be exactly the same, and given that a universal is numerically identical (one and the same) in each of its instances, what is there to stop the two bundles—the two Eiffel Towers—from collapsing into one? In the literature, this problem is known as the problem of individuation.
Now, bare particulars are often introduced as a *solution* to the problem of individualization. By postulating particulars as numerically distinct bearers of properties, the problem would indeed be evaded—different particulars would ontologically ground the twoness of the Eiffel Towers in Paris and in New York. But this kind of solution, according to Russell, commits us to an “unknowable”; he writes: “We experience qualities, but not the subject in which they are supposed to inhere. The introduction of an unknowable can generally, perhaps always, be avoided by suitable technical devices, and clearly it should be avoided whenever possible” (*Inquiry*, p.122). The “technical devices” that Russell has in mind involve constructing coordinates in the visual field in terms of universal qualities, and then extending this procedure to physical space-time. Many have worried about the viability of these Russelian solutions, particularly about the dangers of commitment to absolute (rather than relative) space and time, and about the reliance on physical space and time in the characterization of the ontological categories (rather than the other way around). I won’t engage these worries here. For an in-depth consideration of these issues in Russell’s ontology of particulars as bundles of universals see Gülberk Koç Maclean’s excellent, recent monograph *Bertrand Russell’s Bundle Theory of Particles*. Rather, what concerns me here is whether Russell’s reason for rejecting bare particulars is a good and a relevant one in today’s debate.

Russell appears to reject bare particulars for the same empiricist reasons for which philosophers have criticized Locke’s notion of substance. We have no experience of it, and even in principle can have no way of experiencing it, according to Russell; so why postulate such an entity? As James Moreland rightly notes in his 1998 paper “Theory of Individualization: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars”: “this objection was a forceful one in the days of Bergmann and his disciples because they lived in a time when forms of positivism were alive and, in fact, they themselves subscribed to a version of empiricist epistemology” (p.255). For this reason, Gustav Bergmann and Edwin Allaire of the University of Iowa were troubled by this objection, and discussed it at some length. (See Bergmann’s 1947 article “Russell on Particulars” in *The Philosophical Review* and Allaire’s 1963 article “Bare Particulars” in *Philosophical Studies* in which he specifically addresses Russell’s unknowability objection.)

Allaire’s reply in “Bare Particulars” was interesting, if not obviously successful. He first distinguished between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by recognition, and then proceeded to argue that it is not at all true that we do not know bare particulars in the first sense of “knowing”. On the contrary, according to Allaire, in the very act of experiencing, for example, two identical discs as numerically distinct, we are acquainted with the bare particulars that ground ontologically their numerical distinctness. He says: “To claim that both discs are collections of literally the same universals does not account for the *thisness* and *thatness* which are implicitly referred to in speaking of them as two collections. That is, the two collections of characters—if one persists in speaking that way—are, as presented, numerically different. Clearly, therefore, something other than a character must also be presented. That something is what proponents of the realist analysis call a bare particular” (p.7).

Allaire does not spend any more time explaining the nature of the bare particulars with which we are acquainted. His characterization of them is as succinct as Bergmann’s—they are simple entities, individuators that do not have any nature, structure, or constituents. But the problem with this response is that Russell could still come back and claim that even if one grants that we are acquainted with particularity, it is by no means clear that we are acquainted with a bare particular as such, rather than the complex particular with all (or at least some) of its properties. And if this is so, then what is the difference between a particular with its properties and a particular without them? The danger of insisting on a “pure bareness” of a bare particular is that, if left unqualified, the mystery that surrounds this entity remains. Thus, even if one can counter Russell’s worry by either claiming that we are indeed acquainted with bare particulars in the way that the numerical distinctness of ordinary particulars is presented to us, or by simply rejecting that the adoption of an entity needs to depend on its being perceptible, one thing is clear: proponents of bare particulars need to do more than just claim with Bergmann and Allaire that such entities are simple individuators. In recent literature, Moreland stands out for advancing the debate in this direction. The ins-and-outs of his proposal take us away from Russell, and I discuss them in detail elsewhere.
From the Archives
By Ken Blackwell
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Enjoying the New BRACERS

BRACERS is a letter-by-letter catalogue of the Bertrand Russell Archives. It was developed on McMaster’s IBM mainframe in 1988. At the turn of the century, BRS member David Blitz helped make the data accessible on the web. With the imminent demise of the mainframe last year, McMaster Library gave the catalogue a new home. Systems developed a new database system for it, and migration took place in November. Since then, we’ve been preoccupied in completing the case conversion—the mainframe, to save storage space, used all capitals, no accents, and no italics—and in revising other aspects in a system that is much more conducive to record entry and maintenance. Another five years of input ought to complete coverage of the epistolary documents.

Yet BRACERS can be read for pleasure. Several of Russell’s outstanding correspondences survive. The important correspondences with wives and two other women are extracted and summarized in the Notes. It’s easy to find and read the letters in chronological order. Go to http://bracers.mcmaster.ca. In the Recipient/Sender field, type any of these names:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correspondent</th>
<th>Records</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alys Russell</td>
<td>1,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dora Russell</td>
<td>1,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Russell</td>
<td>1,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edith Russell</td>
<td>4,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoline Morrell</td>
<td>3,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constance Malleson</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers are too high for casual reading, so let’s narrow the scope of our enquiry. Click on Advanced Search and fill in Alys Russell as Recipient and simply “BR” as Sender. There are 775 letters (including some transcriptions) from BR to his first wife. Almost every record has a quote and other information from the letter, such as significant names that Russell mentions. The column at the far right tells you where a letter has been published, e.g. in the Autobiography or the Selected Letters. Clicking the record number will take you to the letter’s own web page with more detail, plus live links to other records, even catalogue records for books in Russell’s library. Up to 1,000 records in partial or full form can be downloaded as an Excel or Word file for offline study. Try tracing the alterations in tone between the Alys—Bertie engagement letters, after marriage has settled in, and, after the near-mystical experience; and then the rapprochement of their old age.

Enjoy.

Note: In revising BRACERS I’ve come across the names of several BRS members. Peter G. Crawford, Lee Eisler, Corliss Lamont, J. B. Neilands, Billy Joe Lucas, Ed McClanathan, Nicholas Griffin, Martin Garstens, Robert K. Davis, Jack Pitt, Richard Fallin and I all corresponded with Bertrand Russell or his widow. I’m sure there were others.

This and That
By Michael E. Berumen
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Russell and Islam

The world holds two classes of men: intelligent men without religion, and religious men without intelligence.” Perhaps one of Russell’s anti-religious musings? Sounds a bit like him in one of his more bombastic moments, doesn’t it? But it wasn’t Russell who wrote this. It is attributed to Abu Ala Al-Ma’arri, the Arab writer and freethinker of the 11th century (Haught, 1996). Criticizing and poking fun at religion and religious people are hardly new. The Greek playwrights did it; Voltaire did it; Gibbon did it; Madison did it; Russell did it; and Charlie Hedbo does it, today.

One wonders what Russell might write about Islam or Islamic fanaticism today. Would he, for example, write an essay or book entitled, “Why I Am Not A Muslim?”* In Russell’s largely Eurocentric world, Christianity was the dominant religion—the religion of his country, the religion of the grandmother who raised him, and the religion that informed much of his historical and cultural heritage. Not that he was ignorant about other religious traditions, for he certainly wasn’t; but Christianity, both its doctrines and its institutions, was naturally of more concern to him because of its malefactions towards the...
individuals and society with which he was most familiar—and, perhaps secondarily, because his more comedic side found its various absurdities irresistible as rhetorical nosh. As a philosopher, of course, and quite aside from scrutinizing religious dogma, he dealt with the various arguments for god, arguments he found altogether deficient; but it was in his capacity as a social critic—and, yes, as an occasional humorist—that he commented on religion and the practices of the faithful.

Russell was neither ignorant of Islam’s importance, historically, nor unaware of many of its main theological tenets. Moreover, much as he was mindful of various good deeds and even worthwhile principles within Christianity, he was not unappreciative of Islam’s (what he often called Mohammedanism) contributions. He went to great lengths to praise aspects of Islamic culture and scholarship in his popular survey, A History of Western Philosophy (1945). Islam did not escape his criticism or his biting wit, either. For example, he wrote, “Christianity and Buddhism are primarily personal religions, with mystical doctrines and a love of contemplation. Mohammedanism and Bolshevism are practical, social, unspiritual, concerned to win the empire of the world” (Russell, 1920, p. 114). In his History he wrote, “The Arabs, although they conquered a great part of the world in the name of a new religion were not a very religious race; the motive of their conquests was plunder and wealth rather than religion” (Russell, 1945, p. 420). And he also wrote, “Then came Islam with its fanatical belief that every soldier dying in battle for the True Faith went straight to a Paradise more attractive than that of the Christians, as hours are more attractive than harps” (Russell, 1950, p. 175). Hours are those attractive, virgin women who will become the sex slaves of the martyred faithful. Female servitude and degradation is an especially important requirement for many religions. Islam would merely like to ensure that it continues into the afterlife **

With this said, Islam did not feature much in Russell’s daily life, so it is not altogether surprising that he didn’t write much about it. Today it would be unavoidable, of course, because it is in the news so much, and because of the much larger Muslim population in England, indeed, the world. Russell was by all accounts a well-mannered person, and he did not go out of his way to offend others—but he certainly did not practice political correctness, either … and least of all when doing so would get in the way of important truths or principles, even when speaking out was unpopular or risky to himself. He earned his spurs on controversial issues early in his career. It seems likely that if he were alive he’d be vociferous about Islamic fanaticism, in particular, and even Islamic doctrine more generally, and perhaps especially on issues such as free speech, the oppression of women, intolerance, generally—and the violence and cruelty perpetrated in the name of Allah. There are a great many reasons Russell would not have been a Muslim, of course. I don’t know if Russell ever read the Koran cover-to-cover, but one need only review a handful of its verses to know why he would have found some of its doctrines repugnant:

Make war on them until idolatry is no more and Allah’s religion reigns supreme. - Surah 8:39
O Prophet! Exhort the believers to fight. If there are 20 steadfast men among you, they shall vanquish 200; and if there are a hundred, they shall rout a thousand unbelievers, for they are devoid of understanding. -Surah 8:65

Allah will humble the unbelievers. Allah and His apostle are free from obligations to idol-worshippers. Proclaim a woeful punishment to the unbelievers. - Surah 9:2-3

Fight those who believe neither in Allah nor the Last Day, nor what has been forbidden by Allah and his messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, even if they are People of the Book, until they pay the tribute and have been humbled. - Surah 9:29

Believers! Make war on the infidels who dwell around you. Let them find harshness in you. Ye who believe! Murder those of the disbelievers. - Surah 9:123

When you meet the unbelievers in the battlefield, strike off their heads, and when you have laid them low, bind your captives firmly. - Surah 47:4

The Koran is full of many such hateful prescriptions towards nonbelievers, and many others are directed towards the subjugation of women, among other depredations. Religion of peace? Not as it is written, though most of its practitioners may behave differently. Belief can certainly motivate behavior, and one would hope people would not hold such beliefs, but
Buttressed by youthful despair, nihilism, romanticism, and yes, testosterone—conditions that could not be solved with military might (then or now). This unwholesome brew would result in a catalyzing event, the assassination of an archduke, which, in turn, fomented a much larger and unnecessary military conflagration among powerful nations. Don’t imagine that such a catastrophe could not happen again with yet a new tinderbox to incite nations to war!

I seriously doubt that Russell would have accepted the neo-conservative narrative about how to fight terrorism by adding more organized, large-scale violence and occupying countries, or that he would have countenanced the hostility and jingoism towards Muslims fostered by media outlets such as Fox News, among others. I rather suspect he would have prescribed treating its root causes: ignorance, poverty, the absence of democratic institutions reinforced by the rule of law (with adequate protections of civil and minority rights), and perhaps not least of all, dealing with bored and troubled youngsters susceptible to fantasies of glory. And, in the process, he would undoubtedly be concerned about the overreaction to acts of terror manifested in excessive national security that jeopardizes our own civil rights. Russell was always and properly suspicious of power and its potential for misuse. It seems unlikely that he would call dealing with Islamic fanaticism a “war on terror,” too, which is one of those overwrought and rather meaningless vagaries that cause many heads to nod in agreement.

Russell thought all religion did more harm than good, though he surely would not stomach a new evangelizing and dogmatic creed of atheism as its replacement. He unquestionably knew that several large, atheistic societies in his own time had anything but an untarnished track record on the practice of nonviolence and moral rectitude.

Russell doubtless would—indeed, he did—find much in the various holy works and history of other religions similar to the immorality of the foregoing Koranic prescriptions and the abhorrent practices justified by them. However, he would not be silent about the ravages done in the name of Allah or his messenger, Mohammed, and he certainly would not exempt either the perpetrators of these horrors or the specific doctrines motivating them from his criticism or his wit. Cowardice and politeness in the face of
evil were not part of Russell’s character. Many Muslims do, in fact, denounce the repulsive acts of fanatics, and that is commendable; but they should also renounce the contemptible instructions that explicitly call for mayhem and quit whitewashing these medieval doctrines by ignoring their ramifications. Most Christians and Jews now choose to ignore the horrors prescribed by their own holy writ, or explain them away. And it is good that they do. We can be sure Russell would say that a god or prophet calling for such things is unworthy of the worship or the respect of free men, notwithstanding the religion.

The religious mind is most secure in the certainty of its belief, and whether it is Islam, Christianity, or an ideology of some sort, it simply cannot abide by the non-belief of others, for it results in an unsettling sort of insecurity—self-doubt—and that is unacceptable to such minds. Fanatical believers require the reinforcement of the likeminded, and they are therefore often unable to tolerate dissent. The worst of them even will kill over it.

Some prominent apologists recently have argued that Charlie Hedbo ought to have shown greater sensitivity to believers to avoid the tragic murders that ensued in Paris, and, further, that it was irresponsible for its managers to subject an unwitting staff to what they say was a predictably terrible outcome. This is preposterous, for while not explicitly so, it smacks of blaming the victim, rather like the rape victim accused of “asking for it” by wearing a miniskirt in Central Park. Moreover, staff members certainly knew the inherent danger of working there based on well-publicized, prior incidents at the magazine, and they unquestionably knew exactly what the mission of Charlie Hedbo is, namely, to poke fun at others’ beliefs, rattle sensibilities in order to shine a light on absurdities, provoke thought, and challenge orthodoxies of all kinds, whether they are held by minorities or majorities.

Russell cautioned not only against the censorious nature of the orthodox, but also otherwise liberal-minded people, writing thusly in 1934: “Those who are opposed to change are naturally opposed to all mention of the evils of existing systems; hence they unavoidably turn to suppression of facts as a method of recommending their views. But the frame of mind which leads to censorship is not confined to anyone set of opinions; indeed, I find quite as much of it among those who believe themselves to be in the vanguard of progress as among more conventional people. Very few are convinced that the whole truth and nothing but the truth will cause their own opinions to appear convincing to others” (Russell, 1998, p. 141).

Impoliteness and assailing customs must be protected, and even when it is protecting speech that is unsavory to most or some of us, lest censorship and timidity become the acceptable norm, or worse, the enshrined law. Civilized people tolerate criticism and humor, and they do so even when they disagree with it, and even when it’s false, offensive, or in bad taste. And they also ought to denounce retributive violence because someone is merely affronted by opinions—in no uncertain terms—and without qualifying or rationalizing said violence as the product of an “understandable” offense. There is NO excuse or justifiable reason for it, whatsoever.

Would Russell have written a humorous polemic for Charlie Hedbo on Islam if he were around today? He certainly did do his share of it with Christianity in various print media. We will never know, of course; but it would not surprise me in the least.

*Honorary Member Ibn Warraq (a pseudonym so he is not killed) wrote a book with this very title.
**As their Judeo-Christian counterparts do with their “holy” texts, embarrassed Muslims go to great lengths to whitewash unpleasantries, appealing to context and translation. But there simply is no getting away from the fact that the Koran, Hadith, and many other Islamic texts encourage, even demand violence and oppression. Despite the inconsistency, it is good when believers ignore the worst parts of the edicts of God and his prophets—one hopes because of a maturing moral sense. It is commendable that Christians no longer burn witches, even though they are told to kill them. It will be good when believing Muslims no longer really believe cutting off heads will result in paradise.

References


Amherst: Prometheus Books.

Bertrand Russell Society

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There are jokes in *Principia Mathematica*, as Ken Blackwell and Michael Berumen have noted. I suppose we can all admit that most are not too very funny. But there is something quite funny indeed going on in its volume 2. Whitehead unintentionally denies Modus Ponens! Of course, this is not funny at all. Something has gone very wrong, and it went on without Russell ever seeming to notice. It is not even corrected in the second edition of 1925—something which is most worthy of correction, if anything ever were.

How and when did this happen? More importantly, how do we correct it? It all started, I surmise, sometime well before 2 December of 1910. We know this because Whitehead had sent to Russell news of his thesis that it is a fallacy to infer $\exists \neg \neg \alpha$ from $\alpha \in \neg \neg \alpha$. Russell duly reported this on the last day of the class he was teaching at Trinity College, Cambridge. Henry Sheffer was taking the class and recorded it in his notes—without flinching. It is hard to believe, so let’s show a picture of his notes:

![Image of notes showing a logical expression]

This is shocking, because the inference seems little more than an existential generalization. This occurs in *Principia* as well. We find:

$$^*100.3 \vdash \alpha \in \neg \neg \alpha \ [^*73.3. \ ^*100.1]$$

Note that it is fallacious to infer $\exists \neg \neg \alpha$, for reasons explained in the Introduction to the present section.

The reason it is a fallacy to make this inference, Whitehead tells us, is that “$\neg \neg \alpha$” has changed its meaning from its occurrence in “$\alpha \in \neg \neg \alpha$” to its occurrence in “$\exists \neg \neg \alpha$”.

Now it gets worse. The strange events of Whitehead’s emending *Principia’s* Volume 3 are recounted by Ivor Grattan-Guinness, who seems first to have noticed that something is gravely wrong. He tells us that in 1911 the printing of *Principia’s* volume 2 was suspended. Several pages had to be rewritten and a special *Prefatory Statement of Symbolic Conventions* was added. In *Principia*, not only do we find that it is a fallacy to infer $\exists \neg \neg \alpha$ from $\alpha \in \neg \neg \alpha$, we also find a denial of an instance of Modus Ponens. It is very hard to believe. So I had better give the evidence. There are different juicy quotes on this. But the following is the less technical (PM, vol. 2, p. 34):

Where typically ambiguous symbols occur in implication, on the contrary, the conditions of significance may be different for the hypothesis and the conclusion, so that fallacies may arise from the use of such implications in inference. E.g. it is a fallacy to infer “$\vdash \exists \neg \neg \alpha$” from the (true) propositions “$\vdash \alpha \in \neg \neg \alpha \vdash \exists \neg \neg \alpha$” and “$\vdash \alpha \in \neg \neg \alpha$.” (The truth of the first of these two requires “$\neg \neg \alpha$” should receive the same typical determination in both of its occurrences.) For these two reasons hypotheticals concerning types are often useful, in spite of the fact that their hypotheses are always true when they are significant.
Yipes! Yes, it looks forbiddingly technical, but we needn’t worry about anything too technical—yet. We can all recognize Modus Ponens when we see it. And in this instance it is clear as anything could be. We have:

\[
\begin{align*}
\vdash \alpha \in \text{Nc}' \alpha \\
\vdash \alpha \in \text{Nc}' \alpha \supset \exists \! \text{Nc}' \alpha \\
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore, \( \exists \! \text{Nc}' \alpha \)

\[
\vdash \rho \supset q
\]

Therefore, \( q \)

This is beyond funny. It is downright absurdly funny—the kind of thing commonly attributed to Mark Twain in the quip, “Humor is tragedy plus time.” Though there many worrisome concerns in the transformation of tragedy into laughter, some tragedies and other mishaps in life become funny when, years later, we look back upon them.

Honestly, there is no way to sugarcoat this bitter pill by speaking of “\( \text{Nc}' \alpha \)” having a different meaning in “\( \alpha \in \text{Nc}' \alpha \)” than it has in “\( \exists \! \text{Nc}' \alpha \)”.

Modus Ponens is a fully syntactic matter. It is a transition rule based on shapes or forms (syntax). It cannot be sensitized to semantic matters. Whitehead has to get his syntax so that ambiguities are uniform. Whitehead never did get his syntax in order, and his emendations to Principia’s volume 2 are a disaster.

Let us first consider the fallacy of inferring “\( \exists \! \text{Nc}' \alpha \)” from “\( \alpha \in \text{Nc}' \alpha \)”. We have to unravel some of the many definitions in Principia. Note, first of all, \( \text{Nc}' \alpha \) is a definite description \((\alpha \equiv \sigma \text{Nc} \alpha)\).

Principia has:

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma \text{Nc} \alpha &= \text{df} \sigma \overline{sm} \alpha \\
\sigma \overline{sm} \alpha &= \text{df} \sigma = \overline{\rho} (\rho \text{sm} \alpha).
\end{align*}
\]

Otherwise put, \( \text{Nc}' \alpha \) is the definite description \((\alpha \equiv \sigma \text{Nc} \alpha)\). We have the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\exists \! \text{Nc}' \alpha &= \text{df} \exists (!\alpha)(\sigma \text{Nc} \alpha) \\
\exists (!\delta)(\delta \text{Nc} \alpha) &= \text{df} (\delta \equiv \sigma \equiv \delta) \cdot \alpha \equiv \delta \cdot \exists (!\delta) \\
\exists \! \delta &= \text{df} (\exists \beta) (\beta \in \text{Nc}' \alpha).
\end{align*}
\]

It is easy, therefore, to see that we have:

\[
\exists \! \text{Nc}' \alpha \equiv (\exists \beta) (\exists \beta \in \text{Nc}' \alpha).
\]

With this in place, we are naturally drawn to the analog (with lower-case Greek letters for classes) of Principia’s theorem:

\[
*10.24 \quad \vdash \varphi \supset (\exists \gamma)(\varphi \gamma).
\]

The analog is this:

\[
\vdash \varphi \supset (\exists \gamma)(\varphi \gamma).
\]

We must ask why it is that:

\[
\vdash \alpha \in \text{Nc}' \alpha \supset (\exists \beta) (\beta \in \text{Nc}' \alpha)
\]

is not an instance of this analog theorem for existential generalization? How can it be fallacious to infer \( \exists \! \text{Nc}' \alpha \)?

Whitehead is correct that it is fallacious to infer \( \exists \! \text{Nc}' \alpha \). The reason, however, seems to escape him. To understand why \( \vdash \alpha \in \text{Nc}' \alpha \supset (\exists \beta) (\beta \in \text{Nc'} \alpha) \) is not an instance of \( \vdash \varphi \supset (\exists \gamma)(\varphi \gamma) \), we have to understand which typical ambiguities in Principia are uniform and which are not uniform (unruly). Those that are unruly are dangerous and may change their meanings in recurrences in a given proposition (wff) and/or in different lines of a proof.

Type indices on object-language variables (individual variables and predicate variables) of Principia are perfectly uniform. They cannot change their type indices in repetitions in a proposition or in the lines of a giv-
en proof. Typical ambiguity suppresses these object-language indices under conventions of uniform restoration. Thus they are perfectly fine. The stability (uniformity) of object-language signs in *Principia*, however, does not extend to expression such as "sm" and "Nc". The signs "sm" and "Nc" are quite unruly. This happens because the symbol "sm" is not in *Principia*'s object language!

The symbol "sm" is indeterminate insofar as it might stand for a relation of homogeneous similarity where \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are classes of the same relative type, or non-homogenous similarity where \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are of different relative types. To show relative types of classes, Whitehead introduced *Principia*'s sections *63-*65. Caution! These sections do not speak about types—something that would clearly breach type regimentation altogether. They speak about relative types of classes. It is a wonderful thing. In *Principia* we may speak about relative types of classes even though no ontology of classes is assumed in the work. For example:

\[
t'x = df \, \alpha \cup \bar{\alpha}
\]

Thus, \( t'x \) is the universal class \( V \) of individuals, namely \( \bar{y}(y = x \lor y \neq x). \) Similarly, we find:

\[
t'_0 \alpha = df \, \alpha \cup \bar{\alpha}.
\]

Now let \( \alpha \) be \( \bar{\beta} \) (\( \beta \subseteq \bar{y}(\varphi(y)) \); then \( t'_0 \alpha \) is just the universal class of classes of individuals, namely:

\[
\bar{\beta} \, (\beta \subseteq \bar{y}(\varphi(y) \lor (\beta \subseteq \bar{y}(\varphi(y)))�
\]

Relative types of classes are not about types at all. Now consider the following:

\[
\alpha \, sm_{\sigma, \varphi} \beta \, \supseteq \beta \, sm_{\sigma, \varphi} \alpha
\]

This is a homogeneous notion and equinumerosity/similarity/bijection is indicated by \( sm_{\sigma, \varphi} \), and we can see that both of the classes \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are of the same relative type as \( \sigma \) (and thus are the same relative type as one another). The subscripts give determination of the relative type—although we still have ambiguity of relative type because we do not know what relative type \( \sigma \) has. Compare:

\[
\alpha \, sm_{\sigma, \gamma} \beta \, \supseteq \beta \, sm_{\gamma, \sigma} \alpha
\]

Here we see that \( \alpha \) has the relative type of \( \sigma \) and \( \beta \) has the relative type of \( \gamma \), while leaving it open whether these are the same relative type. Where \( \sigma \) and \( \gamma \) are not the same relative type, the relation \( sm_{\sigma, \gamma} \) cannot be the same as the relation \( sm_{\gamma, \sigma} \).

Now we can see that properly speaking \( \alpha \, sm \, \beta \) is not an object-language wff of *Principia*. The object language wffs always contain typical determinacy. So returning to:

\[
\vdash \varphi \alpha \supseteq (\exists \gamma)(\varphi \gamma),
\]

we can see that the proper use of the schematic letter \( \varphi \) requires that it stand in for determinate expressions of *Principia* and that it be uniform (the expression that \( \varphi \) stands in for must be the same wherever \( \varphi \) occurs.). Hence, consider the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\vdash \alpha & \in Nc \, ' \alpha \supseteq (\exists \beta)(\beta \in Nc ' \alpha) \\
i.e., \quad \vdash \alpha & \in (\delta) \, (\delta Nc \, ' \alpha \supseteq (\exists \beta)(\beta \in Nc ' \alpha)) \\
i.e., \quad \vdash \alpha & \in (\delta) \, (\delta sm ' \alpha \supseteq (\exists \beta)(\beta \in sm ' \alpha)).
\end{align*}
\]

This is not an instance of \( \vdash \varphi \alpha \supseteq (\exists \gamma)(\varphi \gamma) \) because \( sm ' \) is not determinate. A proper instance of theorem schema \( \vdash \varphi \alpha \supseteq (\exists \gamma)(\varphi \gamma) \) is this:

\[
\begin{align*}
\vdash \alpha & \in (\delta)(\delta sm ' \alpha \supseteq (\exists \beta)(\beta \in sm ' \alpha \, ' \alpha). \\
i.e., \quad \vdash \alpha & \in Nc(\xi ' \alpha \, ' \alpha \supseteq (\exists \beta)(\beta \in Nc(\xi ' \alpha \, ' \alpha.
\end{align*}
\]
All is well, the expressions $\overline{sm}_{\xi_a}$ and $Nc(\xi_a)$ are determinate and perfectly provable in their two occurrences in the wff. Since it is an instance of a theorem schema, it is obviously provable. But nothing here alters the meaning in its different occurrences in the way that was causing Whitehead anxiety. But now we can clearly see that $\vdash \forall \alpha \exists \beta (Nc(\xi_a) \rightarrow \alpha)$. 

This violates the proper uniform employment of the schematic letter $\phi$ in $\vdash \forall \alpha \exists \beta (\phi \rightarrow \alpha)$. All is well.

As we shall see, this will give us a nice way to correct Whitehead’s odd denial of Modus Ponens. We noted that it was Whitehead’s meltdown over Modus Ponens and inference involving unruly expressions that caused him in 1911 to call an abrupt halt to the printing of Volume 2 of Principia. He worked on it throughout that year, but some of his emendations were quite bad! He had not gotten to heart the problem. He hadn’t got the heart because he was under a pernicious confusion—a confusion arising from his doctrine that whatever is “true whenever significant” should be provable in Principia.

Some expressions of Principia are true whenever significant. It is easy to see, in particular, that $\forall \alpha \in Nc(\alpha)$, i.e., $\forall \alpha \in Nc(\xi_a) \alpha$ is true whenever significant. It is not significant if the relative type of $\alpha$ is not the same as that of $\xi$. But should being “true whenever significant” be sufficient for provability? Certainly not! Whitehead was mistaken in thinking that he has rendered a proof and in proclaiming that:

$$*100.3 \vdash \forall \alpha \in Nc \alpha.$$  

The proof he gives is bogus. It is important to see why. And, happily, Whitehead has given us just the notations of relative types to sort it out. The following are provable:

$$\vdash \forall \alpha \in Nc(\alpha) \rightarrow \alpha.$$  

$$\vdash \forall \alpha \in Nc(\alpha) \rightarrow \alpha.$$  

What is not provable, although it is true whenever significant, is this:

$$\forall \alpha \in Nc(\xi_a) \rightarrow \alpha.$$  

One cannot prove this from $\forall \alpha \overline{sm}_{\xi_a} \alpha$. Though it is also true whenever significant, $\forall \alpha \overline{sm}_{\xi_a} \alpha$ is not provable. What is provable is $\forall \alpha \overline{sm}_{\xi_a} \alpha$. Now we have lately seen that we can prove:

$$\vdash \forall \alpha \in Nc(\xi_a) \rightarrow \exists ! Nc(\xi_a) \rightarrow \alpha.$$  

Thus we have:

$$\vdash \forall \alpha \in Nc(\xi_a) \rightarrow \alpha.$$  

$$\vdash \forall \alpha \in Nc(\xi_a) \rightarrow \exists ! Nc(\xi_a) \rightarrow \alpha$$

But these are certainly not of the proper form to apply the rule of Modus Ponens.

When did he realize that unruly ambiguity was a serious problem? Unruly ambiguity occurs in Principia’s volume 1 in section *73 on the similarity relation $sm$. In that section, Whitehead proves:

$$*73.31 \vdash \forall \alpha \overline{sm} \beta \equiv \beta \sm \alpha.$$  

So, he must have known about unruly ambiguity during the printing of Principia’s volume 1. The unruly ambiguity of "sm" was surely known to him when *73 of Principia’s volume 1 was printed in 1910. Admittedly,
Whitehead doesn’t make explicit the unruly ambiguity of expression such as “sm” until Principia’s volume 2. He writes (PM, vol., 2, p. 11):

When a typically ambiguous symbol, such as “sm” or “Nc,” occurs more than once in a given context, it must not be assumed, unless required by the conditions of significance, that it is to receive the same typical determination in each case. Thus, e.g., we shall write “α sm β . . . β sm α,” although, if α and β are of different types, the two symbols “sm” must receive different typical determinateness.

But the foregoing passage obviously belongs in volume 1, section *73 on the similarity relation. I think that it is possible that Whitehead’s crisis and meltdown caused him to move various passages around—pulling this or that sheet from Volume 1 during the tail-end of its printing. Indeed, notations such as “smαγ” which enable the expression of relative types of classes, occur in sections *63-*65 in volume 1. They are not used at all until volume 2 over two hundred pages away. They more naturally belong in volume 2, not volume 1.

Given that Whitehead must have known about the unruly ambiguity of “sm”, what, precisely, was the cause of Whitehead’s meltdown in 1911? Perhaps Whitehead hadn’t thought that inference involving such ambiguity would be such a thorny subject. I suspect that something more is at cause of Whitehead’s work from Volume 1 during the tail of volume 2 over two hundred pages away. They more naturally belong in volume 2, not volume 1.

Happily, he was mistaken in this belief.

Because of the differences between the homogeneous smασ and the possibly heterogeneous smαγ, Whitehead must distinguish homogeneous similarity from ascending similarity and from descending similarity. These differences carry over to names of cardinals. We can see this by attending to the fact that Nc ‘α = p(ρ sm α). This just says that the cardinal number of α equals the class of all classes ρ such that ρ sm α. Here the kind of sm involved is wholly ϕ undetermined. If ρ is lower in relative type than α, then we have what Whitehead calls a “descending cardinal.” If ρ is higher in relative type than α, then we have an “ascending cardinal.” If ρ is the same type as that of α, Whitehead calls it a “homogeneous cardinal.” Whitehead writes “Nn c ‘α” for a descending cardinal that is the class of classes that are sm to α and n-many relative types below α. Whitehead writes “Nn c ‘α” for an ascending cardinal that is the class of classes that are sm to α and n-many types above α. For the homogeneous cardinal of α, Whitehead has “Nn c ‘α.”

We saw that the notion “Nc ‘α” is not determinate in relative type and thus unruly. In contrast, Whitehead has the notation “Nc(ζ) ‘α” for the class of all ρ such that ρ sm α and such that ρ is of the same relative type as ζ. This give determinacy of relative type—that is, it makes things stable again. Repeated occurrences of “Nc(ζ) ‘α” in a proposition or in the lines of a proof have the same determination of relative type. The same goes for “Nn c ‘α” and “Nn c ‘α” and “N0 c ‘α.”

With all this in place, Whitehead proves something rather wonderful and unexpected. There are cardinals such that Nc(ζ) ‘α = Nc(ζ) ‘β and yet ¬(α sm β). Whitehead demonstrates quite conclusively that this follows from Cantor’s power-class theorem. Cantor’s theorem assures that:

\[ *102.73 \vdash \text{Nc}(μ) 'μ = Λ. \]

That is, some cardinals are empty. Cantor’s power-class theorem assures that there can be no function from a class μ onto ϕμ—i.e., the power-class of μ which contains all and only the subclasses of μ. This holds for V, the class of all entities of a given relative type. Hence, we have: Nc(V) ‘ϕV = Λ. But also Nc(V) ‘ϕ ϕV = Λ. Thus we see that:

\[ \text{Nc(V) 'ϕV} = \text{Nc(V) 'ϕ ϕV}. \]

At the same time ¬(ϕV sm ϕ ϕV). Hume’s Principle is this: The cardinal number of α = the cardinal number of β ≡ α sm β.

In simple type theory, Hume’s famous principle admits of exceptions! The result that Hume’s Principle fails in simple type theory has long been hidden from view. Hume’s Principle is a favorite of those who advocate Neologism, and who also hope to recover Frege’s work from the impact of Russell’s paradox. But Hume’s Principle must fail in Frege’s hierarchical system of levels of functions—just as it fails in Principia.

I suspect that during the printing of Principia’s volume 1 section *73, Whitehead must have known that Hume’s Principle is false in simple type theory. In the introduction to section *73, we find (PM, vol. 1, p. 455):
Two classes $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are said to be similar when there is a one-one relation whose domain is $\alpha$ and whose converse domain is $\beta$. We express "$\alpha$ is similar to $\beta$" by the notation "$\alpha \text{ sm } \beta$." When two classes are similar, they have the same cardinal number of terms: it is this fact which gives importance to the relation of similarity.

If Whitehead had not realized at this time that Hume's principle is false in type theory, we would surely have expected the stronger statement of a bicondition: "Two classes are similar if and only if they have the same cardinal number of terms." Notice that *Principia*'s section *73 proves:

*73. 37 \[ \alpha \text{ sm } \beta \supset \rho \text{ sm } \alpha \equiv \rho \text{ sm } \beta. \]

It is a very short step to:

\[ \vdash \alpha \text{ sm } \beta \supset (\rho)(\rho \text{ sm } \alpha \equiv \rho \text{ sm } \beta). \]

In volume 2, this readily yields:

*100.312 \[ \vdash \alpha \text{ sm } \beta \supset \text{Nc}' \alpha = \text{Nc}'\beta. \]

Conspicuous by its absence from volume 1 is the converse direction, which we have lately noted is false when it is couched in type theory. The failure of Hume's Principle in type theory is a wonderful result—a long hidden, unrecognized and unappreciated gem of *Principia*.

Confused by his doctrine of "true whenever significant," Whitehead's was led to introduce quite a few very bad emendations into *Principia's* volume 2, and even into volume 3, including supplementary definitions such as the following:

*110.03 \[ \text{Nc}'\alpha +_c \mu = \text{df} \ N_c \alpha +_c \mu \]
*113.04 \[ \text{Nc}'\alpha \times_c \mu = \text{df} \ N_c \alpha \times_c \mu \]
*119.02 \[ \text{Nc}'\alpha -_c \mu = \text{df} \ N_c \alpha -_c \mu. \]

These are all illicit. We have seen that Nc$\alpha$ is the definite description $(\delta(\delta \text{Nc } \alpha))$, and *Principia* defines $\vee +_c \mu$ and $\vee \times_c \mu$ and $\vee -_c \mu$. So, Whitehead's supplemental definitions would make it the case that a given defined expression (definiendum) has two distinct definiens. Whitehead's bad emendments, produced during his anxiety attack and meltdown, must be removed from *Principia*. The details of how to do this are too technical a matter to discuss here.\(^5\)

One question remains to plague us. Where was Russell during all the chaos? Russell was always forthcoming in acknowledging that *Principia* was a full collaboration. But we know without a doubt that Whitehead produced all the emendations in *Principia* concerning the horrors of unruly ambiguity arising with "sm" and "Nc". Russell himself corroborates this in a short piece in *Mind* called, "Whitehead and Principia Mathematica." He writes:

In the later parts, the primary responsibility was Whitehead’s as regards cardinal arithmetic and mine as regards relation arithmetic. Whitehead alone was responsible for the section on Convergence and Limits of Functions, and for Part VI, on Quantity. Whitehead also contributes dome portions which might have been thought to be more in my province, for instance the “Preparatory Statement of Symbolic Conventions” at the beginning of Volume II, which concerned with types and systematic ambiguity.\(^6\)

I don’t know why Russell never sought to correct Whitehead’s bad emendments in *Principia’s* second edition of 1925. Perhaps he could not then have imagined reproaching Whitehead for them and getting his approval for suggested changes. Alternatively, perhaps Russell didn’t know the details of what Whitehead had done!
In his book, *My Philosophical Development*, Russell wrote the following about *Principia*:

> I used to know only six people who had read the later parts of the book. Three of these were Poles, subsequently (I believe) liquidated by Hitler. The other three were Texans, subsequently successfully assimilated.\(^1\)

It is a shock to admit that perhaps Russell hadn’t read it himself.

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3 The existence of this note was first pointed out to me by Bernard Linsky.
5 See Gregory Landini. Forthcoming: "Whitehead’s Badly Emended *Principia,*" *History and Philosophy of Logic.*

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**Answer to “Not Necessarily Trivial” Query (p. 5): What topic other than philosophy did Russell consider for his fellowship dissertation?**

Russell seriously considered doing his dissertation on economics. The well-known Cambridge economist, Alfred Marshall, had given him an extensive reading list. Russell confided to Alys that he wanted to be more involved in practical affairs, and the pursuit of economics was a means of furthering this interest. In 1895, Russell even went to the University of Berlin for a more in-depth study of economics. At the time, Berlin was a hotbed of socialist thought, and Russell was already beginning to align with many socialist ideas. He had expressed uncertainty about his direction to Alys and friends, though, and for some time he entertained doing dissertations in both mathematical philosophy and economics. His teachers James Ward and J.M.E. McTaggart, among others, were not supportive of this idea, and they encouraged him to stick to his knitting, as it were, and pursue philosophy. Finally he decided to do so—to focus on philosophy—and he commenced writing his dissertation on the foundations of geometry. He received his fellowship in the fall of 1895 (see Russell. 1983. *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 1,* ed by Blackwell, Griffin, et al. London: Allen & Unwin, pp. 246-247 and 306-307).

Russell became a member of the Fabian Society in 1897. The Fabians promoted democratic gradualism to socialism rather than revolution. For the remainder of his life, Russell subscribed to a form of economic syndicalism or “guild socialism.”

One wonders if Russell had pursued economics how the course of his life might have changed, and whether or not he would have had as great an impact in that field as he one day would have in logic and philosophy. Of course, Russell and the younger John Maynard Keynes would eventually become friends. Both were members of the Apostles and Bloomsbury Set, and among their shared interests were mathematics and the philosophical issues relating to induction. Keynes was also, off and on, loosely associated with the Fabians. Russell’s influence on Keynes (G.E. Moore was another, perhaps even greater influence) would have profound effects, and Keynes pointed this out on several occasions. Indeed, he said his early work was most influenced by the two Principias, namely, *Principia Ethica* and *Principia Mathematica.* Keynes would take his cue from *Principia Mathematica* in his attempt to develop a formal axiomatic system of probability in his famous *Treatise.* Keynes would go on to become one of century’s most influential economists and a significant player in world affairs. While conversant with economic theory at the turn of the century, it appears that Russell was not as familiar with later technical developments and literature in economics, especially among the Austrians and Americans.
In director–screenwriter John Michael McDonagh’s 2011 Quentin Tarantino-like comic film, *The Guard*, there is a bizarre scene where three hit men, for no apparent reason, while driving down an Irish road get into a heated debate over who the world’s greatest philosopher might be.

Hit Man #1: “Bertrand Russell.”

Hit Man #2: “The fuckin’ English. Everything has to be fuckin’ English. Name your favorite philosopher, and lo and behold, he’s English.”

Hit Man #3: “He’s Welsh.”

Hit Man #2: “Uh?”

Hit Man #3: “Bertrand Russell was Welsh.”

Hit Man #2: “Bertrand Russell was Welsh?”

Hit Man #3: “Yep.”

Hit Man #2, after a pause: “You know I never knew that. Didn’t think anybody interesting was Welsh.”

Hit Man #3: “Dylan Thomas?”

Hit Man #2: “Like I said.”

The above profane, but humorous scene was filmed in Galway, Ireland. It is amusing that the chauvinistic characters are willing to reconsider Russell’s greatness once they can stop thinking of him as an Englishman; but no doubt Lord Russell himself, given his cosmopolitan leanings, as well as his oft-professed love for his Englishness, might have been doubly offended by their banter, not to say their subsequent actions of gunning down a police officer in cold blood. Still, it’s an unexpected Irish connection as we prepare for the annual meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society, to be held this June 5-7 at Trinity College, Dublin. So what better time to reflect upon Russell and Ireland?

Russell’s long life (1872-1970) roughly corresponds to some of the most traumatic and dramatic years in Irish history, from the days of Charles Stewart Parnell and the fight for Home Rule to the beginnings of “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland. Growing up as a British aristocrat with strong connections to the Liberal Party, as a young man he was steeped in the debate and politics of Home Rule, the movement for the self-government of Ireland under the United Kingdom. The Liberal Party, which his grandfather Lord John Russell (1792-1878) had helped to form, was committed to support the Home Rule cause, under the leadership of Prime Minister William Gladstone, while the Conservative Party vehemently opposed it. Russell came of age while this issue raged through the British Parliament, and as he relates in his autobiography, it was a topic with which his family was intimately connected. He writes: “My grandmother Russell and my Aunt Agatha were passionate supporters of Gladstone’s Home Rule policy, and many Irish M.P.’s used to visit Pembroke Lodge. My grandmother and aunt always vehemently rejected the view that Parnell’s followers were in alliance with terrorists. They admired Parnell, with whom I once shook hands. But when he became involved in scandal, they agreed with Gladstone and repudiated him” (Russell, 1969, pp. 50-51). Russell is alluding here to the so-called “Kitty O’Shea” scandal, the shocking revelation that Parnell, the leader of the Irish Home Rule Party, had been having a longstanding affair with another man’s wife and had fathered three of her children, which caused the moralistic Gladstone to demand that he step down from the leadership of the Irish Parliamentary Party. This caused a bitter split within the Home Rule movement that lasted for a generation. The emotions generated by this scandal are vividly depicted in the famous Christmas dinner scene in James
Joyce’s novel, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. Russell’s grandmother and Aunt Agatha no doubt would have agreed with the sentiments of Mrs. Riordan in that story, a former Parnell supporter who withdrew her support once she learned of his adulterous ways, while the later Bertrand Russell would no doubt have found such a view quaint at best, as well as being nonplussed by the role the clergy played in bringing about Parnell’s downfall.

In a letter written to his Uncle Rollo on August 7, 1887 about his visit to Ireland with Rollo’s sister Agatha, roughly two years before the O’Shea scandal broke out, Russell notes: “We don’t talk Home Rule in the Hotel, as everybody, especially Mrs. Breslin, seems to be very much against it. Auntie would like to play the Wearing of the Green, as we have a Piano here, only she is too much afraid of Mrs. Breslin. She makes up for it by talks with our driver, who quite forgets about his horse and everything when he’s having a conversation. Luckily it’s a very quiet horse, that goes on quite steadily by itself. He doesn’t think Home Rule will ever pass, but he has curious ideas of the good it will do if it does. All the pigs, cattle, etc. are to stay in the country, instead of being exported to England and America. He seems to think that the chief advantage of it” (Russell, 1992, pp. 7-8).

The driver was rather prescient, for Home Rule was not to pass until 1914, at which point it became clear that the powers-that-be in Ulster, as well as the members of the Conservative Party, would never accept it. Russell was then teaching at Harvard and, in a letter to Lady Ottoline on March 23, 1914, he notes, “Ulster seems very serious—it is hard to make out from the papers here. I hope it will settle down” (Russell, 1992, p. 501). Ultimately, the issue was postponed for the duration of the First World War, and afterwards was “resolved” by the partition of the island into two separate political entities. Russell was no admirer of the chief Home Rule opponent, the Unionist and Conservative politician Edward Carson, who had also been Oscar Wilde’s antagonist in the first of the three trials which would eventually lead to the latter’s imprisonment for “gross indecency.” Wilde and Carson, incidentally, had both been students at Trinity College in Dublin at the same time, and were, if not friends, at least acquaintances. Wilde’s fall from grace in 1895, somewhat akin to Parnell’s earlier fall, was an example of the sort of triumphant moralism which Russell spent his life opposing. Russell had further ties to Ireland, including a love for the landscape there. He relates in his autobiography, “Twice I went with Aunt Agatha to Ireland. I used to go for walks with Michael Davitt, the Irish patriot, and also by myself. The beauty of the scenery made a profound impression on me” (Russell, 1969, p. 50). Davitt (1846-1906), a famous Irish Republican and Nationalist, had once been an ally of Parnell’s but became one of his most vocal critics after the O’Shea scandal. A strong Land Reformer, he is also considered to be one of the founders of the British Labour Party, which Russell would eventually join, as the Liberal Party of his grandfather and Gladstone seemed to him increasingly irrelevant and ineffective.

Russell, not surprisingly, given his anti-colonial attitude, often expressed his support for the efforts of the Fenians to overthrow British rule of Ireland. As Ken Blackwell details in the Fall 2014 issue of *The Bulletin* (see “From the Archives: Russell’s Irish Revolutionary Connection”, pages 12-13), one of Russell’s closest friends, the solicitor Crompton Llewelyn Davies (1868-1935), lived for many years in Dublin, and was married to Moya Davies, a strong supporter of Sinn Féin. Their home near Dublin, called Furry Park, was frequently visited by Russell, and as Ken points out, it was also at times a safe house for the Llewelyn Davies’ close friend, the Irish revolutionary Michael Collins, one of the founders of the Irish Free State who was later killed during the bloody Irish Civil War. (Perhaps a visit to Furry Park House might be in order for those attending the annual conference.) While the Liberal Party still held out some hope for Home Rule right up to the early 1920s, the Easter Rising of 1916 and the increasing radicalization of those demanding complete Irish independence essentially led to the demise of Home Rule, and also to the partition of Ireland which remains to this very day.

For all his sympathy for the cause of Irish independence, Russell’s had, to put it mildly, a somewhat ambiguous relationship with the cause of Irish freedom and its various leaders. He admired their anti-colonialism and, like them, was appalled by the oppressive British treatment of the Irish. But he was not so thrilled by their use of violence to achieve their aims, their fervent nationalism, and the connection many—such as Éamon de Valera (1882-1975), who eventually became the long-time leader of the Irish Government—made between Irish identity and Roman Catholicism. For Russell, a strong proponent of internationalism and secularism, this was exactly the wrong road for the Irish independence movement to take, and one that was bound to exacerbate the tensions between the Catholic majority in the Republic of Ireland and the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland. How could there ever be unification if the island remained torn by sectarian differences? This would of course come to a head in the late 1960s throughout Northern Ireland, when the debate for civil rights for the Catholic minority there degenerated into sectarian violence. No doubt if Russell had lived longer he would have had much to say about this issue.
The best article on this overall topic is Richard Davis’, “Bertrand Russell and Ireland” (1980). Regarding the complex issue of the Northern Ireland conflict, Davis writes: “On the vexed question of whether the Ulster problem was at base religious or economic, Russell was forthright. He insisted in 1920 that ‘no economic motive can account for the opposition between Ulster and the rest of Ireland’ . . . Russell was convinced that ‘religion has been the most decisive factor in determining a man’s herd throughout long periods of the world’s history’. His use of the word ‘herd’ is significant, as it implies instinctive group loyalty rather than deliberate adhesion to a creed. Russell’s claim that Catholic workers preferred to vote for Catholic capitalists rather than unbelieving socialists was probably true of most Irish until recently” (Davis, 1980, p. 281). Attendees at the upcoming conference will be able to attest to just how much has changed since Davis published his article in 1980, as both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland have become increasingly secular. But religious differences, and the power of the Churches, still remain strong bones of contention in both the North and South.

While an excellent overview of Russell’s various scattered references to Irish history and politics, there remains one issue that Davis does not address in his article, namely the role of Russell’s own family in Irish history; in particular, the role of his grandfather, Lord John Russell.

John Russell came to power during the worst years of the Irish Famine (1845-1852), also known as an Gorta Mór, “The Great Hunger.” The previous Conservative government under Robert Peel had initiated some measures to try to alleviate the ongoing suffering. When his government fell and the Liberals under Russell assumed power, many in Ireland and England presumed that even stronger alleviating measures would be taken. As Tom Chaffin writes, “Based on his political philosophy, the Liberal Russell might have been expected to do more for the beleaguered Irish than the Conservatives he had replaced. After all, in 1829, as a young M. P. supporting Daniel O’Connell, Russell had played a pivotal role in achieving Catholic Emancipation and the enactment of various democratizing measures, including the Reform Act of 1832—that era’s single most important legislative act in broadening the franchise and democratizing politics in the United Kingdom. And Russell, acting with his fellow Whigs—former runner to the United Kingdom’s Liberal Party—had, in 1834, enacted the legislation that created Britain’s first modern workhouses. Similar legislation for Ireland, supported by Russell, came in 1838” (pages 135-136).

However, just the opposite occurred. Russell, who held power from 1846 to 1852, during the height of the Famine, ended the government-supported public work projects, shifted the burden of the cost of the workhouses to local landlords, and appointed Charles Edward Trevelyan—a protégé of economist Thomas Malthus—as the chief administrator for Irish affairs. Trevelyan’s overall laissez-faire policy regarding famine relief has made him one of the most detested figures in Irish history, and Lord Russell is often equally vilified.

As is well known, Lord John Russell’s grandson, Bertrand Russell, was a strong proponent of Citizens’ Tribunals, such as the International War Crimes Tribunal, which investigated American actions during the Vietnam War. According to Arthur Jay Klinghoffer and Judith Apter Klinghoffer, “Russell said that he wanted to ‘reawaken the world’s conscience’ and, paraphrasing the Cuban national hero Jose Marti, he declared: ‘May this tribunal prevent the crime of silence.’ He also argued that the tribunal’s lack of legal standing was an advantage, as it couldn’t be influenced by any state” (Klinghoffer and Klinghoffer, 2002, p. 119). The Klinghoffers further point out that “The Russell Tribunal spawned many others with various foci of inquiry. They were mainly issue-oriented (human rights and ‘global capitalism’), rather than organized to impact the fate of specific individuals . . . In that vein, some sought to highlight past injustices and were not related to contemporary state behavior” (p. 163).

How fitting, then, that such a tribunal was held recently which, while unconnected with Russell’s name, was in part inspired by his example. The Irish Famine Tribunal, held at Fordham Law School in 2013, examined the responsibility of the British Government of Lord Russell for the tragic consequences of the Famine, in which over one million Irish died of starvation and a million more left the country to seek a better life elsewhere. The Tribunal considered the question whether the actions—or the deliberate inactions—of Lord Russell’s government amounted to either genocide or a crime against humanity. Questions addressed included: were the repeated, devastating failures of the potato crop beyond the power of any government, in the context of the time, to be managed effectively; what relief efforts were made; how responsive was the government in London to reports from relief officials in Ireland; how influential were laissez-faire and providential ideologies; and did British policymakers take advantage of the Famine to “reform” Irish society? Details can be found at http://www.irishfaminetribunal.com for those who’d like to know more about this ongoing effort.

Interestingly enough, the Tribunal has still not published its verdict. At the annual meeting at Trinity College Dublin this coming June, I will look at the arguments made by both the prosecution and the defense, as well as how this Tribunal relates to various Bertrand Russell-connected efforts to hold individuals accountable.
for their abuses of basic human rights. In addition, I am interested in Russell’s own thoughts regarding his
grandfather’s role in the Great Famine, and I am continuing to research this topic. We will have much to dis-
cuss in Dublin!

References


This delightful caricature of Russell is courtesy of Professor Hannes Hölmsteinn Gissurarson. It is unat-
tributed, but thought to have been drawn by the well-known Icelandic artist, Halldor Petursson.
A Nuke—Still Near You!

“In our present world, every thoughtful man and woman is oppressed with a load of terror and guilt and consciousness of vast hatreds. The human spirit cannot free itself to rejoice in the progress of knowledge and in the consciousness of a world-wide cooperation towards happiness and freedom of spirit. The long ages of human misery were due to ignorance and folly: hitherto, though ignorance has grown less, folly has remained. It is open to mankind, if it will allow itself to enter up into the entirely possible heritage of joy, to inaugurate a new era surpassing anything known in previous history. The decision rests with human beings: if they so choose, a new glory is theirs; we must hope that they will not prefer a dark and unnecessary doom.” Bertrand Russell, European Congress on Nuclear Disarmament, 1959.

Nota Bene: Is “nuclear winter” no longer a threat with the end of the Cold War? The American Geophysical Union found that even a small-scale, regional nuclear war could disrupt the global climate. For example, if two opposing nations in the subtropics used 50 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons (about 15 kilotons each) on major cities, as much as five million tons of soot would be released, resulting in cooling of several degrees over large areas of North America and Eurasia, including most of the grain-growing regions. The cooling would last for years, and according to experts, it might be “catastrophic.” Consider this in addition to rising temperatures due to manmade carbon emissions (http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/12/061211090729.htm).

### Status of World’s Nuclear Stockpile
According to the Federation of American Scientists (12-1-14)

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Operational Strategic</th>
<th>Operational Nonstrategic</th>
<th>Reserve Nondeployed</th>
<th>Military Stockpile</th>
<th>Total Inventory</th>
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<td>2,500</td>
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All numbers are estimates and further described in the Nuclear Notebook in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.

Would Russell find much comfort in these statistics? One suspects not.
Russell's Homes: from China to Chelsea
By Sheila Turcon

AFTER leaving Bagley Wood in 1911, Russell had not lived with a woman until he left for China with Dora Black in the summer of 1920. They were delayed in Paris as their ship had to be disinfected because of plague. They stayed briefly at the Hotel Louvois, and then moved into a flat belonging to friends of Dora’s at 6 Rue Boissonade near the Luxembourg Gardens. They stayed from 18 August to 4 September. Russell described the flat to Constance (Colette) Malleson as looking out over “a convent garden, very quiet and pretty—full of Chinese things as it happens” (letter no. 200694). Their ship, the Porthos, eventually sailed from Marseilles. Once the couple reached Peking, they decided to rent a Chinese home instead of living in a “modern-style flat” as many expats did. Dora found the house where according to her “she spent the happiest months” of her entire life.

Dora describes the home in great detail in her autobiography, The Tamarisk Tree. Russell wrote to both Ottoline Morrell and Colette about the house. To Colette, he writes that it is: “a house round a courtyard, only ground floor, very Chinese and delicious—I have filled it with old furniture and Chinese rugs and lovely things—it is not finished yet—it is great fun.” He notes that he is “dreadfully busy as yet as the house got me behind” (no. 200714, 17 November 1920). This contradicts Dora’s account in The Tamarisk Tree, noting that Russell had only provided the money and left her to do everything in a fortnight. But on the next page she writes that Russell accompanied her in the afternoons looking for furniture. Russell writes in much more detail to Ottoline, on the same day he wrote to Colette. “We inhabit it with my interpreter, a Mr. Chao, who has lived 10 years in America, and hates all Chinese things. We have bought all Chinese furniture for our rooms, and he has bought all American things. ... We have 3 rickshaw boys, ... a cook, and a boy who acts as parlourmaid and housemaid. We have old wiggly Chinese bookshelves, heavy black Chinese chairs, a big divan of the sort they used to use for smoking opium, lovely square tables, all black—we get bright colour from curtains and rugs—the sun shines in and makes it hot, although it is ... cold by now here” (no. 1578).

He draws Ottoline a floor plan marking out the rooms around the courtyard. The kitchen next to Mr. Chao’s bedroom on east side of the house; the bedroom, Dora's work room, the big sitting room and a small work room on the north side; Mr. Chao’s sitting room, the cook’s room, and the rickshaw boys’ room on the west side; and the dining room and the box room on the south side. A partition separated the kitchen, the boys’ room and the south wall from the rest of the house. Dora assigns different functions to some of the rooms in her memoir. Russell recollects the Chinese love of fireworks: “When I invited the most intellectual of my students to an evening party, they sent several days ahead extraordinarily elaborate feux d’artifice to be let off in my courtyard” (Russell, 2000, pp. 307-8).
Shown below is a photograph of Russell in the courtyard from the *Russell Monthly*; unfortunately, the quality of the image is rather poor.

Russell in the courtyard of his Peking home

The address of the house was 2 Sui An Buo Hutung. It was located near the North Road of Tongdan in the Doncheng District. “Sui An Buo” refers to an Earl in the Ming Dynasty. “Hutung” translates as an alley. This alley was removed because of city reform at an unknown date, presumably late 20th century. Russell and Dora wrote the street address in different forms. The one I use here is most likely to be correct.

Russell at his desk

By the time the couple returned from China, Dora was near the end of her pregnancy. They could not get married until Russell's divorce from Alys was finalized. The need to get settled quickly was urgent. Dorothy Wrinch let them stay at her home, 9 Strand Cottage, in Winchelsea while they looked for a permanent place to live. In his *Autobiography*, Russell writes that “I tried to rent a flat, but I was both politically and morally undesirable, and landlords refused to have me as a tenant” (Russell, 1968, pp. 385-386). What really
happen was more complex. Dora remembers that the refusal was “politically motivated,” but she adds that they were going to rent Clifford Allen's old flat. Allen's flat (for a time shared with Russell) was no. 70 in Overstrand Mansions, Battersea; the flat that they were eyeing in 1921 was no. 55. This three bedroom, two bathroom flat is on the top floor of Overstrand Mansions with beautiful views of the park. Now a freehold flat, it was last sold in 2006 for £675,000.

The flat was rented by J.B. Hill, who was going to sublet the flat to the Russells. The agent, acting on Hill's behalf, was Frederick W. Coy, a chartered surveyor, at 191A Battersea Bridge Road. On 3 September, Russell wrote to Coy agreeing to take over the tenancy until March 1923 for £86 per annum, agreeing to purchase the furniture and effects for £225, and also agreeing "to carry out any necessary decoration at my own cost." On 9 September, Coy sent a telegram to Russell telling him that the licence to assign no. 55 had been refused. It turned out that Harry Chester of Ranken Ford and Chester, 4 South Square, Gray's Inn was the culprit. Why this barrister had the power to refuse the licence is not known. He may have been representing the owner whose name is never mentioned. On 24 September, Russell wrote to Chester that he was very anxious to obtain the flat and he would not use it for political purposes. He had not been active politically for 3 ½ years. Russell also proposed that he would pay to have electric light added to the flat; presumably it had gas lighting at that time. In reply, Harry Chester wrote on 30 September that he would accept Russell as a tenant provided that he would be a “responsible, respectable and desirable tenant” who would “not use the flat for any purpose which would cause any annoyance or inconvenience to the other tenants of the property.” He offered Russell only a one year lease at £100, noting that Mr. Hill had not been paying fair market value for the flat. He also wanted further references, even though Russell had given full references to Mr. Coy. In reply, Russell notes that he cannot redecorate the flat and put in electric light when he is only being offered a one year lease. He thus refuses Chester's begrudging offer. Chester snippingly replied on 3 October: “I have done my best to meet your views, but apparently the terms are not acceptable and I assume you will not wish to proceed with the proposed agreement.” Mr. Coy got back in touch with Russell on 14 October offering him “a little flat in Albany Mansions” with two bedrooms and a sitting room. The rent was only £50 because of the short lease length.

Russell had by then switched gears and was attempting to buy a terraced house, 31 Sydney Street, in the borough of Kensington and Chelsea, owned by Mrs. Frances Thornton. The property had three floors and a basement. On 5 October, the Russell brothers’ lawyer John J. Withers, from the legal firm of Withers, Bensons, Currie, Williams, wrote to Russell, agreeing “to act in the matter of the purchase” of this property for £1,800. He had to find the money for Russell to buy the home, but he did not anticipate any difficulty in this task. Russell at that time owned various railway stocks. He also held mortgages on two properties, one in Hartfield, Sussex belonging to A.H. Clough and Miss B.A. Clough, the other in Dunhurst, Steep, Hants, belonging to John Haden Badley. A delay in the purchase of Sydney Street was caused by the fact that the deed was found to be missing. This was overcome by registering an absolute title to the property, followed by a month’s notice in the London Gazette. Mrs. Thornton moved out on the 20 October; the Russells took possession on the 21st, the day their furniture arrived. The actual purchase was not completed until 7 December 1921. Insurance on the house contents reveals only three items that had to be listed separately: a £100 gold medal (presumably the Butler medal), a Chinese picture worth £200 and a silk and ermine cloak valued at £150.

About moving day, Russell wrote to Ottoline: “All day Friday vans kept coming with furniture from Cambridge, from Allen's, from Dora's flat. Books poured in in such multitudes that it seemed as if there would never be room for us too. Wittgenstein's dining table was so vast that it couldn't be got into any room except the basement, and that only by taking out the window, so our dining-room has to be in the basement. We moved in ourselves on Monday.” Mrs. Thornton wrote to Dora that her cook, Mrs. Knight, would be pleased to stay on. She also added that “Turner is the best and earliest news agent round here -- he is in Sydney Street, nearer the King's Road than this house.” The only distinguishing feature of the house was its “odd bow window.” Russell took the ground floor front room as his study. “He was to be seen, day after day, framed by the front window, sitting so quietly at a small table, turning over page after page of neatly written manuscript” (D. Russell, 1975, p. 150).

I must admit that I have never been interested enough to go to Sydney Street to photograph it as I have other properties featured in this series. The house would be just one in a row of very similar homes. Thus the illustration printed here is a photograph that appears in The Tamarisk Tree, taken in front of the house; the bow window described by Dora is not there. Google Map’s Street View will give readers a better overall view of the home. It reveals a red-tiled stoop, a black door with a fan window, a white facade on the basement and ground floors with yellow brick on the floors above. The main difference between the homes on the street is
the different type of tiles used on the stoops. The Russells decided that London was not the best place to raise children—their son John was born on 21 November 1921—and, beginning in 1922, they spent half the year in Cornwall.

The couple did use the house for political activities, thus saving the cost of renting campaign headquarters. Russell's Central Committee Rooms were listed as 31 Sydney Street SW3 in the campaign leaflets he issued in 1922 and 1923, when he was running for Parliament as an Independent Labour Party member in Chelsea. Dora ran in 1924, also from 31 Sydney Street. Chelsea is a Conservative riding. Both of them ran to highlight issues, not to win. They both had the same election agent, H.W. Talbot, 8 Tetcott Road, SW10. The photograph used in this article is from Dora's 1924 campaign. The wrought iron railings are still in place in Google Map's Street View.

Dora in the front right smiles at her husband on the stoop at Sydney Street

While they were in Cornwall, Sydney Street was let. Wheeler Brothers was used as the agent. The tenant for part of 1922 was Courtney Pollock. His many complaints cast doubt on how long he stayed. They include that although advertised as a four bedroom house, there were not four bedrooms. A huge annoyance was the thousands of books and pamphlets in the house. “Every drawer in the writing desk is full with books, diaries, and papers” which got in Pollock's way. Rain came down through the skylight in the back of the hall. In 1923 a Mr. Hulett stayed in the house and was delinquent in the rent. Roy Randall lived there in 1924. He asked for an extension to the lease, noting that “some of us have important final examinations” making “it inconvenient to move.” He and his fellow tenants had all enjoyed using Russell's library, unlike Mr. Pollock. Randall would become Dora's lover in 1927.

On 8 October 1926 the title to 31 Sydney Street was transferred to Dora; the document in the Land Registry Office noting this change is dated 27 November 1926. At the same time the chattels of the house were transferred to Dora. I presume that this was done in anticipation of the sale of Sydney Street, but there are no archival documents concerning its sale. Russell's bank passbook indicates that the last time the Chelsea Electricity bill was paid was 29 June 1927. In 1934 Russell's new lawyer Crompton Llewelyn Davies questioned the chattels transfer (17 Oct. 1934). The house last sold in 2006 for £2,200,000. The Russells left in 1927 to spend the spring and summer at Carn Voel in Cornwall and the autumn at their school at Telegraph House, where they would live for several years. My next two articles will feature these two iconic homes.

References

Bertrand Russell. 1922. To the Electors of Chelsea. Russell Archives Pamphlets Collection.
What Can We Know? Russell’s “Final” Epistemological Position in *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*

Much has been written about Russell’s early epistemological positions on how we know things, the nature of judgments and propositions, and the kinds and divisions of knowledge that obtain. In his characteristically clear prose—and in his last, great technical work, one that has been given comparatively little attention—Russell gives us his final positon on the limits of knowledge.

“I conclude that, while mental events and their qualities can be known without inference, physical events are known only as regards their space-time structure. The qualities that compose such events are unknown—so completely unknown that we cannot say either that they are, or that they are not, different from the qualities that we know as belonging to mental events” (p. 247).

“All particular facts that are known without inference are known by perception or memory, that is to say, though experience. In this respect, the empiricist principle calls for no limitation. Inferred particular facts, such as those of history, always demand experienced particular facts among their premises. But since, in deductive logic, one fact or collection of facts cannot imply any other fact, the inferences from facts to other facts can only be valid if the world has certain characteristics which are not logically necessary. Are these characteristics known to us by experience? It would seem not” (p. 526).

“But although our postulates can, in this way, be fitted into a framework, which has what we may call an empiricist “flavour”, it remains undeniable that our knowledge of them, in so far as we do know them, cannot be based upon experience, though all their verifiable consequences are such as experience will confirm. In this sense, it must be admitted, empiricism as a theory of knowledge has proved inadequate, though less so than any other previous theory of knowledge. Indeed, such inadequacies as we have seemed to find in empiricism have been discovered by strict adherence to a doctrine by which empiricist philosophy has been inspired: that all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever” (p. 527).

2015 Annual Meeting in Dublin, Ireland

Relevant Dates:

The meeting is co-sponsored by the Society for the Study of the History of Analytic Philosophy, which will hold its meeting on Thursday, June 4th to Saturday, June 6th, 2015.

Location:

Trinity College
College Green,
Dublin 2, Ireland
T: +353 1 896 1000
Trinity College web site: https://www.tcd.ie
Map of campus and surroundings: https://www.tcd.ie/Maps/map.php
General information about Dublin, Ireland: http://www.dublin.ie/
Note: the venue for most BRS events will be the Arts Building, except for plenary addresses, which will be in the Long Room Hub next door. The Arts Building is by the Nassau Street entrance to campus, a street that easily gets one to Grafton ST, Merrion Square, St. Stephens Green, and other important locations.

BRS Agenda/Papers:

Joint Conference Banquet and Grayling Keynote on Friday, June 5th; BRS Papers and Board Meeting on Saturday, June 6th; BRS Papers and Annual Meeting on Sunday, June 7th. Details later.
See Alan Schwerin’s web site for more up-to-date information on agenda and papers:
https://sites.google.com/site/alanschwerinsphilosophycorner/

Registration Fees* (In Euros. ~Conversion €1.00=$1.15 USD & €1.00=$1.43 CDN):

BRS AM Registration: €100.00 (Students: €50.00)
SSHAP Registration: €100.00 (Students: €50.00)
Joint BRS/SSHAP Registration: €150.00 (Students: €75.00)
*Includes facility charges, snacks, coffees, and lunches; excludes dinners arranged at off-campus venues.

To Register and Accommodation Information:

For general information, registration, and hotels: http://www.tcd.ie/Philosophy/events/analytic-conference/
For on-campus lodging: http://www.tcd.ie/accommodation/

Transportation from Airport:

Air Coach—go here and book your coach to Trinity and City Centre Hotel Area:
http://www.aircoach.ie/ RT Fare will be about €20.00.
City Bus to Trinity: From Dublin Airport Terminal One take Bus 747 (runs frequently): Towards Heuston Rail Station to O’Connell St, Abbey Street, Stop 271; then take Bus 11: Towards Sandyford Business District from O’Connell St, Abbey Street, Stop 271 to Blackthorn Drive, Blackthorn Road, Stop 4848. Fare: about €10.00RT.
Taxi: Estimated fare to Trinity: €17.00 to €23.80

For Additional Information:

Contact Peter Stone by emailing him at stone1936@hotmail.com.
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Factoid: The “data of the senses” received attention at the end of the 19th century in the work of William James. The concept was further refined in the work of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore in the early 20th century. It rests partly on earlier notions of sensory ideas or impressions from empiricist philosophers such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Moore’s seminal paper, “The Refutation of Idealism” (1903), introduced the act-object model of sensing, providing the seeds of the modern view. But the best and most refined statement of the modern notion of “sense data,” upon which nearly all subsequent variations and criticisms are based, can be found in Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy (1912). Therein Russell writes, “Let us give the name of "sense-data" to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name "sensation" to the experience of being immediately aware of these things. … If we are to know anything about the table, it must be by means of the sense-data—brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness, etc.—which we associate with the table.” The notion was extensively discussed by analytic philosophers throughout most of the twentieth century, for example in the work of Broad, Price, Sellars, and Ayer. Russell himself would reject his earlier sense-data theory, and explicitly so in his Analysis of Mind (1921); however, he would retain important features of it over the course of decades, even in his mature epistemology as depicted in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948).

Last but not Least

Are you thinking of estate planning? Consider a bequest no matter how modest to The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc. in your will and/or trust, and let your interest in and support of Bertrand Russell scholarship, his ideas, his ideals, and your Society continue well into the future. A Russellian afterlife, as it were!!

Do you buy your books from Amazon? Consider using Amazon’s Smile program, and the company will donate 0.50% of your purchase price to the BRS. You can sign up by going here: https://smile.amazon.com/. Just logon as you normally would, then refer to the Bertrand Russell Society. It’s not inconvenient to members, who will pay the same prices to Amazon they otherwise would, and it’s essentially “free” money to the BRS, which is recognized by Amazon as a charitable organization.