Inside: our columnists; an interview with Galaugher; articles by Maclean, Korhonen, and Turcon—and much more.
Information for New and Renewing Members

Membership in the Society is $45 per year for individuals, $30 for students, and $25 for those with limited incomes. Add $10.00 to each for couples. A lifetime membership is $1,000 ($1,500 for an individual and $1,750 for a couple after 12-31-16). In addition to the BRS Bulletin, membership includes a subscription to the peer-reviewed, scholarly journal, Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies (published semi-annually by McMaster University), as well as other Society privileges, such as participation in the on-line BRS Forum, the BRS email list, access to a host of Russell-related, multi-media resources, eligibility to run for the board and serve on committees, and eligibility to attend the Annual Meeting.

Renewal dues should be paid by or on January 1st of each year. One’s membership status can be determined by going to russell.mcmaster.ca/brsmembers.htm. There one will also find convenient links to join or renew via PayPal and our information form.

New and renewing members can also send a check or money order via traditional post to the treasurer (make it out to The Bertrand Russell Society). Send it to Michael Berumen, Treasurer, Bertrand Russell Society, 37155 Dickerson Run, Windsor, CO 80550. If a new member, please tell us a little about yourself beyond just your name (interests in Russell, profession, etc.). Include your postal address and email address, as well as your member status (i.e., regular, couple, student, limited income). If a renewing member, please let us know of any relevant changes to your contact information.

The BRS is a non-profit organization, and we greatly appreciate any extra donations or bequests that members choose to give. Donations may be tax-deductible in certain jurisdictions. Please check with your tax or legal advisor.

BRS Board of Directors


BRS Executive Committee

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Publication Information

Editor: Michael E. Berumen
Email: opinealot@gmail.com

Institutional and individual subscriptions to the Bulletin are $20 per year ($30.00 outside of the U.S.). If in stock, single issues of the Bulletin may be obtained for $10 ($15 outside of North America) by sending a check or money order, payable to The Bertrand Russell Society at the address above. Members may access all back issues of BRS periodicals online by contacting Dennis Darland at bertie.episteme@hotmail.com. Digital versions of recent issues also may be found at the BRS website at www.bertrandrussell.org/.

Letters to the editor may be submitted to the editor’s email address. Please reference the issue, author, and title of the article to which the letter relates. Letters should be concise. Publication will be at the discretion of the editor, and predicated upon available space. The editor reserves the right to truncate letters.

Manuscripts may be submitted to the editor at his email address in Microsoft Word. Feature articles and book reviews should be Russell-centric, dealing with Russell’s life or works, and they should be written in either a scholarly or journalistic style. Articles generally should not exceed 7 single-spaced pages, and book reviews should not exceed 2 single-spaced pages. Mathematical, logical, and scientific symbols are fine, but please ensure that they are essential. Footnotes/endnotes should be used sparingly and primarily for citations; the editor reserves the right to convert footnotes to endnotes and vice versa, depending on layout needs. Parenthetical citations and page numbers, with standard reference descriptions at the end of the article, are also fine; but no abbreviations for works, please. Submissions should be made no later than August 31st and December 31st for the fall and spring issues, respectively. The editor will collaborate with the authors, as required, and authors will have the opportunity to review any suggested changes prior to publication. There are no guarantees of publication, and articles submitted may be held for future editions.

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Good food, good facilities, and great company characterized the annual meeting held at Saint John Fisher College in Rochester, NY, June 24-26. Host Tim Madigan outdid himself in ensuring that all ran smoothly. Interesting papers were presented on diverse subjects centering on Russell, punctuated by much conviviality. Forty people were in attendance. The keynote address was given by our member Rick Lewis, who is editor of Philosophy Now, a magazine to which several of our members have contributed. Take a look if you haven’t seen it … it’s as snazzy a periodical as you’ll find in philosophy … at once pleasing to the eye and full of interesting pieces. Rick emphasized the importance of making philosophy accessible to many. The magazine was given the annual BRS Award, which Rick accepted on its behalf.

- Speaking of awards, a founding member of the BRS, Ken Blackwell, received our highest honor. He was made an Honorary Member (see p. 5 for more details).
- Our members Donovan Wishon and Bernie Linsky received this year’s book award for having co-edited Acquaintance, Knowledge and Logic: New Essays on Bertrand Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy, (Stanford: CSLI, 2015, x + 277 pp.). Donovan was on hand at the AM to accept the award.
- The BRS board of directors met for several hours at the annual meeting. The board re-elected the following officers: Chad Trainer as Chair; Tim Madigan as President; Peter Stone as Vice President; Michael Potter as Secretary; and Michael Berumen as Treasurer. These five serve as the Executive Committee, which is charged with routine business when the board is not in session. Additionally, Ray Perkins continues as Vice Chair; Dennis Darland as Vice President of Electronic Projects; and Kris Notaro as Vice President of Web Site Technology.
- The directors gladly accepted David Blitz’s offer to host the next annual meeting at Central Connecticut State University. The meeting is tentatively scheduled for May 19-21, 2017. More details will be announced in the near term.
- 2018 will be the 50th anniversary of the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University. Accordingly—and fittingly—the BRS will hold its annual meeting there that year. More in due course.
• Landon Elkind will be assisting the Society’s treasurer and learn the various procedures and practices pertaining to the BRS’ treasury in anticipation of the current treasurer’s retirement as an officer and from the board. Landon is a BRS director and is a graduate student at the University of Iowa, working towards his PhD in philosophy.

• Bill Bruneau will be taking over as editor of this publication beginning in the fall of 2017. Bill is a historian and professor emeritus of the University of British Columbia. He is particularly interested in the history and practice of education. A member of the BRS board, Bill has an abiding interest in Russell. An editor a forthcoming volume of the Collected Papers, Bill is especially interested in Russell’s views on education. Readers will be interested to know that Bill performs as a pianist with chamber orchestras.

• At a subsequent, on-line board meeting, the directors approved an increase in lifetime dues from $1,000 to $1,500 per person, and $1,750 for a couple, effective January 1, 2017. The original $1,000 requirement was set several decades ago and had not been adjusted to reflect increased costs.

• The BRS now has a small investment account in an I-Shares Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) that reflects the broader large and mid-cap equity market. The investment serves the dual purpose of offsetting the corrosive effects of inflation and building an adequate reserve for future needs. The specific investment is the Russell 1000 Growth Index Fund (the exchange symbol is IWF). The name is coincidental—and appropriate! Member dues were not used for this purpose. Our investment is viewed as a long-term strategy over many years and decades. Heretofore, BRS funds were placed in bank savings and checking accounts with minimal returns—tantamount to keeping one’s money under the mattress. Through June, the average 10-year return of IWF was 8.59%. It is hoped that this investment will help future generations of Russellians to operate the Society and carry-out our mission of promoting both scholarship and Russell’s ideas and ideals.

• Our intrepid anti-nuke warrior, Ray Perkins, made a motion before the membership at the Annual Meeting, namely, that the BRS urge President Barrack Obama to intensify his activity during the remainder of his term, and to fulfill his 2009 pledge to work towards the abolition of nuclear weapons; declare a “no-first-use” policy; take ICBMs off hair-trigger alert; and invite Russia to do likewise. The motion was passed with considerable enthusiasm. Ray, vice chair of the Society, and professor emeritus of Plymouth State University, was quoted in our press release that went to many outlets across the globe: “Whereas it is arguable that the policy of mutually assured destruction (MAD) ever worked, a policy that ignored the possibilities of accidents and assumed there were only rational players in possession of nuclear weapons, it is a certainty today that such a policy is impracticable with the proliferation of nuclear weapons among many states, political and
religious instability in the world, and
the rise of nihilism and martyrdom
as operating principles on the part
of some." Perkins went on to say,
"In many ways, a nuclear catastro-
phe, whether by accident or design,
is more probable today than it was
in the Cold War era." The Society
believes this should be brought to
the front burner in political discus-
sions as a matter of existential im-
portance, one that renders many
other issues more academic if not
dealt with now.

• Members are encouraged to submit
formal, scholarly papers to be
considered for the Bulletin or to
author a guest column in
"Members’ Corner" of up to two
single-spaced pages. The editor is
glad to work with members who
have something they’d like to say
about Russell’s views or life—or on
a topic in a Russellian vein. Write to
the editor at opinealot@gmail.com
for information.

• The future of the BRS depends
upon renewals and new members.
It doesn’t cost much to join, or to
sponsor someone. Please help us
to recruit new members whenever
the opportunity arises. Avoid those
pesky store lines in the coming
months: a membership in the BRS
is the perfect Holiday gift.

• 2016 financial report through
August.

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### Ken Blackwell:
Honorary Member

The board of directors took great
delight in making Kenneth Milton
Blackwell an Honorary Member
at the 2016 Annual Meeting. According
to the rules of honorary membership,
each honorary member must meet at
least one of the following criteria: 1. is
a member of BR’s family; 2. had
worked closely with BR in an important
way; 3. has made a distinctive contri-
bution to BR scholarship; 4. has acted in
support of a cause or idea
that BR championed; 5. has
promoted awareness of
BR or of BR’s work; 6. has
exhibited qualities of character (e.g., moral
courage) reminiscent of BR. There is no evidence
that Ken is related to Russell, but it
was clear to the directors that he meets
not just one of the criteria, but all of the
rest. All agreed that this makes him
particularly deserving of our highest
honor.

If you are a member of the Soci-
ety, chances are you’ve come into con-
tact with Ken. For one, he is the man-
ger of our email list-serve; for another,
he is a frequent poster to both our list
and the Forum, giving members inter-
esting findings and information about
Bertrand Russell. That he would have
such contributions to offer is not sur-
prising, as he is the Honorary Russell
Archivist at McMaster University, home of the Russell Archives and Russell Centre, and was Russell Archivist there from 1968 to 1996. Moreover, he has been a frequent contributor to this publication, not to mention the Russell Journal. Aside from all of this, he is a longstanding director of the Society, and he has held various positions, including chair of the board, interim editor of this periodical, secretary, and treasurer. Certainly not least of all, many know that he is one of the founding members of the Society, having been recruited by its creator and first president, Peter G. Cranford. It was formed in 1974, four years after the death of Russell. But there’s much more to Ken than this….

Ken was born in Kamloops, British Columbia, in 1943. He grew up in Victoria, where he also took his undergraduate degree in English literature and philosophy at the University of Victoria. He then attended Western Ontario, where he received his Master's in library science. Moving further east, he then took an MA in philosophy at McMaster, and a PhD in philosophy at Guelph.

Meanwhile, he was hired at McMaster in 1968. He got the McMaster job because he already knew his way through the archives and was working on a new bibliography of Russell. This he finished in 1994 in partnership with former BRS chair, the late Harry Ruja. They received the BRS Book Award for it.

And here’s where things get especially interesting. It was in 1966 that Ken was hired to help organize Russell’s papers at his last residence in Plas Penrhyn, Wales. It was in July of that year that he met Russell himself. When we asked about having worked with Russell, with characteristic modesty, Ken said, “I worked in his basement; I would not say I worked with him.” But Russell was there, nonetheless. Ken recalls that he was hired by one of our esteemed, Honorary Members, Chris Farley, who was one of Russell’s secretaries at the time; but he suspects that Edith Russell was influential in the decision to hire him, which stands to reason, given Edith’s involvement in managing his affairs in his final years.

Ken first took an interest in Russell in the early sixties before he began studying philosophy. He obtained—and still has—Russell’s Unarmed Victory (1963), which Russell described as his “personal point of view the history of two crises: the Cuban and the Sino-Indian, in both of which I tried to influence the leaders and public opinion on both sides” (Pg. 8-9). Ken had heard of Russell as a public intellectual, as “he was in all the papers” for his interventions. But this was Ken’s first serious foray into his writings. Over fifty years later, it would be an understatement to suggest that probably few if any others have read as much of Russell’s technical, social, and personal writings.

Of course, Ken has also written a great deal about Russell over the years in journals and in several books. Most notably, perhaps, he initiated at McMaster what we now know as the monumental, multivolume Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell series, a collection first proposed to Russell in 1969, with plans finally made in 1980, followed by funding in 1981. The first volume, Cambridge Essays, 1888–99, appeared in 1983, which, along with member Nick Griffin and several others, Ken co-edited. Ken’s first published effort on BR was to participate in A Detailed Catalogue of the Archives of
Bertrand Russell Society

Bulletin Fall 2016-Green Issue

Bertrand Russell (1967), followed by the Index to the second volume of Russell’s Autobiography. He also wrote the book, The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell (1985), where he considers Russell’s writings on ethics and metaethics, and, in particular, Spinoza’s influence (as Russellians will know, Spinoza was Russell’s favorite philosopher), with an emphasis on Spinoza’s idea of ‘impersonal self-enlargement’ as it relates to Russell’s own ethical writings, and its virtues as a ‘way of living’.

The head librarian at McMaster asked Ken to start a newsletter for the Russell Archives back in 1971. In due course, this “newsletter” would metamorphose into what we know recognize as Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, a peer-reviewed, scholarly journal of international repute, and an essential tool for the Russell scholar. Ken continues as its editor, and he has managed to contribute to its content since its inception many years ago. RJ, as it’s fondly known by the cognoscenti, routinely comes out in the winter and summer, and it is a significant benefit to BRS members.

When asked what kept him devoted to Russell studies all these years, Ken said, “It’s not only the intrinsic interest for me of the topics that Bertrand Russell dealt with, and his importance and relevance—it’s also Russell’s political example; the archival and published material that can still be discovered; and the opportunity to publish his writings in new formats.” And, he adds, that he has enjoyed “the many fascinating people I’ve come to know along the way.” How does Russell continue to be relevant? Ken tells us, “I’d say it’s his emphasis on evidence-based beliefs, which in turn requires us to attempt an objective viewpoint.” One suspects that Russell would find that description encapsulates his overall outlook very well.

Russell has had an influence on Ken in more than ways than outlined here, and not least of all in meeting his life-partner and wife, Kadriin. Back in 1970, BRS member Billy Joe Lucas asked Ken to give a talk about Russell to his tutorial class at McMaster. Kadriin was there as a student in the back row of the class—but she didn’t escape from Ken’s attention! Russell would no doubt approve that he should be a catalyst for romance, and one suspects he would find it especially gratifying that his archivist would find love in a class about him. Some 46 years—and three children and two grandchildren—later, they live a short distance from McMaster outside of Hamilton, Ontario.

Not Necessarily Trivial

Bertrand Russell has often been characterized as a pacifist at various stages in his life. This was seldom, if ever, completely true, even during WWI, at which time his opposition to the war resulted in his imprisonment. More accurately, Russell was a utilitarian and a provisional pacifist, preferring to exhaust pacific solutions first, whenever possible. He remained opposed to most rationales for war throughout his life. Around the time of WWI, Russell outlined four classes of war, three of which can be justified, though rarely. What were these classes of war, and in what essay did he describe them? (see p. 9.)
Logicbyte: Tautologies

Mathematics (and logic) is notoriously difficult to define and reduce to a simple statement. In his seminal *Principles of Mathematics*, mostly written in 1900, and then published in 1903, Bertrand Russell gave a concise, formal definition of pure mathematics consisting of a particular class of propositions. He wrote, “Pure mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form “p implies q,” where p and q are propositions containing one or more variables, the same in the two propositions, and neither p nor q contains any constants except logical constants” (p. 3). Russell would go on to refine and amplify his definition in that and subsequent works. For Russell, in the end, logic is the *structure* of pure mathematics and the study of *necessity*.

Wittgenstein was dissatisfied with Russell’s ideas about necessity, though, believing them incomplete. By 1918, Russell, following Wittgenstein and Poincaré, reluctantly concluded that logic is at bottom tautological. I say “reluctantly” because Russell believed that it trivialized logic (and hence, mathematics, which Wittgenstein would soon believe was merely syntactical), taking the meaning out of it, divorced from facts—and standing apart from the “reality” or existence of the universe or any ideal realm of objects.

Wittgenstein believed he dispensed with Russell’s and Frege’s particular notions of logical objects, facts, and constants in his *Tractatus* (1921), and there he famously elucidated the nature of tautology by using truth tables to describe propositions whose truth-functional structure makes them true for every possible combination of the truth values of their underlying propositions, which is to say, true in every situation.

Tautology means different things in different contexts. To the rhetorician and in colloquial usage, where we use natural language, it often means something is true by definition or simply implies a redundancy, saying the same thing in other words. Ignoring Quine’s empirical analysis on the matter, it bears close resemblance to the Kantian notion of analyticity, e.g., “All bodies are extended” or “All unmarried men are bachelors.”

To the modern logician, a tautology is a key principle in propositional logic—in shorthand, it is a proposition that is true under any possible Boolean valuation of its propositional variables, and a formula whose negation is unsatisfiable. There are an infinite number of tautologies. Perhaps the most familiar tautology, though, is the so-called law of the excluded middle, expressed symbolically as: \((A \lor \neg A)\), which has only one propositional variable, A. Something is or is not, and that is incontrovertibly true. Any valuation for this formula must assign A one of the truth values (true or false), and assign \(\neg A\) the other truth value. And here’s the rub—Wittgenstein famously pointed out in his *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (1956): that “it is raining or it is not raining tells us nothing about the weather” (italics mine; p. 231). It therefore *says or depicts nothing*.

Tautological analysis can be extended to predicate logic, which, unlike propositional logic, may contain quantifiers. Here, a tautology still pertains to
propositional logic. A distinction is maintained between logical validities, sentences true in every model, and tautologies, which are a proper propositional subset of them. For example, we get a “first-order tautology” by taking a tautology of propositional logic and by uniformly replacing each propositional variable by a first-order formula—that is, one formula to each propositional variable.

There are alternative views on tautologies (e.g., varieties of mathematical intuitionism and constructivism), as one might imagine; but space requires us to ignore them for our purpose. It will suffice to say that Russell was ultimately dissatisfied with all of the definitions of tautology. In his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919), published near the end of his most creative logical and mathematical work (and written while in prison!), he discusses possible worlds, necessity, existence, and even the ontological argument (p. 203), and he even hints at a paradox found (later) in the *Tractatus* in relation to the apparently nonsensical (unsinnig) nature of both tautologies and contradictions. Russell says that in the absence of a universe, “all general propositions would be true, for the contradictory of a general proposition is a proposition asserting existence, and would therefore always be false if no universe existed” (p. 204).

Russell concluded by saying this about tautologies: “It would be easy to offer a definition which might seem satisfactory for a while: but I know of none that I feel to be satisfactory, in spite of feeling thoroughly familiar with the characteristic of which a definition is wanted. At this point, therefore, for the moment, we reach the frontier of knowledge on our backward journey into the logical foundations of mathematics” (p. 205).

In his *Analysis of Matter* (1927), Russell was convinced all propositions that can be proved by logic are all tautologies (p. 171). Many years later, in Russell’s last, great work in philosophy, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (1948), he would say that “Nothing but tautologies can be known independently of experience” (p. 393). And as we have already said, this is “knowledge” without content. In the end, therefore, Russell believed that what can be known with certainty would leave us in a world with trivial meaning, and, despite the frailties of empiricism, and the realization that all meaningful “human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial,” (p. 327)—in the absence of revelation—our experience, with the aid of logic, the proper structure of philosophical expression, is as good as it gets.


**Answer to Not Necessarily Trivial (p. 7)**

Russell outlined four categories of war: (1) Wars of colonization; (2) Wars of Principle; (3) Wars of Self-defense; and (4) Wars of Prestige. He argues that the first two may be justified, the third seldom so, “except as against an adversary of inferior civilization”, whereas the fourth category, Wars of Prestige, to which WWI belonged, could never be justified. His points on wars of colonization might surprise modern readers … and they are undoubtedly rooted in a sense of the superiority of European civilization, an ethnocentricity he would eventually shed, and well ahead of most of his contemporaries. His argument on Wars of Self-defense is especially pertinent, insofar as he shows that claims of self-defense are often a pretext for aggression, something certainly borne out by history. German expansion in the thirties was to no small extent justified on the (disingenuous) basis of self-defense, not to mention the more recent invasions of Vietnam and Iraq by the US. Wars for the purpose of colonization or for principle were, as he saw it, largely matters of the past. In the former case he used the European colonization of America as an example, interestingly; and in the latter case he had the English and American civil wars in mind.

February 8th, 9th, and 10th, 1974. The Society has two major objectives: to make Russell's views better known and to promote causes he believed in. The Society is developing for furthering Russell's purposes. Present areas of interest include: the promotion of Russell's writings; the encouragement of new scholarly and popular writings on Russell’s life and thought; applications and misapplications of science; disarmament and peace; human rights; the importance of rational thinking; Russell's ideas as attractive alternatives to student mysticism, cynicism, apathy, and alienation; Russell's views as aids to self-understanding; Russell's thoughts on power, politics, and government. In sum, the Bertrand Russell Society is interested in making better known—and in making greater use of Russell's insights into the human heart, the human mind, and the human predicament. At its meeting the Society adopted a constitution, set up committees, and elected the following officers: Peter G. Cranford, of Augusta, President; Robert Davis, of Los Angeles, Vice-President; Katharine Tait, of Falls Village, Connecticut, Treasurer; and Jack Pitt, of Fresno, Secretary. The Society is a democratic one. According to its constitution, ultimate power resides in the membership. 10% of the members can request a vote of the membership at any time on any issue. The Bertrand Russell Society owes its existence primarily to one man’s enthusiasm for Russell's writings; he is now the Society's President. Peter Cranford is a 65-year old clinical psychologist in private practice. He came upon Russell's *Conquest of Happiness* by chance, in a bookstore, and found that
people benefited greatly from reading it. (Thus far, he has given away 600 copies to friends and patients.) This led Cranford into reading more Russell. He would like to see *The Conquest of Happiness* put into every hotel room, alongside the Gideon Society's Bible. The two books might not be altogether strange bedfellows. Dr. Cranford enlisted the cooperation of about a dozen people—most of them subscribers to *Russell*—who were interested in working with him to start the Bertrand Russell Society and in becoming members. This group is largely but by no means exclusively academic. A majority have Ph.D. degrees. Six members are presently associated with colleges and universities. Special fields represented include physics, psychology, philosophy, biochemistry, and German. The Society’s Treasurer, Dr. Tait, is Russell’s daughter. The group also includes an architect, an archivist, and an advertising writer. The Society has had the benefit of advice from The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Ltd., and the Bertrand Russell Society of Japan, as well as the Russell Archives. The next meeting of the Society—the first Annual Meeting—is scheduled for February 7, 8, 9, 1975. The city has not yet been chosen. Anyone interested in Bertrand Russell is invited to become a member. Dues are $12 a year (students $5), and include a subscription to Russell. For more information about the Society and about membership, write Peter G. Cranford, President, Bertrand Russell Society, {address deleted}. News about the Society will continue to appear in *Russell*. (Editor’s note: Lady Kate Russell, Ken Blackwell, and Bob Davis remain as members. They were at that first meeting in 1974. It seems very likely that either the late Peter Cranford or the late Lee Eisler wrote the foregoing piece.)

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**Inquiry and Gift from a Grateful Daughter**

Tim Madigan received an email from Smita Rajput Kamble, a psychologist living in the UK, which begins with the following paragraph:

“I found your email on the Bertrand Russell Society site, and as a first port-of-call, contacted you. My father is an ex-Air Force man who worked in the corporate sector of India, and was very influenced by Bertrand Russell in his early 20s. He wrote to him and Russell sent him a signed photograph of himself. This is safe with our family in India. My father often talks about how much Russell influenced his thinking—towards marriage, morals, religion, and education. I would say that without such reformed thinking from a father, I would not be where I am now, an educated woman with a career. He always said that my education was my dowry in a country where these things matter.”

Ms. Kamble then went on to say that her father was coming to visit her in the UK, and she wanted to take him to visit some Russell sites. Tim contacted several of us, and our member, Tony Simpson, happily obliged and provided her with some useful information. Ms. Kamble was most grateful, then she asked about her father becoming a member of the Society, which we are glad to say he did as a gift from her, adding yet another member to our India contingent. Upon receiving his welcome letter from us, here is what he said in response:
"Thank you very much for such a warm, welcoming letter. I am indeed privileged and honoured to receive it. Yes, it is true that I admired Russell a great deal; you can say I almost fell in love on reading his book *New Hopes for the Changing World* [1951]. It was way back in 1958, probably March or April. I was a young man of 21, then. I loved his categorisation of Man’s conflicts with nature, with other men, and with himself; so much that I resolved not to have conflicts with other human beings, if possible; it remained with me till this day. I am not a very educated man in terms of formal academic qualifications. At the time I read Russell, I had studied up to ‘A’ level in the Indian education system. I also resolved that I shall try to understand my own self. Both these resolves, kept me company till today. I believe I understand myself in a much better way because of my friend, philosopher, and guide Russell. He also advised in that book that due to a fast changing world, man has to change his ways of thinking and feeling. I did not understand at that time the profound meaning of the phrase, ‘Ways of thinking and feeling’ that I understood later on as life took its course. These things have remained with me. Later on I read his other books that changed my mental makeup considerably. It was unfortunate that I could hardly share with others Russell's ways of thinking."

It is most gratifying to know that Russell had such a positive influence on a young man who, in due course, would “pay that forward” to his daughter, now living successfully and independently. We are very glad to have Mohan Rajput in our fold.

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**PRESIDENT’S CORNER**

*By Tim Madigan*  
*tmadigan@rochester.rr.com*

It was my pleasure to host the 2016 annual Bertrand Russell Conference at my place of employment, St. John Fisher College in Rochester, New York. Members of the library staff put together an excellent exhibit of Russell books and quotations, including this favorite of mine: “The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, but wiser people so full of doubts.” Of that, I have no doubt.

A stalwart group of forty hardy souls gathered to discuss such topics as “Are Bertrand Russell's Social and Political Views Still Relevant in the 21st Century?”, “Wittgenstein and Russell on Matter”, “Russell and China”, “A Process-Oriented Definition of Number”, “Monuments to Bertrand Russell and Fenner Brockway in London's Red Lion Square”, “Bertrand Russell and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, and “The Conquest of Happiness Revisited.” As usual, the annual conference covered the gamut of Russell’s long life and intellectual career. I was particularly delighted by the final session of the conference, a master class held by our former president, Alan Schwerin, devoted to Russell’s *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912). Alan did a masterful job of eliciting contributions from all the attendees, making everyone feel comfortable to contribute. It was the perfect way to end the conference, and showed how the Bertrand Russell Society, made up of such disparate parts, can come together as one in fruitful dialogue and discussion. I think Russell
himself would have been delighted to know that the Society named in his honor is so committed to the democratic pursuit of truth. He might not have been pleased to learn that our traditional “Red Hackle Hour” held before the conference banquet no longer serves that particular brand of Scotch, since it not manufactured anymore; but in the spirit of Jamesian “Will to Believe”—we did fill up an empty bottle of it with another better-known brand, Chivas Regal (provided by our longtime member Dave Henehan). Ersatz Red Hackle is better than none!

The Bertrand Russell Society Award for 2016 went to Philosophy Now magazine, in honor of its 25th anniversary. Rick Lewis, its founding editor (who’s still going strong) came over from London, England to accept the award plaque, which read, “Philosophy Now has followed the Russellian tradition of encouraging philosophical inquiry in a popular manner.” In the interest of full disclosure, I should mention that I am a long-time contributor to the magazine and serve on its editorial board, but I hope this isn’t a case of “Special Pleading.”

It was my dissertation director at the State University of Buffalo’s Philosophy Department, Professor Peter Hare, who had first encouraged me to contact Rick Lewis, way back in 1995. Peter and I had talked about trying to put together a magazine that would highlight all the areas of philosophy, and be written in an accessible and inviting manner, in the manner of Russell’s A History of Western Philosophy (1945). Shortly after we started discussing this, Peter came back from an American Philosophical Association Eastern Division meeting, and let me know that he had met a young man named Rick Lewis, who had recently started just such a publication in the United Kingdom. There was no need to start afresh—all we had to do was support Rick’s efforts as best we could. Being a lazy sort, and knowing how much work is involved in running a magazine, I heaved a sigh of relief and took Peter’s good advice to contact Rick immediately.

It has been my pleasure over the years to visit Rick and his equally philosophically committed partner, Anja Steinbauer, several times in their London office/home, and we have met over the years in various other locations as well. I eagerly anticipate each issue of Philosophy Now (even when I’m not in it!), every one of which has given me a bacchanalian amount of food for thought to digest. I was able to participate in the 20th anniversary celebration for the magazine in 2011, and it meant a great deal to me—and I hope to Rick—to be able to give the magazine the Bertrand Russell Award on its 25th anniversary. In addition, even as we speak I am putting together a special issue devoted to Russell for Philosophy Now, which I am guest-editing, and which will feature several members of the Society.

Attending a gathering of Russellians every year always gives me great joy—as Tim Delaney pointed out in his conference presentation, in The Conquest of Happiness (1930), Russell wrote that being around sympathetic friends is one of the true roads to happiness. I encourage everyone reading this to attend and participate in next year’s conference at Central Connecticut State University, to be hosted by my good friend David Blitz. Watch for details in the next Bulletin.
Finally, it behooves me as President to encourage all members to renew before year’s end. Our stalwart Treasurer, Michael Berumen, pointed out at the conference that it has been 30 years since the Society’s Lifetime Membership fee has been raised, and the Board of Directors has voted to raise it from the current $1,000.00 to $1,500.00 at the beginning of 2017. That gives those of you sitting on the fence one last chance to take advantage of the lower fee. I will be doing so myself, for the good of the Society and the chance to save $500.00—a win/win situation if ever there were one!

From The Student Desk
By Landon D. C. Elkind
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The Cost of Publishing Principia Mathematica

Some folks at the Bertrand Russell Society 2016 Annual Meeting at St. John Fisher College wanted to know how much, in today’s terms, Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell paid to publish their co-authored Principia Mathematica. This is a somewhat complicated question—it is really a bundle of questions—so your patience is appreciated.

Each co-author paid £50 to publish Principia. So our initial question is, “What is the 2015 value, in US dollars, of £50 in 1910?”

The Bank of England’s inflation calculator sets £50 in 1910 at a 2015 value of £5,312.50. According to an exchange rate website—whose data may not be precise, but these calculations are all rough—the average exchange rate in 2015 was $1.528162 for £1.

So the cost of publishing Principia was $8,118.36 in today’s dollars—for each co-author. Therefore, their collective cost was $16,236.72.

In contrast, I paid $57.61, or £37.70, for all three volumes of Principia (a cheap facsimile edition, admittedly). The Bank of England’s inflation calculator puts my 1910 cost of buying all three volumes at £0.35 pounds—in 1910 terms that would have been roughly 7 shillings.

However, it is slightly misleading to compare what I paid for one set to the cost of printing multiple copies of the whole set. It is also somewhat distorting to only count the cost to the co-authors. The Royal Society also subsidized the cost of publishing Principia, and the publishers assumed the remaining projected loss as a risk. So another question is, "How much did the co-authors, the Royal Society, and the publishers pay to print each copy of all three volumes of Principia?"

The publishers projected a loss of £600 in publishing Principia. The publishers risked £300 of that projected loss, the Royal Society assumed £200 upfront, and the co-authors took on the remaining £100 upfront. The publishers produced 750 copies of Volume I. Due to low sales, only 500 copies of Volumes II and III were printed, but let us ignore that.

Ostensibly, the co-authors paid for Volume I, whereas, the Royal Society paid for Volumes II and III. Dividing $8,118.36 by 750, both Whitehead and Russell each paid about $10.83 to print each copy of Volume I—or $21.65 jointly. Thanks to the subsidies, that amount covers the cost to the co-
authors of printing all three volumes. So to publish a set of all three volumes, both co-authors paid $10.83 each—or $21.65 jointly. Spreading that cost over three volumes, the co-authors separately paid $3.61 for each volume of Principia—or $7.22 jointly.

Tripling these amounts gives us the cost to the authors plus the Royal Society. Ignoring that fewer copies of Volumes II and III were printed, the Royal Society paid $21.65 for one copy of both Volumes II and III. So the total cost to the co-authors plus the Royal Society for a full set comes to $64.94. This is $7.33 more than what I paid for a cheap facsimile edition.

Doubling these amounts gives us the cost to all parties—the co-authors, the Royal Society, and the publishers. For one of 750 copies of all three volumes, the total cost was $129.88, or $43.29 for each volume. Note that this is actually the net cost, or the full cost minus what the publishers thought they would recoup in sales.

Another question is, “How much did it cost all the parties to print 750 copies of Principia?” We get this by multiplying the cost of each set of three volumes by 750. Thus:

- The co-authors individually paid $8,118.36 or $16,236.72 jointly, to publish Principia.
- The Royal Society paid $32,473.44 to publish Principia.
- The publishers covered a projected loss of $48,710.16 in publishing Principia.

Therefore, the parties combined to put up $97,420.32, or £63,750, to publish Principia.

Yet another question is, “How does the price in 1910 compare with today’s price?” Volumes I, II, and III were priced at 25 shillings (£1.25), 30 shillings (£1.5), and 21 shillings (£1.05), respectively. The prices in 2015 dollars and pounds, then, are as follows:

- You would have paid $202.96 (£132.81) for Volume I.
- You would have paid $243.54 (£159.37) for Volume II.
- You would have paid $170.48 (£111.56) for Volume III.

For the whole set, you would have paid $616.98 (£403.74). Checking Cambridge University Press’ website, you will notice that their price is about twice that—$1,225.00!

It bears mentioning that all such calculations are fraught with other considerations about how to best measure monetary value across time. A variety of other answers to this question can be found in greater detail at Measuring Worth.

Nb. An earlier version of this article was previously published in Daily Nous. I thank the editor, Justin Weinberg, for permission to republish the piece. I also thank Greg Stoutenburg for helpful comments on an earlier draft. And if you found the end of this piece, thanks for reading!
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919) in the university bookstore. I devoured the book in a couple of days and was very much impressed by the author’s lucidity and clarity of exposition. I quickly became interested in other books by the same author, hoping that I could find further clarifications on the subject I was about to study at a much deeper level than I’d learned in high school. I couldn’t find any, but I found another book on a somewhat related subject: The ABC of Relativity (1925). After reading this one, I decided that I should read everything that this author wrote, no matter what the subject was, such was the impression that his writing had on me. By the time I graduated, I had already made my way through The Conquest of Happiness (1930), Marriage and Morals (1929), Why I am Not a Christian (1957 [Essay 1927]), and still hungered for more. At first I thought BR was just another one of those science popularizers who wrote for the general public; but when I came across the books I just mentioned, I was struck by the breadth of his interests. Why I Am Not a Christian made quite an impact on me, being born into a deeply religious family as I was. By that time, I had already nurtured similar thoughts, but had never expressed them to anybody. Needless to say, the book resonated immensely within me. The next book by BR that I read got me thinking: “what subject does this author NOT write about”? It was War Crimes in Vietnam (1967), which got me interested in geopolitics and international affairs. But the next two books definitely got me stuck in Russell’s web: by the time I finished The Problems of Philosophy (1912) and Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), I had been bitten by the philosophy bug. Later on, I found out that BR was not only a popularizer of math and science, and an author who wrote about atheism, war, happiness, and everything; he was also one of the greatest philosophers of all time. And not only that, he was British, like The Beatles! Then I said to myself: “This is my man”.

Then I moved to Rio to make a living, entered professional life, got married, and had children. But BR’s books continued to pour into my shelves and stir my interest in a host of subjects. I must add that although the first books by BR that I read were Portuguese translations, by the time I graduated, I had already acquired a sufficient mastery of his native language to read him in his original English. That was quite another discovery: the beauty of his English prose exceeded by far any Portuguese translation that I read, no matter how accurate the translator tried to be. That is to say, besides a host of other subjects, BR also stirred my interest in the study of the English language. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that I learned English by reading Russell’s books. By the time I retired I had acquired a little library on philosophy, sociology, history, psychology, politics, education, and international affairs, my interest in all those subjects having been sparked by that little book I saw in the university bookstore, whose only purpose was to show what mathematics was all about.
With such a background, only one thing lacked to make my infatuation complete: to be a member of a society dedicated to Bertrand Russell. In fact, I didn’t know such a society existed, until I discovered it in the late 90s, surfing the internet. The BRS had a discussion list in which not only its members could participate, but also everybody who wished to. I entered the list and began interacting with the participants. I learned a lot and contributed the little I knew about BR, his life, and works. To such an extent that made Ken Blackwell, the list owner, to think I was competent enough to write a review about a Mexican book on Russell’s philosophy by Guillermo Hurtado, entitled Proposiciones Russelliánas (1998), to be published in Russell. N.s. Vol. 20, no. 2. Winter 2000, of which he was the editor. Full of enthusiasm I promptly accepted the task, not realizing the immensity of the job I had before me. Needless to say, I read and reread the book, and dove into BR’s early technical works trying to absorb as much as I could in order to write at least an acceptable review. I postponed it as much as I could but Ken kept asking me: “When will that review arrive”? Finally, six, seven long months later, I sent it to Ken and it was accepted! That was the greatest of honors to me. Now, besides reading about Russell I was also WRITING about him. And in English! What else could I ask for?

I quickly became a member of the society and made plans to attend the Annual Meeting that would be held at Ken’s university, McMaster University, in Ontario, Canada. That was in 2001. Once there, I became acquainted with Ken, Nick Griffin, Ray Perkins, and all the others, and had the opportunity to examine in loco BR’s original papers and library, which had been acquired by McMaster University. Since then, I have attended a number of other annual meetings, including the one in Dublin, Ireland, and I’ve made a lot of friends from all over the world as a bonus. Good camaraderie is the best side effect of being a member of the BRS.

That has been my life since that first “encounter” with Bertrand Russell back in the sixties. I can only say that it has been an enriching and rewarding experience for me ever since. Bertrand Russell was the greatest influence in my life, and for me to become a proud member of the BRS was the natural consequence of it.

Russell and Society
By Ray Perkins, Jr.
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Is Bertrand Russell Still Relevant?

The short answer is “Yes”. And even if Bertrand Russell had never written anything other than his 1912 “shilling shocker” (The Problems of Philosophy) and his even more shocking 1927 “Why I am Not a Christian”, his ideas would still be relevant and influential for seekers of truth, justice, and peace today. His lessons in skeptical inquiry and human compassion go beyond religion and metaphysics, and speak to the importance of clear thinking in social/political matters generally—matters where ignorance, prejudice, superstition and fanatical love of country militate against human happiness—and, since the dawn of the nuclear age, threaten the continued existence of our species. Today these lessons are again in need of learning
for a post-Cold War generation—and relearning for their elders who mistook, a quarter century ago, “remarkable progress” for a “problem solved.”

**Our Most Serious Problem**

I’ll offer some thoughts on Russell’s relevance for dealing with what I think he’d regard as the most serious of our serious problems today, viz. the revival of the Cold War and the nuclear peril—a peril well understood by Russell and whose work did so much to lay the foundation for the Cold War’s cessation 20 years after his death.

Throughout most of his life, Bertrand Russell was deeply concerned with world peace and the prospects for human happiness, goals which he rightly saw as existentially threatened by war, especially after the advent of the Bomb. His admonition was succinctly set forth in the “new thinking” called for in the 1955 *Russell-Einstein Manifesto* was twofold: (1) that we, the international community, must recognize that war must be abolished, lest it abolish us; and, as a first step to that end, (2) that nuclear weapons be renounced.

**A Nuclear-Free World?**

Russell lived to see three of the five nuclear powers of his day (US, USSR and UK) sign onto the 1968 *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* (NPT) with its remarkable Article VI legally binding parties to “negotiations in good faith on … nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” The NPT must have given him great hope for the future of mankind notwithstanding his preoccupation at the time with the war in Vietnam and efforts to expose US crimes to international view.

President Obama did (at least) get his Russell-Einstein correct at Hiroshima last May, when he reaffirmed his 2009 commitment to a nuclear-free world, rightly adding “[and] … we must rethink war itself”. These are important words from the President of the United States. But he has also approved a trillion dollar nuclear “modernization” program over the next 30 years, a fact making his words at Hiroshima more than a bit perplexing.

At a time when former Secretary of Defense William Perry and others (e.g., former secretaries of state Colin Powell, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz) are warning that the chances of nuclear catastrophe are now greater than they have ever been, many international groups (including the Bertrand Russell Society) have urged President Obama to refocus on the growing nuclear peril. And to: declare, forthwith, a “no first use” policy; de-alert our land-based missiles (now on hair-trigger alert); and ask the Russians to do likewise.

**A World Without War?**

Russell’s goal of abolishing war is (as he knew) an immense task. It would obviously require great international cooperation, especially among the Security Council’s Permanent Five (US, UK, Russia, France, China)—cooperation to create a supranational federal authority limiting national sovereignty with respect to the “right” to wage war. Such an authority could be a reformed United Nations—but one more genuinely democratic, and without the veto for each of the Permanent...
Five. It would have limited governmental powers, mainly to make, adjudicate and enforce laws for promoting/maintaining international peace. (Surprisingly, these powers largely exist already under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. But the enforcement power hinges on the 15 member Security Council whose majority can be overridden by a “no” from any one of the Permanent Five.)

The Society’s Motto for A Better World

We can glimpse the big picture of Russell’s relevance for our current world with the help of his 1925 characterization of the good life, viz. as “… one inspired by love and guided by knowledge.”

By “love” he means a kind of benevolence, especially an impartial, impersonal and transnational feeling of concern for the well-being of human kind generally.

By “knowledge” he has in mind the pursuit of evidence-based beliefs and respect for scientific consensus on matters of opinion often burdened by the prejudices and arrogant dogmatism of “common sense” (e.g., evolution, climate change); and, where there is no scientific consensus (e.g., regarding matters of socio-political controversy, especially those concerning national “defense”)—one must keep alive a critical skepticism and suspend judgment—pending good evidence.

Some Critical Tools

Russell’s own pursuit of the good life provided several generations with practical lessons concerning our well-being, not just for ourselves and family, but for the whole Human Family. His personal efforts in the cause of peace came with important insights ably applied by some of his admirers (e.g., Noam Chomsky, a BRS honorary member)—for example, the practice of assessing our own “defense” policies and actions by putting oneself in the shoes of those on the other side, and ask: “How must our ‘defensive’ actions look to them?” In our Hobbesian world, one group’s defensive actions often look to the prospective aggressor as evidence of aggressive plans. The current NATO expansion to Russia’s borders is an example. Historical memory is important here. It’s a good bet that the Russians remember Poland’s 1920 attack (“Operation Kiev”); and an even better one Hitler’s 1941 invasion of Russia (through the Ukraine).

Another critical Russellian insight (distilled from his knowledge of history, psychology, and personal experience with the war-time press) is the realization that in most international conflicts one’s government and its obliging media (who heavily rely on official government sources) are notoriously unreliable. Or, as one of Russell’s much admired Cold War journalists, I. F. Stone, more bluntly put it—“all governments are run by liars.”

Today, at a time when love and knowledge are existentially more important than ever, far too many people, including the leaders and the electorate of the most powerful country in the world, are wanting in both of Russell’s “good life” constituents— a fact sadly confirmed by the 2016 US Presidential election.

In sum, Russell’s relevance is essentially what it was—and needs to continue to be—as an antidote against the influences of ignorance, bigotry and
small-minded love of country—these are not nourishment for the well-being of humanity, but for what Russell called "fanaticism," an emotive affliction befogging our understanding of the world and threatening to make the solution of its most serious problems impossible.

Endnotes
1 Russell's sardonic definition of patriotism comes to mind: "the willingness to kill and be killed for trivial reasons."
2 The other two nuclear powers, China and France, also came aboard several years after Russell's death (1970). At the time Israel secretly had nuclear weapons (and has since). The US knew it and tried, to no avail, to get Israel to join the NPT. Although its nuclear status is well known, Israel will neither confirm nor deny possession. Today, counting the Vatican and Palestine, the NPT has 192 members.
3 Based on many years of experience looking over Pentagon budgets and cost estimates, I've confirmed a rule of thumb for actual acquisition costs: Actual cost = Estimated cost x 3.

Antidote to Fanaticism: Bertrand Russell's Liberal Decalogue

1. Do not feel absolutely certain of anything.
2. Do not think it worthwhile to proceed by concealing evidence, for the evidence is sure to come to light.
3. Never try to discourage thinking for you are sure to succeed.
4. When you meet with opposition, even if it should be from your husband or your children, endeavor to overcome it by argument and not by authority, for a victory dependent upon authority is unreal and illusory.
5. Have no respect for the authority of others, for there are always contrary authorities to be found.
6. Do not use power to suppress opinions you think pernicious, for if you do the opinions will suppress you.
7. Do not fear to be eccentric in opinion, for every opinion now accepted was once eccentric.
8. Find more pleasure in intelligent dissent than in passive agreement, for, if you value intelligence as you should, the former implies a deeper agreement than the latter.
9. Be scrupulously truthful, even if the truth is inconvenient, for it is more inconvenient when you try to conceal it.
10. Do not feel envious of the happiness of those who live in a fool's paradise, for only a fool will think that it is happiness (BR. Dec. 16, 1951. "The best answer to fanaticism: Liberalism" in The New York Times Magazine.)
We had occasion to get some thoughts on moving from the academic world into business with our member, Jolen Galaugher, who joined the BRS in 2009, and is presently a member of the board of directors. She is the previous recipient of the BRS Book Award for her work, *Russell's Philosophy of Logical Analysis, 1897-1905* (2013). Jolen is currently Program Development Manager with Vital Life, Inc., one of Canada’s leading providers of workplace health services. Jolen does program development, business development, and communications and marketing work for this private-sector company.

**BRSB:** You spent the better part of your still relatively young life in academia, either in school studying philosophy or teaching philosophy. You took your doctorate at McMaster, and did postdoc work at Iowa with our esteemed member and well-known philosopher, Greg Landini; authored a worthy, technical book (which I’ve read!) in philosophy; published articles; and you held the Visiting Russell Professorship at McMaster. You had a promising academic career ahead of you. What caused you to change course and enter the world of commerce?

**JG:** I had begun to question the impact I could have working within academia. Academics tend to become rather specialized early in their careers in order to establish expertise and secure the sort of job that might allow one to broaden one’s research focus down the road. A broader focus concerned with public impact is not particularly compatible with establishing expertise in a technical subject matter in philosophy. It is clichéd, but the notion that one is working toward knowing ‘more and more about less and less’ can begin to ring true. This can be reinforced by administrators and funding agencies. So, I was impatient, or saw other, earlier opportunities for expanding the scope and relevance of my work.

Another consideration was that my husband, also an academic, had been offered a job in the city where my family still lives. This sort of geographical coincidence is unusual in academia, to understate it. In the spring of 2014, I interviewed for a tenure-track job in Manhattan that I was excited about, but realized in the process that very few of the other advertised tenure-track positions appealed to me philosophically or geographically. When I came to terms with the fact that I wasn’t as excited about the academic jobs on offer as I ought to have been and began to see opportunities for important work outside academia, I made the switch.
BRSB: What differences did you find? Any surprises?

JG: Yes, there are differences. On the one hand, it is refreshing to work in an environment that is dynamic and responds to current human needs and interests. I recently applied for a research and workplace innovation grant, and in the time it might have taken an application to be reviewed in academia, I secured the funding, hired the team, and we implemented the project. We have since trained hundreds of managers in workplace mental health and have just received positive results from our program evaluation study. In academia, it takes a very long time to see any results from one’s work, and, even then, it’s difficult to gauge precisely what the results have been. Even if all goes well, an article in a high impact journal is not a guarantee of real-world impact.

On the other hand, business folk can fall into the immediacy trap—that of sacrificing a more strategic, methodical approach to whatever issue has arisen today. It’s necessary to tolerate some tension or ambiguity while reflecting on the best way forward—philosophers do this well, but oftentimes, business people don’t do this; they prize decisiveness very highly, sometimes even if the markers are present that one is about to execute a poor decision. Sound business decisions are ones which allow for carrying out one’s vision with flexibility and responsiveness to current desires and opportunities in the market without becoming arbitrary or incoherent, which is the risk when immediacy isn’t checked by a larger perspective.

In terms of what has surprised me, perhaps it is how passionate some people in business are about their jobs—about the service one is creating and its relationship to the human condition, not just the bottom line. In academia, in philosophy, people are very reflective about what their profession means to them. Some people in business are just as passionate, though they don’t often say they couldn’t imagine doing anything else—theyir sense of their role usually isn’t dependent upon a particular position or institution.

I was also surprised by how much interesting work there is outside of academia. The training for a position in academia is very specialized, and the opportunities quite limited, so the opportunities outside of academia really seem limitless by contrast. One can establish a track record relatively quickly in one area, which allows you to get a footing in another. There is a lot more movement.

In a sense, it is more of a meritocracy than academia.

BRSB: How has your training in philosophy helped you in your work, if at all?

JG: My training in philosophy has been absolutely critical to my current work, and yet these are skills that I had utterly taken for granted. Some of these skills are fairly mundane and not specific to philosophy, as a discipline but are nonetheless very useful. For instance, the ability to synthesize a huge amount of information and present it in a highly organized manner is something a lot of people, even otherwise talented people, cannot do. Project management, time management, separating priority items from details, attention to
methodology and properly tracking results to improve processes and service delivery methods—these can all be acquired in a PhD program or early academic career.

In philosophy in particular, one is trained to think in a very analytical or critical manner—to seek a third approach when presented with two limiting options; to recognize the assumptions that are obscuring a solution; to always be attuned to a lack of coherence or to the undesirable implications of a certain view. We understand that being a ‘big picture thinker’ means anything but being vague—in fact, it means being very precise. And we understand that ‘thinking out of the box’ doesn’t just involve superficially novel solutions, but reformulating the question or redefining the problem to access new approaches, and we are practiced in that way of thinking. This is the sort of rhetoric one includes on one’s departmental website to recruit undergraduate students to philosophy, but it turns out to be true.

**BRSB:** Did you encounter any biases coming into business as a result of your academic background, biases that you had to counteract, such as, oh, here’s Miss Egghead in the clouds type of thing?

**JG:** Yes, but the biases are true! I once had colleagues laugh when I used the term ‘infelicitous’ in a board meeting. I’ve made references to Leibniz and Newton that, let’s say, were not appreciated! I am still an intellectual at heart, and to some extent will always take an analytic, even a philosophical approach to my work. The key is to bring along the many advantages of this approach without importing its liabilities. I’ve worked with some former academics who don’t transition well to the business environment—they are ponderous in their approach and seem to obfuscate rather than clarify issues. At that point, one isn’t called an egghead, one is called ineffective. So, if you are being called an egghead, you are probably still in good standing.

**BRSB:** Did you come in with some preconceptions, yourself, about business and businesspeople that you had to overcome?

**JG:** Yes, I came in with preconceptions, but these were also all true!

In seriousness, I believe I underestimated the significance and value of some of the talents of those working outside academia, and I underestimated the level of collaboration and partnership between organizations and institutions outside academia.

Within academia, one is judged on what one has accomplished individually, particularly in the humanities, where sole authorship is the norm and collaboration the exception. To attempt this individualist approach outside academia can be disastrous for an organization, and very limiting professionally for an individual. I hadn’t fully realized this when I began work outside academia.

**BRSB:** As a woman, did you find there were more or fewer obstacles than in academia ... perhaps different ones ... or is it about the same?
JG: Generally speaking, there are the same hiring biases and salary obstacles—men are hired at higher salaries and promoted on the basis of potential, with a sort of trust in their innate ability to fulfill the demands of the role, and women are hired and promoted on the basis of achievement, with a sort of baseline apprehension about their competencies. There are measures in place at many Universities and in many companies to counter or mitigate this tendency. Policies help. Awareness of bias helps. Blind review helps. Deliberate actions to change the workplace culture help.

In business, I’ve occasionally seen men who are ineffective or poor performers permitted to idle in their roles, and women challenged or questioned more frequently and called to account at higher standards. In both philosophy and in business, I have seen very accomplished and very smart women interpreted to be saying something much less astute than what they are in fact saying. I’m sure every woman has at least one anecdote of having their ideas repeated by a man in the room to great acclaim, whether in a board room or conference hall.

There are also differences. In philosophy, a woman might not be punished for an aggressive debate style, but may be unintentionally punished for attempting to employ soft skills in philosophical interactions. In business, soft skills and collaboration are more highly prized, but then women walk the line between being overlooked or underestimated for employing them, and being labeled as aggressive or not a ‘team player’ for failing to do so. But I’ve heard all these pitfalls can be avoided by just beginning every statement with: “I agree with Steve. I think…”, whether or not Steve has said anything; whether or not there even is a Steve in your company or department. [BRSB now howling!]

But, actually, philosophy departments have begun to acknowledge there is a very big diversity problem. The blog “What is it like to be a woman in philosophy” provides a forum for contributors who identify as women to share their experiences in the profession. Some positive responses to these issues at the individual and institutional level are shared in the parallel blog, “What we’re doing about what it’s like”. More recently, a comparable blog “What is it like to be a person of color in philosophy?” has begun to share the experiences of people of color within the profession. The representation of people of color within the discipline is really shockingly bad, and the blog gives some hints as to why this might be the case. It is important to listen to these voices rather than speculating about the problem, or worse, denying it exists. There are a lot of constructive initiatives underway, led by the people most affected.

BRSB: There is a certain amount of autonomy as a professor in a classroom setting that does not obtain in the business world for a young executive. Was that a difficult adjustment? Did you feel prepared for the kind of matrix management that business often requires … both vertically and horizontally within the organization?

JG: I think it is a sort of myth about academia that matrix management doesn’t enter into it. Let’s say you’re an assistant professor in an average department—your chair is staunchly opposed to grade inflation and prioritizes traditional instruction, but your dean wants to increase enrollments and decrease attrition with ‘learning innovations’—and you are in the
unenviable position of chairing the relevant committee. Meanwhile, your TA has increased student grades following complaints and the students whose grades were not increased have revolted, with the admin assistant receiving the brunt of the complaints. At the same time, your funding application is due to the granting agency, but you are waiting on a contribution from a collaborator in another department who is awaiting clearance from her chair, while the application must be vetted internally before it can be submitted. While there is a great deal of autonomy in academia, pondering deep meanings in starry-eyed solitude is reserved for the privileged few.

I’ve been fortunate to have a great deal of autonomy in my current role. I strategize and prioritize my initiatives and manage my time accordingly, which is, to a large extent, what one is able to do in academia in a tenured or tenure-track role. This autonomy is something I really value, and believe more employers should entrust to the people working for them—it can reduce overhead, improve morale, reduce costs associated with absenteeism and presenteeism, attract better talent, and contribute to a more effective workforce. More employers are catching on to this.

BRSB: Are academic politics materially different than what you have found in a corporate setting ... I mean in terms of collegiality, getting ahead, addressing issues, and getting your ideas heard or getting things accomplished?

JG: These politics exist in both realms, but in business, at least in progressive businesses, one’s ability to navigate these politics would seem to influence one’s success or failure more directly—if you alienate your colleagues or address issues with your team ineffectively, your projects will collapse and you will fail to meet your goals and targets. In academia, pedigree and rank are very important, so that one has clout independently of, say, being able to motivate a team or handle issues diplomatically. In an organization that is hierarchically arranged, whether academia or business, it would seem that one can, to a greater or lesser extent, substitute pedigree or advancing in the hierarchy for collegiality, communication, and team-building. Of course, how much politicking one has to do and how it is received will depend, in any context, on how much power and privilege one possesses already, but it seems to me that the more of an effect pro-social behaviour has upon one’s advancement, the healthier the organization.

BRSB: Do you find that the business world is more or less hierarchical from an employee’s perspective?

JG: Academia is quite hierarchical. Titles are very rigid, positions are very rigid, everything is ranked from course evaluations to funding applications to academic journals to graduate programs, and it’s an up or out system premised on a traditional family structure that is no longer relevant. Then, superimposed on this traditional hierarchy is that which is imposed when a business model is adopted by administrators. In some institutions it is questionable whether there is much genuine collaboration or communication between administrators and departments. The trend toward “adjunctification” has left those on the bottom rung utterly disenfranchised—the plight of adjuncts in North America has received much publicity recently. Perhaps the only people who have managed, as a group, to change their position in
the hierarchy are students, but even then, students may be given more clout as consumers without being afforded more respect as human beings.

In contrast, hierarchical arrangements in business are waning—they tend to signal dysfunction in management, or a lack of competence or creativity at the top. In forward-thinking businesses, silos are collapsed and collaboration is the norm. There is decreasing emphasis on one’s title and rank within the organization and more emphasis on one’s role and contributions, which, of course, is as it should be.

**BRSB: By the way, what in particular caused you to take an interest in Bertrand Russell? How do you think Russell remains relevant, today?**

**JG:** It is easy to be interested in Russell—Russell is a fascinating figure. As your typical readers know, he was an original founder of Analytic philosophy, was central to the development of symbolic logic, and has greatly influenced the philosophy of science, mind, and language. Some of his contributions were very clever but technical and, to most people, obscure, like his logicist definitions of number or his theory of descriptions, but he was also a well-known public intellectual who was fired and imprisoned for his views. To the end of his life, he was an indefatigable advocate for social causes from pacifism to war crimes tribunals to nuclear disarmament.

At McMaster, I had the privilege to work with Nick Griffin, who is justly celebrated for his work in the history of analytic philosophy, as well as the opportunity to work in the Russell archives, and I could not turn down that opportunity. Russell’s philosophy of math and logic offer lots of satisfying intellectual puzzles, but also bear on bigger philosophical questions.

In terms of how Russell is relevant today—he was so prolific—tell me a topic and I will tell you how he is relevant on that topic today. I don’t intend this as a dodge—I mean it. In general terms, though, I believe Russell is relevant today in virtue of setting a standard for how to think critically and, at the same time, with reasonable human sensitivity.

**BRSB: Do you still find time to pursue your philosophical interests in between work and family?**

**JG:** Between a full-time job with non-traditional and extended hours, a partner with a demanding job, a 15-month old, and various board and community commitments, I still have many hours a day to devote to philosophy—they just fall between 12am and 7am.

In seriousness, I was never really that interested passively perusing philosophical texts. I would not be satisfied, I don’t think, in reading philosophical works and thinking “oh, that is interesting” without having the ability to go on to ask “but is that true?” Lacking the time and resources to try to investigate would be disappointing. In the sense that it takes a lot of time and resources to engage with meaningfully, philosophy seems to me to be more work than hobby.

**BRSB: Some very successful businesspersons majored in philosophy in college, including the likes of investor George Soros, LinkedIn cofounder Reid Hoffman, and**
former Time-Warner CEO Gerald Levin, just to name three. Would you recommend philosophy as a major course of study in undergraduate school, or even at a graduate level, to aspiring business people and entrepreneurs?

JG: Well, it seems to me the people you have in mind were naturally drawn to philosophy and so, I suspect, both interested in the subject matter and more likely to assimilate the skills imparted by engaging with it. There are sub-disciplines within Philosophy that more readily lend themselves to intersection with outside enterprises, like philosophy of law and law or bioethics and medicine, business ethics, and there are some programs geared to people who intend to pursue non-academic careers, like philosophy, politics, and economics programs. But ‘pure philosophy’ is sort of like cilantro—one either has a taste for it, or one doesn’t. If one doesn’t, I would think it would be slow torture to spend years studying say, Locke’s secondary qualities or rigid designators or other specialist issues that form the subject matter of typical doctoral dissertations. If one doesn’t have the desire or aptitude to engage these issues, attempting to do so even within an undergraduate program is unlikely to deliver a robust philosophical skill set—mostly it would be a perplexing and immensely frustrating experience. Of course, there is probably research that shows the opposite.

What I would recommend for business students or even business leaders are core courses in critical thinking. For business students, being open to the notion that one’s initial feeling or idea may be unsupported and may have already been challenged, disputed, and disproved, is a prerequisite to critical thinking. In teaching critical thinking to business students, one realizes the world is about to be populated by leaders who literally do not know how to distinguish premises from conclusions, discern an argument’s structure, or bring to bear a conception of the criteria for what makes something true. But why would people be aware of these things—and of cognitive distortions, fallacies, flawed forms of reasoning, and the like—without ever having this pointed out? However, this lack of basic, critical thinking tools and argumentation techniques puts people at a distinct disadvantage, not just in business, but in any enterprise.

BRSB: And would you recommend that aspiring philosophers with advanced degrees consider careers outside of the university? A number of philosophers in bygone days were people of affairs outside of academia … Marcus Aurelius being an obvious one—but also philosophers such as Bacon, Locke, and Spinoza.

JG: Well, not if they are aspiring philosophers.

In seriousness, if you have some kind of aptitude for business or leadership, then training in philosophy can be a tremendous asset—it helps in thinking strategically and critically, interpreting the priorities underlying client requests, tracing out the implications of certain decisions, asking good questions and seeing connections and opportunities, as well as, of course, negotiating and making a strong argument for almost anything. However, if you have no sense for business, no feeling for where customers are at or how something will be received, then a philosophy degree probably won’t help you. But, absolutely, it is the case that certain skills are acquired in the course of running the gauntlet from beginning a PhD program to securing a tenure track position. Despite the stereotypes surrounding tenure,
nobody in academia is clocking and clocking out with one’s feet on the desk. Working on one’s own initiative, being results-driven, seeing projects through with conscientiousness, tolerating criticism and negative feedback with resiliency, and taking responsibility for outcomes are all traits managers and leaders must have, and are acquired in advanced academic training. If one can tolerate having one’s decisions scrutinized to the extent involved in the PhD defense, and can tolerate the academic job interview process, the world will probably feel a softer place by comparison.

**BRSB: Today Philosophy is highly professionalized. Can one still make a mark in philosophy outside of academia?**

Philosophy is so professionalized, one wonders if one can make a mark within it. In truth, technical training or ability is probably needed to contribute something unique and important to answering certain big picture question (and probably not needed to contribute something unique or important to answering others).

The question, really, is what is a philosopher? Was Carl Sagan a philosopher? Is Naomi Klein a Philosopher? Who counts and who doesn’t? It is interesting to speculate—who will the next Martha Nussbaum be? who will the next Noam Chomsky be?—but enduring influence is difficult to predict. Though it is difficult to say something definite, I would say, definitely, that more philosophers need to take on the role of public intellectual—and early career academics need to be able to do so without fearing it will signal the end of their careers.

**BRSB: Are you working on any philosophical topics presently, or do you intend to do so?**

**JG:** Yes, I think it’s inevitable. While I regret that I have some unfinished projects—projects that a huge amount of work has gone into in the history of philosophy of math and logic—my next philosophical projects are likely to be concerned with social and political issues. At least initially.

**BRSB: You have expressed an interest in making the BRS more attractive to young people, particularly women and people of color. Are their untapped opportunities for members in the business world, for example, and how might we go about it?**

**JG:** Yes, I think this is important for the Russell Society to work on, not just as a matter of marketing or increasing membership, but for the good of the Society.

To be frank, a lack of diversity can be very comfortable for some people—for white people, able-bodied people, men…”. When one is not a member of an underrepresented group, it can seem as if there is nothing much amiss when this presence is lacking.

When one’s own group has supremacy, it is easy to sound like the voice of reason—it is easy to pay lip service to supporting change, while remaining patient with slow and halting progress. But I would say, rather, that to remain patient with a lack of change, to refuse to
challenge the status quo, and to allow one group to remain in a position of supremacy unchecked by other points of view, is to knowingly perpetuate the discrimination and oppression from which one gains as a member of the supremacist group.

As to untapped opportunities, to me the question of whether what we are selling is in fact welcoming or appealing to diverse groups of people is prior to the question of how to reach them, and is probably best answered by a group or committee constituted by that diversity.

BRSB: Thank you! I know many readers will find your remarks at once interesting and instructive. As a result, I suspect this interview will be passed along to a great many people. And good luck, Jolen.

Something to Ponder

When and if fascism comes to America, it will not be labeled "made in Germany"; it will not be marked with a swastika; it will not even be called fascism; it will be called, of course, "Americanism."


Did you know…?

Bertrand Russell is largely responsible for bringing international attention to Gottlob Frege, one of the founders of analytic philosophy. In BR’s *Principles of Mathematics* (1903), he credited the relatively unknown and underappreciated Frege for having been the first to correctly define number in his *Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (1884). Frege might properly be considered the father of axiomatic predicate logic with his invention of quantified variables, an essential tool in many areas of logic. Russellians know of BR’s famous discovery about "the set of things x that are such that x is not a member of x"—one that would topple a fundamental foundational principle of Frege’s. But—BR was also a great admirer of Frege, as were Whitehead and Wittgenstein, and he both used and built upon Frege’s innovations in logic and philosophy.
Katarina Perovic, in her contribution to the Fall 2015 issue of the Bulletin, raises intriguing questions about Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment (MRTJ).¹ In this article, I focus on what she has to say regarding the general character of its precursor, the dual-relation theory of judgment (DRTJ) that is found, for example, in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). The matter deserves an extended comment, as it opens up an interesting perspective on Russell’s theories of judgment in general. I don’t claim to possess a key that opens every interpretative lock, here; but what I have to say might help some fellow-Russellians to orient themselves in a terrain where it’s easy to get lost. I shall consider two key elements in Russell’s thinking about judgment: (i) the issue of propositional unity, and (ii) the correspondence intuition.

(DRTJ) regards propositions as complex entities composed of things plus their properties and relations. Russell was not at all clear as to how a proposition is constituted out of its constituents (I shall discuss the issue below). But, as Perovic emphasizes, it was Russell’s view, for example, that the proposition expressed by “Alice is wise” contains Alice herself and one of her properties among its constituents.

What, then, of truth and falsehood? Perovic (p. 11) gives the following account:

The proposition “Alice is wise” is true simply in virtue of the existence of the complex Alice being wise. But, given that there is no distinction between a proposition and a corresponding complex, there is really nothing informative that can be said about the truth of the proposition—its existence coincides with its being true. Even more troublingly, on this view, false propositions simply do not exist. Let’s say that I falsely judge that Alice is not wise. According to his 1903 view, it would appear that I can judge no such thing since there is no such proposition.

This may in fact be a rather accurate description of the sort of confusion to which Russell apparently fell victim in The Principles of Mathematics. The confusion is not an essential element of (DRTJ), however; and Russell himself succeeded in clearing things up in this respect. Moreover, setting straight the confusion will help us thinking through some of the twists and turns in Russell’s subsequent reflections on judgment and truth, as in (MRTJ) and the psychological theory of judgment that he settled upon around 1918–19.

What, then, is the confusion? It is to be found in the statement that a proposition’s “existence coincides with its being true”. Now, this can’t be; if you have a need at all for propositions in your philosophy, you will need both true and false propositions. This applies to Russell as well. We can see this easily if we consider the general character of (DRTJ), according to which a judgment or a belief is a dual (that is, two-place) relation between a subject and a proposition. Consider Russell’s favorite example of a false belief, Othello’s belief that Desdemona loves Cassio—this is a piece of fiction, but here it is to be treated as if it
were real. Not only is it correct to say that Othello believes something, namely that Desdemona loves Cassio—it’s also correct, even if a little clumsy, to say that there is something such that he believes it; that is, that there is an entity such that Othello believes it. If a judgment is a dual relation, the inference is clearly legitimate. Moreover, it holds whether the belief is true or false; this is a fundamental assumption that Russell accepts. You can give it up if you think, with present day ‘disjunctivists’, that belief is not a ‘natural kind’, but you won’t find that in Russell. (DRTJ) is thus committed to the existence of false propositions, which are entities possessing the same ontological status as the true ones.

What does a proposition’s existence consist in, then, if it does not consist in its truth? What is essential to existence in general is oneness, or being one. Applied to propositions, this means that they must be *unities*, in that while a proposition has many constituents, it is nevertheless one entity. In §54 of *The Principles of Mathematics*, Russell argues that this is because one of the constituents of a proposition is a relation that occurs in that proposition in a special way, as a “relation actually relating” the other constituents. This is why a proposition is an actual unity and more than just a list of its putative constituents.

This cannot be the full story about the unity of the proposition, however. Keep in mind that on (DRTJ), the proposition “Desdemona loves Cassio” has Desdemona herself, Cassio himself, and the relation of loving itself as its constituents. Now, surely, if the relation of loving actually relates Desdemona to Cassio, then *it is the case* that she loves him; as my English dictionary tells me, the adverb ‘actually’ is ‘used to refer to what is true or real’. But if so, Russellian propositions collapse into *facts*. At one point, Russell even argues that what distinguishes a proposition from a list of entities “is not any constituent at all, but simply and solely the fact of relatedness”. To disarm the objection, one should argue that it relies on a notion of fact that is illegitimate in the context of (DRTJ). Later, Russell would indeed say that facts are complexes of their constituents: a fact is what results when a relating relation (or, possibly, a ‘predicating predicate’) knits together other entities. On (DRTJ), on the other hand, this does not yet suffice for facthood. To turn a propositional unity into a fact, *truth* has to be added to it. Unfortunately, Russell failed to explain how this comes about, and *The Principles* is very confused about the matter.

To turn a propositional unity into a fact, truth has to be added to it. Unfortunately, Russell failed to explain how this comes about, and *The Principles* is very confused about the matter. But the basic point is just that a fact is a true proposition, or more perspicuously, propositional unity plus truth.

What the above objection makes absolutely clear is that (DRTJ) must draw a distinction between two kinds of unity: *propositional unity* and *fact unity*. The former is the unity of what is believed, while the latter is the unity of what is the case. Russell may have been confused about this in *The Principles*, but he was quite clear about it later, as when he argued, against Meinong, that the being of a particularized relation cannot be what is actually asserted in a judgment. A particularized relation is a concrete instance of a relation, like Desdemona’s love for Cassio, and the point being that if there is such an
entity, the judgment asserting that she loved him cannot fail to be true. In the same way, he argued that, given (DRTJ), what is asserted—the ‘objective of the judgment’, in Meinong’s terminology—cannot be an event, and for the same reason:

There was no such event as ‘Charles I’s death in his bed’. To say that there ever was such a thing as ‘Charles’s I’s death in his bed’ is merely another way of saying that Charles I died in his bed. Thus if there is an objective, it must be something other than ‘Charles I’s death in his bed’. We may take it to be ‘that Charles I died in his bed’. We shall then have to say the same about true judgments.⁴

Propositions (entities like ‘that Charles I died in his bed’) are thus the only candidates for entities that are judged or believed. They, unlike particularized relations or events, allow the duality of truth and falsehood: particularized relations and events, if there are such entities, are fact unities, whereas propositions in Russell’s sense are propositional unities. The distinction between the two kinds of unity is thus clearly drawn by him. This is the first element that I wanted to introduce.

The second element is the correspondence intuition. It is a sort of gut-feeling that we are supposed to have about truth. As is only appropriate for what we call an ‘intuition’, it’s readily formulated in concrete instances, as when we say that the belief that Charles I died on the scaffold is true because there was such an event as Charles I’s death on the scaffold. In our terminology, the event is a fact-unity, and it is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of the belief.

Russell would later accept the gut-feeling, thus becoming one of the chief advocates of the correspondence theory of truth. But it is ruled out by (DRTJ), according to which a judgment has a proposition as its object, and a judgment is true or false in a derivative sense, depending on whether its object is true or false. We could say that a judgment is true if there is a fact ‘corresponding to it’, but since a fact is just a true proposition, that throws no light on the concept of truth. Given (DRTJ), furthermore, a proposition is an immanent feature of a judgment, rather than something external to it, as it should be on the correspondence conception; a judgment is an act plus proposition, and so a proposition is simply a part of a judgment. Again, we could say that a proposition is external to an act of judging, but a mere act cannot be true or false. So, whichever way we twist (DRTJ), we won’t get a (non-trivial) correspondence theory out of it.

Truth by correspondence has to go by the board, then. Nor is there other plausible explanation of truth, such as pragmatism or coherence. (DRTJ) is thus committed to primitivism about fact unity. This is the view, as Perovic (p. 11) puts it, that “there is really nothing informative that can be said about the truth of the proposition”. Russell himself put the point as follows:

Truth and falsehood, in this view, are ultimate, and no account can be given of what makes a proposition true or false. If we accept the view that there are objective falsehoods, we shall oppose them to facts, and make truth the quality of facts, falsehood the quality of their opposites, which we may call fictions.⁵
The problem here is precisely that it offends against our feeling of truth and falsehood. The distinction is one that we “must merely apprehend”, and hence, Russell argues, it leaves our preference for truth unaccounted in a way that just doesn’t feel right.⁶

The early Russell’s truth-primitivism has been widely noticed. What is less frequently observed is that (DRTJ) was committed to primitivism about propositional unity as well. A proposition is a unity, because it combines several entities into one. Russell can prevent it from collapsing into a fact unity only by insisting that there’s a difference here, although it’s one that cannot be analyzed or explained in any way. With (DRTJ), propositional unity must come out as an indefinable feature of propositions, along with their truth or falsehood. For instance, if you say with Russell that what makes for unity is the fact of relatedness, that’s just a way of saying: a proposition is one entity, rather than many entities, and that’s the end of the story!

Russell is helped here a little by the theory of definite descriptions that he formulated in “On Denoting” (1905). It gave him a way of eliminating non-propositional complexity. Semantically speaking, he found a way of eliminating complex referring expressions, as he held now that definite descriptions (phrases like ‘the current Mayor of London’, which on the face of it refers to Mr. Sadiq Khan) have an implicit propositional structure. Given this, he could explain his ontology by saying that there are simple entities and there are complex entities, and the latter have constituents and a truth-value, while refusing any further elucidation of what is involved in this complexity. As far as I know, he didn’t formulate the conclusion in quite so many words. But fits in very well with the substitutional theory of logic that he worked out around 1905–06.⁷

Philosophically, however, the theory leaves too much in the dark. It denies all insight into the nature of truth and falsehood, which is bad intuitively (and for other reasons as well, which I won’t address here). And it denies all insight into propositional complexity, which leaves Russell without a reply to idealist philosophers, who put great emphasis on the issue of unity. Bradley confronted Russell directly with the hard question: “Is there anything, I ask, in a unity beside its ‘constituents,’ i.e., the terms and the relation, and, if there is anything more, in what does this ‘more’ consist?”⁸ Russell’s primitivism leaves him without a reply on this point. Much has been written about why Russell rejected (DRTJ). There were many such reasons, both ‘logical’ and ‘philosophical’. I submit that the explanatory poverty of the theory did play a role here.

Turning now to (MRTJ), it’s easy to see why Russell should have found it attractive. It gets rid of propositions as single entities and, thereby, of propositional unities as mysterious primitives. There are only fact unities, and Russell can now invoke the notion of relating relation with a clear conscience to explain their unity: a ‘complex’ is a unity because there is a relation among its constituents and occurring in a special way, as really relating the other constituents. A complex is thus an actual unity of its constituents. A judgment, too, is a complex and therefore a unity because the relation of judging occurs in it as a relating relation. Finally, truth and falsehood can be explained in a way that respects the correspondence intuition, as depending on whether or not there exists a fact unity corresponding to the judgment.

This is a great improvement on (DRTJ). The phenomenon of propositional unity will still be there, however, even if there aren’t any propositions as single entities. Russell’s strategy was to explain that phenomenon by explaining how an appearance of propositional unity is generated from the (i) judging subject, (ii) the objects that the judgment is con-
cerned with, and (iii) whatever additional explanatory machinery is needed to generate such an appearance from (i) and (ii). That some extra machinery is needed here is clear, since otherwise there would not be even an appearance of propositional unity but a mere list of entities. A judgment can now be said to be true if there exists a fact-unity (‘complex’) in which the objects of the judgment are actually related in the way that the appearance of unity represents them as being related: when Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, there is Othello thinking of (1) Desdemona, (2) the relation of loving, and (3) Cassio, and in such a way as to generate an appearance of unity; and the belief is true if there’s a corresponding complex, Desdemona’s-loving-Cassio.

This is just schematic, and the hard analytic task consists in explaining how the appearance of propositional unity comes to be. Between 1910 and 1913, Russell experimented with several solutions to the problem. The eventual disappearance of (MRTJ) is usually attributed to the criticism that Wittgenstein directed at it in 1913, although there’s no consensus on the point of the criticism. I won’t consider this issue here. Instead, I shall draw up a sketch of some of the later developments.

Quite apart from the difficulties that Russell had in explaining the appearance of unity, he was forced to give up (MRTJ) when, in the process of becoming a neutral monist, he began to think that the judging subject, too, ought to be ‘constructed’, rather than ‘postulated’. The connection is made explicitly in this passage by Russell himself:

> The theory of belief which I formerly advocated, namely, that it consisted in a multiple relation of the subject to the objects constituting the ‘objective’, i.e. the fact that makes the belief true or false, is rendered impossible by the rejection of the subject. The constituents of the belief cannot, when the subject is rejected, be the same as the constituents of its ‘objective’.9

The point here is that if there’s no judging subject, there is nothing to produce an appearance of unity unless it is representations that accomplish this. This change of mind brought about a radical shift in Russell’s thinking about judgment. He was led to adopt a psychological theory of judgment, where representing is not a relationship between a subject and worldly objects—a subject creating an appearance of unity—but is in the final analysis a property of mental images:

> What I believe when I believe that Caesar crossed the Rubicon is not the actual event, which took place in 49 BC; it is a present occurrence, something that is now in my mind.10

This promises neat solutions to Russell’s old problems:

> The advantages [of the psychological theory] are those derived from the rehabilitation of content, making it possible to admit propositions as actual complex occurrences, and doing away with the difficulty of answering the question: what do we believe when we believe falsely?11

> ‘Content’ is what one believes when one believes that so-and-so—for example that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. If content is in a mind, it won’t give rise to the problem of
worldly facts. Russell in fact adopted the Wittgensteinian view that contents are facts, a feature that he took to be crucial for their ability to represent. But now content is just a fact to the effect that given images stand in determinate relations to each other. A fact of this kind is wholly innocuous, since one can put an image of a cat and an image of a mat together, without as much as touching the cat and the mat.

But if a content is in a mind, isn’t that a version of psychologism, a view that is just plainly false? For what I believe when I believe that Caesar crossed the Rubicon has nothing to do with my mind, since neither Caesar nor the pitiable river in northern Italy is a creature of the mind. Contents, therefore, cannot be in the mind.

This is a familiar line of thought. Here, though, the reply is that it confuses two uses of the phrase ‘object of thought’: the phrase may mean (1) what we think, this being the sense that Russell is concerned with in the quotations above; but it may also mean (2) what we think about. When I think that Caesar crossed the Rubicon at 49 B.C., what I think is that Caesar crossed the Rubicon at 49 B.C., while what I think about involves both the man and the river and, perhaps, the entire event of Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C. Once we draw the distinction, it’s no longer clear that Russell was confused in the way the objection suggests. He would agree, of course, that what we think about is not in general in our minds; but this doesn’t show that the content, in the sense of what one thinks, could not be in one’s mind.

An important dimension must nevertheless be added to the notion of content, thus understood. A psychological occurrence deserves to be called a ‘content’ only when it’s regarded as a picture or image of something else. A content is not just a psychological occurrence, but an occurrence plus the relationship that it bears to something external; this is what turns it into a picture. Russell, of course, was well aware of this, which is why he now argued, in The Analysis of Mind (1921) and elsewhere, that a proposition in the fundamental sense is a mental image possessing what he called an objective reference.

Having got this far, we have to ask: What are the implications of the new perspective on judgment for propositional unity and the correspondence intuition? Keeping in mind the notion of objective reference, we can see that the old problem of propositional unity has not vanished but has taken on a new form, one that is familiar from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921). Simply put, the question is this: what is a mental proposition a picture of?

The correspondence intuition aligns truth with being and falsehood with non-being, as in the simple formulation that a belief is true if the entity to which it refers is there, while a belief is false if the entity to which it refers is not there. This raises in an acute form a problem about reference. Russell called it the ‘problem of false belief’, although it’s as much a problem for the analysis of true beliefs. He was emphatic that no reference to nonexistent or merely possible facts or states of affairs will do here, as the postulation of such entities testifies only to a lack of sense of reality.

It may be possible to answer the question regarding propositional unity in a way that incurs no such illicit commitments—this may have been the view of the Tractatus. The idea would be that a state of affairs that is merely possible has no other mode of being than that of being represented, and the unity of what is merely possible is the unity of a proposition qua fact: a proposition as a mental picture is an arrangement of pictorial elements showing how certain entities in the world—entities correlated with the elements of the picture—are arranged in the world if the proposition is true. It’s natural to read this formulation in a way.
that involves acceptance of the correspondence intuition in more or less its simplest form: a proposition is true if, and only if, there is such an arrangement of entities as the proposition depicts. The picture-theory thus promises to solve the problem of propositional unity in a way that lets you cling to the correspondence intuition.

Russell’s development of the notion of objective reference took a rather different form, however; and most likely because he abhorred all versions of the simple formulation for their apparent commitment to entities that are merely possible or non-existent. He argued, in such works as *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* (1919) and *The Analysis of Mind*, that every atomic proposition, \( p \), and its contradictory opposite, \( \neg p \), has a fact-unity as its objective reference, namely the fact which makes \( p \) true and \( \neg p \) false, or else makes \( \neg p \) true and \( p \) false—in this he was making use of ideas communicated by Wittgenstein in his pre-war *Notes on Logic*. The ‘meaning’ of a proposition is determined by how the proposition refers to a fact—either ‘towards it’ or ‘away from it’, as Russell put it—and no reference to anything that is merely possible or non-existent is needed—I won’t pause to consider whether this last claim can be made good.

Like all philosophical theories, Russell’s comes at a price. In particular, there’s its commitment to negative facts. If \( p \) is true, it’s a fact that \( p \), and if \( p \) is false, it’s a fact that \( \neg p \). Hence, there are negative facts. Russell himself was delighted when he found himself defending such a paradoxical-sounding view, but it must be admitted that negative facts are problematic creatures. Here are two difficulties.

First, a fact is supposed to be a unity, but it’s difficult to see how a negative fact could be one. A fact is a way for given entities to be tied together. Now, it’s a fact that Desdemona does not love Cassio. We should say, then, that things’ \( \neg \) being tied together is one way for them to be tied together. I’m not sure that I can see how this could be.

Secondly, the question arises: What’s the difference between positive and negative facts? Russell is clear that they don’t have different constituents, because a negation is not an entity and cannot therefore be a constituent. Rather, the difference is in their having opposing *qualities*, positive and negative, a difference that is “ultimate and irreducible”. One question this raises is: What are we to say of truth and falsehood? And the reply must be: an atomic proposition is true if the fact which is its objective reference has positive quality, and the negation of an atomic proposition is true if the fact which is its objective reference has a negative quality. What a definition of truth accomplishes for atomic propositions is just such a correlation of truth and falsehood with two primitive qualities of facts.

Technically, this doesn’t belong with truth-primitivism. The distinction between truth and falsehood is not just left there to be apprehended, but is grounded in facts and their opposing qualities. Here, however, one may feel that the ground that Russell has identified is unsatisfactory, and somewhat in the way that truth primitivism was found to be unsatisfactory. At any rate, Russell himself now issued the familiar-sounding complaint that the ‘purely formal definition of truth and falsehood’, which establishes a connection between propositions and facts, is inadequate because it does not throw any light upon our preference for true beliefs rather than false ones”. What is needed, he adds, is a story that takes into account the causal efficacy of our beliefs.

The suggested remedy indicates, it seems to me, that the trouble here is at bottom not with any of the details of the formal truth definition but with the very idea of such an enterprise. With some plausibility, we may attribute to the Russell of the 1920s some such line of thought as the following. The difficulties regarding the unity of negative facts and their
capability to act as truth-grounds point in the direction of a ‘deflationary’ account of facts. Once we cease to think of facts as complex entities, we can sidestep these problems and avail ourselves of a smooth-running, ‘formal’ definition of truth. Such a definition decrees, for example, that “Brutus killed Caesar” is true because of the fact that Brutus killed Caesar. And this, Russell now argues, “keeps us in the verbal realm, and does not get us outside it to some realm of non-verbal fact”. You could take issue with that, but here the important point is that, as Russell now sees it, the language-world connection is not to be understood through a formal definition of truth but with the help of what is at bottom a causal theory of meaning.

Endnotes

13 For this simple formulation, see G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1953, chapters XIV and XV.
16 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind, p. 278.
On Teaching Philosophy “Objectively”
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This piece is inspired by Alan Schwerin’s workshop at the 2016 BRS Annual Meeting, where Schwerin handed out copies of a letter written by Bertrand Russell to his friend, Gilbert Murray, during the writing of The Problems of Philosophy. One of the points Schwerin wanted us to think about was that Murray had asked Russell to write an objective exposition of the problems of philosophy. Russell, however, found this to be a difficult task:

I find that, quite contrary to my intention, it [the book] is an exposition of my own views, not an impartial account of what is thought by various philosophers. I found it impossible to write interestingly or freely or with conviction, unless I was trying to persuade the reader to agree with me (Russell 1911, Ltr. to Murray, Papers, xli).

In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell confines the problems of philosophy to ones in the theory of knowledge and metaphysics. He discusses the nature of matter; how we can have mathematical, logical, and general knowledge; and whether we can have certainty. Russell introduces these problems through an exposition of the views of the leading Western philosophers, such as Descartes, Berkeley, and Kant. As he is depicting these philosophers’ views, Russell portrays an accurate picture of them, but he does not shy away from criticism.

Russell Lecturing at UCLA in 1939.

It is indeed a problem if a book, which is intended to be an introduction of philosophy, merely consists of criticisms of major philosophical views. However, this is not the case in Russell’s introduction to philosophy. I think one reason why the criticism seems to stand out is due to Russell’s lucid explanation of each philosophical problem and position, for it is easier for a reader to see the flaws and merits of an argument, once the position to be criticized is clearly laid out for them, as Russell ably does.

To a certain extent, I agree that an author of an introductory text to philosophy ought to present the material as objectively as possible, since they would thereby ensure that the philosophers’ views are presented fairly. We want to believe that if we ensure that our presentation of an author’s views is not contaminated by our subjective views on the matter, we will have a better chance of representing that author’s views as accurately as possible.
In the following, I will argue that if a book, paper, or lecture is to spark an audience’s interest in philosophy, then it ought not to be written or delivered in a purely objective manner. The objective presentation of the content must be peppered with the author or speaker’s own evaluation of the content, which communicates her engagement with the material and thereby inspires the audience to do the same. Surely there are many different ways in which an author, lecturer, or teacher can get her audience interested in the subject matter. In this article, I merely want to make a case for one such method, inspired by Russell’s abovementioned letter to Murray, namely presenting the content objectively, but at the same time, revealing one’s preferences, grounded by argument.

An objective presentation ought to be accompanied by a subjective evaluation, first of all, because purely objective accounts, if they are possible at all, tend to be dry and uninteresting to read or listen to. They are more like instruction manuals, which, most of the time, give accurate information on how to use a machine, for instance, but they are never interesting or captivating for the reader. Especially considering that the audience of The Problems of Philosophy was meant to be lay readers with no background in philosophy, and as Russell’s friend suggested, the book had to be comprehensible by a shop assistant, it was vital that the book not be uninteresting.

It is particularly this unattractive aspect of purely objective presentations of a philosophical topic that interests me most here. For during Alan Schwerin’s workshop, I realized that I had a similar experience in teaching philosophy to my undergraduate students, who take philosophy as an elective. I have been teaching introductory classes for a number of years now. The first several years I would teach the content as objectively as I could in order not to influence any of the students. I thought this was the best way to enable them to think independently and form their own ideas on the philosophical issues. Delivering to them information unperturbed by my subjective point of view, I believed, would yield free thinkers.

I had one problem, however. Given that most of the students I get are not already interested in philosophical questions, I had to rouse their interest first. But I could not get the students interested in questions of knowledge or existence. And because they weren’t interested in the subject matter, they were reluctant to learn or explore any issue further. So, even though I thought I had created an unbiased environment and presented them with the many sides of an issue, they would not try to form their own opinions, for they had no motivation or interest to do so. I pondered over this problem for a while, even expressed my concern over my lack of ability to get the students interested in philosophical questions at a departmental social gathering. In response, a colleague at the gathering told me I should perhaps think back on what it was that my own professors of philosophy did which got me interested in philosophy. I kept teaching, with this question at the back of my mind. I tried to recall my experience as a student of philosophy for the first time and realized that it was mostly his competence in, and passion for, philosophy which sparked an interest in me, when Arda Denkel taught his introduction to philosophy classes at Boğaziçi University. But how did he convey this passion? Not quite knowing the answer, in some of my classes, I spontaneously abandoned giving a purely objective account of the philosophical debates, but would express my view on these debates along with my “objective” presentation. But I would always make it explicit when it was my view that I was expressing. I noticed that the students in these classes were getting interested in epistemological and metaphysical questions and they were motivated to discuss the issues and learn more about them. So in
my experience, objective presentations of philosophical positions accompanied by my own appraisal have turned out to be more fruitful, insofar as one’s goal is to stimulate philosophical interest, which, in turn, will lead to learning how to think, assess evidence, and form one’s own opinion on some philosophical question.

According to Russell, “education should have two objects: First, to give definite knowledge, reading and writing, language and mathematics, and so on; secondly, to create those mental habits which will enable people to acquire knowledge and form sound judgments for themselves. The first of these we may call information, the second intelligence” (Russell 1975, 109). Thus, it is important to teach both information and intelligence. However, it is challenging to teach students intelligence, in the above sense, if they are not already interested in the content through which such intellectual skills are to be taught. I believe one remedy to this situation is to allow the teacher to reveal her preferences and enthusiasm as she is teaching her material.

Russell explains the importance of stimulating the students’ interest before we teach them anything. Some of the advantages are that “the child learns faster because he is cooperating”, “he learns with less fatigue, because there is not the constant strain of bringing back a reluctant and bored attention” (Russell 1962, 139). Furthermore, according to Russell, “if … you can first stimulate the child’s desire to know, and then, as a favour, give him the knowledge he wants … very much less external discipline is required, and attention is secured without difficulty” (138). Thus, what is foremost is to rouse the student’s interest in the subject before embarking on any teaching of content. After that, the teaching of the content, I think, must not be totally disinterested and unbiased, but fair and engaged.

One worry about my suggestion is that if the teacher presents the philosophical positions with a preference, she will not foster an environment where the students are free to form and express their own opinions, since they will be inclined to think that the teacher, as presuming the position of authority, knows which view is right and which is false, and therefore they will be intimidated or at least be discouraged from straying away from the view supported by the teacher.

This worry subsides if the teacher is committed to the view that all our knowledge has a certain degree of doubtfulness, that is, if she does not present her evaluation of any position as if she has a hold of the objective truth on the matter, and if she, at the same time, teaches the students intellectually virtuous ways of inquiry. As Donovan Wishon reminded me in conversation at the 2016 BRS Meeting, Russell holds that all our beliefs are open to doubt. “None of our beliefs are quite true; all have at least a penumbra of vagueness and error” (Russell 1970, 105). Nevertheless, according to Russell, there are methods of increasing the degree of our certainty: “hearing all sides, trying to ascertain all the relevant facts, controlling our own bias by discussion with people who have the opposite bias, and cultivating a readiness to discard any hypothesis which has proved inadequate” (104).
These are the intellectual skills a teacher needs to impart on her students, as well as imparting objective presentation of philosophical views and her own analysis of the views in question.

According to Russell, it is important for both the teacher and the student to have freedom of opinion with no limitations (135). Some of his reasons for this view are that (1) all our beliefs are doubtful. The common mistake teachers make, according to Russell, is to present a doubtful proposition as certain (ibid.). We should not claim to teach the truth. But we should teach truthfully. The difference, according to Russell, is that “truth … is an ideal, towards which we can approximate, but which we cannot hope to reach. Education should fit us for the nearest possible approach to truth, and to do this it must teach truthfulness … [which is] the habit of forming our opinions on the evidence, and holding them with that degree of conviction which the evidence warrants” (136). (2) Exclusion of teachers who openly hold unorthodox opinions from educational institutions has adverse effects. “It excludes from the teaching profession men who combine honesty with intellectual vigour, who are just the men likely to have the best moral and mental effect upon their pupils” (ibid.). Russell’s examples in this passage suggest that teachers should be free to teach their subjects without restraints. They should be able to express their own points of view or focus on the subjects they favor. Teachers who are free to express their own points of view would help students learn better because they would thereby arouse the interest of the students in the subject matter, which would motivate them to undertake the effort to learn.

Another way we can prevent undue influence on the students’ views is for university or college departments to hire faculty with diverse views and philosophical positions and thereby ensure that the students hear arguments from many sides. When discussing how “the art of newspaper reading” should be taught, Russell argues that the teacher should pick an important event in history and have students read papers “from both sides and some impartial account of what really happened. He should show how, from the biased account of either side, a practised reader could infer what really happened” (114). Similarly, a philosophy student taking classes from both Hegelian and Russellian lecturers would have a chance to hear two different sides on metaphysical questions and form her own opinion on the matter.

According to Russell, a young person will be interested in a topic if the topic has some practical importance, and if she finds that divergent opinions are held about it. Thus, Russell argues:

A young man learning economics … ought to hear lectures from individualists and socialists, protectionists and free-traders, inflationists, and believers in the gold standard. He ought to be encouraged to read the best books of the various schools, as recommended by those who believe in them. This would teach him to weigh arguments and evidence, to know that no opinion is certainly right, and to judge men by their quality rather than by their consonance with preconceptions (136-137).

In Education and the Modern World (1932), Russell states that “it is not enough to mirror the world. It should be mirrored with emotion; a specific emotion appropriate to the object, and a general joy in the mere act of knowing” (11). I think that the teacher must have emotions with respect to the material she is teaching and not be afraid to display them. One obvious way of having emotions with respect to a body of knowledge is to en-
gage with it, by way of evaluating it, which consequently leads to approval, disapproval, or suspension of judgement and further inquiry. This is how the teacher’s subjective evaluation allows her emotions and passions about the subject matter to be manifested.

Contrary to what I have been arguing, Russell, at least when it comes to young children, seems to hold that the teacher ought to present all sides to an issue with equal enthusiasm:

Debates, conducted seriously with a view to ascertaining the truth, could be of great value. In these, the teacher should learn not to take sides, even if he or she has strong convictions. If almost all the pupils take one side, the teacher should take the other, saying that it is only for purposes of argument. Otherwise, his part should be confined to correcting mistakes as to facts. By such means, the pupils could learn discussion as a means of ascertaining truth, not as a contest for rhetorical victory (Russell 1962, 152-153).

I think, on the contrary, the teacher portrayed by Russell here would be teaching rhetoric, by playing the devil’s advocate, showing that one can successfully defend a position that they do not necessarily hold to be true. This teacher model, I believe, creates the impression of a teacher who does not care either way about the truth of any political or philosophical position, but is smart and tactful enough to argue either way. And such a disinterested person may come across as insincere and therefore not inspire passion in the students to inquire further with the desire to find the truth of the matter. But to be fair to Russell, he suggests that the teacher ought to argue for a claim she does not believe in merely for the purposes of argument, and should say so to the students. So long as the students understand why the teacher is arguing for a position she does not in fact hold to be true, I agree that it would be helpful for the students to hear it in order to be informed about the many positions one can take on a question, and in order to see what grounds can be provided for each position.

Again, according to Russell, education should not “aim at making [children] belong to this party or that, but at enabling them to choose intelligently between parties” (Russell 1971. 101). Education ought to “aim at making [children] able to think, not at making them think what their teachers think” (ibid.). “Education ought to foster the wish for truth, not the conviction that some particular creed is the truth” (107).

William Hare has noticed the tension between these passages and Russell’s earlier mentioned views to the effect that the teacher should be free to express her views: “We may wonder if … departure from neutrality is conducive to the development of open-mindedness in the students… How is this to be reconciled with the view that students must be exposed to the most vehement and terrific argumentation on all sides of every question in order to offset fanaticism?” (Hare 1987, 36-37) He explains the seeming inconsistency away first by making a distinction between having an open mind and being open-minded, and, second, by pointing out that Russell encourages the teacher to think and express her view without indoctrinating the students by way of requiring the teacher to have, among others, two qualities: reverence and humility.

Russell supports being open-minded, but not having an open mind. According to Russell, “open-mindedness is not incompatible with having convictions” (1987, 32). Hare explains that being open-minded is an attitude. It is being open to the possibility that some
view or other is true. It is not synonymous with having an open mind, in the sense of having no opinion on some matter (33). Hare quotes Russell in support: “The rational person ‘accepts the most probable hypothesis for the time being while continuing to look for new evidence to confirm or refute it’ (31).” Russell, furthermore, focuses on the attitude of the teacher, who must be reverent and humble (37). By reverence, Russell means that students need to be respected, that is, they are not to be shaped into soldiers of a certain creed; they ought to be taught to think independently for themselves (37). By humility, Russell means that teachers must recognize that there is a good chance that any of their considered opinions will turn out to be false.

I believe that the teacher should express her own opinions, but not in the form of indoctrination or propaganda. As Hare argues, this can be brought about by expressing one’s views with a liberal attitude; that is, by being humble and respecting the students, acknowledging that her beliefs may be erroneous, always checking facts, supporting her views by argument, and being tolerant to dissenting views.

The following lines from *Education and the Modern World*, suggest that the apparent inconsistency in Russell’s views is also due to the difference between an ideal teacher and a real teacher who aims at the ideal. The ideal teacher would not make propaganda in class, that is, not impose a certain point of view on the students. The real teacher would strive *not* to make propaganda, but will eventually have to make a certain amount of it, since, after all, she is an adult with a mind of her own, and her students are young:

> No adult can avoid expressing his aversions and preferences, and any such expression in the presence of the young has the effect of propaganda. The question for the educator is not whether there shall be propaganda, but how much, how organised, and of what sort; also whether, at some stage during education, an attempt should be made to free boys and girls, as far as possible, from the influence of propaganda by teaching them methods of arriving at impartial judgments (208).

Russell drew students and the general public to his lectures and captivated them. Even though Russell’s presentations of other philosophical positions were fair for the most part, I do not think that a purely impartial account of philosophical views was one of the reasons why people were attracted to his lectures. It was his competence in the subjects, the strength with which he supported his claims, his eloquence, his witty jokes (Slater 1992, xx), and the passion with which he defended his considered convictions. I think the last of these characteristics had an important role in sparking interest and encouraging philosophical debates among his audience. In the same spirit, philosophy teachers today ought to be able to freely evaluate the positions as they are presenting them. Such evaluative presentation does not necessarily constitute unfair or subjective presentation. More importantly, such engaged presentations succeed in stimulating interest in students. As Russell has excellently put it:

> To demand of a teacher that he shall abstain altogether from controversial opinions is to demand that he shall be dull and suppress half his personality. There are those, it is true, who have no party feelings, but they seldom make inspiring teachers. (Russell 1932, 218-219)

References


Cartoon by Gregory Landini
Russell's Houses: Telegraph House
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I. Buying Telegraph House

Telegraph House, located in the Sussex countryside, is the setting for a tale of two brothers, Frank and Bertie Russell.¹ In the beginning, the house, owned by Frank, provided a place where Bertie could spend time in the country. But during the 1920s, after Bertie moved in, the house severely tested his relationship with Frank over several years until Frank's death in 1931. It was not sold until 1937.

The house can be viewed as an attempt by Frank Russell to establish a country estate that the Russell earldom did not have. The brothers' grandfather, Lord John Russell, did not inherit any land, as he was a younger son of the Duke of Bedford. His earldom came from Queen Victoria in recognition of his service to the United Kingdom as Prime Minister. She lent him Pembroke Lodge in Richmond to serve as a country property while he was in office. At that time, a country estate was essential for the aristocracy. When the first Earl Russell died in 1878 the title jumped a generation and was inherited by his grandson Frank, who was only eleven. Frank and Bertie had been left orphans after the deaths of their parents and sister. Telegraph House was not a self-sustaining, operating estate, but it did provide Frank with a country retreat.

Unlike 57 Gordon Square, his London town home, which he shared with Bertie on-and-off during World War I, and which is not mentioned in his autobiography, My Life and Adventures, Frank devotes an entire chapter to Telegraph House.² He is not specific as to when he acquired the property, noting that it was “some years before” 1900 (p. 259). He purchased it from a Miss Guthrie and “from this moment Telegraph House became my passion” (p. 259).

¹ First names are used in this article to distinguish the brothers. Bertrand Arthur William is called “Bertie” and John Francis Stanley is called “Frank”. The nickname of Frank appears to have been the invention of the Pearsall Smith family (Middle Span, p. 45). The story of Telegraph House is complicated. Some documents and correspondence which would help to clarify parts of the story are not extant.
² Although a biography of Frank has not been published, see Peter Bartrip's article, “A Talent to Alienate: the 2nd Earl (Frank) Russell (1865-1931)”, n.s. 32 (Winter 2012-13): 101-126, for a very fair assessment of his life.
He was given all the old deeds to the place dating back to a lease from Lord Robert Spencer in 1808. Frank purchased the small cottage, named Telegraph House, as well as an acre of land for £450. He installed “a nominee” to live there (p. 260). His friend, the American philosopher George Santayana, first visited there in 1891 (My Host the World, p. 77). They had met at Harvard University. Telegraph House was located in an isolated part of the South Downs. Frank notes that there were “only two houses in a radius of one mile” (p. 260). “The views on every side were magnificent; before me was spread nearly the whole of Spithead, and half of the Isle of Wight, and behind me on the other side of the South Downs were Blackdown, Hindhead, and the hills encircling Petersfield” (pp. 259-60). The name of the house derives from the fact that it had been “one of the Admiralty semaphore stations in the days when this was the method of rapid communication between Portsmouth Dockyard and the Admiralty in London” (p. 260). According to Bertie, Frank had acquired it “as a discreet retreat where he could enjoy the society of Miss Morris” (Auto 2, p. 153). There is no mention of Miss Morris in Frank’s autobiography; however, she is mentioned in Santayana’s book, although not by name. Santayana found the name Telegraph House “absurd”—probably because the structure then was a small cottage; but “soon, however, in the jolly English way, the absurdity was domesticated, and everybody called the place T.H.” “I visited it repeatedly during thirty-two years, under its three mistresses [Miss Morris, Mollie Russell, Elizabeth Russell], all three of whom I found hospitable and friendly, and of all places it is perhaps the place where I have breathed most freely” (My Host, p. 76). Over the years Frank made a number of improvements to the property, acquiring seven more acres, putting in a tennis court, and adding to the existing four-room cottage “two good bedrooms, a bath-room, and a library” with a “servants' hall at the back of the kitchen” (p. 261).

II. Moving to Telegraph House

In 1901 Frank and his second wife, Mollie, decided to live at Telegraph House. “Further extensions and additions were now made ... stables, a large greenhouse, a tool-house and potting shed, and a gardener's cottage” (p. 262). With motor cars becoming more popular, Frank had to build his own road to the property as the existing one was too steep. Around 1909 he was able to buy 220 acres of land from a neighbour, Captain Hornby. By now Frank was “swollen with ambition; Telegraph House ... had developed into an estate; and the next thing to do was to build a mansion suitable to its new dignity” (p. 263). He decided “to pull down the old one-floor cottage with its attic, and to substitute two floors with decent rooms, decent bedrooms, another bathroom and above all a tower”. The tower was important because “of the extended view” it would provide (p. 263). Years later Bertie would write about the tower: “Here I made my study, and I have never known one with a more beautiful outlook” (Auto 2, p. 153). Frank continues: “the stables was converted into a motor house, and a very large tank for water was dug at the foot of the garden. We lived exclusively on rain water and up to that time we had had to depend upon a little tank holding only 3,000 gallons. This tank was now reserved for drinking water only, and my new big tank

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3 Mollie Russell is sometimes called “Molly”; both are nicknames for “Marion”.

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was proved so adequate that during those years of severe drought when other people hardly had water to drink I have been able to continue watering my garden” (pp. 263-4). He now “had a beautiful and perfect house, protected from the weather outside by a cement coating like a coastguard station, and protected inside by hollow walls and double glass windows, and warmed throughout by steam radiators, so that even in the most violent gales it was warmer than my London house” (p. 264). The land was very diverse. There were dells, yew and beech trees, heather and juniper, ferns and bluebells. “In fact, the country had everything that the heart of man could desire except of course water. The nearest water was the River Rother near Rogate village about four miles away, or Petersfield Pond” (p. 266).

Frank is sitting to the side of the front door; the tower (not visible) rises above him—he holding a dog and cat, usually not the best of friends.

The first extant letter that Bertie wrote from the house was in 1908 before the construction of the tower. He was there with his first wife, Alys, and wrote to their friend Helen Flexner on 28 December that they were “taking a fortnight’s Xmas holiday, of which we are devoting half to family duties”. He says nothing about the house but does describe the other guests. They were “a Russian theosophist lady (who bores me to extinction), and my cousins, Sir William and Lady Grove.” “Her energy, eloquence and vanity are almost unsurpassable. We quarrel about vivisection, vaccination, and God: we agree about pronunciation and suffrage: both agreements and disagreements are vehement on both sides.” Mollie sent him an invitation to visit on 5 June 1913, noting that “we have day light-saving time at T.H. and tea is now at 4 p.m.” A Daylight Saving Bill had been defeated in the House of
Commons in 1908; it did not come into effect in the UK until the summer of 1916. Thus, Frank and Mollie were ahead of the curve.

Frank invited many people to stay—this is part of the life of having a country estate. On 10 June 1909 Laurence Housman received an invitation to “see our beautiful house on the Downs in August or September.” By then, the extensive renovations, including the tower room, were presumably done. On 28 March 1911 Frank extended an invitation to the novelist, H.G. Wells, to visit “on Easter Monday April 17th for a couple of days”. Wells agreed to come and in a letter of 11 April 1911 Frank notes that: “Elizabeth will very likely be coming down by the same train but without her German Garden.” Elizabeth von Arnim was a very successful novelist—*Elizabeth and Her German Garden* was a bestseller. Frank and Elizabeth had first met in 1894, introduced by his aunt, Maude Stanley (Usborne, pp. 47, 175). Elizabeth and Wells were lovers; Frank was acting as a go-between. Wells writes about his affair with Elizabeth in *H.G. Wells in Love*. A section of the book, “The Episode of Little e” describes his affair with Elizabeth, which began in 1910 (p. 93) and ended in late 1913. Elizabeth’s “imagination turned to Earl Russell, who at that time had a house, Telegraph House, above Harting, just close to Up Park, where my mother was once housekeeper. We had visited the Russells in the beginning of our affair, and I had felt my way along the passage to her room in the dark. There was a re-entrant angle that puzzled me extremely in the blackness, and the current Countess [Mollie] had a habit of sleeping with her door across the landing wide open. Little e even then found Russell an attractive misunderstood man who needed only an able wife to be reinstated socially. The current Countess was not a social success” (p. 91).

In 1914 Frank’s marriage to Mollie was ending. Following a petition filed on 9 March 1914, it was agreed that Frank would pay Mollie £50 a month in alimony (John J. Withers affidavit, 16 March 1928). Frank was still relatively well-off despite all the money he had poured into Telegraph House. The amount seemed reasonable to him in order to rid himself of Mollie.

Wells continues: “I do not know how far things went between Russell and Little e before the war, but the catastrophe of August 1914 made it highly desirable that she should recover British nationality. She got back from Switzerland to England with difficulty—a legal German.” Wells implies that she married Frank because of this and that the marriage “saved her belongings in England from confiscation as alien property”. Her daughter and biographer, writing under the pseudonym Leslie de Charmes, however, calls their relationship a true love match (p. 152). Elizabeth had separated from her husband, Count von Arnim, in 1908; he died in 1910. In a letter to Ottoline Morrell of 9 September 1915, Bertie writes: Elizabeth “says ... that she was unguarded with my brother at first, because she looked upon him as safely married, and therefore suitable as a lover. Suddenly, without consulting her, he wrote and said he was getting divorced.” She has three main objections to him, one of which is that “he loves Telegraph House, which is hideous.” Russell thinks that “I don't think she will marry him” (*Auto*, 2, pp. 54-5). He was wrong—the couple married on 11 February 1916 (*Oxford DNB*). Bertie was present at the registry wedding (Usborne, p. 189). The Christmas before the wedding found Elizabeth, Frank and Bertie at Telegraph House (de Charmes, p. 174). Santayana who visited Frank and Elizabeth at Telegraph House notes that: “The place was materially much improved, the grounds developed,

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4 Frank was still in touch with Housman in January 1925.
the hall panelled, the rooms freshened up and adorned; but Russell was preoccupied and silent, Elizabeth hardly visible save at table, and a mysterious emptiness seemed to pervade the place where, in good Mollie's day, I had felt so free and happy" (My Host, p. 98).

When Russell was in Brixton Prison in 1918, Frank's wife Elizabeth and Constance (Colette) Malleson, Bertie's lover, became acquainted as they were both frequent visitors at the prison as was Frank. In fact this time was a high-water mark in the brothers' relationship, as Frank did everything possible to ease his brother's imprisonment. Elizabeth invited Colette to spend the week-end at Telegraph House. Bertie wrote to Colette on 8 July: "Fearful place. I shan't want to go there when I emerge, as I shall not be ill. Please tell Elizabeth and let her prepare my brother's mind." Upon her return on 15 July 1918 Colette wrote: "...I now quite understand your horror of Telegraph House: characterless, dreary, an architect's nightmare. I certainly saw it under worst possible conditions: it poured the whole way as we motored down, it poured almost whole week-end, and it poured whole way as we motored back. Only on Saturday were there short moments when it cleared. I spent most of the a.m. walking the downs and woods. Elizabeth, sensible woman, stayed indoors; but I feel she must suffer from that house, though she doesn't say so. She really has pluck. Frank, at close quarters, is so utterly unlike you that it's impossible to think of you as brothers: he's such a huge blustering pink-cheeked schoolboy inextricably entangled in motor cars and electrical gadgets. But the fact that he's doing so much for you, makes one feel very grateful to him. I see absolutely nothing of your parents in him: only the Grandmother Stanley."

When Bertie got out of prison in September 1918, his jealousy caused him to quarrel with Colette. Their relationship fractured and off he went to Telegraph House! Rubbing it in, on 20 September he wrote to Colette: "This place is divinely beautiful—the sunset last night was one of the most wonderful I have ever seen. And this morning the sea gleams under the sun, shadows of clouds chase each other across the woods, and the Isle of Wight hills shimmer in the dim West. It goes to my soul—I have not been very happy these last days, but the glory of the world is healing and gives one courage for the future." Elizabeth and Frank separated in 1919—she left never to return. The couple, however, did not divorce. Elizabeth did not ask for any monetary compensation—escaping from Frank was its own reward. Usborne thinks that Elizabeth left because of Frank's adultery (p. 195), not because of his tyrannical behaviour (p. 191). Katie Roiphe thinks it was neither adultery nor bad behaviour, finding Elizabeth's comment of 31 March 1919 that she had “discovered behaviour of a secret nature that made it impossible for a decent woman to stay” (de Charms, p. 201) too cryptic to interpret definitively (pp. 134-5). Bertie was back at Telegraph House after the end of Elizabeth's reign. "My brother has a rum party. Three more or less gay females, no one else. One of them is married, a South African interested in gold mines, whom apparently he got to know in the way of business; the second is her sister, who is training to be a professional singer, lives over a hat-shop, and is regarded by my brother as attractive; the third is a Miss Anderson who works on Vogue, is proud of having claustrophobia, and talks without ceasing. All are silly and dull" (to Colette, 11 Oct 1919).

Elizabeth does not appear in the index to Frank's autobiography. However, according to Karen Usborne, the woman described on p. 180 but not named is in fact Elizabeth. Frank's bitterness towards Elizabeth took the form of a law-suit which was a typical response for him. He sued the removal firm Shoolbred & Shoolbred for taking away items, including “some cushions, electric light fittings, tennis balls, a hammock and a tea table” that in fact belonged to him. The case actually went to court. Elizabeth's amusing testimony
about the hammock is printed by both de Charms (p. 203) and Usborne (p. 213); “Elizabeth was exonerated completely.” Usborne estimates that over his lifetime Frank spent £30,000 on litigation (p. 212). Frank felt that Bertie did not support him sufficiently through this crisis (letter of 15 Sept. 1920).

In 1921 Elizabeth published the novel *Vera*, a devastating portrait of Frank and Telegraph House. Vera is the first wife of Everard Wemyss. (The name of Wemyss had already been used by Elizabeth as her name in a book of letters she was to write with Bertie.) Vera has died from a fall from her sitting room at The Willows. He quickly marries again, to Lucy Entwhistle, a much younger woman who does not want to live in the house, but is powerless against Wemyss’s desire for his beloved house. The house is panelled in oak with purchased antlers hanging from the walls. There are life-size photographs of Wemyss’s father, who died when he was quite old, and of Vera. In the course of a day, their first day in the house together, Wemyss reveals himself to be a cruel man, “a great cross schoolboy” (p. 345), who torments Lucy and is extremely rude to the domestic staff. Of Vera, H.G. Wells writes: “I do not think she would have written this book if he had not provoked her by writing and circulating a rather clumsy parody of an anonymous sentimental book of hers, *In the Mountains*. The description of his freaks of temper and tyranny and his house are absurdly true. But she inserted into her account of the hall of Telegraph House enlarged photographs … This was too much for him. He met me in the Reform club one day … ‘Now is it true that there are enlarged photographs of my relations in it?’ ‘It isn’t’, I said. ’But she makes it highly probable. And after all Vera is a novel…. Is it meant for you, Russell?’ ‘Ugh’, said Russell” (H.G. Wells, p. 92). Of all things in the book to fasten upon, the photographs seem minor and do not bear any resemblance to Russell relatives. They were important to Frank, presumably because they were a fabrication. Bertie also writes about the novel, calling it “intolerably cruel”. “Vera is already dead; she had been his wife, and he is supposed to be heartbroken at the loss of her … As the novel proceeds, the reader gradually gathers that her death was not an accident, but suicide brought on by my brother’s cruelty” (*Auto 2*, pp. 153-54). Katie Roiphe finds the depiction of Wemyss to be “a tour de force of comic creepiness, perhaps the most appalling domestic villain ever written” (p. 125).

### III. Losing Control of Telegraph House

Frank wrote Bertie two letters in early 1921 about his financial difficulties. In the later one, 22 March 1921, he said that “The bankrupt has receded a little for the moment but the pauper remains.” It was agreed on 12 December 1921 that the sum Frank had to pay Mollie be reduced from £600 to £400 annually (affidavit of John J. Withers, 16 March 1928). Most of the information in this and the following two paragraphs comes from this affidavit. In his *Autobiography*, Bertie writes that Frank “had speculated unwisely, and lost every penny that he possessed” (2, p. 153). Telegraph House was conveyed to John J. Withers, in a trust. Frank was to pay Withers £1,000 to secure the said annual sum. The property was mortgaged for £4,200. Withers could let Telegraph House “with all the powers ... of an absolute owner.” In January 1922 Withers purchased for £1,000 the furniture and effects in Telegraph House. An inventory was then made with a valuation of £3,684. Telegraph House is described as inaccessible and difficult to let. From 2 February 1922 Withers let Telegraph...
House and its furniture to Frank on a yearly basis for £800, paid quarterly with deductions for expenses of £400. In 1923 Santayana visited Frank for the last time at Telegraph House. “I found him busy over the wires of his new radio—it was then a novelty—and in the evening, without dressing, we went to dine at a retired Admiral's in a neighbouring village ...” (My Host, pp. 143-4).

On 14 July 1924 Frank informed Withers that he could not pay the rent. Frank asked for a lease on the gardener’s cottage. He would remain as caretaker of the property. This was agreed to on 31 August. The yearly rent was only £20. From September 1924, the main house remained unlet and unoccupied. Frank “resided in the cottage and acted as caretaker of the house and used the library and his office there from time to time.” In 1926 Frank paid off the mortgages. The house was now making an annual net income of £450 but it is not explained in the Withers's affidavit where this money came from or how Frank was able to pay off the mortgages. In December 1926 Bertie and his second wife Dora “conceived the idea of starting a school for small children and of using the Telegraph House property for that purpose....” In January 1927 the three of them told Withers they “were then upon the most cordial terms.” The arrangement that Frank had from 1924 to 1927 seemed ideal for him and Bertie's offer to let the property upset the apple-cart. However, Frank's difficulty with the plan did not emerge until sometime later.

John J. Withers of the legal firm Withers, Bensons, Currie, Williams and Co. had acted for Bertie on legal matters for some time. He handled the sale of Bagley Wood and the purchase of Sydney Street in London. A very prominent solicitor, one of his other clients was Joseph Conrad. Withers was the Member of Parliament for Cambridge. Crompton Llewelyn Davies, Bertie's close friend, worked for the firm. On 25 January 1927, Frank wrote to Bertie suggesting a term of 10 years for the lease “if you like. By that time, I shall be happily dead or it will be yours anyhow. You realize of course that Withers is the legal owner at present.” This letter was signed “yours sweetly” with the “sweetly” crossed out, replaced by “affly” [affectionately] and “drunk again!” noted below. On 31 January 1927 Withers wrote to Bertie that Telegraph House “is now part of a trust fund which I hold for the purpose of securing Mollie Countess Russell's annuity of £400 per year, and I think there would be no difficulty in arranging terms of letting to you generally on the lines you mention. I should have to mention the matter, of course, to Frank and Mollie, but it would be a solution of a great many difficulties.” Frank had used A.P. Doulton of Vandercom, Stanton & Co. to act for him in his divorce from his first wife. It seems curious as to why he used his brother's lawyer Withers to set up the trust for Telegraph House. Frank himself had studied the law and was called in the bar in 1905 (Life and Adventures, p. 300).

On 3 February 1927 Frank wrote to Bertie: “As you will have T.H. anyhow when I die why not convey the estate to you now subject to a charge of £600 a year to me for my life.” This idea was not discussed again until May. On 9 Feb. 1927 Withers and Bertie met at the House of Lords to discuss the terms. The lease was for 10 years, £400 annually, with an option to purchase for £12,000; furniture included, cottage excluded. The rental amount coincides with the amount owing to Mollie. On 11 February Bertie agreed to terms, but wanted to put up bungalows on the grounds. In April 1927 a draft lease was prepared. Bertie and Dora decided to also lease Battine House which was about 2 miles away. The owner would

5 Santayana means that they did not change into formal clothes for this outing. The admiral was Vice-Admiral Sir William Fane de Salis, the owner of Battine House.
not let it if it was to be used for pupils. Dora asked Frank to give up the cottage on the grounds of Telegraph House and lease Battine House. There were discussions about this from April to June 1927. Frank also said no to the construction of bungalows (Affidavit of John J. Withers, 16 March 1928).

On 27 May 1927 Withers wrote to Bertie: “I saw Frank yesterday ... he told me again that he could not enter into anything with regard to the matter until the lease was signed, and he would not be able to give up possession till 6 weeks after the lease was signed.” With regard to Bertie's offer of £600 a year, first proposed by Frank back in February, Withers thinks it will not be “very practicable, as it will mean giving up Telegraph House from the Trust for £600 a year, which will stop on Frank’s death; whereas Lady Russell [Mollie] might live after that and I should have to provide for her annuity.” He promises, however, to consider it. Nothing came of it. This was just a hint of difficulties to come. As Bertie notes in his Autobiography his brother “bore me a grudge for inhabiting his paradise” (2, p. 153). The lease was executed on 23 June 1927. Frank did agree to go to Battine House for three months beginning 15 July. On 18 July Dora had some furniture moved from Telegraph House to Battine House (Affidavit of John J. Withers, 16 March 1928). On 17 June 1927 Withers wrote to Bertie: “I shall have no objections to the bungalows being used as class
rooms and for sleeping if approved by the local authority.” Withers had gone against Frank’s wishes with regard to the construction of bungalows.

On 7 July 1927 Frank wrote to Bertie: “I don’t want to quarrel, but of course you have struck me as very unreasonable. But I think the reason for this is ... that you do not understand anything about land in the country.” The letter concerns Bertie possibly buying a cottage from Frank along with 7 acres on the grounds of Telegraph House as well as Frank wanting to build something. It was too late for that “this year” and Frank concludes that he will “have to look about to buy a house somewhere else.” Unfortunately, Bertie’s letter to Frank, which would help to clarify Frank’s reply, is not extant. On 9 July 1927, Frank wrote to Dora. He included a list of things she might wish to buy: a telescope complete with stand and a collection of local stuffed animals—stoat, squirrel, owl, woodcock, fox—among other things. The gates have been painted a bright red. “Bertie may think the colour appropriate!” Bertie took legal possession of Telegraph House on 15 July 1927 (Crompton Llewelyn Davies to Withers, 21 Feb. 1928). On 3 August 1927 Dora wrote to Withers that she and Bertie could not afford the telescope. The squabbling about the telescope went on for years. There was also a dispute about furniture which is the reason for the Withers's affidavit. It seems that Frank had learned nothing from his past mistakes with Elizabeth.

Sensing more trouble, Bertie wrote to his old friend from Trinity undergraduate days, Crompton Llewelyn Davies. Crompton had left Withers’s firm to become the solicitor for the Post Office. Crompton’s wife, Moya, was Irish, and Crompton found himself in difficulties with the Post Office over the Irish Troubles. After he was dismissed from the Post Office he joined the firm Coward, Chance & Co. (Times obituary, 25 Nov. 1935, p. 14). Bertie’s letter is not extant, but Crompton’s reply of 16 August from Ireland is. He writes: “I shall be back in London on 1 Sept. I quite agree that it will be best for me to see Withers as soon as he can be seen. I suppose we should say to him ‘We don’t understand what has been done hitherto; we haven’t had the furniture we were promised and have been put to trouble and expense thereby; but we will overlook it now and will eliminate the furniture part of the case by buying what there is at a fair valuation, and the rent will then, as the lease says, be £200 for the land and buildings.’” Upon his return Crompton got right to work. He wrote to Bertie on 3 September 1927 that he had met with Mr. Wesley. Withers was on vacation. “I pointed out that ... you had been the victim of wrongdoing throughout and had been greatly inconvenienced....” Crompton remained Bertie’s lawyer until his death in 1935; their lengthy correspondence about Telegraph House illustrates the strength of their friendship as well as the wit and charm of both men.

IV. Beacon Hill School Opens at Telegraph House

Although Bertie had had legal possession of Telegraph House since 15 July, he had spent the summer at Carn Voel in Cornwall. He was to arrive at Telegraph House on 1 September 1927 (letter to Joan Folwell, 18 August 1927). Frank, meanwhile, was still at Battine House. Bertie then left for a lecture tour of the United States. Beacon Hill School opened at

6 Conflicting information in archival documents leave the ownership of a cottage or cottages on the grounds of Telegraph House unclear.
Telegraph House without Bertie being there. It was an experimental, progressive school for young children. Much has been written on the school and it not the purpose of this article to describe the school in any detail. Telegraph House went from being a private, family home to an institution. Bertie and Dora could escape at times to Battine House; they also spent the summers at Carn Voel until their marriage broke down completely.

On 6 March 1928 Crompton wrote to Withers attempting to reach a settlement about the furniture “before the proceedings on Your Originating Summons develop”. Crompton failed and Withers filed an affidavit on 16 March, which is quoted extensively above. Withers made reference to Vandercom Stanton and Co. representing Frank and Crompton Llewelyn Davies representing Bertie. The case—in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division—was J.J. Withers vs. Frank, Bertie, and Mollie Russell. On 16 April 1928 Bertie wanted a sentence that Crompton had placed in Bertie's draft affidavit removed. It said “that I think my brother is mad and lost all sense of honour”. It would “make it more difficult to ef-
fect reconciliation with my brother at some future date” if the sentence was not eliminated. Bertie swore his affidavit on 23 April. On 24 October 1928 Bertie told Crompton that Frank had decided to put the cottage which was not in the trust up for sale. Nothing seems to have come from this and the fact that Frank thought he was able to sell the cottage when previously he had to rent it from Withers seems odd. On 12 November Crompton told Bertie that “at last an Order has been made, staying proceedings on Withers summons on the agreed terms” concerning the furniture. Frank continued to insist on compensation for a list of smaller items, from light shades to a tennis net. Bertie paid him £61; Crompton received the receipt, dated 14 December, on 18 December 1928. Bertie decided on this course because as he told Crompton on 6 December 1928: “I do not so much mind fighting Withers, but when it comes to fighting my brother, I shrink almost as much from winning as from losing.” On 15 December Bertie added: “What a funny fellow my brother is to have made such a fuss.... I can only think that he desired the sensation of successful bullying and having acquired that, was comparatively indifferent to the cash.” Bertie ended the letter by saying, “I cannot tell you how relieved I am to have the whole complicated tangle disposed of.”

The amount paid in December 1928 did not cover the telescope which was returned on 17 December without its stand which followed the next day. Frank wanted £6 for repairs and other costs for the telescope which he felt had been returned in poor condition (Vandercom to Coward Chance, 24 June 1929). Bertie refused. “The telescope was carefully stored away during the whole time that it was in my keeping, and if it was in bad condition when it was restored, it must have been in equally bad condition when it was handed to me” (to Crompton, 29 June 1929).

Despite the fact that the matter of the telescope had not yet been resolved, on 5 April 1929 Bertie wrote to Crompton that he had just seen Frank who was “quite amicable”. “Withers has let him the cottage and is apparently under obligation to supply him with water.” There was a water pipe from Telegraph House to the cottage but the tank at the house barely had enough water for the house since Beacon Hill school was being run from the property. Two further letters from Bertie to Crompton on water followed on 8 and 28 April. After considering the matter, Bertie wrote in his last letter: “...I am inclined to agree that my brother's proposal for a water supply at the cottage will not do. It is clearly Withers's duty to construct a tank on the premises of the cottage.” Crompton writing to Bertie on 29 May 1929 noted “that they [Frank and Withers] are far more cunning and ruthless than we are, and though we may start well, we don't last out to the wining-post.” “I have a premonition that though I may fight for Queen and Faith as valiantly as Sir Richard Grenville,^7 it will end with my collapsing on deck as he did.” Bertie replied on 3 June 1929 that he hated “to think of your suffering the fate of Sir Richard Grenville.” Dora blamed herself for the brothers' difficulties. She told Crompton on 11 October that Frank had sent a very “friendly letter saying he did not know he [Bertie] was going to America, but if he were, recommending to him some of his friends out in California”. “I am afraid that I am the object of the persecution, and that is tangled up with Frank's complexes about his previous wife.”

In January 1930 the dispute over the telescope came to a head. On 11 January 1930 Crompton reminded Bertie that Frank had written on 20 November 1928 that “the telescope was not left in the boxroom as you have twice stated, but in the office’. Are you both perfectly sure that the children did not take the instruments out on to the lawn to play see-

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^7 Sir Richard Grenville (1542-1591) who died in the assault against the Spanish fleet off the Azores.
saw on them?” In fact, the telescope had been moved from the office to the boxroom for safe-keeping. The court date was set for 20 January in Midhurst, County Court of Sussex. Bertie was represented by Hubert Parker, a friend of Crompton’s who lived in Sussex. Frank was represented by another local lawyer, J.M. Furneaux. Unfortunately the result of this court skirmish has not been preserved.

With the telescope issue resolved, water and fire came to the fore. Bertie wrote Compton on 14 October 1930 that water for the cottage is under discussion again. On 20 October Bertie added “that there is risk of fire because of the location and the condition of the battery in the basement.” In a memorandum titled “Electrical Installation at Telegraph House” signed on 1 November 1930, Frank noted that “as for the risk of fire from the battery this is absolute nonsense.” It seems strange that Frank would be such a nuisance over so many things when he lacked a proper water supply at the cottage and was dependent on his brother and/or Withers for water. On 4 November Crompton notified Bertie that Frank “is making arrangements for a separate water supply for the cottage. At last a victory!”

In 1955, when Bertie was getting insurance for Plas Penhryn, he wrote that “I had a fire at Telegraph House and I think the year was 1929 but I am not certain of the year. I received insurance on this occasion” (to Mr. Abbott, Coward, Chance & Co., 26 Aug.). The fire that Bertie is referring to is probably a shed that burned down on 11 September 1934; this was after Telegraph House had reverted to being a private home. Guardian Assurance paid £40 in compensation (Coward, Chance to Withers, 27 Sept. 1934). There was also a gorse and heather fire in late June 1930; in a letter to Crompton on 2 July Bertie told him that the Petersfield Fire Brigade charged £15 to put out the fire. Earlier that year, on 11 March 1930, Bertie had written to Dorothy Harvey, the mother of one of the Beacon Hill pupils, Jason. He had found Jason and other children making bonfires without adult supervision. He told Mrs. Harvey that the danger of fire was real and that there could be “thousands of pounds worth of damage in a very short time.” He assured her that he had dealt with the matter successfully—it appears that he was overly optimistic on that score.

On 14 January 1931 Dora wrote to Crompton with regard to Battine House that she and Bertie do “not wish to prolong the lease after the five years, and would, in fact, prefer to terminate the lease after four years. We have therefore agreed with Sir William de Salis's son, the present owner of Battine, to release Battine House on August 12th this year. We shall then be able either to store such furniture of Frank’s as we have there, or return it to Telegraph House, and that bone of contention will be removed.” Under consideration at this time was the closing of the school run from Telegraph House and the sub-letting of the house.

In 1919 while still married and living with Elizabeth, Frank began a relationship with Miss Amy Otter, a secretary; the two could not marry because he and Elizabeth never divorced. The couple mainly lived at Dyke House, Methwold, Norfolk, although they also had a place in London. How much time he, or they, spent at the Telegraph House cottage is not clear. He was with Amy Otter in Marseille when he died suddenly on 3 March 1931 of influenza. Bertie went to France. Dora wrote to him on 4 March: “I kept thinking of the blowy cold wet crossing to France today ... You looked so white and troubled, sweetheart. I supposed it must be because the old quarrel with Frank had not been made up and I did not know how to comfort you because I thought you must be blaming me in your heart.” Upon Bertie’s return, he wrote to Ottoline: “I didn’t know he was ill, and he was my only near relation; we shared many early memories that now I share with no one. It was a pity we quar-
relled, as we were always fond of each other. We had more or less made it up, but I had always intended to make it up more completely.” He praised his brother’s character calling him stoic and courageous and concluded that his death “was a good end” (Letter no. 1691, 9 March 1931). Frank’s ashes were scattered on the Sussex Downs on 30 March 1931. There was no religious ceremony and no one wore mourning dress. When Frank died he was Under-Secretary for India. Present at the service, besides Bertie, Dora, and their children, were Lord Snell, Lord Marley, representing the prime minister, and other government officials. News clippings pasted into a scrapbook in the Russell Archives describe the day.

Frank left everything to Miss Otter in his will, contrary to his 1927 promise to leave Telegraph House to Bertie. Dated 15 August 1927, the will named her as both the executor and the sole beneficiary of “all my real and personal Estate” (Rec. Acq. 502). Another document in the same file, dated 28 May 1931 listed the gross value of his estate at £10,130.8.8 and the net value at £853.16.0. Amy Otter and Bertie had a cordial relationship. They saw themselves as united against Mollie. In April 1931 the cottage tenants decided to leave before their lease was up because it was “not habitable” (25 April 1931, BR to Crompton). Frank must have sub-let it. Bertie decided to he would like to rent it since he was giving up Battine House. Writing to Crompton on 25 April 1931, he said that Miss Otter “is willing to agree to anything that Withers will sanction.... It would be necessary to do something about the water supply....” Withers dug in his heels about the water but agreed to let Bertie have the cottage until midsummer at the current rent (1 May 1931). Frank had agreed to remedy the water situation in November 1930—one can only assume he had not done so. On 6 May 1931 Withers informed Crompton that the cottage forms part of the trust estate, and the tenancy does not end until 24 June 1932. On 18 May 1931 Bertie wrote to Crompton regarding the Methwold furniture: “If, on the other hand, the Methwold furniture belongs to the Trust, Miss Otter ought to be informed of the fact as soon as possible, and we ought to proceed to put Withers in prison.”

On 5 June 1931 Bertie wrote to Crompton that he and Miss Otter had met and she “is prepared to be very friendly. She proposes ultimately to leave me Telegraph House, but at the moment my brother’s estate has brought her in an adverse balance of £350.” This amount was typed incorrectly; it should have been £3,500. On 3 June 1931 after Bertie and Miss Otter had met, her lawyers, Vandercom & Co., wrote to Crompton: Bertie “has made an offer to purchase from Miss Otter the reversionary interest of the late Earl in a sum of £4,300 5% War Stock which forms part of the funds comprised in the Settlement made by the late Earl for the benefit of Mollie, Countess Russell.... The offer is to pay £3,500 for the reversion to the £4,300 War Stock, £1,500 to be paid down and the balance of £2,000 when Lord Russell returns from his contemplated tour in America....” On 27 June 1931 Bertie wrote again to Crompton: “My brother’s estate was practically bankrupt and in order to avoid bankruptcy proceedings, Miss Otter has to find £3,500. I am prepared to lend her this sum on any security that is in your opinion adequate, provided that she either pays me interest or an adequately increased lump sum after Mollie’s death....” “I do not want an arrangement which is philanthropic on my part, but one which is sound....” The 28 May document noted above appears to indicate that the estate was not bankrupt. Nevertheless, this agreement marks Bertie’s formal involvement in the trust. Miss Otter’s lawyers also indicate that furniture, pictures, silver, and the tenancy of the cottage occupied by Frank at £20 per annum were also discussed and that “these matters of course, are for the Trustee of the
Settlement ... to accede”. It must be remembered that Telegraph House remained in a trust controlled by Withers.

On 14 August 1931 Amy Otter and Bertie entered into an agreement. The archival copy is a draft one and not signed. Bertie was to pay her £3,500 in installments while she was to assign to Bertie her reversionary interest in a £4,300 War Loan. Her lawyer pointed out that Miss Otter is willing “to meet all duties, not only on the late Lord Russell's death but on the death of Countess Molly.” She did not, however, want to pay duties on Telegraph House “which she is in effect giving to your client [Bertie] subject to reservation of life interest to herself.” On 8 October Richard Buckland of Vandercom listed the contents of the trust as: war stock worth £4,365; Telegraph House and estate, furniture, pictures, silver. The income (in and out) is positive £200. On 13 October 1931 Bertie wrote to Crompton that “in any case, the odds are in favour of Mollie dying before the expiration of the lease [in 1937]. Perhaps Miss Otter and I might combine to send her presents of the best liquor from time to time.” Miss Otter was at the time 58, Bertie 59, while Mollie was around 75.

The next day Bertie wrote to Crompton: “The large picture of my mother and Lady Carlisle, which Miss Otter believes to be valuable, is hanging on the staircase here, and is at Miss Otter's disposal if she wishes to have it. I should suggest Lady Mary Murray as a possible purchaser; she is rich, and the portrait of her mother is excellent.” Russell's mother and Rosalind Howard, Countess of Carlisle were sisters, the daughters of the second Baron Stanley of Alderley. Lady Mary Murray was a daughter of Countess Carlisle; she was married to the classicist Gilbert Murray. In 1949 Bertie annotated a 1937 letter he wrote to Murray, indicating that the portrait was at Naworth Castle, Brampton, Cumbria, the seat of the Earls of Carlisle (document .053548).

V. Bertie Moves Out of Telegraph House

Bertie and Dora’s marriage fractured during their years at Telegraph House. On 20 March 1932 he wrote to Dora, telling her he planned on living with Patricia (Peter) Spence once she left Oxford. Peter had been engaged as the children’s nanny in the summer of 1930. A draft legal deed of separation is dated 1 December 1932. The final document was signed on 31 December 1932 (Crompton to BR, 24 May 1933). From 1929 to 1932 Bertie and Dora had maintained a flat at 38 Bernard Street in Bloomsbury that they both used. In the autumn of 1932 Bertie rented a flat at 47 Emperor's Gate in Kensington. This block of flats can be viewed on Google Street-view. He left Telegraph House in April 1932 for Carn Voel; he moved into his new London flat in November. Dora remained at Telegraph House and for a time Beacon Hill School continued. On 7 February 1933 Bertie wrote to Crompton that: “I think that even if Dora evacuates Telegraph House, I shall not want to live there myself.” He believed that Dora “will not mind so much giving up Telegraph House” if she knows that he will not be living there after she leaves”. On 15 May 1933 Crompton wrote to F.G. Maw, Dora’s solicitor: “This morning I have a received a letter” from Bertie of 9 May. Crompton quotes Bertie: “The uncertainty and expense of temporary arrangements, and the inconvenience of absence from my books and personal possessions, become increasingly irksome. I should therefore like Dora to know that I will not extend her tenancy of Telegraph House beyond July 25th 1934, unless she will now bind herself to remain at least till Mid-
summer 1937, in which case I will let her have it for £100 a year, on the understanding that I recover my personal furniture and belongings. “If she is going to stay at Telegraph House I must take an unfurnished house ....” In May 1933 Bertie and Peter travelled to Yegen, Granada, Spain to visit Gerald Brenan and his wife, Gamel. Then in the summer of 1933, Bertie and Peter moved into Deudraeth Castle Hotel at Portmeirion, Wales⁸. There he wrote Freedom and Organization. Bertie had now decided to live at Telegraph House after Dora left if the house could not be sold (8 Sept. 1933, BR to Dora). He was hoping to sell the house to an interested buyer, Mrs. Pike. Unfortunately, nothing came of it. She thought the price so “so excessive” that she “abandoned the idea altogether”.

While Bertie was in Wales, Telegraph House fell victim to vandalism. Dora’s lawyer, F. Graham Maw, wrote to Crompton on 14 July 1933 about “the legends painted on the various parts of Telegraph House during the night of 11th-12th instant: Hurrah lovely Three Down with Zozo / Beautiful Bertie you are too red to be true. / Down with Russia. / Red Bertie’s / We have taken your bloody flag and left you ours. / Horch! Lovely Three!”⁹ Maw “is trying to effect a sufficient insurance against malicious damage.” The linking of Bertie with Communism clung to him most of his life. It echoes back to the comment of his own brother, Frank, re the red gate made on 9 July 1927, despite the fact that Bertie had rejected the practice of communism much earlier in his The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (1920). It also echoes forward to the “better red than dead” controversy that he would be caught up in the late 1950s. Ironically, Dora, who was still living at Telegraph House, was a supporter of Soviet Russia.

Crompton soldiered on, trying to clarify the Trust though he compared the situation as being “too mathematical for me—like where and when with two trains, going in opposite directions at diverse speeds, meet?” On 1 February 1934 Crompton wrote to Bertie, telling him that he has written to Withers that matters are so complicated that “Bertie is now inclined to let it wait until Mollie dies” — he will then sell Telegraph House. The assumption is that he had Miss Otter’s agreement on this plan. A year earlier Bertie had been assured that since there would be no “running interest on the death duties on Frank’s estate”, he could “await Mollie’s demise calmly” (BR to Crompton, 5 Feb. 1933). On 17 February Bertie questioned Crompton. He wanted to know what exactly he would get from Miss Otter once Mollie died. He was concerned about death duties and Telegraph House standing empty. “Your view seems to be that, when Mollie dies, I get whatever the 'trust' fund amounts to, whether more or less than £4,300”. Crompton replied on 20 February 1934: “You say you would like to know what the truth is,—you jesting Pilate, you! Shelley, who spent his life pursuing Truth like a lover, might be indignant when he was not believed about the simple matter of fact of his stolen hat; why should you, who have pursued Truth only to annihilate her, call out for a draught of water from her sacred well?” Crompton's five page note, titled “Lord Russell: Mollie Countess Russell's Trust, Telegraph House, Note” sets out all the complexities involved as succinctly as possible (.133555). He points out that only “Withers the Trustee, Mollie the Annuitant, and Bertie the Reversioner” are the stake-holders. “Any ultimate

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⁸ The name of the hotel is now spelled “Castell”.
⁹ “Zozo” is the name of a demon. The Battle of the Boyne, the victory of William of Orange over the Catholics, is commemorated on 12 July. Any linkage to this anti-Communism incident is pure conjecture. There are no additional archival documents about this incident.
loss is likely to fall on Bertie, but the other two have no interest in slaughtering the reversion, if arrangements to preserve it can be agreed upon."

Beginning in late March and continuing during April and May 1934, a series of letters was exchanged between Crompton and Withers, discussing the price that Telegraph House might fetch. The prices ranged from a low of £5,000 to a high of £7,000. Mollie had agreed to the sale. "Articles to be Specially Noted" was made of some of the contents of Telegraph House (.133823). The list includes books now in Russell's Library, his Columbia University gold medal and two square tables of Doomsday oak. On 12 April Withers wrote to Crompton with regard to a buyer that "Lady Russell suggests that the property may be very useful as an Aerodrome, being on high ground and not very far from the Solent." On 17 April Withers reminded Crompton that "I am the Trustee of the Settlement and am the only person who can sell, and that with Countess Russell's consent, and therefore all effective instructions must come from me." On 20 April Mollie agreed that Constable and Maude would be the agents for the sale (Crompton to BR). Constable and Maude, Land Agents, wrote to Withers about a serious drawback on 31 May 1934. A pure water supply was now dependent on rain water which had to be boiled. The Agents compiled a list of eight repairs totalling £725 to make the house saleable. Water was not listed. "We have heard that the services of a Water Engineer and Diviner were utilised in 1933 ... we understand that they actually gave an estimate for carrying out the work amounting to £550." Dora wrote that "I made some enquiries about boring an artesian well through the chalk, and sent particulars to Bertie, suggesting that we might share an experimental trial boring, which would not be ruinously expensive. He was not interested, so I began to look for other premises [for the school], possibly nearer to London" (Tamarisk Tree, p. 279). On 11 July 1934 Crompton wrote to Bertie about the various repairs needed at Telegraph House. "I think that Withers recognises that the matter is not pressing from his point of view, but he is always in fear of Mollie, and I suppose if you became insolvent and Telegraph House could not be disposed of there might be a question of her annuity running short."

**VI. Bertie Returns to Telegraph House**

Dora was to leave Telegraph House on 25 July, the same day Bertie's servants were to arrive. Bertie was to arrive on 28 July. Crompton confirmed these dates in a letter to Bertie on 16 July. Bertie and Peter were to live there for the next three years. They could have left earlier but were unable to sell the house until 1937 when the lease ended. Telegraph House returned to being a private country estate as Frank had always wanted. Frank's widow, Elizabeth, wrote to Bertie on 31 August from her home in France. "I'm thrilled to see your address, and to hear that there, cleared of Dora's school, you are going to live. May you at last lay [to rest] the curse that has clung to that house, and bring it peace and happiness. I would quite particularly love to visit it again under the new régime, and rejoice over the complete fading out of the old one." On 2 August 1934 Peter wrote in pencil a letter addressed to "Bertrand Russell, Tender Hearted Philosopher." She is in the tower room and notes that she will "never want to go away." On 15 November 1934 Bertie wrote to his friend Bob Trevelyan that he was at the Hotel Alexandra in Lyme Regis, Dorset,
while a new kitchen range was being put in. Bertie hopes Bob and his wife Bessie will visit Telegraph House "some time soon."

Bertie and Peter found the house in a terrible state—among other things there were bed bugs (Crompton to BR, 26 Nov. 1934). Bertie sent a specimen of a bug to a Dr. Omerod. Rowe and Maw, writing to Coward, Chance on 17 September 1934 noted that Dora would not take responsibility for the bugs by paying for their extermination. It was irrelevant that a bug or bugs had been found and sent to a doctor—they could not be connected to her. "Dr. Omerod" is probably a misspelling of the surname of Dr. Catherine Jane Ormerod, a doctor at Beacon Hill School. Of course, there was a dispute about various items—Chinese mandarin robe, Roman relics, books, a plaque and a barograph. Dora did agree to pay for the cleaning of sheets and pillows. All of this was just part of a very messy divorce which had dragged on interminably. The decree nisi was issued on 11 November 1934, with the decree final on 1 July 1935.

In the summer an exciting discovery had been made on the estate. “On the south slope of North Marden Down, near the drive to Telegraph House and about one mile S.S.W. from Beacon Hill, an extensive Roman-Celtic farm settlement has been found. The Down here is dense with trees and undergrowth, so that the enclosure bank, numerous hut sites with dry flint walling and lynchets of the fields, are very difficult to find. They are in a peculiarly remote part of the Downs.” John Russell, aged 13, and friends “have dug up many fragments of Roman pottery; and there have been found a coin of Postumus, part of a bronze horse trapping, and sherds of Samian ware.” (Letter in The Times, 10 Sept. 1934, p. 7, from S.E. Winbolt). John Russell replied, downplaying his role in the discovery (The Times, 18 Sept. 1934, p. 7). The manuscript for this letter is in Bertie's hand and thus has been added to Russell's Bibliography as C34.36a. Katharine Tait writes that these Roman remains, exciting as they were, “never produced much” (“Memories of Beacon Hill”).

By December 1934, Constable and Maude were no longer the exclusive agents for Telegraph House. Messrs. Hamptons were now also involved and Withers was demanding that the price “could not be lower than £10,000” (Coward, Chance to BR, 28 Dec.). On 4 January 1934 Crompton wrote to Bertie that he had met with Mr. Empson of Hamptons. Collins & Collins are also being called in as agents. Withers is away on a cruise for his health. Crompton “cannot help thinking that in standing out for £10,000” Withers “may be bluffing or looking over what may be the best interest of Mollie.” The price was far higher than any of the agents' appraisals.

On 23 February 1935 Amy Otter made her will. She gave Bertie “453 Venezuelan Oil Concession shares and all my outstanding reversionary interest under the trusts created by the late John Francis Stanley Earl Russell in favour of Marion [Mollie] Countess Russell of her life free of all duties that might be payable on my death.” She also left him “the Applewood chair now at Dyke house formerly belonging to his brother and also all my silver marked 'R' also at Dyke House” (.133882). Her executor was Richard Buckland of Vanderbilt, Stanton & Co. On 28 February Amy Otter died. A brief death notice appeared in The Times, 2 March 1935, p. 1. Mollie lived on.

In August 1935, Gerald and Gamel Brenan visited for a fortnight. Gerald describes the house as “a modern but not ugly building.” “All the furniture in the house was ugly. Bertie was aware of this and explained that it had once belonged to Wittgenstein and was on that account sacred to him. But I think that he was really indifferent to his indoor surroundings, though he loved Nature and was proud of his magnificent estate.” “He was a
very good host, considerate, hospitable and by turns serious and amusing. In the mornings he worked, but during the rest of the day we were together, going for walks through the beech woods after lunch and in the evenings talking and reading aloud to one another. (Personal Record, pp. 216-17). Gerald then goes on to describe their conversations. Brenan’s biographer, Jonathan Gathorne-Hardy, notes that “he was flattered by Russell’s friendship, but one has the feeling of Gerald very much forced into continuous top gear. He took voluminous notes in their bedroom (very useful when he wrote Personal Record), and kept his end up by steering the conversation into literature” (The Interior Castle, p. 295).10

At the end of the summer, Bertie wrote a letter of complaint to the Manager, Railway Air Services Ltd., 18 Sept. 1935: “I have for some time been suffering serious inconvenience from the passage of aeroplanes on the London—Isle of Wight service immediately over my house, and I write to ask if you would be so kind as to do something to mitigate this nuisance.

My house is isolated, and stands high on the downs; it is unfortunate for me and my household. I feel sure, however, that our sufferings need not be so great as they are at present. In the first place, it does not seem to me necessary that the aeroplanes should pass immediately over the house or gardens; in the second place, they could and should fly higher when they come to higher ground.

You will understand, I am sure, that to be obliged to suspend conversation during the passage of a machine, to be interrupted in difficult mathematical work11 by a deafening roar, to be closely observed from the air if one should venture to take a sunbath in a spot of otherwise impregnable privacy, is extremely annoying. Moreover, I am trying to sell my estate, and find that prospective purchasers are very reasonably deterred by these inconveniences.

It is frequently possible to read the numbers of the machines. I have noted two in proof of this assertion: GADEL and GABVB.”12

In mid-October 1935 Bertie’s Religion and Science was published. On 22 October 1935 Peter wrote to Bertie, who was in Norway. “The weather is bitterly cold and I am wearing several layers of wool and have a large fire and the central heating as hot as possible, but I am not warm enough yet. Hines and Wild are planting a fringe of crocuses round the lawn, and I shall go out and help them. It will be sad if after all this the house is sold. I am thinking of going in for bee-keeping on a large scale. The bees only need attention on a few days in the year and the honey here is really exceptionally fine, because of the heather and aromatic herbs.

10 I asked Gathorne-Hardy if these notes had survived. He wrote to me on 23 August 1994 that he thought not. Gerald “was a great destroyer”.
11 He was writing “On Order in Time”; B&R C36.12.
12 Railways Air Services (RAS) was formed in March 1934 by four railway companies and Imperial Airways. It was based at Croydon Airport, London. On 1 May 1934 RAS and Spartan Air Lines, working in ticketing association with Southern Railways, began a Croydon-Isle of Wight service with three planes. GADEL is listed on the Wikipedia page as a Spartan Cruiser III. GABVB could not be located on the internet. A response, if any, is not in the Archives. In 1936, the year after his complaint, Bertie wrote: “Recently within a quarter of a mile of my house, three men were killed in an aeroplane crash on a dark and foggy night;” (Papers 21: 225).
aromatic herbs. With ten hives I think I could make almost £50 a year, and it would be a pleasant hobby. I also intend to make money by selling rabbits. The cottage people say they want to stay there indefinitely ... the bungalow people seem to be settling in for life, and I have no doubt that I can let the Lab very profitably.... If only the wretched Mollie would die! I find that I have come to love the place passionately and shall hate losing it ... the woods are full of spindle berries and everything looks very lovely when the sun is out.”

Kate Tait remembers the transformation that her step-mother wrought at Telegraph House, remaking it from a shabby school into a proper “gentleman’s country residence.” A classroom was “returned to its original function as a library and sitting room and, although it was off by itself at the end of a long corridor, it became the heart of the house. My father had a huge desk in the bay window, where he sat and wrote all morning ...” (*My Father*, p. 115). The afternoons were spent walking “for miles through our own woods, cutting back brambles to keep the footpaths open and watching the dog in his inept chase after rabbits ...” (*My Father*, p. 116). “Dinner, thanks to Peter, was always an elegant occasion. We had a beautiful table and chairs (which had come to my father from the philosopher Wittgenstein), heavy Russell family silver and candlesticks, glassware and china bought by Peter to complement them, and food worthy of the setting.” (*My Father*, p. 116)


On 18 January 1936 Bertie and Peter married. They were soon to embark on editing a work about Bertie’s parents which would be published by the Woolf’s Hogarth Press in March 1937. On 18 September 1936 Virginia Woolf wrote to Ethel Symth: “Did I tell you Bertie Russell has sent us, to publish, his fathers and mothers old letters—sweepings of old desks—2,000 pages: so fascinating and tragic, I live almost as much with the Amberleys in the 80ties as here and now” (*Letters of Virginia Woolf*, no. 3173). A few days later an invitation to tea which was later changed to lunch was extended by Bertie to Leonard and Virginia Woolf. In his letter of 22 September Bertie explains that “it takes 1 1/2 hours by car – Newhaven, Brighton, Chichester.” Monks House, the Woolfs' country home, was in the eastern part of Sussex while Telegraph House was much further to the west but also in Sussex. On 3 October 1936 he told them to drive up “an avenue of copper beeches” to reach the house. The invitation was changed once the cook became available; it appears
Peter could not manage lunch for four on her own. The Woolfs were expected on 7 October 1936. Unfortunately Virginia did not write about this in her diary. Her editor notes: “There are no entries in VW's diary between 23 June and 30 October 1936. Her state of health remained precarious ... the Woolfs [decamped] to Rodmell earlier than usual, on 9 July.... There they remained ... until 11 October.” Virginia did however mention the visit in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell, 9 October 1936. “... Bertie came here [to Monks House, Rodmell] to discuss it [The Amberley Papers], and we went there to his Tower on the downs and made the acquaintance of Peter. I hadn't seen Bertie for 20 years. What an entrancing mind ....” (Letters of Virginia Woolf, no. 3179). Peter's role as co-editor is not mentioned. Leonard Woolf gives a different account of the visit which casts doubt on whether lunch had been served; writing to Margaret Llewelyn Davies on 30 December 1936: “In October we went over and fetched her [Judith Stephen, Virginia's niece] from Bedales [School], of which she is head girl, gave her lunch in Petersfield and then took her out to Bertie Russell. We are publishing an immense work, in two vols for him, the letter and diaries of his mother and father, one of the most fascinating books I've read for a long time. We had to go and discuss business with him in his extraordinary tower, Telegraph House. He teaches philosophy” (Letters of Leonard Woolf, pp. 242-3). The Woolfs presumably drove over in their 1933 silver and green Lanchester 18 automobile; both of them write about the vehicle but it would have been of little interest to Bertie. (Virginia Woolf, letter no. 3172; Leonard Woolf, Downhill, p. 188). During their visit they may have discussed bees as the Woolfs had hives at Monks House and Peter was also keeping bees. “Leonard became expert at bee-keeping.... Virginia liked to help with bottling the honey” (Virginia Woolf's Garden, p. 38). Like Frank, Leonard bought more land as it became available.

VII. Telegraph House Is Sold

During 1936 Bertie's Which Way to Peace? was published. He continued to look for a buyer for Telegraph House. He confided to his old friend, Lion Phillimore on 24 September 1936 that he was willing to sell the house for £6,000. “It is very kind of you to take an interest in the matter and perhaps it would be a good plan for your agent to see the place.” The following month he told her that “the man who thinks of buying this house, and who almost certainly will buy it if handled tactfully, keeps raising new points of detail on the telephone, so that I cannot go away at the moment.” “It is vital to the welfare of the whole family to get rid of this house, and I don't want to run any risks” (from BR, 15 October 1936). The house was sold in January 1937 for £5,500. There were two bidders—a Polish prince and a businessman named Brewis. The contract was signed with Mr. Brewis’s lawyers on 17 February 1937. On 18 March 1937 he told Lion that the house had been sold. Bertie wrote in his Autobiography that he sold it to an English businessman (2, p. 193). In a Petition for Decrease of Maintenance [for Dora], 9 Dec. 1937, it is noted that Telegraph House was sold on 29 Sept. 1937 by the trustee (Withers) for £5,468. Thus, the deal had a very long close. He also told his publisher, Stanley Unwin, on 23 September 1937 that the house had sold. “I am very much relieved to be rid of this large house & estate, though I do not get the money until the death of my brother's second wife, who is 80, but still going strong, like Johnnie Walker & (they say) by his help.”
In the same letter that he tells Lion about the sale of Telegraph House, he confesses his financial concerns. By the sale of the house, “we gain by being able to live more cheaply in an small house, and it will reduce what I have to pay Molly from £400 a year to about £280, free of income tax. But the price goes into a trust, and I get none of it till she dies. When she dies, I no longer, of course, have to pay her, and I get a capital of £6,500. Until then, I have to pay out £535 a year to Dora (till her death or mine), plus £280 and income tax to Molly. This amounts to nearly my whole income, earned and unearned. I am living on capital, but have not much left. With a child coming, at my age, the situation is anxious, and I cannot give up earning money unless money for research is forthcoming from somewhere....” On 15 April 1937 Bertie’s son Conrad Russell was born. He had a monthly nurse for the first few weeks of his life—Bertie wrote to Ottoline Morrell on 13 May that the nurse had left and would not be replaced. (Letter no. 1762).

Bertie, Peter, and Conrad left Telegraph House on 13 October for their new home, Amberley House, in Kidlington, near Oxford. Bertie received further clarification on his financial position at the end of the year. On 16 December 1937 Louis Tylor wrote: “that since Countess Mollie is able to recover a substantial sum from the Revenue in respect of income tax, the sum which you will have to pay Withers to make up the annuity to £400 a year, free of tax, is just under £100 per annum.”

Further information is contained in the attached Petition for Decrease of Maintenance [for Dora], 9 Dec. 1937. If Bertie made up the shortfall to Mollie “he will become entitled on her death to the property comprised in the said Trust Fund less the annuity of £5 ....”. If Bertie doesn’t make up the shortfall then he will get £3,500 less when Mollie dies. Death duties of about £2,400 are payable in either case. Thus Bertie gambled that Mollie would die sooner rather than later and it would be worth it to make up the shortfall. Mollie continued living until 14 August 1942 when she died aged 84. That amounts to a £600 outlay. Bertie colours the truth when he wrote in his Autobiography that after Frank’s “death, I had to pay this”; that being the “£400 a year for life” that Mollie had demanded as her price for the divorce. “She died at about the age of ninety.” (Auto 2, p. 153). This had always seemed to be a rather bizarre situation. How could a brother, under any legal system, be made responsible for his brother’s alimony payments? At last the mystery has been solved.

It is not clear how much Bertie inherited. Because of currency restrictions during wartime, it is unlikely that Bertie, who was then living in the United States, received any money immediately. In a letter of 13 March 1944, Tylor tells him that Miss Otter’s estate has still not been wound up. A capital account statement for the trust was prepared by Withers & Co. on 10 January 1947. It details two small payments, both under £300 being made to Bertie in

Conrad with his nurse on the grounds of Telegraph House. Note the beehive in the background.
1946 and 1947. There is a listing of stocks held by the trust valued at £7,475. On 2 July 1951 Tylor wrote to Bertie listing his investments. Two of the stocks are identical to those held in the trust. The assumption is that the contents of the trust were finally put under Bertie’s control sometime during or after 1947.

After about fifty years, Telegraph House had left the Russell family. Bertie wrote: “I loved the downs and the woods and my tower room with its views in all four directions. I had known the place for forty years or more ... It represented continuity, of which, apart from work, my life had far less than I could have wished” (Auto 2, pp. 193-94). John would no longer inherit it as Bertie had promised—at least according to Dora that was what he had promised (Tamarisk Tree, p. 251). Any attempt to create a country estate for the earldom had come to an end.

**Beacon Hill: The tower.**

**VIII. Telegraph House after the Russells Left**

Renovations on the house began in 1938. William Bruneau, one of the editors of “Behaviourism and Education, 1927-28”, Volume 18 of the Collected Papers (in progress), obtained copies of floor plans titled “Telegraph House. Harting W. Sussex, Proposed Alterations, Jan. 1938”. Kate Tait has annotated these plans giving the rooms the functions they had when it was a school. Renovations were extensive including the demolition of part of the structure and the removal of walls in parts of what remained. The attached building visible in photograph no. 3 was probably demolished at this time. In October 1938, additional plans were filed, “Telegraph House. South Harting. Proposed Reconstruction of Garage for New Lounge. October 1938.”
By 1953 Battine House had become a youth hostel. Dan and Wogilla Wilson, wardens, Youth Hostels Association, wrote to Bertie on 3 December 1953: “You may remember that the De Salis 13 family named some of the bedrooms and bathrooms after ships or depôts with which they had been connected.” They want to name a dormitory room after Bertie. He replied on 4 Dec. 1953: “I am honoured that you should wish to call one of the rooms in Battine House after me and I am glad to give my permission. Battine House when I had it was an annex to my school, of which the main building was at Telegraph House.”

Later, Rev. P.H. Francis was in touch with both Bertie and Kenneth Blackwell. Francis wrote to Bertie on 25 May 1968. “About three years ago, when East Marden people were asking for help in repairing the church, I wrote to you, and you kindly sent me a cheque for the church.” Francis was the rector of Racton and Vicar of Stoughton, neighbouring parishes to East Marden. “I am the son of the later [sic] Rector of East and North Marden.” On 6 February 1970 he wrote to Kenneth Blackwell: “My mother and father ... were friendly with” Frank Russell. “My mother was friendly” with Elizabeth. “... they often went to Telegraph House and met people there. Earl Russell [Frank] often called at the Rectory. The Rectory adjoined the Battine House, and the children of the school used our garden.” He also tells Blackwell that Captain R. De Salis, R.N., owned Battine House.

In 1975 Dora Russell wrote in The Tamarisk Tree that she had been “told by friends ... that there is now actually a swimming pool at Telegraph House” (p. 279). The water problems must have been solved. Comparing the Ordnance Survey maps of 1912 and 1976 shows that the swimming pool was located behind the house on the right side where the [water] tanks used to be.

On 7 August 1988 Jürg Frick, a Swiss, photographed Telegraph House. He was writing a dissertation “Menschenbild und Erziehungsziel: Pädagogische Theorie und Praxis bei Bertrand Russell”. At the same time he met Kate Tait and her sister Harriet Ward in London. The dissertation was published in 1990 in Bern by Paul Haupt. In the photograph the house is pale yellow in colour. Decades later, William Bruneau requested that Kate Tait write “Memories of Beacon Hill”. She describes the grounds, house, and outbuildings. She begins: “First, the mile-long flint drive, lined with young copper beech trees (now in 2003 forest giants).” Although isolated, it never felt that way as “there was so much to see and do and learn.” In a letter to Richard Rempel she told him that friends had recently taken her to Telegraph House; she found “both the house and grounds ... vastly changed” (2 Oct. 2003).

13 Vice-Admiral Sir William Fane de Salis (1858-1939) retired in 1913 from the Royal Navy. He is buried in East Marden. He had two sons: (Henry) Rodolph (1890-1972) and Antony (1896-1976).
In early June 2005 a film crew making a documentary about Bertrand Russell filmed at Telegraph House. The documentary, “The Three Passions of Bertrand Russell” was never completed but there are some rough cuts in the Russell Archives. The house is the same shade of yellow as photographed by Frick. It appears very similar to how it looked in 1988. Nicholas Griffin visited the house with the film crew.

Telegraph House, Screen Grab from Film Documentary, 2005.

The house appears on the website “British Listed Buildings”. It is listed mainly for “historical reasons”.

Telegraph House, Frank's passion, is still standing more than one hundred years after he “fell in love with the place” and long after Bertie spent years of frustration mixed with contentment there.

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**Archival documents and correspondence**


**Websites**

“British Listed Buildings”. The location is given as “Elsted and Treyford” which is a parish: [http://www.britishlistedbuildings.co.uk/en-301710-telegraph-house-elsted-and-treyford-west#VnbglfkrLct](http://www.britishlistedbuildings.co.uk/en-301710-telegraph-house-elsted-and-treyford-west#VnbglfkrLct)
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In memoriam. Elizabeth "Bette" Chambers (July 31, 1930 to October 27, 2015), former president of the American Humanist Association, and a longtime member and supporter of the BRS.

Last but not Least

Are you thinking of estate planning? Consider a bequest, no matter how modest, to The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc. in your will and/or trust, and let your interest in and support of Bertrand Russell scholarship, his ideas, his ideals, and your Society continue well into the future. A Russellian afterlife, as it were!!

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