THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY
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We begin this issue with a report from the society president, John Lenz. He will announce the preliminary details of the Annual Bertrand Russell Society Conference, which will be held June 19-21 at the Ethics Center of the University of South Florida in St. Petersburg.

John’s report will be followed by “Russell News”, which is a column of short blurbs about Russell, works on Russell, society happenings, reports on members, general gossip, and other vital talking points for the informed and discerning society member. In my view, the standard of information one should strive for, in a Platonic sense, is Ken Blackwell, the guru of Russell trivia, realizing that Ken has a considerable head start on all of us.

I am pleased to draw your attention to an outstanding article in this issue, David Rodier’s “Russell’s Plato.” Originally presented at the Russell Conference two years ago at Drew University, Rodier has further examined Russell’s study of Plato and uncovered some important insights. For all of those who question Russell as a philosophical historian, this article should provide considerable evidence to the contrary. It also functions as a footnote to the discussion of the Popper/Russell view of Plato reported in the articles by Ivor Grattan-Guinness and Sir Karl Popper found in *Russell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives*, New Series, Volume 12, Number 1, Summer, 1992.

A book review of P.M.S. Hacker’s *Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy* follows Rodier’s article.

I also recommend Cliff Henke’s outstanding review of “Reds”, the epic movie of the life of Jack Reed, featuring Dora Russell and other contemporaries of Bertrand Russell as witnesses. In our next issue, Cliff will review a recent BBC production, “Coming Through,” a television drama about the life of D. H. Lawrence, starring Kenneth Branagh and Helen Mirren. This is now out on video cassette in the United States.

As in the last issue, we will profile society members. A blank profile form is included, which should be used to help the society learn more about its membership. If you haven’t filled out a form, please do and send it to me at 1806 Rollins Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22307, USA.

Finally, please note two important items: the 1998 membership renewal form and the call for nominations for the board of directors. Please fill both out and send them to Dennis Darland and Michael Rockler, respectively. The addresses are on the forms.
I hope you enjoy this issue. As always, I thank my associate editors, Katie Kendig and Bob Barnard, for their ideas and assistance. A special thanks goes to John Lenz, who has been a constant source of news and ideas, as well as support.

FROM THE PRESIDENT
John R. Lenz
Drew University

The Bertrand Russell Society exists to foster our shared interests, and our work manifests itself in two main ways: publication of this Quarterly, and the holding of our Annual Meeting with its presentations, awards, and social events. Nowadays, sponsorship of WWW home page and the Russell-L electronic discussion group (a mailing list) enable us to maintain a daily presence around the world. All these forums exist for the voices of all BRS members.

There is still nothing like the face-to-face interaction of the Annual Meeting, about to celebrate its 25th anniversary in St. Petersburg, Florida in June, 1998. Please see the preliminary report in this issue. We are working hard to stage a memorable and intellectually stimulating weekend. At the same time, we see this as a crucial opportunity to strengthen the BRS for the future. Anyone may present a paper, lead a discussion, or raise an issue. Please think about making a contribution yourself and contact me at jlenz@drew.edu if you would like to be on the program.

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY CONFERENCE:
19-21 JUNE 1998
USF, St. Petersburg, Florida
John R. Lenz
Drew University

Plans are underway for the 25th (!) annual Bertrand Russell Society meeting. We are planning to convene during the weekend of June 19-21, 1998, at the University of Southern Florida in St. Petersburg, Florida. Details on registering and lodging, directions and an updated program, will be included in the February Quarterly. We are grateful to Jan Loeb Eisler, Mitchell Haney and John Shosky for invaluable help in the preparation of what promises to be a memorable meeting.

Last year, our meeting was somewhat muted as we agreed to merge with the Humanist conference of the Center for Inquiry (although, certainly, it was a pleasure to meet new people and especially students). For 1998, we plan to offer a variety of talks and activities. Our theme is "New Directions in Russell Studies", and, as in the past, presentations will be multi-media: videos (the much discussed but not seen in the U.S. new BBC documentary on Russell's life), audio (Russell's radio debate with Copleston, which was excluded from the American edition of Why I Am Not a Christian), a panel discussion (on a controversial new portrait of Russell's life), as well as several presentations offering new angles on understanding Russell in all his complexity. The conference should be educational and stimulating.

At the same time, the Annual Meeting offers us a chance to raise issues of BRS policy and planning. All are encouraged to participate. PLEASE consider making a presentation. Let me know if you would like to share a paper or discussion with us on any topic.

The Tentative Program (more to come)
Viewing of Russell interviews and documentaries: the new BBC documentary about Russell's life (not yet released in the U.S.) and the Russell-Copleston debate on the existence of God (audiotape with transcript).
Workshop: on a short essay of Russell’s
Summary of paper: by 1998 student winner of Prizes for Papers
BRS business: BRS Board of Directors Meeting; election of new officers; BRS Society Meeting; Announcement of 1998 BRS Award, BRS Book Award, and
RUSSELL NEWS: Publications, etc.

- Ray Monk has been awarded the prestigious 1997 Bertrand Russell Society Book Award for *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1996. Congratulations to Ray. This controversial book will be the subject of a panel discussion at the Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society in Tampa this June.

- There is a lengthy review of Monk and Tony Palmer’s *Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy* by Jan Dejnozka in *History and Philosophy of Logic*, 18, No. 1 (1997), 49-54.

- Ken Blackwell has announced that the Russell Archives has obtained the first draft of Russell’s essay, “Is a Permanent Peace Possible?” The final version was published in the *Atlantic Monthly* of March, 1915 and reprinted in *Justice in Wartime* and in Volume 13 of the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*. The manuscript came from Elizabeth Perkins, who also sent 15 letters from Russell, all written between 1915 and 1919.

- Reports from Arabia. Look for three books in Arabic which have been reported to the Quarterly. One is by Ibrahim Najjar entitled *Bertrand Russell: His Thought and Place in Contemporary Philosophy*. This is an introduction to Russell, covering his life, work in logic, theory of knowledge, politics, and ethics. There is also a final chapter about Russell’s relevance to the Arab world, with comparisons to Ibn Rushd and other contemporary Arab thinkers. The second book is entitled *Power: A Philosophical Analysis of Justice*. The author was not reported to the Quarterly. Also, check out a third text, Ibn Warrų’s *Why I am not a Muslim*.

- John Shosky is scheduled to teach a graduate class on Russell and Wittgenstein at Charles University in Prague beginning in February, 1998. The syllabus lists the following topics for Russell: logic of relations, theory of descriptions, theory of types, Russell’s paradox, and Russell’s logical atomism. The seminar will also discuss works by Frege, Moore, Ramsey, and Ayer. Shosky will also teach a graduate seminar on the history of logic at Charles and a graduate seminar on modern deductive logic for the Department of Philosophy in the Czech Academy of Sciences.

- Associate Editor Katie Kendig reports from the London School of Economics that she is taking a seminar on mathematical logic. She was asked to speak on Russell’s theory of types.

- Mary Ann Cassar recently informed the Quarterly of the publication of *Interfaces*, a collection of essays on philosophy edited by Joe Friggieri and Salvino Busuttil. These essays were collected in honor of Peter Serracino Inglott, the recently retired head of the department of philosophy at the University of Malta. The ISBN number is 99909-2-017-6. The publisher is the University of Malta Press.


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RUSSELL’S PLATO
David Rodier
American University

Russell’s *A History of Western Philosophy* is the last major work of the long period between his two Cambridge careers. The work is perhaps the most widely read of all of Russell’s many publications but, despite its claim to importance in the Russellian *oeuvre*, the work is largely neglected, even by students of Russell. This paradox has been succinctly noted by Louis Greenspan:

... Russell’s history is rarely to be found in the curricula of philosophy departments. It is still a popular success. It remains a favorite with Book Clubs, it is the book by a major philosopher most likely to be found in Airport bookstores, but
Part of the disdain of professional philosophers for *A History of Western Philosophy* may actually be its deceptively popular appearance. The work lacks the usual scholarly apparatus. It has no bibliography. Quotations are not always identified in a way which would allow an easy checking of sources - or for that matter in a way that would encourage the general reader to go to the philosophic texts in question. When Russell does cite a work to support his views, it frequently is from scholarship that is at least a generation old. This appearance of absence of scholarship is further exacerbated, for the specialist at least, by Russell's own disarming claim of lack of expertise in most of his subject matter:

I owe a word of explanation and apology to specialists on any part of my enormous subject. It is obviously impossible to know as much about every philosopher as can be known about him by a man whose field is less wide; I have no doubt that every singly philosopher whom I have mentioned, with the exception of Leibniz, is better known to many men than to me (x).

In this paper I shall argue that at least in the case of Plato, Russell's disclaimer of expertise and his popularizing manner of presentation, conceal both a rather strong familiarity with recent scholarship and a willingness to use that scholarship for his own philosophic ends. To establish this let us begin by noting certain peculiarities about the section of *A History of Western Philosophy* which deals with Plato. Even a cursory reading of these chapters reveals two striking anomalies. The first is the length of the discussion of Plato. The six chapters Russell devotes to Plato present a much more extensive discussion than that given any other philosopher - or any other figure - he discusses in the work. Further, Russell's chapters on Plato contain a second anomaly. That is the fact that there is a complete absence of any scholarly apparatus throughout the entire discussion of Plato. In this paper I shall discuss both of these anomalies and then suggest reasons for each.

1.

Russell devotes a total of six chapters in the history to Plato. There are chapters on: Plato's Sources (Chapter 13), his utopia (Chapter 14), the theory of ideas (15), Plato's theory of immortality (16), his cosmogony (17) and his account of knowledge and perception (18). In terms of the Platonic dialogues discussed we have the *Republic* (Chapters 14 and 15), the *Phaedo* and *Meno* (Chapter 16), the *Timaeus* (chapter 17), and the *Theaetetus* (Chapter 19). There are also brief references to the *Symposium* and the *Parmenides* - the latter being a very significant one for an estimate of Russell's familiarity with the Platonic scholarship of his time. In addition Russell discusses the *Apology* in Chapter 11 in the context of his discussion of Socrates. In sharp contrast to the six chapters devoted to Plato, Russell devotes only a chapter each to Kant, Hume, and even his own specialization, Leibniz.

An answer to the first anomaly - the length of time spent in discussing Plato - is apparently given by Russell himself:

Plato and Aristotle were the most influential of all philosophers, ancient, mediaeval, or modern; and of the two, it was Plato who had the greatest effect upon subsequent ages. I say this for two reasons: first, that Aristotle himself is the outcome of Plato; second, that Christian theology and philosophy, at any rate until the thirteenth century, was much more Platonic than Aristotelian. It is necessary, therefore, in a history of philosophic thought, to treat Plato, and to a lesser degree Aristotle, much more fully than any of their predecessors or successors (104).

In fact, as Greenspan has pointed out, the answer to the general question of the various length of discussion Russell devotes to the figures he covers is rather a bit more complicated. There are issues at work in the structuring of the discussion which Russell does not explicitly acknowledge. But a more detailed investigation of why Russell spends so much time on Plato can be presented after we discuss the second anomaly.

2.

The second anomaly is the absence on any scholarly documentation throughout the Plato chapters. In the majority of cases, Russell's discussions of major philosophers lack any references to the secondary literature. But in the chapters on Plato it is not just that Russell follows his common pattern of making no reference to any secondary discussions of the Platonic text. In the case of the other philosophers he discusses, Russell usually gives some sort of reference to the textual source. In these chapters on Plato, Russell gives a number of quotations from Plato but he does not give the Stephanus page numbers for any of the passages he quotes. In this respect Russell's quotations from Plato are sharply differentiated from his quotations from Aristotle in the immediately succeeding chapters. In the case of Aristotle the usual Bekker numbers are to be
found in the footnotes. In stark contrast there are no footnotes of any kind in the Plato chapters. The effect of this rhetorical strategy is that Russell forces the reader to look at Plato only through Russell’s eyes. There are no counter interpretations of the Platonic text to contend with. In fact there is no way to check on the context or the text of the quotations. Plato exists for the reader only as Russell presents him.

In general, of course, Russell clearly wishes to present only his interpretation of the history of philosophy. He is not interested in presenting one among many competing narratives. For this reason the absence of any reference to the secondary literature which might present alternative interpretations of the philosophers Russell is discussing or alternative versions of the narrative of philosophy’s history is to be expected. What is not so easily accounted for is Russell’s exceptional choice in the chapters on Plato even to document the source of his quotations. This insistence that the only Plato the reader encounters is precisely the Plato Russell presents and that the reader’s encounter with the Platonic corpus be limited to the quotations Russell presents needs to be explained. But such an explanation may well depend on the question of Russell’s familiarity with contemporary Platonic scholarship. Certainly if Russell were to be presenting a highly idiosyncratic interpretation of Plato, then it would be in his interest to refuse to acknowledge competing readings of the Platonic text. It would also be in his best interest not to encourage the reader to look at the Platonic text to check on the plausibility of Russell’s interpretation of Plato. However, I think that a careful glance at Russell’s interpretation of Plato shows that Russell was quite aware of many of the changes in the interpretation of Plato which had happened in the period just before he wrote A History of Western Philosophy and that an alternative explanation of his failure to document the source of his Platonic quotations is required. After first investigating the evidence for Russell’s knowledge of the then recent Platonic scholarship, I shall propose an alternative explanation of the absence of Stephanus page numbers in the Plato chapters.

Russell’s life spans one of the most significant periods in the development of Platonic studies. For the purposes of the study of the discussion of Plato in A History of Western Philosophy we might take 1892 - the date of the publication of the third edition of Benjamin Jowett’s translation of Plato as a beginning point and 1939 - the date of Gilbert Ryle’s publication in Mind of his article “Plato’s Parmenides” as representative dates. The reason for choosing these two points is rather simple. The Jowett translation rapidly became (as it unfortunately has remained) the most widely used complete translation of Plato. The Ryle article initiated discussions of the issue of Plato’s intellectual development. The latter issue is, as I shall show, particularly important for deciding the question of Russell’s familiarity with contemporary Platonic scholarship.

Nineteenth century philologists had made two enduring contributions to Platonic studies. The first was laying the foundation for the first modern critical edition of the Platonic corpus sine Henri Estienne’s initial publication of the Greek text in 1578. This effort culminated in John Burnet’s Oxford text of Plato which appeared 1900 through 1907. The second great achievement of nineteenth-century philologists was the establishment of a general consensus on the relative chronology of Plato’s Dialogues.

After the publication of Burnet’s edition of the Greek text there was a flourishing of Platonic scholarship - especially in the English speaking world. We can begin to assess Russell’s familiarity with this scholarship by discussing his interpretations of three dialogues: the Timaeus, the Parmenides, and the Republic. In his interpretation of the Timaeus and the Parmenides we shall see that Russell shows an awareness of contemporary Platonic scholarship. In the case of the Republic he anticipates a major direction of later interpretation.

Russell’s discussion of the Timaeus needs to be discussed only briefly. In terms of interpretation, Russell seems to be strongly influenced by A. E. Taylor’s commentary and its insistence that in the Timaeus Plato is presenting what is essentially a Pythagorean view of the physical world. However, unlike Taylor, Russell believes the Timaeus is no mere exercise in historical recreation. Russell holds that the dialogue presents Plato’s own beliefs. What is more significant than the details of his interpretation is the fact that Russell recognized the historical importance of the Timaeus. Although Russell is still firmly in the tradition of nineteenth century English interpretation in seeing the Republic as “Plato’s most important dialogue (108)”, he also recognizes that this phrase must be taken to mean philosophically important in our terms, and not that the Republic was necessarily the most important dialogue historically. On the contrary, Russell notes that the Timaeus, “... had more influence than anything else in Plato, which is curious, as it certainly contains more that is simple silly than is to be found in his other writings. As philosophy, it is unimportant, but historically it was so influential that it must be considered in some detail (143)”. This claim about the dialogue’s importance is repeated at the end of chapter 17: “The whole dialogue, as I said before, deserves to be studied because of its great influence on ancient and medieval thought, and this influence is not confined to what is least fantastic (148).”

When we turn to a discussion of Russell’s interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides it is important that we note the limitations of the achievements of
nineteenth century Platonic scholarship. As was noted earlier, one of the triumphs of nineteenth century Classical philologists was establishing the relative chronology of the Platonic dialogues. However, well into the twentieth century, Platonic scholars considered the relative chronology of the Dialogues as unimportant for the issue of interpreting Plato’s philosophy. The dominant view was that Plato, unlike almost every other major philosopher, arrived at his core beliefs early and never significantly modified his views. In effect, the relative chronology of the Dialogues was not taken as having any real significance for the question of Plato’s philosophical development. As late as 1933 Paul Shorey would publish What Plato Said and discuss each of the Dialogues without any indication that there might be any real development or change in Plato’s philosophy. Lest it be thought that Shorey reflected a merely American point of view, one which perhaps was not up on current European scholarship, it should be noted that Werner Jaeger’s pioneering Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung was published in 1923 and appeared in an English translation in 1934. This epoch making work depends for its major thesis about Aristote’s intellectual development on the assumption that Plato’s philosophy was essentially static from the earliest to the latest dialogues.

After Ryle’s 1939 article on the Parmenides the assumption of a static Platonic philosophy could no longer be asserted without qualification. Ryle’s position that Plato developed philosophically from the middle to the late dialogues became the standard thesis. The only real issue was how radically did Plato modify his “Theory of Ideas” or even whether or not he ever held such a theory -- at least in the form that nineteenth and early twentieth-century scholars had confidently presented. When we turn to Russell’s discussions of Plato’s metaphysics and epistemology, we seem to have evidence that he does not subscribe to the view that Plato arrived at the basic elements of his position early and never significantly modified his views. In effect, the relative chronology of the Dialogues was not taken as having any real significance for the question of Plato’s philosophical development. As late as 1933 Paul Shorey would publish What Plato Said and discuss each of the Dialogues without any indication that there might be any real development or change in Plato’s philosophy. Lest it be thought that Shorey reflected a merely American point of view, one which perhaps was not up on current European scholarship, it should be noted that Werner Jaeger’s pioneering Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung was published in 1923 and appeared in an English translation in 1934. This epoch making work depends for its major thesis about Aristote’s intellectual development on the assumption that Plato’s philosophy was essentially static from the earliest to the latest dialogues.

Ryle’s article not only raised the question of Plato’s philosophic development. It also directed attention to a dialogue which was commonly held to be philosophically insignificant. Even as intense a platonic partisan as A. E. Taylor failed to see any philosophic importance in the Parmenides:

If this is the right way to understand the dialogue, and Plato seems to tell us that it is, it follows that the Parmenides is, all through, an elaborate jeu d’esprit, and that all interpretations based on taking it for anything else (including an earlier one by the present writer), are mistaken in principle. It equally follows that the ironical spirit of the work must not be forgotten in dealing with isolated passages (351).

A little later Taylor remarks, “It would be taking Plato’s metaphysical jest too gravely to make a minute examination of all the details of these bewildering arguments (361).”

In sharp contrast to Taylor, Russell says:

[Aristotle] advances against [the theory of] ideas a number of very good arguments, most of which are already found in Plato’s Parmenides. The strongest argument is that of the ‘third man': if a man is a man because he resembles the ideal man, there must be a still more ideal man to whom both ordinary men and the ideal man are similar (162).

Both the fact that Russell takes the arguments of the Parmenides against the theory of ideas seriously and the fact that he identifies of the “Third Man Argument” (an argument which his own difficulties with the paradox of self-predication might have made him especially sensitive) as the most telling argument, seem to show the influence of Ryle’s article on the Parmenides. It is also interesting to note that on both points Russell here anticipates the direction of much Platonic scholarship in the decades after the publication of A History of Western Philosophy.

However, there is one very significant difference between Russell’s treatment of the later Platonic Dialogues and that of much of the post 1939 scholarship. This is that Russell virtually ignores the issue of whether or not there is significant development in Plato’s thought. Most recent scholarship on Plato has essentially accepted the modern logical criticism of the traditional Theory of Forms earlier ascribed to Plato. But modern scholars have tended to insist that even if this theory might be characteristic of Plato’s middle dialogues, it was radically criticized and perhaps even abandoned by Plato in the later dialogues. Russell admits, at least obliquely, that Plato did develop significant criticisms of the theory of ideas. Whether or not Russell also believed that Plato accepted these criticisms does not seem to be a significant issue for Russell. In fact, as we shall see later, it may be that Russell has very significant ideological reasons for not discussing the possibility of Plato’s philosophic development. But before discussing this issue let us turn to Russell’s discussion of the Republic.

4.

In the period after the publication of A History of Western Philosophy there was a bitter debate about Plato’s political philosophy, especially as that
philosophy was presented in the *Republic*. Most often this debate is seen to be initiated by Sir Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* in 1945. What has not been appreciated is the fact that Russell himself anticipated the main lines of Popper's interpretation of Plato as the father of totalitarianism. In fact, Russell may be said to have initiated a re-evaluation of Plato's political theory that was at least as thoroughgoing and as radical as the Platonic scholars' general re-evaluation of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Dialogues.

When Plato became a staple of the English philosophical curriculum in the nineteenth-century, it was in the form of a Plato whose philosophy reached its culmination in the *Republic*. This view (which, incidentally, Russell endorses [108]) was not the standard one in Classical Antiquity or the Renaissance. The selection of the *Republic* as the more significant dialogue than either the *Timaeus* or the *Parmenides* was associated with the successful attempt to use Plato to legitimate a series of educational and political reforms. For our purposes here we may ignore the reasons for the prioritizing of the *Republic* in the Platonic Canon. What is important for our purposes is the way that the *Republic* was interpreted. On the whole, nineteenth and early twentieth-century English writers tended to view the Plato of the *Republic* as an anti-conservative Philosophical Radical and even a proper ancestor of the French Revolution. It may be true that the Plato of the *Republic* clearly did not have much use for *egalite*, but he certainly was, they thought, the philosopher of *fraternite* and of *liberte* - at least in Robespierre's sense of the latter term. Like the English Radicals, the Plato of the *Republic* saw little good in either private property or the (traditional) family. In the words of Sir Ernest Barker:

> There is something French in Plato’s mind, something of that pushing of a principle to its logical extremes, which distinguished Calvin in theology and Rousseau in politics ... When we turn to Aristotle, it hardly seems fanciful to detect more of an English spirit of compromise ... Where Plato turned Radical under the compulsion of the Idea, Aristotle has much sound Conservatism: he respects property, he sees good in the family. He recognizes the general ‘laxity’ of actual life, the impossibility of including man wholly within the pale of any scheme. He recognizes, above all, that a Government can only go so far as a people follows: ‘the number of those who wish a State to continue must be greater than the number of those who wish the contrary’. This is a principle which Plato had not realized: he had forgotten (rather than despised) the people (162).

Even if Plato were not viewed as a Philosophic Radical, he was always viewed as an anti-conservative. If not quite a thorough-going advocate of democracy, Plato was held to be at the very least a trenchant critic of conservatism and aristocracy.

The view of Plato as anti-conservative continued to dominate English Platonic interpretation during the first part of the twentieth-century. A. E. Taylor and Francis M. Comford, although disagreeing on many details of Platonic interpretation, were agreed in making Plato the patron of liberal society rather than just the source of the radical political tradition. Taylor consistently argued against an interpretation of the *Republic* which would make it the ancestor of the radicalism of the French Revolution. Taylor's Plato instead is the opponent of militarism and the advocate of an enlightened liberal elite controlling society by their expertise. Comford goes even further in making Plato the patron of the liberal democratic order:

> ... Plato’s thought, from first to last, was chiefly bent on the question of how society could be shaped so that man might realize the best that is in him. This is, above all, the theme of his central work, the *Republic* (xv).

> ... the author of the earliest Utopia in European literature confronts the modern reader with the ultimate problem of politics: how can the state be so ordered as to place effective control in the hands of men who understand that you cannot make either an individual or a society happy by making them richer or more powerful than their neighbours. So long as knowledge is valued as a means to power, and power as the means to wealth, the helm of the ship of state will be grasped by the ambitious man, whose Bible is Machiavelli’s Prince or by the man of business, whose Bible is his profit and loss account. It is Plato’s merit to have seen that this problem looms up, in every age, behind all the superficial arguments of political expediency (xxix).

Russell’s view of Plato’s political philosophy is in sharp contrast to the dominant stream of interpretation in either of its forms. He saw Plato neither as the father of Philosophical Radicalism nor as the patron of liberal society. For Russell, Plato was the precursor of twentieth-century totalitarianism. In many significant ways his Plato is the Plato of Sir Karl Popper’s *The Open Society and Its Enemies* or of Gilbert Ryle’s *Plato’s Progress*. Russell emphasizes that by means of a definition of justice which is radically different from the modern one, Plato is able to have “inequalities of power and privilege without injustice (114)”. He
further sees that the Platonic state must be totalitarian in its essence. More importantly, Russell shows what the achievements of Plato’s ideal state better than Machiavelli’s Prince or the modern man of business might attempt. For Russell, the accomplishments of Plato’s Ideal State are,

... rather humdrum. It will achieve success in wars against roughly equal populations, and it will secure a livelihood for a certain small number of people. It will almost certainly produce no art or science, because of its rigidity; in this respect, as in others, it will be like Sparta. In spite of all the fine talk, skill in war and enough to eat is all that will be achieved. Plato had lived through famine and defeat in Athens; perhaps, subconsciously, he thought the avoidance of these evils the best that statesmanship could accomplish (115).

In depicting Plato’s Ideal State as totalitarian and Plato as the godfather of twentieth-century totalitarian states, Russell was following up a line of criticism which had already appeared in his The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism which was published in 1920. In that work Russell observes,

Far closer than any historical parallel [sc. to the present Russian Government] is the parallel of Plato’s Republic. The Communist Party corresponds to the guardians; the soldiers have about the same status in both; there is in Russia an attempt to deal with family life more or less as Plato suggested. I suppose it may be assumed that every teacher of Plato throughout the world abhors Bolshevism, and that every Bolshevik regards Plato as an antiquated bourgeois. Nevertheless, the parallel is extraordinarily exact between Plato’s Republic and the regime which the better Bolsheviks are endeavouring to create (23).

5.

The results of our discussion may be summarized as follows. Russell’s chapters on Plato in A History of Western Philosophy are anomalous in two respects: First, more space is devoted to a discussion of Plato than any other philosopher; second, unlike other chapters which contain at least a minimum of documentation, the Plato chapters are unique in giving no references, not even references to the source of the direct quotations from Plato. The answer to the first anomaly seems to be provided by Russell himself. Russell claims that, “it was Plato who had the greatest effect upon subsequent ages (104)”. As to the second anomaly, I hope that I have shown that the fact that Russell gives no reference to the secondary literature is not the result of his absence of familiarity with the contemporary Plato scholarship. Not only does Russell seem to be aware of the newer interpretations of Plato’s metaphysics and epistemology, he is himself, a bit ahead of his contemporaries in his assessment of Plato’s political philosophy. But although Russell appears to be familiar with the strikingly new developments, he does not refer to any contemporary scholars. He seems to be content to present an interpretation of Plato which takes account of their scholarship without wishing to direct the reader to any of the contemporary disagreements within the literature.

It would appear that Russell’s rhetorical strategy is quite deliberate. Russell is writing a revisionist history of philosophy. His expressed intention is to present the history of philosophy as, “an integral part of social and political life (ix)”. But it is also the case that for Russell, Plato is the crucial figure in the story of philosophy’s relation to social and political life. Since this is so, Russell must present a particular view of Plato, one which will set the stage for all that he thinks is central to the narrative he is going to present. Plato is the greatest figure in the tradition, but unfortunately Plato also subverted philosophy from its true task:

Plato is always concerned to advocate views that will make people what he thinks is virtuous; he is hardly ever intellectually honest, because he allows himself to judge doctrines by their social consequences. Even about this he is not honest; he pretends to follow the arguments and to be judging by purely intellectual standards, when in fact he is twisting the discussion so as to lead to a virtuous result. He introduced this vice into philosophy, where it has persisted ever since . . . . One of the defects of all philosophers since Plato is that their inquiries into ethics proceed on the assumptions that they already know the conclusions to be reached (78-79).

This passage provides the clue to Russell’s rhetorical strategy. His real quarrel is not so much with Plato’s Theory of Forms, or even Plato’s anti-empiricism. Plato’s errors in logic, epistemology or metaphysics are in the long run harmless errors. For errors in matters of logic or science can be cleared up by further discussion. Russell’s real concern is Plato’s commitment to ideology, to a vision of philosophy which subordinates free inquiry to the attainment of truths previously determined to be socially or politically acceptable. Russell is concerned with Plato’s basic formulation of the philosophic quest. Russell sees Plato as the great example of how philosophy can go wrong. In Russell’s narrative, Plato set
the example of a philosopher who was willing to subordinate truth to other political or social values, present them, and not be distracted by alternative views and tentative conjectures.

Such a subordination of truth to other concerns is precisely what Russell could not accept in ethics and social theory. It is fitting that at the end of a long period of his life when ethics was his primary concern, when he turns to a survey of the entire history of philosophy, a history which he wants to see in the context of the social antecedents and consequences of philosophic theory, that Russell should begin his account with a re-evaluation of the Platonic tradition.

But Russell’s re-evaluation of Plato is so radical that he must not let his account degenerate into considerations of alternative readings of the Platonic text or even by alternative passages in Plato which might tell against his vision of the Father of Western Philosophy introducing the basic vice into Western philosophizing about ethics and social theory. This appears to be the reason why Russell chooses a rhetorical strategy which denies the reader any account of the divergences in Platonic scholarship and any references to the wider Platonic text. Russell must marginalize his own expertise in the current controversies among Platonic scholars if he is going to focus attention effectively on the basic philosophic position he wishes to oppose. However, the absence of the explicit framework of scholarly interpretation does not necessarily mean that the writer is not familiar with the scholarly tradition.

Even if my account of the reasons for Russell’s refusing to provide any documentation in his long discussion of Plato is rejected, I bode that I have shown that Russell did in fact know the writings of his contemporary Plato interpreters and specifically his own revisionist issues - and in fact he even anticipated the radical revision of Plato’s political philosophy which would dominate certain areas of Platonic scholarship in the decades after A History of Western Philosophy was published.


Comford, Francis MacDonald. The Republic of Plato. (London: Oxford University Press, 1941)


Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy, and its connection with political and social circumstances from the earliest times to the present day. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945)


WITTGENSTEIN’S PLACE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

A BOOK REVIEW

John Shosky

American University


This book provides a rough analogy of what we need in Russelian scholarship: someone of great insight who documents Russell’s vast influence over twentieth century philosophy, with its personalities and crossing currents, with Cambridge as the epicenter of the shock waves sent out by Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Ramsey, Wisdom, and Anscombe. Peter Hacker does all of this for Wittgenstein alone, using Oxford as the epicenter of Wittgenstein’s powerful influence on philosophy.

Peter Hacker is a fellow of St. John’s College, Oxford. You probably know him as the author or co-author (with George Baker) of numerous works on Wittgenstein, among them the four-volume Analytical Commentary of the Philosophical Investigations. This new book is designed as a follow-up to the commentary, locating Wittgenstein in historical context. There is much comparison to Frege, Russell, and Quine, the other central figures of the last one hundred years.

But this is not a dry, hard-to-read book. This is a rapidly-running stream of information, history, analysis, and impressions. Hacker has used his many friendly connections in Oxford to probe way beyond the traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein and his contemporaries. Through personal knowledge, interviews, fresh examination of texts, a look at newly discovered material, and even some use of unpublished sources, Hacker has told the general philosophical story better than Passmore, Pears (Wittgenstein), Ayer, Grayling, or Monk, and even rivals the technical work of Anscombe, Malcolm, Pitcher, Hintikka, Fogelin, Kripke, Pears (The False Prison), or even the outstanding new addition by Genova. In short, this is a great book about philosophy and the influence of Wittgenstein, both as an important history and as a nuts-and-bolts discussion of dense issues.

The book begins with a background discussion of the origins of analytical philosophy. Twentieth century philosophy has its “twofold root” in Cambridge with Moore and Russell. Hacker tells the story of the rise of analytic
philosophy as a "historical movement" that is dynamic and constantly evolving. For Hacker, "[i]t cannot be defined by reference to a determinate number of non-trivial doctrines or principles, all of which were embraced by every philosopher who can with justice be described as a member of the analytic movement. Rather, it consists of different, overlapping strands, with no usefully defining fibre or fibres running through a whole temporal length . . . . Hence the phenomenon of analytic philosophy must not be viewed as a simple linear development. It has a complex synchronic, as well as a diachronic, dimension."

The reaction of analytic philosophy against idealism is told as a personal and professional battle by Moore and Russell against the dominant philosophical trend of their time. Their work in logic, epistemology, and language set the stage for Wittgenstein. So did the technical advances in logic by Boole, Jevons, Peano, Whitehead and Russell. Frege and Russell both made a concerted effort to analyze language, but mostly for "clues" that could help the logician. The construction of a logically perfect language was part of the solution to the "flawed, distorting mirror" of language.

The Second chapter explains Wittgenstein's achievements in the *Tractatus*. This book is viewed as a landmark of twentieth century philosophy (which it surely is). The main achievements fall within four headings: its criticism of Frege and Russell; its metaphysical picture of the relation of thought, language, and reality; its positive account of the nature of the propositions of logic; and its critique of metaphysics and its conception of philosophy as analysis. But Hacker traces Wittgenstein's later disappointment with these views, which were errors that required the attempt at resolution in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

The Third chapter discusses the impact of the *Tractatus* on the Vienna Circle. There has been much written about the Circle, but rarely with such economy and clarity. After detailing the membership of the Circle, Hacker shows Wittgenstein's relationship to its main doctrines: forging a relationship between philosophy analysis and science, the demolition of metaphysics, necessary truth and conventionalism, the verification principle, and the unity of science.

Hacker then devotes his Fourth chapter to philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford during the inter-war years. This is an exciting chapter, told with much insider information, with hints of the personalities and debates that fashioned some of the greatest minds of the twentieth century. Here we can read about Cambridge's Broad, Ramsey, Braithwaite, Wisdom, Stebbing, Black, and Malcolm. We get a flavor of Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge. Then Hacker gives us the view from Oxford, where Ryle, Price, Mabbott, Ayer, Berlin, Austin, Kneale, Grice, Waismann, and Strawson were busy with their own work in language, logic, and analysis. Some absorbed Wittgenstein through personal contact (Ryle and Waismann). Others found him second-hand through the Vienna Circle (Ayer) or through analysis of language (Austin, Grice, and Strawson). This chapter is one of the best I have ever read about Oxford philosophy, and gives some cogency to the view that there was a linguistic movement at Oxford, perhaps one-step removed from Wittgenstein, but spiritually akin through the emphasis on language in philosophical analysis.

Chapter Five then takes up the achievement of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Hacker's goal is to show the unity of the *Investigations* (no small task), assuming that readers can turn to the Hacker/Baker commentaries for illumination of the details. He groups the achievements of the *Investigations* under five headings: its repudiation of philosophical analysis and the espousal of connective analysis, its conception of philosophy and therapeutic analysis, its critique of metaphysics, its philosophy of language and conception of meaning as use, and its philosophical psychology and repudiation of the inner/outer conception of the mental. Needless to say, *Philosophical Investigations* is well-known for its uniqueness in philosophy and for what Hacker has described as its ability to undercut previously received philosophy traditions. Therefore, "(Wittgenstein's) philosophy can no more be located on the received maps of philosophical possibilities than the North Star can be located on the maps of the globe."

Chapter Six then examines Wittgenstein's impact on post-war philosophy. It was during this time that Wittgenstein's disciples came to the forefront of philosophy: Anescombe, Malcolm, Toulmin, von Wright, Geach, Rhees, and others. While Wittgenstein considered Oxford "an influenza area," his influence was spread by Ryle, Ayer, Pears, Paul, Flew, Wozley, Hare, Kenny, Hampshire, Strawson, Warnock, Grice, and even the jurist Hart. Harre combined an interest in Wittgenstein with science and psychology. A second generation of Wittgenstein philosophers in Oxford included Hacker, Baker, and Grayling.

Chapter Seven outlines post-positivism in the United States and Quine's famous apostasy from the "two dogmas of empiricism." Several logical positivists came to the United States before the Second World War, and brought their enthusiasm for the early Wittgenstein with them. Philosophers such as Carnap, Feigl, Hempel, Reichenbach, Frank, Gödel, Tarski, and Menger each found their way to American universities to continue their work. Yet, one member/attendee of the Circle, Quine, argued that the analytic/synthetic distinction was untenable, that significant empirical statements were not reducible to sense data, and that sentential verificationism was untenable. These objections cut to the heart of positivism and its Wittgensteinian inspiration, and
had serious consequences for analytical philosophy.

Finally, Hacker shows that Wittgenstein's influence has led to a decline in analytical philosophy, if we mean by that "a tradition of connective analytical philosophy." The center of gravity in philosophy has shifted, with many philosophers now working with Wittgenstein's "new vision and new methods. His bequest is a vision of philosophy as the pursuit not of knowledge but of understanding. The task of philosophy is not to add to the sum of human knowledge, but to enable us to attain a clear understanding of what is already known."

This is Wittgenstein's story, and a similar story could be told about Russell, but perhaps of no other philosopher in the twentieth century. This is a story about how one philosopher's influence can change the history of Philosophy. In the absence of a similar book about Russell and his importance to several generations of scholars, Hacker's book will allow the documentation of Wittgenstein's influence to rule by default. This book is well-done, formidable, and breath-taking in its scope. I recommend Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy very highly. It is brilliant, brilliant, brilliant. I find myself reading it for fun and enjoyment, using it as an encyclopedic reference, citing it as the final word on several key interpretations of various philosopher's positions, and searching for new nuggets of wisdom. Perhaps only Hacker could corral all of the evidence, texts, gossip, impressions, and interpretations into a readable, fast-moving, scholarly, and fascinating volume. I hope Russell scholars will look at this book and sigh, wishing for a companion volume for Russell, either by Oxford's Hacker or someone of comparable gifts at Cambridge. There should be a Russell's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy, and Hacker's book should be the model for this much-needed effort.

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"Reds" (1981)
MEMORY COMES AND GOES: A Video Review
Cliff Henke

Author's note: This series, which has been devoted to recent films, now will consider several older movies that also involved people and events Russell knew well.

“I don’t recall them too well,” Dora Russell muses at the beginning of this epic about the Russian Revolution, among other things, as seen through the eyes of American communists of the time, “Memory comes and goes.” This can be said of all history. We all tend to recall events selectively, and in turn shaped by our own world views. Jack Reed, the enigmatic American left-wing journalist who viewed first-hand not the abdication of Czar Nicholas but the Bolshevik takeover is a convenient canvas for those to paint their own recollection of the times. To the “witnesses,” the figures of that era who knew Reed and whose interviews writer/director Warren Beatty excerpts throughout the story, the protagonist was a complex personality. He was at once a coward, a naive ideologue, a rogue, a nobody, and an influential visionary.

The resulting portrait of both documentary and fictional parts is an engaging film worth revisiting today. It won Academy Awards for Beatty's direction and for Maureen Stapleton's supporting performance in playing Emma Goldman. Both are deserved, as well as Vitorrio Stororo's for his sweeping and lyrical cinematography. In fact, I admire this quality of Reds most, which joins Stororo’s other breathtaking masterpieces of camera and lighting technique (for me most notably Apocalypse Now).

Also enhancing the movie's realistic yet romantic feel are Richard Sylbert's sets and locations. The poignant design of Reed’s and wife Louise Bryant’s (played admirably by Diane Kenton) flat, an abandoned upper-crust apartment complete with initially covered chandelier, is particularly inspired and evocative of the tumultuous time and place. Dave Grusin’s and Stephen Sondheim’s music embellish the feel at another dimension. So, too, does the supporting cast, which includes not only Stapleton’s performance but also Edward Herrmann and Paul Sorvino as resident Greenwich Village lefties, as well as Jack Nicholson’s detached, wry portrait of Eugene O’Neill.

Whether Beatty’s, or Keaton’s, or some other member of the team’s choice, the decision for Kenton to wear her hats pulled down so far onto her forehead to frame Keaton’s eyes is a splendid touch. Stororo masterfully exploits it with just the right lighting and close-ups, and these give the film even more eloquence of what must have been true earnestness among those like Bryant who were faithful to the cause.

Beatty also plays Reed, but unfortunately here is where he might have bitten off more than he can chew. I have never found his wooden acting style very engaging anyway, and it seems even more out of place given the passion of the time. I wonder what Beatty’s contemporary, Martin Sheen, or even today’s John Cusak could have done with the intensity and self-absorption the role demands. Meanwhile, the story and script are simultaneously compelling and unsatisfying, perhaps also evocative of the time. On the one hand, the story takes in most of the
great events in the first part of the century, much as Carrington and Tom and Viv
do, plus one more: Reds also has the backdrop of the Russian Revolution, which
dictated so much of the tension in the world even to this day. It successfully
illuminates the paradox of that time -- that dissent against revolutionary excesses
would be considered treasonous. Emma Goldman tells Jack Reed late in the story
that she plans to leave, because “it can never work.” Jack asks her how she can
when “we’ve just started.” Herein dramatizes the left’s dilemma in supporting the
Bolsheviks: were they really a transition to proletarian rule or just another
totalitarian state but with the correct rhetoric?

The central relationship between Jack and Louise is far less satisfying, on
the other hand. It is no fault of how Louise is characterized and played; she seeks
Jack’s love, is torn up inside by desiring that much from a man, and comes to
terms with the fact that the struggle for power is less important than love and
happiness. To me she is the real protagonist in this movie, yet I think Beatty’s
sympathies lie with Jack. He is somehow allowed to get away with leaving her for
a flattering and ultimately vain occupation. Whether due to the mixed record of
the factual Jack Reed or Beatty’s opaque portrayal of the man, this film sheds
little light on what really animated the only American to be buried within the walls
of the Kremlin. Yes, memory comes and goes, but like literature and other arts,
film is supposed to help fill in those gaps in between.

THE GREATER ROCHESTER RUSSELL SET
Peter Stone
University of Rochester

After laying dormant for almost a year, the Greater Rochester Russell Set
(GRRS) is once again alive, and spreading the gospel according to Bertie. The
Set, a Rochester, NY-based group dedicated to the study and discussion of the life
and ideas of Bertrand Russell, has already held two successful meetings in 1997,
one devoted to The Problems of Philosophy (1912), the other to Human Society
in Ethics and Politics (1952). In 1998, we hope to hold many more. Sadly, we
fear that many of the participants from last year’s meetings are unaware that the
group has been revived. Thus, we are anxious to make our presence known once
again.

The GRRS meets on the second Tuesday of every month at 7 p.m. at
Moonbeams Gallery & Coffee Saloon, 696 University Avenue, Rochester, NY.
There will be no January meeting. The February meeting will be devoted to On
Education Especially in Early Childhood (1926) (retitled Education and the
Good Life), and the March meeting to Principles of Social Reconstruction
(1916).

The group is anxious for ideas for future meetings and encourages
everyone both to participate and to get involved in keeping the GRRS a lively part
of Rochester’s intellectual culture. Interested people should contact David White
at (716)461-3495 or at davidw@sjfc.edu or just come to a meeting ready to listen
and talk. See you in February!

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
Membership Profiles

BRS members have asked for information about other members in the
Society. Here are just a few profiles. If you haven’t yet sent yours in, please take
a few moments when you finish this issue of the Quarterly and send yours in.

Name: Howard A. Blair
Address: 118 Hertford Street
Syracuse, New York 13210
E-mail: Blair@top.cis.yr.edu
First book of Russell’s I read was: Why I Am Not A Christian
Latest book of Russell’s I read was: Collected Papers, Volume 7: Theory of
Knowledge
Favorite Russell Quotation: "Common sense is the metaphysics of savages."
Reason for joining BRS: Access to discourse on ideas having affinity with
those espoused by Russell
Recent applications of Russell’s views to your own life: (Re-)developing an
intense skepticism, particularly about common sense.

Name: Bruce Thompson
Address: 82 Topping Drive
Riverhead, New York, 11901
E-mail: BruceT@cats.ucsc.edu
First book of Russell’s I read was: Autobiography
Latest book of Russell’s I read was: Portraits from Memory.
Favorite Russell Quotation: “The old world will pass away, burnt in the fire of its own hot passions. And from its ashes will spring a new world, full of fresh hope, with the light of morning in its eyes.” From Proposed Roads to Freedom.

Reason for joining BRS: To honor an intellectual hero, stay in touch with Russell scholarship.

Recent applications of Russell’s views to your own life: Conquest of Happiness is always good therapy.

Additional Comments: Recently acquired three Russell letters in Northern California (they had been in someone’s attic) and sent them off to the Russell Archives at McMaster University.

Name: Christos Tzanetakis
Address: 3120 N. A-1-A, Apt. #5033 South
Fort Pierce, Florida 34999
E-mail: athalfic@AOL.com

First book of Russell’s I read was: Either Why I Am Not a Christian or A History of Western Philosophy.

Latest book of Russell’s I read was: The Conquest of Happiness.

Favorite Russell Quotation: “We ought to make the best we can of the world; and if it is not so good as we wish, after all it will still be better than what others have made of it in all these ages. A good world needs knowledge, kindness, and courage; it does not need a regretful hankering after the past or a fettering of the free intelligence by the words uttered long ago by ignorant men. It needs a fearless outlook and a free intelligence. It needs hope for the future, not looking back all the time towards a past that is dead, which we trust will be far surpassed by the future that our intelligence can create.”

Reason for joining BRS: To get in touch with other admirers of Russell and promote his ideas.

Recent applications of Russell’s views to your own life: His Conquest of Happiness has been a daily guideline.

Additional Comments: As founder and president of ATHEISTS OF FLORIDA, INC., I have introduced his book, Why I Am Not a Christian by giving free copies to all our student members. Also, over 150 copies of the book have been sold either at the Miami Book Fair International, held annually in Miami, Florida, or during the annual conventions of the Atheist Alliance, Inc. in which Athetys of Florida is a member society. In 1994, as television producer for Athetys of Florida, Inc., I dedicated one of the twelve half-hour programs on Bertrand Russell. Main guest was Mr. Lee Eissler, founding member of the Bertrand Russell Society.
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
Membership Profile Form

Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to:

John Shosky
BRS Editor
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, VA 22307

NAME: ____________________________________________

ADDRESS: _________________________________________

E_MAIL: __________________________________________

First book of Russell's I read was _____________________

Last book of Russell's I read was _____________________

Favorite Russell Quotation: __________________________

Reason(s) for Joining BRS: __________________________

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life: 

Additional Comments: ____________________________________________
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
1998 Membership Renewal Form

This is a reminder to renew BRS membership for 1998.

If you have already renewed for 1998 or have joined the BRS in 1998, please accept our thanks once again for participating in the BRS.

If you have not yet renewed your membership for 1998 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- please mail the form below along with the appropriate payment TODAY. Thanks!

Please mail this form and payment to:

Dennis Darland
BRS Treasurer
1965 Winding Hills Road, #1304
Davenport, IA 52807
U.S.A.

I have looked at the membership categories below and have checked the appropriate category for my circumstances. I have enclosed my 1998 dues in U.S. funds payable to "Bertrand Russell Society". (Please print clearly.)

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☐ Couple $40
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☐ Limited Income Couple $25
☐ Contributor $50 and up
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☐ Sponsor $100 and up
☐ Patron $250 and up
☐ Benefactor $500 and up
☐ Life Member $1,000 and up
☐ Organization Membership $50
☐ PLUS $10 (if outside U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico)
☐ PLUS $4 (if in Canada or Mexico)

NAME_________________________ DATE_________________________

ADDRESS_________________________

E_MAIL_________________________