The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August, and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

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It is time to renew your membership for 1998.

♦ If you have already renewed for 1998 or have joined the BRS in 1998, please accept the thanks of the Society once again for your participation.

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FROM THE EDITOR  
JOHN SHOSKY  
CHARLES UNIVERSITY

This is the second edition of the Quarterly edited in Prague. Here the Spring weather has been remarkably beautiful, making it hard to concentrate on philosophy. But my colleagues in the Academy of Sciences and at Charles University have been excellent role models, helping me to learn that love of logic and philosophy can overcome the temptations of a sunny day.

In this issue you will find a membership renewal form as you open the Quarterly. I have learned that there are some of you who believe that the placement of the renewal form at the end of the Quarterly, as in past issues, makes it easy to overlook this important request. So, by popular demand, the membership renewal form is now in the front. If you haven’t renewed, please pull out the checkbook, fill in the form, and send check and form to John Lenz as soon as possible. Thank you for your continued support, because you are the Bertrand Russell Society.

In this issue we have a letter from John Lenz about the death of Lee Eislcr, a co-founder of the Society and a herculean figure in Russell Studies. Words cannot convey his immense importance to the BRS or the personal loss felt by many of us. Lee was a dynamic, visionary supporter of the Russell Society. His loss is acutely felt by those who knew him because Lee’s love of Russell was infectious and his work on behalf of the BRS was formidable. All of us send condolences to Lee’s wife, Jan, our current Vice President.

There is another edition of "Russell News", a series of talking points about new developments in Russell Studies.

Ken Blackwell has prepared a valuable survey of recent reprints of Russell’s work. He has included publications dates and the name of the eminent person providing a contextual introduction. How many of these reprints have made it to your library?

In a featured essay, Timothy Childers examines Russell’s contributions to probability theory. A distinguished member of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, and a scholar in the Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy, Tim is one of the foremost students of probability theory in the Czech Republic. This essay is a valuable addition to the Russell corpus.

We also have a report by the editor on Russell’s influence in the Czech Republic. Through translations, correspondence, courageous educators, and dedicated students, Russell has been an important influence on Czech logic and philosophy. The enclosed report is probably analogous to that of many other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where Russell was sometimes viewed as a hero by the communist governments and sometimes vilified by those same governments. As a voice of freedom and reason, Russell had a singular impact on the intellectual climate of this part of the world.

In another report, Assistant Editor Bob Barnard finds that in many parts of Southeastern Europe Russell’s influence is receding. Russell is now primarily remembered for his philosophical contributions, not his political or social commentary.

Surprisingly, there is a growing "Russell Renaissance" in many parts of Europe. Following Barnard’s report there is a discussion of The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell by Francisco Rodriguez-Consuegra of Spain. His book is a powerful example of the growing interest in Russell Studies in the United States, Australia, Canada, and Great Britain, as well as on the European Continent.

Cliff Henke has supplied another video review, this time looking at a documentary about the First World War. As a pacifist, Russell worked to limit British involvement in that war. This documentary captures the issues, intellectual climate, and historical events of the "war to end all wars." This review is important, given the earlier discussion of Russell’s influence in Europe. The video provides a thorough contextual presentation of the Great War, allowing the viewer to better understand Russell’s pacifism and the opposition in Great Britain to Russell’s position.

If you haven’t filled out a membership profile form, please do so so we can learn more about your interest in, and appreciation of, Russell.

As explained in the last issue, the cover drawing is by Iva Petkova, an outstanding artist from Sofia, Bulgaria.

My apologies for the delayed appearance of this issue. The fault is entirely mine. We’ll try to get the Quarterly back on schedule with the next issue.

Again, I thank my assistant editors, Katie Kendig and Robert Barnard.

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LEE EISLER:
REMEMBRANCE OF A GOOD FRIEND
JOHN LENZ
DREW UNIVERSITY

I am very sorry to inform the members of the BRS of the death of Lee Eisler in Florida on April 22, 1998. Lee was the long-time spirit behind the BRS, of which he was a co-founder. He held the BRS together as editor of the Newsletter for many years and as a wonderfully congenial officer for membership and information (in addition to his many other services) until his retirement several years ago.

Lee led a colorful life. After graduating from the New York Military Academy and Dartmouth College, he worked at Bulova Watch Company and then entered the field of advertising. Upon retirement he moved to rural Pennsylvania and then to Florida.

Lee had a life-long interest in Russell. He was the author of Morals Without Mystery: A Liberating Alternative to Established Morality Based on Bertrand Russell’s Views Applied to Current Problems (Philosophical Library, 1971). The book was based on Russell’s views in Human Society in Ethics and Politics. Russell reviewed an early copy of Eisler’s book and his comments were included on the front cover of the dust-jacket: “Morals Without Mystery is a well-written short presentation of the kind of morality I believe in and advocate.” About the book, Lee said that “Unfortunately, most people don’t read books by philosophers, even readable ones like Russell. I hope Morals Without Mystery will bring Russell’s views on morality to people who might otherwise not come across them.”

Lee was also the editor of The Quotable Bertrand Russell (Prometheus Books, 1993). That book was dedicated to the memory of Russell, "who let light into dark corners of the past and present and saw a happy future for Man, despite current troubles, with Intelligence showing the way."

Lee will be missed by all of us who knew him. He is survived by his second wife, Jan Loeb Eisler, the current Vice President of the BRS. I know I speak for the entire Society when I send Jan our heartfelt condolences. Thank you for sharing Lee with all of us.

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### RUSSELL NEWS ###

There are eight newly elected members of the BRS Board of Directors: Ken Blackwell, Dennis Darland, Gladys Leithauser, John Lenz, S.J. Reinhardt, David Rodier, Tom Stanley, and Ruili Ye. Each was elected to a three-year term. Congratulations.

Kenneth Blackwell is the newly elected chairman of the board, replacing Michael Rockler. Peter Stone is the new BRS secretary, as well as the secretary of the board of directors. Peter replaces Ken as BRS secretary. The other officers of the society were re-elected to new terms at the most recent annual meeting in Tampa, June 19-21, 1998. More about the annual meeting in the next issue of the Quarterly.

Daniel Hearsum, owner of Pembroke Lodge, Russell’s childhood home, writes to inform the BRS that his family company has entered into a long-term agreement with the Royal Parks Agency to restore the Lodge. He proposes to dedicate a room to Russell. Therefore, he would like any assistance in providing Russell memorabilia or financial support. He can be reached at Pembroke Lodge, Richmond Park, Richmond, Surrey TW10 5HX, United Kingdom. The telephone number is 44-0181-948-7088.

Irving Copi is the recipient of the 1998 Bertrand Russell Society Service Award. Professor Copi, known to generations of students for his Introduction to Logic textbook (now in its tenth edition, co-authored with Carl Cohen), was a longtime fixture at University of Michigan. He is now a professor at the University of Hawaii. He is well-known for three other publications: Symbolic Logic (now in its fifth edition), Essays on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (edited with Robert Beard), and Readings on Logic (edited with James Gould). Professor Copi has been an avid student of Russell’s work and a powerful advocate for the use of logical reasoning in philosophy. It is an honor to associate Professor Copi’s name with our Society. Congratulations.

John G. Slater of the University of Toronto received the 1998 Bertrand Russell Society Book Award for his cumulative contributions to Russell Studies, most recently through his editorship of Volumes 10 and 11 of The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Congratulations to a giant in the field of Russell Studies.

BRS President John Lenz was interviewed by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation on April 1st for a series of radio programs they are preparing on Bertrand Russell.

Robert Barnard, assistant editor of the BRS Quarterly, recently attended a
Conference in Bled, Slovenia on the topic of "vagueness" in philosophy. Bob's presentation concerned the foundations of logic. Bob has constantly noted in his presentations that Russell was the real father of this topic, dating from the 1923 presentation on "vagueness" in the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, Volume 1, June, 1923, pp. 84-92).

David Rodier, chairman of the Philosophy and Religion Department at American University and a recently elected BRS Board Member, spoke at "Logica '98" in the Czech Republic on "Russell's Notes on Logic." Rodier reports that the paper discussed the historical significance of Russell's "Advanced Logic" Seminar at Harvard in 1914.

Ray Monk, the 1997 winner of the Bertrand Russell Society Book Award for his volume Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude, wrote to express his thanks to the BRS. He is currently finishing the second volume of his biography of Russell.

Ivor Grattan-Guinness reported in Axiomathes (Number 3, December, 1996, pp. 435-6) that there are some manuscripts concerning Wittgenstein in the Archives at University College, London. C.K. Ogden was the first translator of the Tractatus (with considerable help from Frank Ramsey, Dorothy Wrinch, and Russell). The manuscripts are part of a larger donation by the Mark Hayman family in 1992 (Hayman was Ogden's solicitor). Included are six sets of materials directly concerned with Wittgenstein: 1) a typescript of the original translation, 2) transcriptions of Wittgenstein's letters, 3) various lists of proposed changes, 4) letters concerning changes for the reprint of the Tractatus in 1933, 5) letters of the mid-1950s from Max Black and Georg Kreisel about the translation, and 6) letters from 1962 and later. Grattan-Guinness doubts that there is anything unknown here. But this is a finding of note, even if duplicated elsewhere. As always, Ivor seems to find things. He surely is one of the most diligent and accomplished historians of logic and mathematics. He is also the author of the Fontana History of the Mathematical Sciences, published in 1997.

Petr Kolár, chairman of the Department of Logic in the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, has started a member branch of the BRS in Prague. Petr is an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at Charles IV University and the author of several important papers on logic and truth theory. He told your editor that "Russell has always been my hero." Good luck to our friends in Prague. Let the word go forth. There is some discussion about starting a branch of the BRS in Bulgaria. More about that in the next issue. With other branches in India and the Philippines, the BRS is starting to expand world-wide.

Professor Karol Berka, a logic legend in Prague, recently donated a copy of a letter from Russell to the Quarterly. The correspondence was on stationary from the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and concerned Berka's efforts to compile a bibliography of Russell's writings. Russell wanted a copy and also was interested to discover if Berka had come across any Russell papers in the hands of private collectors. Of interest are the listed sponsors of the Peace Foundation in 1966: the Duke of Bedford, Dr. Max Born, Lord Boyd Orr, Pablo Casals, Danilo Dolci, Queen Elisabeth of the Belgians, Kenneth Kaunda, Ayub Khan, Jawaharlal Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Limus Pauling, S. Radhakrishnan, Vanessa Redgrave, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, Halle Slassie, Leopold Senghor, and Norodom Sihamouk.

Claudio de Almeida has published Russell on the Foundations of Logic (Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 1998). The book consists of two long essays: "The Argument of 'On Denoting'" and "Russell: a logica e a teoria do juizo." The second essay is in Portuguese and is about Russell's theory of judgement. Dr. de Almeida did his Ph.D. in Russell Studies at McMaster University.


NEWLY INTRODUCED RUSSELL REPRINTS
KENNETH BLACKWELL
McMASTER UNIVERSITY

During this decade Russell's publishers have hastened to reintroduce him to a new public and have reprinted some two dozen of his books with new introductions for paperback release. These reprints didn't get into a Bibliography of Bertrand Russell (in three volumes, London: Routledge, 1994), which closed as of 1990, so I'm compiling a complete list. Here's the list so far, with the date of publication of the reprint, arranged by introducer.

Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, 1995, Thomas Baldwin
My Philosophical Development, 1995, Thomas Baldwin
The Problem of China, 1993, Ken Coates
German Social Democracy, 1995, Ken Coates (?)
The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, 1995, Ken Coates
RUSSELL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROBABILITY
TIMOTHY CHILDERS
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
CZECH REPUBLIC

From the time of Bolzano until the Second World War, the foundations of probability fascinated Central European philosophers.1 Brentano, Meinong, Lukasiewicz and Carnap are good examples, but it is rare to find a book published in philosophy in this tradition that did contain at least a chapter on probability.2 The favored interpretation was usually the logical one. According to this interpretation, probability should be equally distributed over some basic logical particles. If probability is so defined, it serves as a generalization of logic, in that given extreme assignments of only 1 and 0, the calculus becomes the usual Boolean one, preserving entailment relations. The main rival to this interpretation, also widely canvassed in Central Europe, was the frequentist interpretation, according to which probability is the measure of the occurrence of an attribute in a population.3 The highest development of the logical interpretation was at the hands of Carnap in his monumental Logical Foundations of Probability. But this development was certainly due to earlier contributions, originating from Cambridge. We can trace the logical interpretation from J.M. Keynes to Wittgenstein to Waismann and finally to Carnap.

My aim in this paper is a modest one: to show that Russell was responsible in significant part for the renewal of interest in the theories of probability. This is perhaps not surprising: he knew all the key figures, working closely with some. As well, he wrote extensively on epistemology and logic, and on probability as well.

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1 More specifically, philosophers trained in the Austro-Hungarian tradition.

2 Interestingly enough, T.G. Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia and friend and student of Brentano, gave his 1882 inaugural address at the Czech University in Prague on the application of probability to Hume's problem of induction. More information on this can be found in Rene Weller, "Introduction" and Rudolf Haller's "Masaryk's Theorie der Wissenschaft," both found in On Masaryk: Texts in English and German, Volume XII of Studien zur Oesterreichischen Philosophie, edited by Josef Novak, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1988, pp. 1-11, 39-53, respectively.

But even more specifically, it was Russell’s account of justification, transmitted to (and via) Keynes, that led to the responses leading to significant advances in other interpretations. Thus I will trace out at least some of the connections from Russell to Carnap, and to other thinkers on the foundations of probability.

G.E. Moore’s comments on probability in *Principia Ethica* inspired Keynes to write his *A Treatise on Probability*. Moore had argued that a society’s moral rules served as a rational guide to right action because these rules, if followed, would with high probability lead to right actions. (The relevant argument can be found in *Principia Ethica*, p.162.) It was this argument that in part lead Keynes to write this Treatise, as he later reported in his essay “My Early Beliefs”: “He [Moore] also has a section on the justification of general rules of conduct. The large part played by considerations of probability in his theory of right conduct was, indeed, an important contributory cause to my spending all the leisure of many years on the study of that subject...” (Keynes 1933 [1972], p. 445) But he ends this sentence by stating his other main influence-Russell: “I was writing under the joint influence of Moore’s *Principia Ethica* and Russell’s *Principia Mathematica...*” (Ibid.)

4 We could take an earlier starting point, for example, John Venn’s *Logic of Chance* (London: Macmillan, 1888). However, Keynes’ work is a good starting point since his *Treatise* was the first book-length work in English on the foundations of probability for 55 years (as Keynes himself notes in the introduction). Keynes’ book also served as a catalyst for an explosion of interest in the foundations of probability, both in England and on the continent. This, it seems, was mostly due to his account of the knowledge of the probability relation, which as I shall argue came from Russell, and so makes it an appropriate starting point for an article in this Quarterly. I should also mention that the date of the publication of the Treatise can be confusing. Keynes had completed 27 of 30 chapters of the book by 1910, basing it on his fellowship dissertation submitted in 1908. For citations and other matters regarding the research on probability at Cambridge at this time, see S.L. Zabell, *Ramsey, Truth and Probability*, *Theoria*, Volume LVII, pp. 211-238.

5 I should note that Keynes goes on to say that he accepted neither Moore’s view of probability nor his account of the relation to probability rules of conduct. In particular, Keynes regarded Moore’s frequentist interpretation of probability as untenable. His disagreement with Moore’s interpretation of probability seems to have been rooted, or perhaps motivated by, his rejection of Moore’s conclusions about the ethical implications of an intuitionistic approach. Also, there has been much debate as to the accuracy of Keynes’ report of Moore’s influence on him, and of the accuracy of Keynes’ report of the ethical views of his and the Bloomsbury group’s ethical views in “My Early Beliefs” (e.g. Robert Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed*, 1883-1920, Volume 1, London: Macmillan, 1983). An account of Moore’s considerable influence, drawn from Keynes’ unpublished papers, may be found in Skidelsky and in D.E. Moggridge, *John Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography* (London: Routledge, 1992). Moggridge’s book also serves as a good introduction to the growing literature on Keynes’ theory of probability. Also noteworthy are A.M. Carabelli, *On Keynes’ Method* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988) and Rob M. O’Donnell, *Keynes: Philosophy, Economics and Politics: The Philosophical Foundations of Keynes’ Thought and Their Influence on his Economics and Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989). It is clear from Keynes’ many statements of Moore’s influence on him, in both his published and unpublished writings, that although Keynes disagreed with much in Moore, and developed his theory of probability in opposition to Moore’s, Keynes adopted many of Moore’s general philosophical positions. As well, the fact that Keynes discussed his then-unpublished Treatise on Probability with Moore (Moore even read the proofs) suggests Moore’s strong influence on his work. But, unfortunately, we have no details of their discussions, only the dates of appointments (see B.W. Bateman, *G.E. Moore and J.M. Keynes: A Missing Chapter in the History of the Expected Utility Model*, *American Economic Review*, Volume 78, Number 5, 1988, pp. 1098-1106).

6 This is perhaps not quite correct. Łukasiewicz in 1913, for example, developed a logical theory independently of the trend from Cambridge. Nonetheless, his account of logical probability was almost completely ignored outside of Poland.

7 Or, at least, his epistemology of logic as put forward in 1910 and 1912. His account at this time, it should be noted, resembles in many respects Moore’s epistemology for ethics.
between "[t]he objects of knowledge and belief" and "the objects of direct acquaintance" which are "sensations, meanings, and perceptions." (Ibid., p. 12) Direct acquaintance, according to Keynes (and Russell), leads to direct knowledge "as the result of contemplating the objects of acquaintance." (Ibid.) Keynes gave as an example of direct knowledge gained from direct acquaintance the transition from the sensing of yellow to knowledge of certain propositions about yellow. (Ibid., p. 13) Russell had likewise used the sensation of yellow as a paradigmatic example of things known by direct acquaintance (Russell 1910 [1917], pp. 212-213). Moore of course also used this example.

Keynes followed Russell in calling propositions obtained directly "self-evident." (Keynes 1921 [1973], p. 18) Keynes, like Russell, assumed direct knowledge ("knowledge by acquaintance") to be indubitable: ":...I have assumed that all direct knowledge is certain." (Ibid., p. 17) He held that we could come to know probability relations (which are second order, or "secondary" propositions) by "perceiving... [a] probability relation" which holds between the propositions of direct knowledge. (Ibid., pp. 12-13)

So for Keynes, direct acquaintance serves two purposes: it supplies propositions about which we are certain, and it supplies knowledge of the logical and probabilistic relations we can use to reason from the certain propositions to probable propositions. Thus the very foundations of his theory of probability came from Russell. And it was just Keynes' account of foundations that sparked Ramsey's development of a theory of subjective probability, leading to what is now the dominant interpretation. Ramsey remarked: "...real does not seem to be any such things as the probability relations he [Keynes] describes. He supposes that, at any rate in certain cases, they can be perceived; but speaking for myself I feel confident that this is not true. I do not perceive them, and if I am to be persuaded that they exist it must be by argument; moreover I shrewdly suspect that others do not perceive them either, because they are able to come to so very little agreement as to which of them relates any two given propositions." (Ramsey 1978, p. 62. The essay was written in 1926 and published posthumously in 1931.) Ramsey, like many other writers, aimed to provide other more certain foundations, and ended up with a subjectivist interpretation.8 Russell's stand on Ramsey's criticism is interestingly ambiguous. He wrote two reviews of Ramsey's work in Mind in 1931 and in Philosophy in 1932 (both published in Russell 1996). The first review contains a discussion of the use of direct perception, as he and Keynes called it, and Ramsey's claim that there is no such thing. He concludes:

"The whole matter of direct perception in abstract matters is difficult. There are those who use it too readily, and those who will not use it at all. It is to be wished that a canon could be established regulating its legitimate use. Meanwhile, those who claim to perceive a probability relation which others do not perceive are naturally heard with scepticism, although it may well be that they are in the right. Ramsey argues that Mr. Keynes does not himself perceive this relation, but a negative of this sort is always difficult to establish. (Russell 1931 [1996] p.111)

Clearly, Russell felt the force of Ramsey's criticism, but was unwilling to accept it. Concerning Ramsey's positive contribution Russell was quite dismissive: "Ramsey's theory of probability is, to my mind, less penetrating than his work on mathematical logic." (Ibid.) His reason, later echoed by Carnap, was that Probability, if concerned with degrees of belief, is concerned with what they ought to be, not with what they in fact are. What they ought to be must depend on something objective, which ought therefore to be used as the definition of probability. I am still not persuaded that some amended form of the frequency theory may not prove feasible." (Ibid., 112)

Russell's later review, however, was quite dismissive, saying only that Ramsey's now much-celebrated essay "is, to my mind, less valuable than most of the other essays." (Russell 1932 [1996], p. 117) Russell continued in his views, as far as I know. He held a two-concept view, according to which both the relative frequency and logical interpretations are to be correctly applied in different domains, although he considered both interpretations problematic. He also continued to ignore the subjective interpretation of probability. And, he also seems to have held to Keynes' account of how we come to know probabilities.

The other means of responding to Ramsey's criticism was to remove the reliance on intuition. This was Wittgenstein's revival of the Bolzanian theory of probability in the Tractatus, which placed him firmly in the Central European tradition. In a letter to Keynes from Cassino, dated June, 12, 1919, Wittgenstein writes: "Have you done any more work on probability? My M-S. contains a few lines about it which, I believe-solve the essential question." (Wittgenstein 1980, p.251) Wittgenstein's theory, though mathematically the same, was derived from

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8 The list of writers so influenced leads us to at least two of the very important foundational articles on probability. B.O. Koopman's "The Axioms and Algebra of Intuitive Probability" Annals of Mathematics, Volume 41, 1940, pp. 269-292, which introduced the first time interval-valued probabilities. Shimony's "Coherence and the Axioms of Confirmation, Journal of Symbolic Logic, Volume 20, Number 1, 1955, pp. 1-28", introduced a complete version of the Dutch Book argument in response to difficulties with Keynes' claim of an intuitionistic justification: "Both Keynes and Koopman justify their axiomatizations by a claim of self-evidence. However, it is meaningful to speak of degrees of self-evidence, many of Keynes' axioms and several of Koopman's...are less self-evident than is desirable. Consequently, a more adequate justification of the axioms...is needed." (Ibid., p. 4.)
assumptions of logical independence, and thus, in a sense at least, merely follows from the definition of logical structures involved. Appeals to intuition, it seems, are thus circumvented.\(^9\) Wittgenstein’s views were transmitted to Waismann, who delivered a paper on it at the 1929 Prague conference, which was then reported in *Erkenntnis* (1930-1931). Following the paper was a discussion, also recorded in this volume of *Erkenntnis*. Carnap was present at the meeting. He much later turned his attention to these problems, and, in a sense, completed the program of logical probability.\(^10\) Thus the further development of logical probability in the Central European (Bolzanian) tradition was also given impetus by the reaction to Keynes’ views.

We can therefore say that at least two of the major trends of probability were given impetus by the reaction to Keynes’ views: the subjectivist and the logical. But the reaction was to Keynes’ interpretation of the probability relation, that is, to Keynes’ account of the epistemology of probability. And this comes from Russell, who continued to champion it. I shall not examine in any detail Russell’s account of probability. This was not my aim. I rather hope to have shown the importance of Russell’s influence on the subsequent inquiries into the foundations of probability.

**Bibliography**


During the Spring Semester of 1998 I taught a graduate seminar at Charles IV University on "Russell and Wittgenstein". It was a great honor, but even more so because this year is the 650th anniversary of Charles University, founded in 1348. The university has been associated with some of the greatest names in European intellectual history, such as Jan Hus, Johannes Kepler, Tycho Brahe, Tomáš Masaryk (the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic), Edward Benes (the second president), Jaroslav Heyrovsky (Nobel Prize winner in 1959 for work in polarography), and many other great scholars. The university prizes its philosophy and logic departments, which are staffed by outstanding, world-class scholars and populated by brilliant, hard-working students. The philosophy department is in an impressive building that dominates the landscape at Jan Palach Square, a beautiful spot by the Vltava River. The square, named for a student who committed suicide to protest the Soviet occupation in 1968, also has the beautiful Rudolfinum, an outstanding orchestra. The university even publishes a booklet about its history with a picture of Sir Karl Popper receiving an honorary degree.

So I assumed that Russell would be well known to the students at Charles. But I was quite surprised to discover that analytical philosophy was virtually ignored by many of them, including graduate students in logic who were well-versed in logical systems. I found little knowledge of the work of Moore, Russell, Ramsey, Ayer, Austin, Ryle, Flew, or Nozick. There was some knowledge of Frege, especially the Concept Script and the Foundations of Arithmetic. There was vast knowledge of Gödel, Tarski, and other European logicians. In fact, Gödel is probably read more closely by the logic students here than in most American universities. I discovered a deep knowledge of Quine and Strawson, which I believe is due to the lasting impact of recent lectures by those philosophers in the Czech Republic. But Russell was a hollow name for most, vaguely associated with Frege, Gödel, or Quine.

Of course, part of the problem was political. British and American philosophers were ignored during the Nazi occupation, the twenty-year Czech communist rule of 1948-1968, and the Soviet occupation from 1969-1989. I was amused to see that in the Department of Logic in the Institute of Philosophy, where framed pictures of the great philosophers grace the hallways, there were few British thinkers. Hume and Bacon are given some pride of place. Locke is hidden at the end of one hall. I did not see pictures of Hobbes, Berkeley, DeMorgan, Hamilton (either one), Boole, Bentham, Mill, Whitehead, Russell, Moore, Ayer, or even Wittgenstein, who must be excluded by association. I was told this exclusion was deliberate, a legacy from the Nazi and Communist past, an attempt to highlight the European contributions to philosophy and ignore the philosophers who came from Britain's liberal democracy. There were no American philosophers pictured, which means that Pierce, Emerson, James, Royce, Perry, C.I. Lewis, and Dewey were too politically-charged for acknowledgement. Given Quine's immense stature here, his picture will probably be up in a few years.

But the major problem -- the primary reason for this lack of influence -- was unavailability of texts and inaccessibility of ideas. Western textbooks are prohibitively expensive. I was advised to bring any required texts with me and I did (I used Russell's "On Denoting" and Lectures on Logical Atomism (the version edited by Pears), Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic). There simply was a lack of available books on Russell and most other analytical philosophers, period. I found the students here hungry for ideas, and they expressed great appreciation for philosophers like Quine and Strawson because they had personally made the effort to come to the Czech Republic. But without textbooks students were limited in their knowledge of those figures who had not been translated into Czech or whose translations were now out of print. There was some knowledge of Wittgenstein, which is due to the widespread availability of his work in German, English, and Czech. I will discuss this below in more detail. The availability of texts that we take for granted in Western Europe, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere is so important to the progress of knowledge. Without textbooks, whether in translation or in the original languages, students are severely limited in their ability to explore philosophical ideas in any depth.

As we talked about Russell in our seminar, I wondered about the intellectual history of Russell in the Czech Republic, and of other philosophers associated with logic or analytical philosophy in this century. So I decided to ask around and try to piece together a brief commentary on the influence of analytical philosophy in the Czech Republic. The following commentary is very idiosyncratic and personal, a reflection of the impressions from conversations and extensive oral history. I have no way of knowing if some of what I heard was true.

I thought that Carnap might be a key figure in my sojourn. He had taught at the German University (in 1882 ethnic polarization led to a division of the university into two independent bodies, Czech and German. The Czech University was closed during the Nazi occupation and the German University was closed permanently after 1945). So I asked about him. Several logicians and philosophers told me that Carnap was isolated during his time here, having little influence on the Czech intellectual climate. Because he taught at the German University, he didn't have much contact with Czech philosophers or logicians.
Russell’s great champion in Prague was, and is, Karol Berka. Of Jewish lineage, Berka was rounded up by the Nazis during the occupation and sent to work as a agricultural laborer. He was later pressed into work as a mason, forced to construct underground bunkers. Toward the end of the war he was placed in the Terezin concentration camp (Theresienstadt in German), where he was liberated by the Soviet Army. He returned to Prague and took up an interest in philosophy, logic, and science. He taught philosophy and logic at the Institute Für Philosophie in Leipzig. In the Spring of 1968 he was a visiting professor at Penn State, and returned to Prague in 1969 where was a professor at Charles University and a member of the Institute of Philosophy. Berka was often in conflict with the communist authorities for his work in analytic philosophy and, especially, for his work in symbolic logic. During the communist era, Hegelian approaches to logic were favored for their political advantages and progressive view of history. Hence, symbolic logic was considered a dangerous alternative because it was apolitical. Berka taught symbolic logic, so he was suspect.

Berka’s work in philosophy and logic gave him a strong appreciation of Russell. But Russell was in and out of favor. The communists disliked Russell’s rejection of Bolshevism, but loved his criticism of the Vietnam War. Russell’s liberalism was unfavorable but his socialism acceptable. Marxist philosophers were in vogue. British philosophers were seen as apologists for capitalism.

However, Russell’s views penetrated Czech society. His work in logic was known, directly and via Poland, particularly his introduction to the first volume of *Principia Mathematica*. His introduction to the *Tractatus* was read with great interest. His popularizations of science were read, books such as the *ABC’s of Relativity*. Some of his books and articles were available in translation (see discussion below). Berka told me that Russell was “popular in the private life.” So, his social commentary was known, especially *Marriage and Morals*, which was widely read. Perhaps his most famous book was *Why I Am Not a Christian*, twice translated into Czech. Berka’s opinion is that Russell was “the most influential Western philosopher, as a philosopher, in Czechoslovakia.”

Berka tried to make Russell’s thought more widely available. For him, Russell was "the father of logic" and "the catalyst to anything new in logic." Russell also "knew his capacities -- knew when he was exhausted on a subject." Berka like the combination of brilliance, accomplishment, and honesty. So Berka and L. Tondl published a translated collection of Russell’s work in 1967 entitled *Logika, Jazyk, and Veda (Logic, Language, and Science)*, Prague: Svoboda, with an introduction by Russell. The book contained three sections. The first, "Logic and Mathematics", reproduced "On Denoting," "Descriptions," which was Chapter 16 of *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, and "Theory of Logical Types," which was the version found in the Introduction and in Chapter 2 of *Principia

Professor Berka has also been involved in other translations of Russell. In 1975, he worked with J. Husak to produce Zkoumdni o Smyslu a Prawdivosti (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Prague). I don't know the publisher, but it may have been Svoboda again. In 1993, he edited and translated another collection: Logika, Veda, Filozofie, Spolecnost (Logic, Science, Philosophy, Society, Prague). Again, I don't know the publisher. Section One, "Logic and Mathematics", included the two chapters on Principia Mathematica (7 and 8) in My Philosophical Development, "Mathematics and Metaphysicians," which was Chapter 5 from Mysticism and Logic, "Analysis of Propositions" from Chapters 15 and 18 of An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, and "Truth and Falsehood" from Chapter 13 of The Analysis of Mind. Section Two, "Science", contained "Scientific Knowledge" from Chapters 2 and 3 of The Scientific Outlook and "Is Science Superstitious?" from Chapter 3 of Sceptical Essays. Section Three, "Philosophy", was composed of "On the Relation of Universals and Particulars" from Logic and Knowledge, "On Scientific Method in Philosophy," which is Chapter 6 in Mysticism and Logic, "Logical Positivism" from Logic and Knowledge, "Hume," which is Chapter 17 of Book Three of History of Western Philosophy, and "Philosophy and Politics," Chapter 1 of Unpopular Essays. Section Four, "Man and Society", contains "A Free Man's Worship," from Chapter 3 of Mysticism and Logic, "Can a Man Be Rational?" from Chapter 4 of Sceptical Essays, "Freedom and Society" from Chapter 13 of Sceptical Essays, "Steps Towards Peace," found in Portraits From Memory, "Methods of Settling Disputes in a Nuclear Age," from Chapter 3 of Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, and "The Social Responsibilities of Scientists," from Part Four, Chapter 3 of Fact and Fiction.

Professor Berka has recently translated The Problems of Philosophy, but has had trouble finding a publisher. He has been looking for a grant to defray the cost of publication.


There have been other Czech translations of Russell's work, but none of them recent. Professor Berka has compiled a list and discovered that the translations include (All were published in Prague):

Problem Filosofie (The Problems of Philosophy), translated by Z. Smetacek, Cin, 1927

"Teorie Poznani" (an article on theory of knowledge), translated by J. Schutzner, Ruch Filosoficky, Vol. III, No. 1, 1928

Proc Nejsem Krestan (Why I Am Not a Christian), translator unknown, Volna Myslenka, 1928. There was another translation by F. Kejdana for Orbis in 1961.

Boj o Sesti (The Conquest of Happiness), translated by L. Vymetal, Orbis, 1931


O Vychove Zejmina v Ranem Detsvte (On Education, Especially in Early Childhood), translated by J. Hrusa, Orbis, 1932

Prospleo Nabozenstvi Civilizaci? (Has Religion Made Useful Contributions to Civilization?), translated by K. Planansky, Volna Myslenka, 1935

Svoboda a Organizace: 1814-1914 (Freedom and Organization: 1814-1914), translated by J. Kriz, Delnicke Nakladatel Stvi (Worker's Publishing House), 1948

Berka has been a strong advocate for Russell, sometimes at considerable personal risk. But his integrity has guided him during the times when Russell was unpopular with the authorities. Because he has experienced the prison camps, he knows the worst that can happen. He told me that, if you are of a certain age in the Czech Republic, between the Nazis and the Communists, "then you probably spent some time in prison if you were a good person."

Now, in retirement, he is still active in philosophy and logic. I have witnessed Berka in action at the Golden Lion Pub where he meets with colleagues twice a week over beer to discuss their work informally. This is the pub where Vaclav Havel, Bill Clinton, and the late, beloved Bohumil Hrabal (author of Closely Observed Trains and many other delightful books) sat and drank beer during Clinton's state visit (Clinton is very popular here because he went out to the pubs with Havel). There is even a picture of the three of them on one wall. This is a pub that caters to locals and shuns tourists, so Clinton saw the real Prague. Twice a week Berka and his colleagues hold court here: listening, lecturing, advising, encouraging, laughing, gossiping, drinking, and speculating on the quality
of various local brews. One of my most cherished, unexpected experiences in Prague was to be invited to a session at the "Lion," escorted by Berka. I was dazzled by stories of various philosophical figures in the Czech Republic and elsewhere, as one philosopher after another spoke to me about past memories or current projects. I later told Tim Childers that I learned more about Czech philosophy in one hour at the "Lion" than in several weeks of discussion elsewhere, further cementing my view that philosophy and beer go very well together.

In whatever setting, Berka is a survivor who has been tested by the authorities, by the events of history, and by the horrors of war. His honesty and integrity have never deserted him.

Another philosopher who was a proponent of analytic philosophy was the late Pavel Tichy. Tichy was born in 1936 in Brno, that great city associated with so many philosophers and musicians. He taught at Charles University from 1961-1968 and then left at the time of the Soviet occupation. He became a research fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Exeter and received a Ph.D. from Exeter in 1971. He then assumed a lectureship at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand, where he became one of the bright lights in a well-regarded department that includes Charles Pigden and Tichy's wife, Jindra. He stayed at Otago for many years, with a brief interruption as a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pittsburgh from 1976-1977. He rose to the rank of professor in 1981. Tragically, Tichy died in 1994, just weeks before returning to Prague to assume a professorship at Charles. His loss is still deeply lamented in Prague.

Tichy was incredibly influential in the Czech Republic, even during his exile. You cannot enter into a prolonged philosophical conversation, hear a presentation on modern philosophy, read a syllabus about a logic or a contemporary philosophy class, or go to a conference without hearing his name. One friend of Tichy's, the widely-respected Pavel Materna, has worked very hard to publicize Tichy's work. Materna spoke to me of the importance of Tichy's scholarship ("the views of famous men are the milestones of progress"), especially his "Transparent Intentional Logic," which I won't try to explain here. But I refer the reader to Tichy's many published articles in Western journals and to The Foundation's of Frege's Logic (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988). Tichy was also a close student of Russell, with important observations about the theory of types and theory of denoting in The Foundations of Frege's Logic. Many of Tichy's unpublished papers, together with an appreciation by Materna, have been translated into English and gathered into an issue of the journal From the Logical Point of View, Volume III, Number 2, 1994. The journal is published by the Institute of Philosophy. Personally, I also recommend "The Scandal of Linguistics," an essay published in an earlier volume of the same journal (Volume I, Number 3, 1992, pp. 70-80).

There Tichy argues that linguists haven't made much progress in understanding the nature of language or the real uses of meaning. He also claims that language cannot be viewed as a game. Rather, "it is one of the most important weapons in our struggle for survival." (p. 80) I must admit I'm still trying to learn about Tichy and I don't claim to know much more than I've written here. But I do recommend his work to anyone who wants to understand Czech philosophy. He is a central figure in today's philosophical discussions.

So far I have spoken of Carnap, Frank, Gentzen, and Russell. Perhaps I should add a few comments about Wittgenstein. The study of Wittgenstein has flourished in Prague, although with less intensity or recognizable impact than in the United States or the United Kingdom. There have been two recent translations concerning Wittgenstein into Czech that deserve mention. One is a fine translation of the Philosophical Investigations (Filosofická Zkoumání) by Jiri Prechar. Published by Filosofia in 1998, the main publishing house of philosophical texts in Prague, this affordable (about $6.00), handsome publication has made Wittgenstein's later thought accessible at the same time as the appearance of a translation of Ray Monk's Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (Wittgenstein Udel Genia, Prague: Hynek, 1996) by Otakar Vochoc, my office mate in the Academy of Sciences. Mr. Vochoc is one of the premier translators of philosophical texts into Czech, having also just finished a translation of George Simmel's work (Penize v Moderní Kultuře a Jine Exeje, Sociologické Nakladatelství, 1997). The Monk translation is in virtually every bookstore. Several of my students had already read Monk's book or were in the process of reading it. Many only knew of Russell through Wittgenstein. Most of my students had read something by Wittgenstein prior to my seminar (usually the Tractatus, with a rough split between those who had read the German text or the English translation, both with the Russell introduction).

However, while there was some knowledge of Wittgenstein, there was very little understanding of his logical discoveries. Most of my logic students were well-versed in various logical systems. But they did not have a deep background in the applications of logic to philosophy. In particular, there was little evidence of any thought about the implications of the Tractatus. In another graduate seminar I taught on philosophical logic, I was staggered by the lack of thought about the nature of logic or its relationship to the formation or use of propositions.

Frankly, the Czech students I encountered were as good as any students in the world at the development of logical systems in propositional, quantificational, modal, fuzzy, or deontic logics. Yet, there was a clear need for more thought about what these systems do, what the propositions in these systems mean, and the application of logical systems. This is a critique that could be given of most logic students. I simply found that same need in Prague.
The actual teaching of logic at Charles University is first-class, and perhaps best described as "world-class." The Department of Logic at Charles University is outstanding. The course offerings give students a thorough background of historical and current work in logic.

The scholarship at Charles is also notable. I was very impressed by a new book, Logika a Etika (Logic and Ethics), written by Kolár and Vladimir Svoboda. It was published by Filosofia in 1997. Kolár I have mentioned above and elsewhere in this edition of the Quarterly. Svoboda also teaches courses in logic and deontic logic at Charles and is in the Academy's Department of Logic. The book is an attempt to look at meta-ethics (especially deontic logic) from a logical standpoint, or logic from a meta-ethical standpoint. The availability of this book is remarkable, with copies everywhere. Kolár and Svoboda are using the book in the classroom with much success. I hope that we will soon see a translation into English.

In conclusion, I searched for Carnap and Frank in Prague. I did not find them. I heard of Gentzen, who died tragically, a victim of politics, nationalism, and war's brutality. I found Berka, a man who respected Russell and worked against considerable political resistance to disseminate Russell's work. I am sure that Russell understood and respected Berka's efforts, which he certainly knew about, as evidenced by the two letters of correspondence from Russell to Berka. And I discovered that Wittgenstein is now a powerful influence in Prague, thanks to the availability of his work in translation and Monk's biography. In this most literate and cultured of countries, with its well-educated and gentle people searching for economic and cultural contact with Western Europe, Russell may again have a role in forging a united, democratic continent. But unless his books are available, his influence will be limited to those who are fortunate enough to find him in a library or second-hand store. Ideas have consequences, but only if the ideas are publicly known.

For those who might wish to read more about the Czech Republic, may I recommend three important books. One is Timothy Garton Ash's The Magic Lantern, New York: Vintage Books, 1993 (published in Great Britain by Granta Books of Cambridge in 1990 as We the People). Ash is a fellow of St. Anthony's College, Oxford, and is the great historian of contemporary Eastern and Central Europe. This book is about the fall of communism in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. He was an eye-witness to many of the important events and knew most of the key dissidents. He is very popular in the Czech Republic. A powerful book about life under the Nazis and Communists is Heda Margolius Kovaly's Prague Farewell. It has been published by various houses in both Czech and English since 1988. The version I recommend is by Indigo Press in 1997. Kovaly survived the concentration camps, married an influential member of the Community Party who was purged and executed as part of the infamous Slansky Trial, escaped to the West, worked at Harvard Law School, and then returned in 1996 to live in Prague. Her love of Prague and her candid discussion of Czech history will stay with you long after finishing the book. I have given it to several friends to read. I also recommend Jiri Weil's Life with a Star, the most profound, unforgettable book about Jewish life during the Nazi Occupation of Prague. This book has been praised as "one of the finest novels of the century" (The Independent), and rightly so. It is the only book I've ever read that I simply could not put down, no matter how sleepy I was or how hard I tried to think about something else. It is disturbing, gripping, and courageous.

I should also add a word about Czech literature, although the quality of Czech writing is as well-known and admired as Czech beer. But if you haven't read something by Ivan Klíma, Milan Kundera, Josef Skvorecký, Ludvík Vaculík, or the great Bohumil Hrabal, then I strongly urge you to include them on your list. These are great, timeless writers who have much to teach us.

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RUSSELL IN WAITING: RUSSELL'S INFLUENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE
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In this brief note it is my aim to acquaint the reader with some of the things I have recently learned about the status of Russell's writings and related themes of philosophical interest in various parts of Eastern Europe. While we often think of Vienna as perpetually having a rich intellectual tradition, the fact that most of Southeastern Europe was unified politically, and to some extent culturally, under the Austro-Hungarian Empire has slowly faded from most people's thinking. One result of this unification was a common intellectual heritage, especially in the development of philosophy prior to World War I. This heritage is deeply rooted in the philosophic "descriptive psychology" of Franz Brentano but has robust branches which extend into Germany, Poland, Hungary, and the former Yugoslavia. The connection to Russell emerges from his reaction to Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie in the early 1900s.

It is natural to say that one cannot really understand a thinker unless one comes to know those who have influenced him and those against whom he has reacted. Until recently, English speaking philosophy has all but ignored the work of
Meinong, except as an historical curiosity, and often when it was considered, distorted second-handed characterizations were treated canonically. However, anyone who goes back to read Russell’s original articles on Meinong in *Mind*, prior to his _volte face_ in 1905’s “On Denoting,” will find Russell a surprisingly sympathetic commentator. It is therefore only an historical accident that Meinong quickly faded from view as Russell’s work came to be more influenced by Wittgenstein, and then later as he reacted against Wittgenstein and his interests started to range more widely. But this much is preface.

One reason Meinong is an all but lost interlocutor with Russell’s philosophy is that his work is not widely available to those who, unlike Russell, do not read German. I have recently learned that Russell’s work shares a similar fate in some parts of Eastern Europe. According to Professor Matjaz Potre of the University of Ljubljana in the Republic of Slovenia, one of the main barriers to a wider appreciation of Russell’s work is the fact that very few of his texts have been translated into the national languages of emerging post-communist Europe. When I asked Professor Potre if he could recall anyone recently teaching a course focusing upon Russell’s work, he could only point to one: an interdisciplinary seminar which read the introduction to *Principia Mathematica*. Still, even there, it was one text among many, and made more difficult by the fact that the Slovenian students had to read it in non-native Croatian. Those who know the work in question will sympathize, for the text in question is taxing enough in English.

Potre recalled that among the works by Russell available in Slovenia, though not all in Slovene, were *Principia Mathematica, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Problems of Philosophy, The Nature of Acquaintance*, and *Logical Atomism*. At first this list seems encouraging, for surely Russell the mathematician and logician must be universally read. But, Potre indicated that, if Russell is mentioned, it is almost always in association with the theory of descriptions, not his work on the foundations of mathematics. And, of course, it is not surprising that much of Russell’s work on social themes would not have been available in formerly communist Eastern Europe. Further, this situation is made more difficult by the limited development of the publishing industry in these areas. But there is hope that this may change one day.

Recently, interest and participation in analytic philosophy has been expanding greatly in Southeastern Europe. At the same time the old intellectual connections among the universities of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire have been reasserting themselves, encouraging a vibrant revitalization of intellectual life. There is a very active contingent of Slovenes and Croatians in the European Society for Analytic Philosophy and a number of significant conferences have been held in Slovenia and Croatia in the last 15 years on topics in analytic metaphysics and epistemology, as well as philosophy of mind and cognitive science. These conferences have drawn some of the top analytic philosophers from Great Britain and the United States. But the flow of ideas is in both directions. Professor Potre is an example. His research during a recent Fulbright Fellowship in the United States was on the relations between early phenomenology and contemporary cognitive science. He also currently holds an editorial position with *Acta Analytica*, the premier journal of analytic philosophy on the European continent.

In conclusion, despite his lack of prominence in Southeastern Europe, I suspect Russell would be content with both the pace and direction of change. Russell, too, often sought to come to know a place or culture better by experiencing it firsthand. Recall his visits to Germany, Russia, China, and the United States. So, as we seek to better understand Russell, we must come to know figures like Meinong and Brentano. And, as those studying the tradition of Meinong and Brentano look back, they will find Russell waiting for them.

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**THE MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL**

**BY FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ-CONSUEGRA**

**REVIEWED BY JOHN SHOSKY**

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Francisco A. Rodriguez-Consuegra, _The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell: Origins and Development_ (Boston/Basel/Berlin: Birkhauser Verlag, 1991) 236 pp. It may seem strange to review a book that is now seven years old. But _The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell_ is a landmark publication, both in terms of its scholarship and the historical value of its appearance. Any serious student of Russell should possess a copy of this brilliant, cogent, and thorough book. Because this issue of the _Quarterly_ concerns Russell studies in Europe, it is important to mention this fine work published by one of the leading scholars on Russell on the continent. Rodriguez-Consuegra is to be congratulated on a fine presentation, and for having the courage and persistence to devote himself to unearthing the sources, influences, and stimulants for Russell’s mathematical philosophy. _The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell_ is highly recommended, both as a careful description of Russell’s efforts and achievements, and as an important history of the development of mathematical philosophy in the first quarter of the twentieth century. I agree with Ivor Grattan-Guinness in his preface: Rodriguez-Consuegra has "launched a veritable one-man Armada upon
the history of Russell’s logical thought” (xiv).

The book offers five lengthy chapters. The first concerns “Methodological and Logician Background.” Russell was a determined, eager, and encyclopedic student of his predecessors. The rise of quantificational logic, engineered by Boole, Frege, Schroeder, and Peano, provided the genealogy for Russell’s achievements. The groundbreaking discoveries of Cantor and Dedekind were inspirational to Russell. This chapter shows how vital these influences are in understanding Russell’s goals, methodology, and direction. Logicism, the attempt to deduce mathematics (and covertly knowledge of the external world), from logic was a direct result of the discoveries of Russell’s predecessors. This chapter should be required reading for graduate comprehensive examinations that test the evolution of mathematical logic from 1847 to 1901. There is also a rare discussion of Russell’s “Contributions of Peano and his School.” Russell learned from Peano. The second chapter deals with Russell’s “Unpublished Mathematical Philosophy: 1898-1900.” The central event in Russell’s mathematical/logical development was the Paris Congress of 1900, where he met Peano. However, prior to July, 1900, Russell had examined many of the issues that would figure in his later work. Drawing upon these unpublished manuscripts (now found in the Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volumes 2 and 3), Rodriguez-Consuegra shows Whitehead and Cantor’s influence on Russell, and how logic came to have a “philosophical priority” over mathematics in the logicist program. One of the great strengths of this book is that Russell’s reliance on logic to address problems in ontology is repeatedly highlighted and examined. The logicist program offered a chance to uncover knowledge about the external world, and Russell recognized the mutual advantage of linking logic and epistemology. Russell’s logical realism can be traced to this period, revealing an epistemological agenda well before Russell’s more obvious steps in the Problems of Philosophy, the 1912 “shilling shocker”, and Theory of Knowledge, the unpublished manuscript of 1913. Incidentally, Wittgenstein hated both of these efforts, in part because he clearly understood Russell’s intention to use logic as covert epistemology.

The third chapter concerns “The Contribution of Peano and his School.” Russell came to the Paris Congress looking for a mathematical logic that could satisfy the needs of the logicist program and his own demands for philosophical progress. He left armed with Peano’s logic of relations, elegant new symbolism, and a cogent view of material implication. Russell said that he spent one month digesting everything that Peano wrote, and then in the Fall of 1900 began writing the monumental Principles of Mathematics. Popper, Quine, and many others have paid much tribute to this book, which was a precursor to Principia Mathematica. But few scholars have actually examined the writings of Peano and explored the links to Russell. This chapter fills that void admirably.

A fourth chapter looks at the Principles of Mathematics, and its use of symbolism, class concepts, indefinables, relations, propositional functions, material implication, and an early atomistic structure. The definitions for cardinal numbers, ordinal numbers, and real numbers are explicated and analyzed. This chapter is actually a continuation of the previous one, because it ends with a long list of lessons Russell learned from Peano.

Finally, in the last chapter, Rodriguez-Consuegra re-examines the “Philosophical and Methodological Problems” confronting Russell. Like Frege before him, Russell’s methodology is best understood by examining the use of definitions, which are the linepins of his entire enterprise. We also see a clear emergence of Russell’s use of abstraction, logical analysis, and relational logic.

I now move from a review of the book itself to a wider discussion of Russellian scholarship. Since 1990, there has been a renaissance in Russellian scholarship, of which this book is a part, primarily motivated by new explorations of Russell’s work from the misguided idealism of the late 1890s to the publication of his lectures on “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” in 1917-1918. During this period, Russell churned out an enormously rich, deep, and lasting legacy. Consider just a few of his publications: “The Logic of Relations” in 1901, the discovery of Russell’s Paradox in 1901 (if not earlier) and communicated to Frege in 1902, the Principles of Mathematics in 1903, “On Denoting” and “The Import of Propositions” in 1905, “Mathematical Philosophy Based on a Theory of Types” in 1908, Principia Mathematica (with Whitehead) in 1910, his unpublished manuscript Theory of Knowledge in 1913, “On Scientific Method in Philosophy” in 1914, Our Knowledge of the External World in 1914, and the profound Philosophy of Logical Atomism in 1917-1918. During these two decades, Russell found the most important paradox of the century, explicated his theory of descriptions and theory of types, constructed his logical atomism, re-invigorated empiricism, and developed new logical techniques. He played a leading role in the rise of logicism. Russell also had formative interactions with Peano, Frege, Couturat, Whitehead, Moore, James, Hardy, Wittgenstein, and Dewey. In addition, the Russell of this period directly inspired Wittgenstein’s work, and later stimulated the work of American logicians (Lewis, Shiffer, and Quine), the Vienna Circle (especially Carnap and Ayer), and the anti-Circle Popper and Godel. Arguably, Russell is also the key counterpart of linguistic philosophy, where he is both a godfather and favorite target.

Yet, surprisingly, at the end of the 1980s, Russell was the scholastic equivalent of yesterday’s papers. From Russell’s death in 1970 until 1989, Russellian scholarship seemed sparse, mostly mopping up old encounters, and leaving the
impression that work on Russell had been exhausted. Russell never wanted disciples, and he didn’t have many. Ayer, Quine, and many others associated with Russell were too independent, talented, and honest to become Russell’s mouthpiece. Also, Russell’s clear, straightforward prose left little room for re-interpretation. Russell’s errors were well known, and his virtues forgotten. One of my own professors once asked me, “How can you like Russell, when he was so wrong about everything he ever wrote?” There were many in academic philosophy who shared a disdain for Russell.

There was also an important, powerful crossing current -- the almost mythic figure of Wittgenstein, who seemed to become all things to some people. Elizabeth Anscombe once wrote that it was a tragedy that Wittgenstein had become a “cult figure.” It was a double tragedy because Wittgenstein’s popularity was at Russell’s expense. For example, the Derek Jarman film on Wittgenstein pictures Russell as a doddering and perplexed oaf, whereas Wittgenstein is heroically tortured and relentlessly driven to uncover the truth in the world. In my view, many philosophers are now emerging from the shadow of Wittgenstein, and welcome a reassessment of Russell.

Russell was, after all, his own worst critic, and, after his death, other critics finally had the field to themselves. Michael Dummett pushed Frege, often at Russell’s expense. Richard Rorty pushed pragmatism, Derrida, or both, finding Russell mistaken, old-fashioned, and philosophically quaint. It was hard to find a good word about Russell anywhere. He seemed destined for quick relegation to obscurity, not escalating significance.

All of that began to change in 1990, when Hylton published his magnificent Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytical Philosophy. Hylton demonstrated that Russell’s early work had been insufficiently examined. For too long, Russell’s own analysis and that of his critics was taken to be the final word. But Hylton showed that fresh insights could be found, and that there was a voluminous amount of unpublished material that needed scrutiny. Such an enterprise showed a depth and force in Russell’s work that recalled the relevance of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic and the fruitfulness of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In my view, the great achievement of Hylton’s book was its productive unpacking of Russell’s elegant prose, revealing an underlying and little-realized appreciation of the difficulties involved in tackling philosophical problems. There was more to Russell than we thought.

So, the publication of Rodriguez-Consuegra’s book is an exciting event in Russelian scholarship, part of the new wave of Russelian studies. It adds an important and scholarly voice to the growing number of excellent commentators on Russell’s early, most prolific work.

The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell is also an important event in the European study of Russell, which has previously been less interesting and less prevalent than in Anglo-Austrian-American circles. Many German scholars find Russell important, but simply view him as a foil for Wittgenstein, ignoring the apparent similarities between Russell and Husserl, particularly the Russell found in the 1913 Theory of Knowledge manuscript. Rodriguez-Consuegra is one of the most visible and capable leaders of a vanguard of Russelian students on the rest of the continent, principally found to date in France, Spain, and Italy.

Among Russian scholars, the kick against The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell is that Rodriguez-Consuegra is a bit too rapid in drawing his conclusions and that many of his interpretations are questionable. Granted, there is much to debate here, which is good news. The early Russell provides much grist for philosophical thought, both in what he covers and in what he leaves out. The wisdom of Russell’s premises, methodology, theories, corrections, deletions, and historical scholarship is questionable. There are many alternative interpretations within and outside of the theory of descriptions, the nature of propositions, and other aspects of Russell’s thought that are now again open to discussion. In philosophy, nothing is settled, and Russell himself welcomed criticism as the road to progress. But Rodriguez-Consuegra has given us a formative, well-reasoned, tough, and comprehensive discussion of Russell’s mathematical philosophy. He has also led the renaissance of Russell studies in Anglo-Austrian-American circles, and provided a powerful voice for Russelian scholarship in the rest of Europe. The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell is a book that cannot be ignored.

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"AND SWEAR YOU'LL NEVER FORGET"
A VIDEO REVIEW OF
THE GREAT WAR AND THE SHAPING
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
REVIEWED BY
CLIFF HENKE

Reviewer's Note: We continue this series of video reviews with more new twists. This column is the first to examine a work that touches on themes raised by Russell's life work and looks at events important in his life. It is also the first to review a documentary.

Seven decades after the war's end, the "eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month" that marks Armistice Day is but an afterthought to most of us. This is especially true of Americans, who were never comfortable with involvement in the Great War anyway. It was viewed here as a European affair, and, when the United States finally entered the war, it did so veiling its interest in protecting its commerce "to make the world safe for democracy" in Woodrow Wilson's famous words.

Of course, we now know, it did not, and given the greedy terms of the Treaty of Versailles, it might have actually endangered democracy's chances in places like Germany, Russia, Italy, and Austria.

These facts are sad enough, given the tens of millions who lost their lives or parts of their bodies or minds in the struggle. But the residue of hatred catalyzed by the Great War set the stage for even more gruesome theater and still plays out to this day in the Balkans and trans-Caucasus.

The lessons of territorial ambition and ethnic hatred as impulses for war remain lost of some, to the detriment of the rest. These lessons were all too painfully known to Russell himself. He paid a high price for his objections to the war. He lost both liberty and livelihood at the peak of his reputation. He broke with dear friends, including his mentor and collaborator Alfred North Whitehead.

Yet, Russell's courage needs to be fully appreciated in light of two other facts. First, although he had Marxist and Bolshevik sympathies during the war, his visit to the Soviet Union in the 1920s turned him against that brand of communism. Second, while he was vehemently against the First World war, he was vociferous in support of the Second World War. The difference lay in what he viewed as a diametrical contrast of purposes: in his view the first war was to execute national ambition and the second to defend against hegemonic tyranny.

Although Russell's role is curiously absent from this production, Russell himself would be proud of this magisterial joint production of the BBC and the Los Angeles public television station KCET, in association with the Imperial War Museum of Great Britain, because all his rationale for hating the Great War is eloquently presented. Executive Producer Blaine Baggett and his team lay it all out for us in eight two-hour episodes, five years and five million dollars in the making.

The first six episodes give us the war itself: the raw national lust for power and militarism that drove all of Europe to dismember, the miscalculation and foolish repeat of the old military adage that we are always preparing to fight the last war, the political intransigence that drove the soldiers themselves to rebel against their leaders in the conflict's next-to-last year and, most of all the ineradicable, incessant carnage that almost unexpectedly stopped in 1918. The last two episodes detail the larger effects: the political aftermath that led to the next world war, the birth of nihilist philosophy and literature and dadaist art in Weimar Germany, and the popularization of spiritualism, seances, and other attempts to speak with dead loved ones in France and Britain.

Interviews with some of the world's most respected Great War historians give the episodes authority and keen insight. Cambridge University's Jay Winter co-wrote many of the episodes and is also credited as the series chief historical advisor. There are also volumes of letters, diaries, newspaper accounts, and other first-hand material that add further credibility. And because the Great War happened after the invention of cinema, there are clips of fascinating and at times harrowing detail, some of which was never before viewed by a mass audience. The ones of a soldier having a twitching, heaving nervous breakdown because of "shell-shock" and those of "the men with broken faces," as the French call them, who have noses gone and faces hideously shattered being fitted for masks are two that I will never forget.

Salome Gens gives the narration an Old World, yet personal, dignity that makes this loaded material even more evocative. The use of actors such as Gens, Jeremy Irons, Ralph Fiennes, Martin Landau, Ruth Stapleton, and others to read the personal accounts mentioned above borrows heavily from a technique that Ken Burns made popular. This series compliments Burns' most famous work, The Civil War, handsomely.

It is in this technique that Irons, reading the poetry and other words of the famous British poet Siegfried Sasson, almost steals the show. Sasson wrote poetry from the front, then was sent to convalesce in a Liverpool hospital from shell shock in the middle of the war. It was in hospital where he wrote some of the most eloquent opposition to the war, and as a result was declared temporarily insane and not allowed to return to his men. Finally, he renounced some of his opposition and went back to the front where he was wounded near the war's end.
"Does it matter -- losing your legs?" asks Sasson/Irons after the boys come home. "For people will always be kind, and you need not show that you mind when the others come in after hunting to gobble their muffins and eggs." This kind of bitter, graphic, ironic tonic that Sasson and others provided was desperately needed, but ignored, before, during, and after the Great War. Yet, as Baggett's stunning work illustrates, neither the populace nor their leaders would ever come to grips with why it went on for so long, or mind the reasons for it in the first place, leading to an even bigger tragedy merely two-decades later.

Some reviewers of this series have said that they felt caught up in the creator's anger at all this waste after viewing it. I felt profound sadness, not anger, after seeing it. I was sad for what now seems upon reflection to be inevitable, for lessons not learned, for warnings unheeded. Perhaps Sasson's words at the end can explain: "Have you forgotten yet?", Irons begins to read, "For the world's events have rumbled on since those gagged days, like traffic checked while at the crossing of city ways....Do you remember the stretcher cases lurching back with dying eyes and lolling heads, those ashen-grey masks of the lads who once were keen and kind and gay? Have you forgotten yet? Look up, and swear by the green of the spring that you'll never forget."

I assure you will not after viewing it.

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