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THE LETTERS AND LOGIC ISSUE

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IT'S TIME TO RENEW YOUR MEMBERSHIP  
TO THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

All BRS regular memberships expire at the end of the year. So if you haven't renewed your membership, now is the time to do it! Just fill out the membership form in the center of this issue, and send it, with a check or money order payable to The Bertrand Russell Society, to the BRS Treasurer: Dennis Darland, 1406 26th Street, Rock Island, IL 61201-2837, USA.

You can now also pay by credit card, using PayPal on the web. Just go to the PayPal website at http://www.paypal.com and open a free account. Then, when PayPal prompts you for the recipient’s email address, have your dues sent to Dennis at: brs-pp@qconline.com. Be sure to state the purpose of the payment – membership renewal – in the email message that accompanies this payment to the BRS from PayPal. Do not include your credit card information in this message, but do include any changes in your name or address. Dennis will send you an email receipt and update your account accordingly.

To determine if you need to renew, just check the mailing label on this issue. It will have one of the following 4-digit numbers on it:

- 2003 means that you are paid up through this year, but need to renew for 2004;
- 2004 means that you have already renewed for 2004, and so are set for the coming year;
- 7777, 8888, or 9999 mean that you are a Life Member, Honorary Member, or receiving the BRSQ as a courtesy, and that you do not need to renew.

If you have any questions about your membership, please feel free to contact Dennis at: djdarland@qconline.com.

IN THIS ISSUE

In 1988, an old file in the storeroom of a Viennese real-estate dealer was found to contain a number of letters written to Ludwig Wittgenstein. Among them were some written to Wittgenstein by Gottlob Frege. The letters from Frege to Wittgenstein were published in German the following year, and since then, various extracts from them have been published here and there in English. In this issue of the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, new English translations of the four most philosophically interesting of these letters are published in full. They concern Frege’s comments to Wittgenstein on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Richard Schmitt, the translator, provides an introduction to the letters that includes detailed bibliographic information clearing up many murky references to them that have occurred in earlier standard works on Wittgenstein. The letters themselves are stunning in the acuteness and sheer mental power that Frege displays in them. It is a pleasure to have a translation that brings these characters back to life for us with such force and vividness.

Letters of a different kind will be a regular feature in the Quarterly beginning with this issue, namely, Russell’s urgent letters to the world in the form of his numerous and famous Letters to the Editor. In this issue, we see one of Russell’s early letters on the subject of Israel’s relations to the Arab world. Ray Perkins, the general editor of this series, provides an introduction to the letter, giving the general background to its creation.

Did Russell have a modal logic? In a previous issue of the Quarterly (February 2003) Dan Kervick reviewed Jan Dejnožka’s controversial book, Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance, in which Dejnožka argues in the affirmative. In his review of the book, Kervick raised some questions about the thesis and expressed some doubts about it. The subject returns in this issue with Dejnožka’s reply to Kervick’s review. It is not clear that we have yet gotten to the bottom of the matter, so the issue may return to these pages in future issues.

Kevin Klement reviews an anthology of selections from Frege and Russell on Logicism and the Philosophy of Language, and along the way, provides us with some insight into the nature of logic itself. We hope the reader will take some time to look over this interesting review.
SOCIETY NEWS

REMINISCENCE OF A SYMPHONY PERFORMANCE. In the last issue of the Quarterly, Ken Blackwell and Tom Stanley related the story of how British composer Graham Whettam had dedicated his 4th symphony, Sinfonia Contra Timore, to Bertrand Russell and all other persons who suffer imprisonment and other injustice for the expression of their beliefs or the convenience of politicians and bureaucracies. This dedication had apparently kept the symphony off the BBC until protests by Russell and other public figures got it performed on that network.

Robert Davis, one of the original founders of the BRS and Society President from 1975-82, writes to tell us more about the symphony, as well as to correct some mistaken rumors about his health:

Regarding the note in Issue 119 of Graham Whettam and his symphony #4 dedicated to Russell: we played this for members interested in hearing it at the 1978 Annual Meeting. I had learned of it and the troubles getting it aired on the BBC and contacted Whettam. I met with him on one of my visits to Britain and he gave us a master tape. Warren Smith, at the time a recording mogul with his own studio, transcribed it to a tape and we played it at a lunch for those interested. It has no direct connection to Russell other than the dedication. It was a very "modern" piece, very dissonant. I usually loathe that sort of thing but I found it "interesting" none the less. Don Jackanich, with a more sophisticated if masochistic taste in modern music, liked it. Unfortunately no one else did and I had people complain I had subjected them to it even though it was an entirely volunteer experience. In a 1978 letter to me when he sent the tape Warren stated that he was keeping the master until directed to send it to either the BRS Library or the Archives. I assume we did so and probably to the Archives which is where I think it belongs. Ken Blackwell or Tom Stanley may know. After 25 years, it may be of interest to be played at a meeting again.

On a completely unrelated matter I wish to report my health is OK. Shortly after the Annual Meeting, Dennis Darland called to check on me. Someone had told him at the meeting that I had cancer. I do not. The confusion probably stems from the fact that I had a spinal tumor and many people assume all tumors are cancerous. The tumor almost made me a quadriplegic; almost killed me. I was under the knife for 8 hours - with Liz Taylor's surgeon, "he gets the tough ones" - in March 2001. Then 8 days in intensive care and then another week in the rehabilitation center AKA the "Snake Pit". I'm OK now but in a certain sense still recovering after 30 months in that I still make occasional gains in energy and stamina which have been curtailed by the operation.

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HEAVEN AND HELL. Also in the last Quarterly, Peter Stone reminded us of Leo Rosten's interview of Russell concerning Russell's agnosticism. Rosten asked Russell what he would think if, upon dying, he found himself in Heaven and before The Lord. Anthony Flew writes and asks why Rosten wondered about Russell finding himself in Heaven, for "surely any old-fashioned Jew, Christian or Muslim would expect Russell, like the rest of us, to find ourselves in Hell." Flew also writes to suggest that a letter from him published in the last Quarterly was misprinted. The original letter has gone missing, and the editors are still struggling to come to grips with all the details of this typographical mystery, but this much is clear: In his May 2003 editorial, Peter quoted Russell's famous statement that "it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing that it is true." Peter then went on to elaborate on this doctrine by explaining: "when talking about unicorns, minotaurs, or compassionate conservatives, one does not normally have to prove their non-existence; the mere lack of any evidence is sufficient reason not to believe in any of them." Flew then wrote to point out that in more than thirty years experience as one, he has not observed his fellow Conservatives to be conspicuously less compassionate than members of other parties. We think that even in its first form, Flew made his point with his usual incisiveness.

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MORE FLEW NEWS. On the 50th anniversary of the famous 1948 Copleston-Russell debate concerning the existence of God, William Craig and Anthony Flew met in Madison, Wisconsin to publicly debate the issue anew. That anniversary debate is now being published by Ashgate in a volume entitled Does God Exist: The Craig-Flew Debate, edited by Stan Wallace. The volume, as well as containing the edited transcript of the debate, also contains chapters critiquing the debate and discussing the
issues raised by it. The volume is to appear in 2004. The original Copleston-Russell debate, as well as occurring in the Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell (v. 11), has been published in the British, but not the American edition of Why I Am Not a Christian (the U.S. Jesuits would not give Father Copleston permission to publish it here), Bertrand Russell on God and Religion (1986), and numerous student anthologies.

RE-ORIENTALISM. New York City ROUE and BRS Founding Member WARREN ALLEN SMITH sends us this report on two Honorary Members of the BRS. TASLIMA NASRIN, he tells us, is now a Guest Researcher at Harvard’s JFK School of Government, using the University’s libraries to research such subjects as patriarchy, Islamism, and rationalism. Nasrin is also featured in a new documentary film Fearless: Stories from Asian Women—The Price of Freedom, which had its U.S. premiere Friday, October 17th at the 7th Annual Hollywood Film Festival. Her new webpage is at http://taslimanasrin.com. And BRS Honorary Member IBN WARRAQ had an article on the editorial page of The Wall Street Journal (Monday, September 29, 2003), in which, following the recent death of Columbia University’s EDWARD SAID, Warraq accused Said of “having practically invented the intellectual argument for Muslim rage.” Warraq goes on to further criticize Said’s classic work Orientalism, in which Said first made the arguments to which Warraq takes exception.

SUPPORT THE SOCIETY – ATTEND THE APA! There will of course be a Russell Society session again this year at the Eastern Division Meeting of the AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. Please be sure and attend if you can. This year, the Eastern APA is meeting in Washington D.C., December 27-30, at the Washington Hilton and Towers. The BRS session will be on Sunday, December 28, from 9-11 am. Speakers there will be SORIN COSTREIE (University of Western Ontario) speaking on ‘The Epistemological Difficulty of Russell’s Theory of Denoting Concepts’, with KEVIN KLEMENT (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) giving the commentary, and DEREK H. BROWN speaking on ‘Russell on Appearance, Reality, and Color’, with JUSTIN LEIBER (University of Houston) giving the commentary. Derek Brown will chair the session.

Also at this year’s Eastern APA will be a Colloquium on Russell and Frege. This will be on Tuesday, December 30, from 11:15 to 1:15. The first speaker, at 11:15, will be MATTHEW MCKEON (University of Massachusetts-Amherst) speaking on ‘Russell and Logical Ontology’, with EDGAR BOEDEKER (University of Northern Iowa) giving the commentary, and at 12:15, JOONOL KIM (University of Notre Dame) speaks on ‘Are Numbers Objects? Part II’, with CHRISTOPHER PINCOCK (Purdue University) giving the commentary. KEVIN KLEMENT will chair the first session and STEVE GERRARD the second.

ANNUAL MEETING NEWS!

The 2004 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY will be hosted by long-time BRS member RAY PERKINS Jr and Plymouth State University. Ray is preparing a website with information about the conference. Questions about the conference concerning housing, food, travel, etc. can be directed to Ray at: perkrk@earthlink.net. Details of the conference will be included in the next Quarterly, posted at the conference website, and announced on the BRS-LIST in the near future. We hope that everyone will attend this meeting in the beautiful hill and lake region of New Hampshire.

CALL FOR PAPERS: Paper proposals for the next Annual Meeting can be sent to BRS President ALAN SCHWERIN at: aschweri@monmouth.edu. The deadline for submissions is one month before the Annual Meeting. (The date of the AM has not yet been determined.) Talks should be about 20 minutes in length. There are no subject limitations other than the need to deal with issues that relate to Russell’s life and thought. Further details for submissions will be posted soon at the meeting website, the BRS website, and on the BRS-LIST.

BRS BOARD ELECTIONS – BE SURE TO VOTE!

VOTING HAS BEEN SIMPLIFIED this year – you have eight votes to cast and seven candidates to choose from. You can’t go wrong! Originally, there had been eight nominees, but LAURIE ENDICOTT THOMAS withdrew her nomination, as she has not been feeling well for a while, and was not sure that she would be able to serve if elected. However, she reports that she has been feeling much better recently due to a new treatment she has been trying. We hope that she continues to improve and that we will see her at the 2004 Annual Meeting this summer in New Hampshire.

To continue with election news, those desiring a more competitive race may write-in for candidates who are members of the
BRS in good standing. Ken Blackwell has proposed David Blitz, a research fellow at the Russell Archives at McMaster who is on leave this year from Central Connecticut State, as a write-in candidate. David has agreed to serve if elected. His biography is listed below with those of the regular nominees. Other write-in candidates are similarly acceptable.

Ballots are located in the center of this issue. Please return them to Tom Stanley, Box 434, Wilder, VT 05080 USA or email your vote to Tom at tom.stanley@valley.net. Tom is this year’s election committee. Each member of a couple with joint membership is entitled to vote. All ballots must include the name and (in the case of written ballots) the signature of the member voting, and must be received by December 31, 2003.

The nominees for the 2004-2006 term of the BRS Board of Directors are: Kenneth Blackwell (nominated by Chad Trainer), Dennis Darland (nominated by Chad Trainer), David Heneman (nominated by Warren Allen Smith), Stephen Reinhardt (nominated by Chad Trainer), David White (nominated by Chad Trainer), Tom Stanley (nominated by Peter Stone), John Lenz (nominated by Peter Stone).

BOARD CANDIDATE BIOGRAPHIES AND STATEMENTS:

Kenneth Blackwell, a founding member of the BRS, has served as Chairman of the Board of Directors and has hosted several Annual Meetings of the Society at McMaster University. He edits the academic journal Russell.

Dennis Darland graduated from Augustana College with a B.A. in mathematics, physics, and philosophy. Since then, he has spent most of his life as a software engineer, and has independently pursued the academic subjects he studied at Augustana. In philosophy, he is particularly interested Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Whitehead, and Dennett. He has served both as Board member and as Society Treasurer for many years.

David Heneman has been a practicing lawyer for over 36 years. A graduate of Hamilton College and Cornell Law School, he thinks it is important for the Board of Directors to consist not only of academics but other interested persons with business experience. He further believes that lawyers are uniquely qualified to serve on non-profit boards. He has been a BR admirer and member of the BR Society for many years and has attended many annual meetings. He is a longstanding member of the BR

Steve Reinhardt is the only BRS member to have attended every Annual Meeting to date. He is retired from the legal staff of Dupont. He is a long time Board member, and has served as Treasurer and on the Society’s Bylaws Revision Committee.

Tom Stanley has been the Society librarian since 1984, and a director since 1985. He and his wife operate Stanley Books, specializing in the fine arts.

David White holds a PhD in philosophy from Cornell University and has been teaching philosophy at St. John Fisher College in Rochester for twenty-five years. He has been reading Russell since the fall of 1966, is a founding member of the Greater Rochester Russell Set, has served as an editor of the BRS Quarterly, and is now Chair of the BRS Board. Most recently, he did a promotion of the BRS at the World Congress of Philosophy in Istanbul, and over the past few years, he has organized sessions on Russell for the American Philosophical Association. White was the “cover-boy” for the August 2003 issue of the BRSQ.

David Blitz, whose name has been put forward by Ken Blackwell as a proposed write-in candidate and who has agreed to serve if elected, is a Philosophy Professor at Central Connecticut State University who focuses on Russell’s views on war and peace. He is also editor of volume 30 of the Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. He is currently on sabbatical leave at the Russell Research Centre and Archives at McMaster University.
THE QUARTERLY'S EDITORIAL OFFICE MOVES TO NYC. After two and a half years of service, PETER STONE has stepped down as editor of the BRS Quarterly in order to accept a teaching position at Stanford and concentrate on research. The new editors are Rosalind Carey and John Ongley, and the new address for the editorial office, located at Lehman College-CUNY in the Bronx, is at the front of this issue of the Quarterly. The Bertrand Russell Society wishes to thank Peter for the excellent service he provided the Society for so long as editor of the Quarterly and to wish him much luck and happiness in California. The Society also wishes to thank Peter's Rochester crew - PHIL EBERSOLE, TIM MADIGAN, RACHEL MURRAY, DAVID WHITE, and ALAN BONE - for the able work they did for so long in assisting Peter with the Quarterly. The new editors especially want to thank Peter and David White for all the help they gave with the transition of the Quarterly's editorship.

RUSSELL ON THE ISRAELI / PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Selected, and with an Introduction by RAY PERKINS JR

What follows is a previously unpublished letter to the editor by Bertrand Russell. It was written for publication in The New Outlook, but either was never sent to that journal, or else was sent but never published by them. The New Outlook, known simply as The Outlook before 1932, is a left of center Israeli publication which has been around since 1902. At the time of Russell's writing, the Arabs and the Israelis were between wars - between the 1956 Arab-Israeli war and the six day war of 1967 by which Israel underwent significant de facto territorial expansion. Israel's population was growing fast during this period, and the Arab territorial "conviction", referred to by Russell, would prove true in the wake of the '67 war. Russell identifies the (Palestinian) resettlement problem as central to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and he recommends a remedy which, as he says, would require a "magnanimous gesture" on the part of Israel. Of course, Israel has long been sensitive about the "demographics problem", and it's no surprise that Russell's proposal would fall on deaf ears. But some, like this editor, might say that had the soll of suggestion made by Russell been accepted by Israel in 1963, the coming war - and all the problems of the "occupied territories" which that war has engendered - could have been avoided.

Russell's writings on Palestine and the Middle East are relatively thin compared to his main points of public focus in the 50s and 60s, viz. nuclear weapons and the war in Vietnam. But his basic position was clear. Regarding the creation of the State of Israel he wrote on June 15, 1960: "I think it was a mistake to establish a Jewish State in Palestine, but it would be a still greater mistake to try to get rid of it now that it exists."1 On the 1956 Suez War, he wrote in the same letter: "I thought the Suez War a blunder and a crime, and said so publicly at the time."2 His views on the 1967 war and its aftermath are recorded in his last public

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1 B. Feinberg and R. Kasils, eds. Dear Bertrand Russell... (Houghton-Mifflin, 1969), p. 48
2 Ibid. See also Russell's public letters at the time in my Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell (Owen Court, 2002), pp. 248-51
BERTRAND RUSSELL

The New Outlook, Karl Netter 8, Tel Aviv, Israel, (4th February, 1963)

Dear Sirs,

I am very grateful to you for your kind cable and I am greatly encouraged by the efforts you make to bring about friendship between Israel and the Arab World.

I consider the main difficulties to consist of the disposition of the refugees and of the Arab conviction that Israel cannot absorb its expanding population without expanding its boundaries. It seems to me that if Israel were to make a magnanimous gesture, which might take the shape of agreeing to accept the return of all Arabs who have left Israel and to finance the re-settlement of all those refugees who did not wish to return – then it might be possible to have serious talks with Arab Governments, which could lead to the normalisation of relationships. A further point would be a non-aggression pact, guaranteeing that Israel accepts her present boundaries to be final.

I am writing in this way, because I believe that the Arabs feel themselves to have been fundamentally wronged and are, therefore, not able to take the initiative. It is in Israel’s fundamental interest quickly to settle her dispute with the Arab world. It is, therefore, for Israel to make several generous steps which would remove the major source of grievance without endangering the basic Israeli requirement of acceptance.

I accept the honour you do me in identifying yourselves with my remarks in your recent Symposium. Please keep me informed of your efforts.

With good wishes,
Yours sincerely,

Bertrand Russell

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3 See Yours Faithfully, pp. 411-12.
Dan Kervick, in his review of my *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance*, finds the book "confusing and difficult." For example, Kervick says, "At times, Dejnožka seems to suggest only that Russell has an implicit modal logic. In other passages it is asserted that the modal logic is explicit" (Kervick 2003: 31). However, I indicate many times in the book that the logics are implicit (my 1999: 16, 17, 61 twice, 62, 66, 96), and there is an entire chapter devoted to paraphrasing Russell’s modal texts into implicit logics. I found it otiose to add "implicit" every time I wrote "logic." Besides, it is obvious that Russell never expressly states any modal logics. I never thought anyone would think otherwise. Take it from me, I am talking about implicit modal logics.

Kervick does not understand what I mean when I say Russell rejects modal entities and modal notions, yet "functionally" has a modal logic – a logic which "behaves as if it were" based on modal entities or modal notions, which "simulates" a modal logic which is based on modal entities or modal notions (Kervick 2003: 30).

The idea is simple, and it is Russell’s. I am finding implicit in Russell logical analyses of the same sort that Russell is always doing. Namely, Russell finds that often, "supposed entities can be replaced by purely logical structures [which] substitute [for the supposed entities] without altering [the truth-value] of the ... propositions in question" (Russell 1971: 326, my emphasis). The two most famous examples in Russell are his definition of numbers as classes of classes in *Principia Mathematica*, and his logical analysis eliminating definite descriptions in "On Denoting."

Russell’s greatest achievement was to develop a logic which "functions" as, "substitutes" for, or "replaces," mathematics. He analyzes all arithmetical expressions away, and uses logical expressions in their place. No arithmetical entities are assumed, and no arithmetical notions are involved. Arithmetical entities and notions are eliminated across the board. Yet Russell can say and do everything in his logic that mathematicians can say and do in arithmetic. This is just how I describe Russell as analyzing all modal expressions away and using quantificational
expressions in their place (my 1999: 2). Russell does not alter truth-values in modal logic when he rejects modal entities any more than he alters truth-values in arithmetic when he rejects numbers. He expressly preserves arithmetic, and if my formalization is right, he implicitly preserves modal logic, though I believe this is "surely unintentional on Russell's part" (my 1999: 97).

Kervick says that I seem "to be aware" that the concept of logical necessity and the concept of analyticity are "quite definitely" different for Russell (Kervick 2003: 36-37). "Yet," he proclaims, "there is a surprise in store when Dejnozka turns [to define the implicit necessity operator of implicit FG-MDL]. For FG-MDL, it turns out, is based on reading "it is necessary that P" as it is analytically true that A!" (Kervick 2003: 37, Kervick's emphasis).

The eliminative analysis of necessity as analyticity is Russell's (1994: 519), not mine. And once again, his idea is simple. Far from being a problem, such a difference is a necessary requirement of a successful logical analysis. For a logical analysis to be significant (informative), the analysans and analysandum must differ in connotative meaning; otherwise the analysis would be circular. In Russellian analysis, the sense in which they must be the same is extensional salva veritate, and the sense in which they must differ (prior to defining) is intensional. This is known as the paradox of analysis.

Imagine noting that the concept of a number and the concept of a class are "quite definitely" different for Russell, and then proclaiming "Yet there is a surprise in store when Russell comes to define number. For Principia, it turns out, is based on reading 'number' as class of classes!"

Kervick asks, "And what does the previously unrecognized Russellian modal logic look like? Where is it formalized, and what is the result? What are its theorems and its fundamental principles?" (Kervick 2003: 30). "But Dejnozka never presents this formalization" (Kervick 2003: 31).

I state the formalization three times in chapter 6:

S1. \( P \rightarrow \Box P \)
S2. \( \Diamond(P \& Q) \rightarrow \Diamond P \)
S3. \( (P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (\Diamond P \rightarrow \Diamond Q) \)
S4. \( \Diamond \Diamond P \rightarrow \Diamond P \)
S5. \( \Diamond P \rightarrow \Box \Diamond P \)

I state it three times so as to cover seven implicit modal logics - three alethic, one causal, one epistemic, and two deontic. I state that all seven implicit logics have the same S5 formalization, and differ only as to interpretation of the modal operators (my 1999: 80). And I carefully discuss the paraphrase of Russell into each implicit logic one formal axiom at a time.

Kervick also says, "There also appears to be some confusion between modal logics and modal languages… [T]he appropriate medium for paraphrases of Russell’s thinking would presumably be some sort of fully interpreted language, rather than a logic" (Kervick 2003: 31). Not at all. I say “logic” more times than I would care to count—thirty-six times in chapter 6 alone. Nor are the logics lacking an interpretation. Strictly speaking, describing Russell’s implicit interpretation is not necessary to my task of showing an S5 logic implicit in Russell. But I also describe Russell’s intended model for his quantified logic twice (my 1999: 72, 101).

Kervick goes on to observe that everyone uses casual modal language, even, say, the Marx Brothers, and that it would be otiose to delineate whatever modal logic might be implicit in the casual modal talk of the Marx Brothers (Kervick 2003: 32). This is disingenuous. I am paraphrasing a great logician’s technical theories concerning philosophical topics of modality, including several expressly stated semi-formal logical analyses, not the comedy routines of a vaudeville act.

Kervick says that modalities in MDL are not “relative to” specific variables (my term is “with respect to”), but apply non-relatively or simpliciter to entire propositional functions (Kervick 2003: 34). He says our interpretations of MDL are “significantly different” (Kervick 2003: 34), but does not explain why.

In fact Kervick’s interpretation of MDL is definable in terms of mine. For a propositional function is MDL-necessary simpliciter just in case it is MDL-necessary with respect to every specific variable it contains. But still my interpretation of MDL is the correct one. Russell describes MDL possibility as follows:

When you take any propositional function and assert of it that it is possible, that it is sometimes true, that gives you the fundamental meaning of ‘existence’. You may express it by saying that there is at least one value of \( x \) for which that propositional function is true. Take ‘\( x \) is a man’, there is at least one value of \( x \) for which this is true. That is what one means by
saying that ‘There are men’, or that ‘Men exist’. (Russell 1971: 232, my emphasis)

Note that where I say “with respect to x”, Russell twice says “of x for which”. This is a “smoking gun” text showing that MDL-possibility always binds a specific variable. The text is semi-formal and is thus more perspicuous than the casual talk of “any propositional function” in the same passage. Kervick’s repeated reliance on casual language is not a good idea for reading Russell. Russell is not an ordinary language philosopher, and what counts is how he formalizes things. Obviously, Russell would formalize this text as existential quantification, and as we know, the existential quantifier binds (“is relative to”) specific variables.

Let us think about the implications of this famous text. The text states that existence and MDL-possibility are defined as being the very same notion, *not always false*. Thus existence and MDL-possibility are interchangeable *salva veritate*, even *salva analytice*. Thus Kervick’s account implies that existence is predicated of propositional functions as *simpliciter* as MDL-possibility is. And that is absurd. The heart of the Frege-Russell logical revolution, multiple nested quantifiers, would be destroyed. And all the subtlety of MDL as I interpret it would be correspondingly lost, since the corresponding multiply nested modal operators would be destroyed.

Many modal statements are not even expressible on Kervick’s interpretation of MDL. For example, “Logical analysis is endless,” i.e., “Everything is a logical constituent of something”, or “(\(\forall x)(\exists y)Cxy\)” (compare Russell 1971: 202). On my account of MDL, this is synonymous with “(\(\exists x)(\forall y)Cxy\)”, but in Kervick-MDL, it is unwritable. Due to Russell’s repeated identification of existence and MDL-possibility as the same “fundamental logical idea” (Russell 1971: 232; 254), Kervick cannot even write “(\(\forall x)(\exists y)Cxy\)”!

We may now distinguish four logical stages. Stage 1 is my version of MDL, on which a propositional function is necessary with respect to a variable it contains if it is always true with respect to that variable. This stage is faithful to Russell’s equation of possibility with existence, and of necessity with universality, since his existential and universal quantifiers are applied with respect to, i.e., *bind*, specific variables.

Stage 2 is Kervick’s version of MDL, on which a propositional function is necessary *simpliciter* if and only if it is always true with respect to every variable it contains. The previous sentence defines stage 2 in terms of stage 1, thus showing how to get along without stage 2, the only stage Russell never expressly defines.

Stage 3 is Russell’s definition in “Necessity and Possibility” and “On the Notion of a Cause” of a proposition as necessary with respect to a determinate constituent if, when we replace that determinate constituent with a variable, the resulting propositional function is always true. Stage 3 is definable in terms of either stage 1 or stage 2; in fact, the previous sentence states the definition, which may be taken either in Kervick’s way or mine.

Stage 4 is Russell’s analysis of a necessary proposition as analytic, where “Analytic propositions have the property that they are necessary with respect to all of their constituents except as are what I call logical constants” (1994: 519, my emphasis). Clearly, stage 4 is definable in terms of any of the preceding stages. Thus all four stages are distinct only in reason.

We may also speak of a mix-and-match matrix. Stages 1 and 2 apply to propositional functions, while stages 3 and 4 apply to propositions. Stages 1 and 3 make modalities “relative to” specific variables or determinate constituents, while stages 2 and 4 do not.

Kervick calls MDL, or associates MDL with, my “second account of Russell’s modal logic,” my “modality as quantification account” (Kervick 2003: 37). He then criticizes MDL because it applies, and is intended by Russell to apply, modal notions to propositional functions, not propositions, and thus does not study logical relationships among propositions prefixed by modal operators (Kervick 2003: 38). Folks, MDL is not a modal logic! I indicate that eight times (my 1999: ix, 3, 16, 62, 80, 96, 194, 196). MDL is never on the list of seven modal logics (my 1999: 16, 80). “MDL is not the modal logic” (my 1999: 196), but the “basic element” (my 1999: 16), the “building block” (my 1999: 96, 194), the “stepping-stone” (my 1999: 3). MDL is stage 1. Only stage 4 is a modal logic, the early alethic FG–MDL. Kervick claims I give two accounts of FG–MDL, one analytic and one MDL-quantificational. But FG–MDL-analyticity is just what is definable (eliminable) in terms of MDL quantificational notions. This is just how FG–MDL functions as a modal logic without using modal notions. There is no second account.

1903-1905. In that paper, Russell finds that no one theory captures all our modal intuitions, and concludes that the topic of modality ought to be banished from logic (my 1999: 112; see 6). But if we stop there, we miss the big picture. Russell basically banishes modal entities and notions from then on. But the banishment of the topic ends the very next year when Russell accepts eliminative logical analysis MDL as his own theory of modality. Russell accepts MDL in eight published works from 1906 to 1940, a period of thirty-six years. Russell evidently accepts MDL from 1906 to the end of his life. And FG-MDL is definable in terms of MDL according to Russell’s own definition of “analytic” in “Necessity and Possibility.” Thus Russell implicitly accepts FG-MDL from 1906 until 1914, when he implicitly modifies FG-MDL into FG-MDL* by adding the requirement of truth in virtue of logical form (my 1999: 8). Thus Russell implicitly holds mature logic FG-MDL* from 1914 to the end of his life, a period of fifty-six years. That is the big story of the tenth of the book Kervick reviewed. The FG-MDL* necessity operator is implicitly the Pr/.#ci.p/.c} thesis assertion sign, construed as iterable; and so is the relevance logic entailment operator, implied by Russell’s repeatedly stated whole-part “containment” theory of logical deduction, which Anderson-Belnap overlook.

REFERENCES

Rackham School of Graduate Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan
dejnozka@juno.com

BOOK REVIEW

FREGE AND RUSSELL ON LOGIC AND LANGUAGE
KEVIN C. KLEMENT


This new anthology brings together 15 pieces by the most prominent defenders of logicism: Russell, and his German predecessor Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). Logicism is the position in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical truth is a species of logical truth. According to logicists, when properly analyzed, the truths of mathematics reveal themselves to be expressible in the vocabulary of logic alone, and deducible from purely logical premises. This position dates back to the 17th century, and was first championed by Leibniz, but prior to the late 19th century, the study of logic had not advanced sufficiently for this thesis to be fully tested. Frege, one of the chief innovators in the turn-of-the-century advance in logic, was the first to develop a thoroughly axiomatic calculus for logic. Therein, he hoped to show that the truths of arithmetic could be proved using axioms of logic alone. Working independently, Russell developed views remarkably similar to Frege’s, and although Russell later discovered problems with Frege’s logical system, he went on to develop his own extensive attempt to reduce mathematics to logic.

Their works during the years 1879-1925 not only represent contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics, but as the title of the anthology suggests, have also had a considerable impact on the philosophy of language. Building upon what they had learned in developing their logical calculi and attempting to analyze the statements of arithmetical affirmations in both Frege and Russell faulted traditional Aristotelian logic for taking the subject/predicate analysis of grammar as a guide in understanding logical form. Frege went on to argue for a sense/reference dualism in meaning, and for analyzing all language in terms of the notions of function and argument typically only applied to
mathematical formulae. Although he rejected Frege's sense/reference distinction, Russell too argued that the apparent grammatical form of statements was systematically misleading about logical form. For instance, with his influential Theory of Descriptions, Russell argued that statements of the form “the so-and-so is such-and-such” must actually be analyzed as complicated existentially quantified propositions.

The anthology contains nine works by Frege. They include firstly an excerpt from his 1879 classic *Conceptual Notation*, in which Frege first presented his logical system, followed by two additional papers from the early 1880s in which he informally explains the advantages to his function calculus over rival systems. The next item is the introduction to Frege’s 1884 *Foundations of Arithmetic*, in which he lays out some methodological principles used in his philosophy of mathematics. Next, the anthology includes three pieces from the early 1890s, together considered to be Frege’s most important contributions to metaphysics and philosophy of language: “Function and Concept,” “On Concept and Object,” and “On Sense and Reference.” Here Frege describes his function/argument analysis of both natural and logical languages, and describes his views on meaning. The last two pieces by Frege are 1904’s “What is a Function?”, in which he clarifies his understanding of the nature of functions, and highlights some misunderstandings in the work of some of his contemporaries, and 1919’s “The Thought”, in which Frege discusses his views on the nature of truth, and argues for a “third realm” of abstract senses and thoughts, distinct from both the physical and the mental realms.

The anthology only contains six works by Russell. First is the 1901 essay “Mathematics and the Metaphysicians,” in which he describes how recent work by mathematicians has helped to solve some longstanding philosophical puzzles about the nature of number and infinity. Next is the classic 1905 paper “On Denoting,” in which Russell first outlined the theory of descriptions and argued against the rival positions of Frege and Meinong. This is followed by the 1911 essay, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” which describes some epistemological and other philosophical developments related to the theory of descriptions. The next entry is a chapter entitled “Logic and the Essence of Philosophy,” taken from 1914’s *Our Knowledge of the External World*, in which Russell explains how past misunderstandings in logical analysis have lead to philosophical mistakes. The final two contributions are from Russell’s 1919 *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*: first, the chapter on descriptions, and second, the final chapter in which Russell explores some still undecided questions about the nature of logic itself.

Although all the works in the anthology have been published before, and most are readily available elsewhere, the anthology is the first of its kind to focus exclusively on the works on Frege and Russell together, and therefore may serve to partly fill a void in instructional materials for courses dedicated to these figures. Depending on one’s purposes, however, it would very likely need supplementation. For undergraduate students, together these 15 works would serve as a good introduction to Frege’s and Russell’s views on logical analysis and the philosophy of language. When it comes to logicism itself, they contain very little information about the details of their views on the nature of numbers, or their methodology for reducing mathematics to logic. In fact, many of the works included are polemical pieces in which they attempt to convince readers to read their other works, and/or compare their merits with those of others. At least some familiarity with the details of their programs beyond what the anthology contains would be necessary to draw any informed conclusions about the virtues and/or shortcomings of logicism. For beginners, it could be supplemented with relatively informal full-length treatments such as (the remainders of) Frege’s *Foundations of Arithmetic* and Russell’s *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. For advanced students interested in the details of their logical systems, the difficulties they faced (such as Russell’s paradox of sets), their methods of overcoming them (e.g., Russell’s Theory of Types), and the details of their logicist arguments, one would need to turn to more technical writings such as Frege’s *Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, Russell’s “Mathematical Logic As Based on the Theory of Types,” or Russell and Whitehead’s *Principia Mathematica*. Unfortunately, nothing from these technical writings is contained in the collection.

The anthology also includes a 75-page introduction by the editor, which aims to provide an overview to the historical background of their writings, their main philosophical positions and points of disagreement. While the introduction may be helpful to many students, and does a particularly good job at discussing some of the shortcomings of pre-Fregean logic, a number of cautionary notes are in order.

Firstly, certain of the views of Frege, Russell and others are
oversimplified. For example, the naïveté of early modern philosophers with regard to philosophical logic is exaggerated; Kant is given too large a place, and also portrayed much more psychologically than he in fact was. Both Russell's and Frege's views on the nature of logic as an a priori science are distorted, and too closely tied to "inference". The changes in the views of Frege and Russell over time are not mentioned or clarified. For example, both Russell's early metaphysics of propositions and his later fact-based theory are discussed at different points, but it is not mentioned that these views are incompatible, and that, historically, one was succeeded by the other.

A number of the issues discussed in the introduction are presented somewhat sloppily. Distinctions between linguistic items and their meanings are often not kept straight, especially in the discussion of Frege's views on the nature of functions. A logical form is defined as a "sentence-schema", whereas both Russell and Frege took great pains to distinguish the logical forms of objective propositions and thoughts from anything linguistic. The editor often talks about such things as "the meaning of a proposition" or the "meaning of a concept," whereas propositions and concepts are not things with meanings; they themselves are the meanings.

On a number of points, the introduction gets the views of Frege, Russell, or both subtly wrong. For example, it makes such claims as that Frege's quantifiers are limited to a "contextually relevant domain", and that Russell believed that quantifiers are functions from predicates to truth-values, neither of which is true. The editor claims that Frege thought that logical operators were functions from "sentences to sentences", a claim Frege never made. (For Frege, logical connectives refer to functions, but it is doubtful that they themselves are functions.) He claims that both Russell's and Frege's logical systems were extensional, when in actuality only Frege's system is extensional by modern standards. The editor presents the Theory of Types as a hierarchy of different types of sets with different types of members; however, Russell's mature logic actually eschewed commitment to sets as entities altogether, and the Theory of Types was actually one of different ranges of significance for what Russell called "propositional functions", which Russell used to analyze away apparent commitment to classes or sets.

It also oddly claims that Russell, contra Kant, wanted to restore the "analyticity" of arithmetical claims, whereas Russell actually claimed that both logic and mathematics were synthetic a priori. In the Introduction, the editor alleges that Frege's theory that senses exist in a third realm apart from the mental and physical is obscure, and not fully explained. However, he neglects to mention exactly what he finds lacking or unclear about Frege's position, and so the discussion comes off as nothing more than an uncharitable jab. The editor also insinuates that Russell never fully engaged with dualistic theories of meaning (those that draw a distinction between sense or meaning and reference or denotation), which is easily shown false by a study of his 1903-1905 manuscripts.

Finally, he wrongly claims that there is a consensus among experts that logicism has been refuted by Gödel's incompleteness results. Gödel showed that not all arithmetical truths can be captured in a single deductive system. While this shows that the Frege-Russell form of logicism was perhaps somewhat naively strong, it does not touch the core of logicism. Similar results show that not all higher-order logical truths can be captured in a single deductive system, so Gödel's results do not point the way to any difference between logical and mathematical truth.

Department of Philosophy
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts
klement@philos.umass.edu
In his review of COLIN MCGINN’s new autobiography for *The New Statesman*, NICHOLAS FEARNS has this to say about McGinn and Russell. While an undergraduate in philosophy at Manchester University, McGinn, whose heroes at that time were JOHN LENNON and BERTRAND RUSSELL, began smoking Russell’s favorite brand of pipe tobacco in the hopes that it would make him as brilliant as Russell. We find it hard to believe that McGinn actually thought that it was smoking a particular brand of pipe tobacco that made Russell brilliant, when everyone knows it was the RED HACKLE that did it.

Fearns also says that McGinn was recently introduced to the film actress JENNIFER ANISTON at a HOLLYWOOD PARTY. Aniston was apparently quite impressed to meet a professional philosopher, but the encounter ended in embarrassment when she proved never to have heard of KANT, DESCARTES, or Russell. McGinn agonized for a long time over the “interpersonal discomfort” he had caused the poor multimillionaire movie star to suffer. – *New Statesman*, June 9, 2003

The 53rd Annual PUGWASH CONFERENCE returned to Pugwash, Nova Scotia for the first time in 44 years this past July. The original Pugwash Conference had been called into being by the multimillionaire and Pugwash native son CYRUS EATON. Eaton had been impressed by the famous 1955 manifesto, signed by EINSTEIN, Russell, and others, that demanded that governments on both sides of the iron curtain renounce nuclear weapons, so he wrote to Russell offering to host and finance a conference on nuclear disarmament, and the famous 1957 Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs was born. Thirty-eight years later, it received the Nobel Peace Prize. By 1959, the annual conference had outgrown Pugwash and it moved on to bigger centers, although smaller workshops continued to be held there over the years. One of the original Pugwash participants, and last surviving signatory of the 1955 manifesto, JOSEPH ROTBLAT, attended the most recent Pugwash Conference. It was a bittersweet visit for him: “It’s a bit lonely now” the 94 year-old Polish-born nuclear physicist said. Rotblat was the 1983 recipient of the BRS Annual Award. – *McClures*, July, 2003.

The Cold War CIA funding of the liberal anti-communist CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM has been gone over again by the press, this time in the *New York Times*. CIA funding for the Congress was first disclosed in 1967, but a large amount of historical evidence recently made available allows for a more complete understanding of the events. British intellectuals were suspicious of the Congress from the start, and its founding conference – in West Berlin in 1950 – was constantly interrupted by interventions from Hugh Trevor-Roper and A.J. Ayer, who objected to the organizers’ excessive anti-communism. Nevertheless, the Congress was soon a regular part of British intellectual life.

The author of the *Times* article, Hugh Wilford, asserts that Russell was one among “several eminent intellectuals who remained mistrustful of the CCF”, and that he was “at the center of several embarrassing public rows about McCarthyism with the CCF’s U.S. affiliate, the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. This culminated in 1957 with his noisy resignation from one of the CCF’s honorary chairs.” Wilford also asserts that “most of the British intellectuals involved in the CCF’s operations knew all along about the organization’s links to the U.S. government.”

Along with recent allegations by Timothy Garton Ash that Russell published three books (*Why Communism Must Fail, What is Freedom?*, and *What is Democracy?*) knowing that their publication was financed by the British Foreign Office, such allegations, however one might evaluate and interpret them, show a complexity to Cold War politics that was much more difficult, if not impossible, to discern while we were in its midst. – *Times Education Suplement*, July 4, 2003

In *The Spectator*, Paul Johnson’s nostalgic complaint about “old-fashioned Englishmen” and pipe smoking has this to say about Russell: “In my *New Statesman* days in the Fifties, pipes were common among the intelligentsia, being seen as ‘democratic’. Did not Uncle Joe smoke one? Bertrand Russell certainly did, adding another dimension to the compound aroma of sartorial fustiness, baldness and cerebral dandruff he carried around with him. The most technological of the smokers was Ritchie Calder, appropriately our science correspondent. He assembled with other luminaries every Monday at 10:30 a.m. for our editorial conference. There were Dr Balogh and Barbara Castle, Professor Patrick Blackett, the defence expert … and Gerald Gardner, later lord chancellor, with others including Russell himself, though he was not often asked as Kingsley Martin, the editor, thought him ‘too disruptive’.”

Traveler’s Diary/Conference Report

In mid-August, I traveled to the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, held in the village of Kirchberg am Wechsel. The conference is held in the village grade school, noteworthy for the gym on its top floor—a large hall with peaked roof, floor-to-ceiling plate glass windows opening out onto the Alps, and bars, ladders, ropes, and rings for the children. It was in this room that we adults crowded for the plenary lectures (sweating in the European heat wave), while other, less notable speakers met in the smaller but cooler classrooms on the lower floors.

Kirchberg is neighbor to Trattenberg, the town in which Wittgenstein retired to teach school children, satisfied that he had cleaned up the problems of philosophy. Perhaps he taught them in a school not unlike that in Kirchberg: a bus trip to Trattenbach—which I missed—allows one to learn more. But Kirchberg itself was quite revealing: bread, butter, cheese, sausage (i.e. franks) and beer; a culturally ingrained Catholicism; a pronounced, lilting accent: it made sense of Wittgenstein to me (no pun intended), or at least why he would wish to retire there.

As for the conference itself, only about a sixth of the hundred papers presented during the week-long conference were devoted to Wittgenstein, the others addressing the general theme of the year, knowledge and belief. Patrick Siuppes spoke on Bayesian Epistemology, Robert Audi on Philosophy of Religion, Crispin Wright on Skepticism, Certainty, Moore, and Wittgenstein, Hans-Johann Glock on Wittgenstein on Truth, and Michael Heller on whether the universe can explain itself. For the most part, I attended papers on Wittgenstein, many of them quite good, and to my relief, most of them in English. Two on the Tractatus that especially stood out were Daniele-Moyal-Sharrock’s on nonsense and Maija Aalto’s on sense and substance.

I was on a budget; the taxis from my Gasthaus high in the Alps to the valley and village of Kirchberg were expensive; the highlight of the trip for me was an early morning meal of bread and butter (like the lunch Wittgenstein is said to have eaten in his 40s, with chocolate), and a long hour and a half hike down breathtaking hills to the village and conference below. A summer slide (like a luge, but not one) winds down the mountain, and a summer lift (like a ski-lift, but not one) runs up it; walking down the mountain I would sometimes have day trippers passing above, their feet dangling only yards from my head. – Rosalind Carey

RUSTLINGS! - Three Russell-Related Word Puzzles

By Gerry Wildenberg

Numbers 1 and 2 comprise coded quotes in which each letter stands for another letter. (For example BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EHHFRRYY, if O=B, R=E, et cetera.) In cipher number 2 word separations are disguised and punctuation removed. The grouping into 5 letter “words” is meant only to help readability and does not relate to the actual quote. These two quotes will be familiar to some Russellians; after solving them, try to identify the source.

Puzzle number 3 is not a substitution cipher. Instead, this quote has been permuted slightly by means of exchanging some of the letters with nearby letters. (For example, “The puzzle below” might be changed to: tuhepzlebelwo.) At the same time, spaces and punctuation have been removed!

1. YJI YV CAl UYNC WUZYFCPJc IHIUICN YV NGLLINN WJ QILYUWM P UPJ YV MIJWGN WJ CY HIPFJ CAI PFC YV RJJGJJLWPWCWJY.

2. PUXNA NHGW KNLLP WUXWJ VHLUL HBRUR GWQEW JWHRL VFNH WAGW HXKWW HIRUK UEWRG VHJVJ GUPVJ RNAAP PWLAR NUHJUZ RWAGH NAVPR WEKJV HLECP WJUZI FPPUX NRJNA NHZWE WHAW

3. OENOFHTEODDEFSTCOFMHEITPOATRCWEHACHEICOHF USAATCTCHSEOHSMIESFILTTAHWEETNDRMOAIAGNOORUW NDOOGORLVIEFORUTBETONETEHPURPOSESOFTHERPEOPAE SLTCIONS

RUSTLINGS! – SOLUTIONS TO LAST ISSUE’S PUZZLES

When we see an American film, we know beforehand that virtue will be rewarded, that crime will be shown not to pay, and that the heroine, always faultlessly dressed in spite of incredible tribulations, will emerge happily to lifelong bliss with the hero. – BR, ‘Political and Cultural Influence of the U.S.A.’, The Listener, December 8, 1949. Reprinted in Bertrand Russell’s America, v. II, 1945-1970, edited by Feinberg and Casrils.
Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process. Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY INC.
3RD QUARTER TREASURER’S REPORT
CASH FLOW, 7/1/03 – 9/30/03

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Compiled 10/8/03 by Dennis Darland
BRS Treasurer, djdarland@qconline.com

GREATER ROCHESTER RUSSELL SET
Celebrating Six Years of Monthly Russell Meetings
Open to the Public

2003-2004 PROGRAM

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<td>Portraits of Russell from Memory: A Panel Discussion</td>
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<td>Why I Am Not a Christian</td>
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<td>Marriage and Morals</td>
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All meetings are held at Daily Perks Coffee House, 389 Gregory Street, Rochester, NY, at 6:30 PM. (Note new meeting time.) For information call Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184, email tmadigan@rochester.rr.com or visit http://sun1.sjfc.edu/~wildenbe/grrs/Russell_poster.html. All dates and topics are subject to change.

BUY A BRS T SHIRT TODAY!

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