THE ANALYTICAL RUSSELL

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THE ANALYTICAL RUSSELL

CONTENTS

In This Issue  5
Society News  7
Features
Russell Letter on Nuclear Deterrence. Selected, with an
Introduction by RAY PERKINS JR  BERTRAND RUSSELL  11
Ambiguity, Dissimilarity, and Subsumption Failure  RUI ZHU  13
Review
A Faithful Companion. Review of The Cambridge Companion to
Bertrand Russell, Nicholas Griffin, ed.  KEVIN KLEMENT  25
Russell in the News
The First American News Reports, with Commentary by
JOHN ONGLEY  42
End Matter
Traveler’s Diary, More Society News, Rustlings, Treasurer’s
Reports  53

A GREAT AFFAIR IN A SCENIC SETTING

The 31st
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
ANNUAL MEETING

June 18-20, 2004
Plymouth State University Plymouth NH

REGISTRATION
Members: $60 Non-Members: $75 Students: $40
Includes Friday Buffet, Saturday Evening Banquet, and Papers
Papers only (no meals): One day: $20 Two days: $35
*Students are invited to hear papers free of charge*

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Off-Campus: Common Man Inn and Spa (866)-843-2626, or (603) 536-2200. The Federal House Inn (603) 536-4644. Best Inn, (603) 536-2330. All are in Plymouth, NH. To ensure off-campus accommodations reserve rooms as soon as possible.

TO REGISTER
Send checks—payable to the Bertrand Russell Society—to:

Ray Perkins, Jr.
Department of Philosophy
Plymouth State University
Plymouth, NH 03264

The website for the BRS Annual Meeting can be found at: http://oz.plymouth.edu/~perkins/. Additional information concerning the event is forthcoming on the website.

Please direct any questions concerning the 31st Annual Meeting to the convener of this year’s meeting, Prof. Ray Perkins, Jr., at perkkrk@earthlink.net

CALL FOR PAPERS
&
NEW! CALL FOR RUSSELL MASTER-CLASSES
THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
31ST ANNUAL MEETING

To present papers or lead seminars on some aspect of Russell's thought or life at the forthcoming Annual Meeting, send abstracts no later than April 30, 2004 to BRS President Alan Schwerin at aschweri@monmouth.edu. Limit papers to 20 minutes (roughly 10 pages). Below is a list of papers already accepted:

Academic Papers
“Russell and Fiction” Tim Madigan (U. of Rochester Press)
“Russell and the Stoics” John Lenz (Drew University)

New! A series of “Master Classes” will be held this year at the Annual Meeting. The papers and seminars accepted for presentation so far are:

Master Classes (conducted by the scholars listed below)
Class 1: “Russell's Logical Atomism and Empiricism”
Gregory Landini (University of Iowa)
Class 2: “Durant and Russell”
Peter Stone (Stanford University)
Class 3: “Russell and the Soul”
Alan Schwerin (Monmouth University)

If you have a favorite paper or chapter by Russell that you would like to explore with others in a seminar setting, let Alan know what the text is and he will have copies made available in advance—either online or in hardcopy—for those attending the meeting. The session will involve a short introduction by you, followed by contributions from the audience who will have done their homework before the seminar. This is a great opportunity to share research, and to reach out to others who might be interested in your Russell scholarship.
JOIN/RENEW NOW! To join, just send a check or money order, payable to The Bertrand Russell Society, to the BRS Treasurer: Dennis Darland, 1406 26th Street, Rock Island, IL 61201-2837, USA. Current members: remember that all BRS regular memberships expire at the end of the year; now is the time to renew!

Membership in the Bertrand Russell Society is $35 for individuals, $40 for couples, $20 for students and those on limited incomes, and $25 for limited income couples. Membership entitles you to a subscription to The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, as well as Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies (published biannually by The Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University), Society voting rights, and other Society privileges. Direct membership questions to Dennis Darland at: djdarland@qconline.com.

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IN THIS ISSUE:

In the last issue of the BRSQ, we provided some historical documentation about early analytic philosophy – letters, translated from the German by Richard Schmitt, in which Frege put hard questions to Wittgenstein about the Tractatus. Richard also provided a thorough report on the history of the letters themselves. In this issue, our feature article moves away from the historical to engage in philosophical inquiry itself, with a light and lucid exercise in linguistic philosophy by Rui Zhu, whose son, Bertrand, will be ten months old in March.

In the essay, Rui looks at a debate about language between Russell and Quine, and seeks a solution that lies somewhere in between them. Both accessible and original, the essay shows how one can use principles from transformational grammar to suggest new ways of solving philosophical problems concerning language.

In the second major piece in this issue, Kevin Klement appears again with a marathon review of every single essay in the new Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. From this review, you can begin to get an idea of whether the Companion, long and impatiently awaited by the Russell world, has been worth the wait. Kevin provides a highly informative report on every aspect of Russell’s work covered in the Companion, and the reader, specialist and non-specialist alike, is likely to learn more than a few things about Russell’s thought in reading the review. Apart from one lively opinion on Amazon.com, this is the first review of the Companion we know of. We feel that Klement has gotten its critical appraisal off to a sharp and perceptive start.

As usual, gossip, Russell news, and Society business are to be found in abundance in ‘Society News’. This is followed by another in our series of Russell’s letters to the editor, again selected and introduced by the series editor, Ray Perkins Jr. This issue’s letter gives an especially comprehensive statement of Russell’s views on the threat of nuclear weapons. And finally, we continue to provide historical documentation of Russell and those closely related to him in ‘Russell in the News’, which reproduces early news clippings about Russell and his first wife, Alys. Here, the emphasis is on Russell the public man and public intellectual. Future issues will
take a further turn towards the public Russell, with articles on Russell and the Cold War, his continuing influence in China, more reviews and gossip, and even further stories on Russell’s affairs of the heart.

CORRECTIONS AND ELABORATIONS: In the last issue of the Quarterly (November 2003, no. 120), we erroneously stated the publication history of Russell’s February 4, 1963 letter to the editor of the Tel Aviv New Outlook (item c63.10b in A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell, edited by Blackwell and Ruja). Kenneth Blackwell points out that that letter was previously published as ‘A Message from Lord Russell’ in the March-April issue (v.6, no.3, p.2) of New Outlook, and was reprinted in Hebrew in al-Hamishmar, Tel Aviv, circa March 8, 1963. The journal in which it was first published, New Outlook, was not the same journal which changed its name to The New Outlook in 1932, but rather one that began in July 1957 and was in its sixth volume in 1963. (Aubrey Hodes, an editor at New Outlook, had been in touch with Russell since 1959, and in that year, informed Russell that the journal was two years old.) In the last paragraph of his letter, Russell alludes to remarks of his that were published in “your recent Symposium”. This is a reference to another writing by Russell (item c62.49a in Blackwell and Ruja) in the November-December issue of the same journal to which the 1963 letter was a follow-up. We thank Kenneth Blackwell for this information, and also thank the Bertrand Russell Archive for permission to publish the letter. Peter Stone points out that the item in the ‘Russell in the News’ section of the November Quarterly on Russell and the Cold War was based on an article in the July 4, 2003 London (not New York) Times Educational Supplement. We thank Peter for correcting this mistake.

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Replies by Readers to BRSQ Articles are at
http://www.lehman.cuny.edu/philosophy/BRSQ.htm

SOCIETY NEWS

OUR MAN IN ISTANBUL. Last summer, David White, BRS Board of Directors Chair, traveled to the Bosphorus Straits to tell the people there about the Bertrand Russell Society. Here is his report:

My travels this summer were in two parts. I first spent three weeks in England, doing research at the British Library and preparing for my presentation on Lord John Russell by hanging out at the Lord John Russell Pub, which is a short walk from the library. From there I went to Istanbul for the World Congress of Philosophy. It was at the previous World Congress, five years ago in Boston, that I first learned the term “conference junkie.” A “conference junkie” is someone who enjoys attending conferences, and especially associating with other conference junkies. I really didn’t learn much about Lord John Russell at the pub named for him. The only association item I could find was a picture, admittedly hung right above the center of the bar.

I do wish the BRS could have made more of a showing at the World Congress. My one disappointment was that not one colleague, family member, or Rochester Russell Setter was willing to join me for the outing. Terrorists have been doing their worst for a long time, but I can’t see making plans around them when bathtubs and basement stairs are so much greater hazards. Of course, I ended up with plenty of company in London and in Istanbul. All my travel plans went off without a hitch.

I was lodged in a nice enough hotel, but in a neighborhood where other establishments took advantage of tourists. The conference people had made sure we were clearly warned about them, and about the con artists in the area who would buddy-up to take advantage of tourists’ reluctance to give them the brush-off right away for fear they might be an innocent citizen just trying to be friendly (they never were).

I came prepared to chair a round-table on Dewey’s A Common Faith and to present my own paper in the Philosophy of Religion section. However, someone dropped out of another panel, so I was asked to do a presentation on the Bertrand Rus-
sell Society, aimed at people who might want to start their own philosophical club. Then there were some people who did not show up at all, so I mounted the stage and gave a fourth presentation. Having gone that far by myself, I was determined to make it worthwhile. My talk on the BRS had quite a large audience (100+), and was well received.

A lot of my time at the Congress was spent hanging out at the Philosophy Now booth – an excellent opportunity to connect with other conference junkies. I would urge anyone who enjoys BRS meetings or reading the BRSQ to subscribe to Philosophy Now magazine, since Rick Lewis, the editor, has proved a great friend to the Society.

As usual, the press made light of philosophers meeting, but truly the World Congress was no more and no less than what one chose to make of it. After I returned home, I gave my Lord John Russell talk, which turned out to be the last session of the GRRS at Daily Perks. We have now moved to Writers & Books.

THE MYSTERY OF THE MISSING SYMPHONY (CONCLUDING EPISODE).

BRSQ readers will recall that in the August BRSQ (#119), Ken Blackwell and Tom Stanley informed us that British composer Graham Whettam had dedicated his Symphony No. 4 (Sinfonia Contrata Timore) to BR and “all other people who suffer imprisonment of other injustice for the expression of their beliefs or the convenience of politicians and bureaucracies”, and that this dedication apparently kept the symphony off the BBC until protests by Russell and others got it performed by that network.

Robert Davis (founding member of the BRS and president of the Society from 1975-82) then wrote in and told us, in the November BRSQ (#120), that this symphony had actually been played during lunch at the Society’s Annual Meeting in 1978, but that, being a modern piece, there were some complains from the membership in attendance about having been subjected to it. Davis said that he had heard of the symphony, contacted Whettam, and met him on a visit to England, where Whettam gave him a master tape of the symphony. Davis subsequently turned the master over to Warren Allen Smith, who had a recording studio at the time, and Warren transcribed it to the tape they played during lunch at the ’78 Annual Meeting. Warren meanwhile notified Davis that he would keep the master tape until notified to send it either to the BRS Library or the BR Archives.

And that is the last anyone heard of it, until we received a communication from Warren just this week (mid-February). In it he says that Whettam, who was born in 1927 in East Germany, sent a stereo tape of his Sinfonia Contrata Timore to the BRS in 1977, and that the BRS Librarian, Don Jackanizc of Chicago “sent the tape to board member Warren Allen Smith, who had the facilities in his New York City recording studio – Variety Recording Studio – to play the tape and master it into commercial LPs if needed. Herr Whettam, however, thought the Society operated much as a label and also a distributor. He wanted details as to how and when he would be paid. He was informed that, with his permission, the BRS would gladly make a special Bertrand Russell edition of the LP but that any profits after expenses would be entirely for the Society. He could, however, arrange for a different edition of the same work elsewhere. Whettam declined, and Smith still has the original tape.”

Warren then says “the tape itself is probably worthless and is on a 10 1/2” large reel that is playable only on professional equipment. Any suggestions as to who might want the tape or where it should be sent?” The symphony is available on the web from Crochet for $8.99 or from Amazon.com for $16.97. So we now know where the tape is, but are holding our breath in excitement over what will finally happen to it, and hope to have the full details for you in the next issue of the BRSQ.

NEW YORK CITY POWER LUNCHEON. The most recent meeting of the GNYCCBRS (pronounced guh-NYKA-burrs by the acronymically gifted) took place over lunch at Ben’s Kosher Deli—at W. 38th Street and 7th Avenue—on the Saturday afternoon following Thanksgiving. At the very far end of its vast main room, Ben’s possesses several longish tables linked together, these make a very good place to plot, and talk. The table included Tim Madigan, Peter Stone and his father Frank, Thom Weidlich, Ruili Ye, John Ongley, David Goldman, Warren Allen Smith (our host), Dennis Middlebrooks, Peter Ross, Taslima Nasrin, Taslima’s sister and niece, and
myself. At one end sat W.A.S, presiding in style, at the other end sat Taslima, guest of dishonor, and her relatives. (Ms. Nasrin is an anti-Muslim dissident in exile from Bangladesh and doing research at Harvard.) I was closer to her end than the other and therefore able to spy, or at least eavesdrop while our resident psychiatrist, David Goldman, probed Ms. Nasrin's memories of childhood. What influence in her past caused her to cast off the traditional Muslim female role? I didn't quite make out the answer, focused as I was on the menu. While those among the cognoscenti ate some soup-like dish, I ordered something utterly forgettable. But we were there to talk. Peter was within shouting range, and managed to convey his satisfaction with his new position at Stanford. Weidlich sat across from me and had to endure questions from me about writing books. Being profoundly socially inept I really only felt comfortable talking to Taslima’s niece. About 11 or so, she goes to school in New York and is embarrassed by her name (which means something like passionate flower of longing). Been there (age 11), done that, have the t-shirt.

After lunch, after coffee, came a period of fidgeting and shifting about: everyone changed places or stood, a phone-camera appeared from somewhere, and Taslima was invited to speak. As a speaker, Taslima is surprising rather than charismatic and powerful, and she managed to assert some extraordinary things. For example, when I asked her to discuss her attitude towards religiously moderate Muslims she immediately shot back that no Muslim is moderate—or rather, that to be a true Muslim is to be an extremist—because the true Muslim reads and follows the Koran, and the Koran is irredeemably extremist. I knew what she meant, but wanted to ask her why she permits the extremist Muslim to define “Islam” or “Muslim”. At one point during the long, pleasant afternoon, Taslima related her most recent collision with the government of Bangladesh. The current flap is due to a memoir in which she describes her sexual relationships with various men, who she identifies. This new book is causing great consternation among most Bangladesh men, who have either been “outed” or take issue with any expression of female sexuality. RC

(Society News is continued on page 54)

FEATURES

ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: A LETTER TO THE EDITOR
BY BERTRAND RUSSELL

Selected, and with an Introduction, by RAY PERKINS, JR.

BR’s letter to the Assistant Editor of Maariv (S. Rosenfield, spelled ‘Rosenfield’ by Russell), an Israeli daily newspaper, is published here for the first time. This powerful letter was written January 26, 1963, only three months after the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust. It is one of Russell’s most forceful public condemnations of the immorality of nuclear weapons, not only because of what H-bombs are likely to do, but also because of what their deployers are willing to do.

In the letter, Russell draws some striking parallels between the evils of Nazism and the East-West policy of nuclear deterrence which, he says, rests on the “willingness to commit genocide”. The letter is a stark reminder that the forces that produced anti-Semitism and its horrors are still very much with us and, when combined with nationalism and technology, threaten to produce even greater catastrophe. His reference to “... napalm, mass bombings and chemical ... weapons” brings to mind the concurrent American oppression in Vietnam, a matter that Russell was following closely in the press and would soon raise his voice against (See Yours Faithfully. Bertrand Russell, Open Court, 2002, pp. 360-95).

26 January 1963
S. Rosenfield, Assistant Editor
Maariv, Israel

Dear Mr. Rosenfield,

Thank you for your letter which my work has prevented being answered earlier. I can not send a full contribution at this time but I should wish to send you the following:

“Nazism and Fascism draw on responses which can be found in all cultures and all human beings. In a world of napalm, mass bombings, chemical and nuclear weapons we see clearly enough the capacity for murderous aggression and the atrophy of conscience possible in men. Every major Government of East and West tolerates a national policy worse in consequence than that of Adolf Hitler. One hydrogen bomb can kill more people than perished in the concen-
The cruelty and aggression inherent in man are often organised and directed towards victims who are easily attackable. Particularly where no clear and rational answer to complex problems is available to distraught peoples, the scapegoat is a convenient psychological alternative. This phenomenon exists in every organised society. When it combines with nationalism and technology the result is something such as the world saw under Hitler.

I think it is of absolute importance to remember that the same conditions which gave rise to Hitler pertain in organised states today. Individuals feel helpless to stop barbarism and therefore gradually acquiesce and even justify it. Nuclear policy is based on the willingness to commit genocide. Every individual who accepts such a policy or allows it to continue without personal protest is assuming the role of Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann is becoming a euphemism for Everyman.

I have little patience for the exploration of the evil of Nazism which avoids recognising the conditions which made it possible and the extent to which those conditions are with us now. Every country which persecutes a minority in the name of national security is guilty. The guilt is the weakness and blindness to cruelty which, when widespread, permit every and any atrocity.

I say that the treatment of a society’s worst offenders and most hated members is an indication of its own moral standard. If a society can in all conscience permit the cruel treatment of any man, ultimately it will allow it for all.

Anti-Semitism focused on a small community in a minority, easily attacked because weak, and easily hated because cohesive and independent. The Jews were the example but they were and are when persecuted only a symbol of the ease with which mankind sinks into barbarism and the scarcity of individuals who truly stand out against it. When mass incineration of nuclear war descends upon us it will be too late to learn this lesson. The time, as always, is now.”

I wish this to be used in its entirety, if it is used at all, and I should be most grateful to you for confirmation of its use. I hope to hear from you.

Yours sincerely,

Bertrand Russell

AMBIGUITY, DISSIMILARITY, AND CONJUNCTION FAILURE

RUI ZHU

When a general term is used to describe very different things, may we still treat it as the same general term? This question has survived centuries of debate in ontology. Plato’s problem of the being of non-being is a product of his positive answer to it. Russell thinks that Plato’s problem can be avoided by treating some key general terms as ambiguous. Although the ontological context is no longer relevant today, the issue remains interesting, for it still challenges our intuition concerning what counts as a legitimate sentence. In this paper, I will discuss a group of sentences such as “The chair and question are hard” that use a general term to describe (or subsume) drastically different objects. While there is an obvious quaintness with such a sentence, what shall we do with it? Shall we disallow it for the reason that its general term is ambiguous (Bertrand Russell thinks so), or shall we deem it permissible, only with its quaintness attributed to the dissimilarity of the objects (Quine thinks so)? I will argue that such a conjunction is not permissible, but Quine might be right that there is no ambiguity involved in the general term itself. Instead of attributing the conjunction failure to the ambiguity of the term, I will construct a rule (based on the rule of contraction in transformational grammar) to bar such conjunctions.

I. PLATO’S PUZZLE

In The Sophist, Plato compares

(1) The not-great is not-great,
(2) The not-beautiful is not-beautiful,
(3) The not-being is not-being.¹

The trifling innocence of (1) and (2) is contrasted with the horror felt by the Eleatic stranger over (3), for it contradicts Parmenides’ teaching, ‘Non-being never is.’ The indisputable truth of (1) and (2) forces both the stranger and his interlocutor, Theaetetus, to agree

¹ Sophist, 258
that

In the same manner (à la (1) and (2)) not-being has been found to be and is not being. (Italics added) ²

Besides his reluctant discovery that non-being has being, the stranger verges on saying that non-being is assured of the same kind of being as being itself, as the not-great and the not-beautiful are assured of the same kind of being as their opposites. It is apparent that Plato sees no difference in the tokens of 'is' in (1) – (3). 'Is' has the same meaning in all three occurrences and ascribes being to the subject of the sentence in which it is embedded.

2. A RUSSELLIAN AMBIGUITY

When Russell of 1912 considers the issue of being, he is not addressing the puzzle over non-being. Instead, the existence of universals in contrast with the existence of particulars occupies his attention. Compare

(4) Chairs and rocks exist,
(5) Numbers exist.

According to Russell, the word 'exist' has different meanings in (4) and (5). Numbers as universals do not exist in the same way as particulars such as chairs and rocks do. The existence of universals is timeless and belongs to a realm of subsistence, while the existence of chairs and rocks is fleeting and constitutes the ordinary meaning of existence.³

Supposing that Plato's non-being belongs to Russell's class of universals, the being of non-being would be taken as the subsistence of non-being - the original air of absurdity would go by the board. This is the benefit of Russell's ambiguity verdict.

3. NOT ABOUT ONTOLOGY

With the introduction of quantification, the ontological quirkiness of the occurrences of 'is' or 'exist' in a sentence ceases to be fascinating. But trouble is often a possessive spirit - it chooses to appear

² Ibid.

in a different body if the original fails it. Forget ontology, but one can still ask whether the word 'existent' means the same in the following equivalent renditions of (4) and (5):

(6) Chairs and rocks are existent,
(7) Numbers are existent.

At this moment, insistence on the fact that 'existent' is not a predicate (therefore, it does not have any meaning) only delays the problem. For it shows up again in this example of Quine's

(8) The chair is hard,
(9) The question is hard.

Is the word 'hard' ambiguous in (8) and (9)? Could one claim, in the way Russell does with 'existent' in (6) and (7), that 'hard' has different meanings in (8) and (9)? The apparent awkwardness of

(10) The chair and question are hard

seems to support the ambiguity verdict.

4. QUINE'S OBJECTIVELY DISSIMILARITY

Quine dismisses the Russellian diagnosis as baseless. In his own words, Quine says that he is baffled by philosophers' maintenance that 'true' said of logical laws and 'true' said of confessions (or 'hard' said of the chair and 'hard' said of the question, or 'existent' said of chairs and rocks and 'existent' said of numbers) are two usages of an ambiguous term instead of the same very general term.⁴ He demands evidence for the ambiguity verdict. With regard to the air of peculiarity of (10), Quine attributes it to the drastic dissimilarity between chairs and questions. 'Hard' is the same general term in (8) and (9), and there is nothing wrong with (10) itself. What causes discomfort is not the feared illegitimacy of (10), but the dissimilarity in objects - which is not a concern for logicians.

5. FAILURE OF CONJUNCTION

Indeed, Russell's ambiguity explanation of such odd sentences does not apply here. But Quine's attitude is all too cavalier. Although I

⁴ Word and Object, MIT Press, 1960, p. 131.
would like to agree that there is no foundation for one to claim that the meaning of ‘hard’ is different in (8) and (9), their conjunction (10) offends us just a little more than we can bear. Compare (10) – (12) (call them ‘Group A’)

(10) The chair and question are hard,
(11) John’s arthritis and punch are deadly,
(12) The ball and landing are soft

with

(13) Her eyes and the fountain are pure,
(14) The boy and monument are tall,
(15) His personality and the mud are soft.

While (13) – (15) (Group B) are also awkward and involve drastically different things, they do not abuse our linguistic taste to the same extent as do (10) – (12). The difference between the two groups lies not just in the familiarity of existing similes evidenced by Group B, but also in the absolute incomparability of the pairs of things in Group A. Most languages allow a comparison between a pair of eyes and a fountain, and some languages (e.g. Chinese) allow comparing an individual’s character to mud. But it is no accident that no language allows comparing a hard question to a hard chair, a punch to arthritis, or a landing to a ball. An English speaker may be amused by some unexpected exotic comparisons (like Mencius’ comparing an indolent mind to a weedy road), but a comparison between a question and chair is far from amusing.

In my opinion, Quine’s analysis applies to sentences of Group B, but not to those of Group A. Conjunctions of Group A affront us not just in the dissimilarity of their conjuncts, but also in their semantic propriety. When an English speaker decides against a sentence like (10), what motivates her is not so much the pragmatics of English as a sense of semantic propriety that underlies all languages. As a matter of principle, conjunction should be barred with respect to a hard chair and a hard question, or a punch and arthritis. How could Group A be disallowed, if we agree that ‘hard’ means the same in (8) and (9), or ‘deadly’ means the same (the very general term, ‘deadly’, meaning ‘capable of causing death’) in ‘John’s arthritis is deadly’ and ‘John’s punch is deadly’?

Note that the whole matter is largely intuitive and frustratingly vague because we do not have a working concept of semantic frames. Not all conjunctions are ruled out because of the clash of the frames. Sentences of Group B are examples of permissible conjunctions. It seems that a term can still be used to describe drastically different things as long as there is no clash of semantic frames.
Although this “whistle in the dark” approach helps nothing, we may not take flight and refuse to acknowledge possible conjunction failure under the same predicate. Healthy greed for clarity should not blind us to real problems.

7. CONTRACTION

Since we do not really know what a semantic frame is, and whether it belongs to the pragmatics or semantics or syntax of a language, we end up with many questions and no clear solutions in hand. What I will propose in the following is to treat conjunction after the model of contraction in transformational grammar and form a constraint on conjunction which our intuition about semantic frames captures but fails to deliver. It should not come as a surprise that we treat conjunction after the model of contraction because of the similarity in the two operations. But I must add the disclaimer that I am not treating conjunction as a particular case of contraction.

In transformational grammar, a rule of deletion concerning contraction says:

(Contraction-Rule) Contraction is blocked if there is a missing constituent after the item concerned.6

For examples of contraction, we have in the following, where the ‘is’ of (16) is contracted into the ‘s’ of (17):

(16) It is a jolly good day,
(17) It’s a jolly good day.

Or where ‘had’ is contracted into ‘d’:

(18) He had a jolly good day,
(19) He’d a jolly good day.

But a similar contraction would fail between (20) and (21):

(20) A jolly good day (that) it is,
(21) A jolly good day (that) it’s.

Or between (22) and (23):

(22) A jolly good day (that) he had,
(23) A jolly good day (that) he’d.

While (17) and (19) are grammatical, (21) and (23) are not. The explanation from transformational grammar points out the fact that there is a trace of a wh-pronoun that is left behind after the wh-movement of the constituent following ‘is/had’ in (21) and (23). The D-structure of (20) is

(24) A jolly good day (that) it is which

Now move the wh-phrase and get the S-structure:

(25) A jolly good day which (that) it is

Delete the wh-phrase and get the surface structure, which is (20):

(20) A jolly good day (that) it is

Because ‘which’ is the missing constituent after ‘it is’ in (20) but still exists in the D-structure, (24), contracting ‘is’ to ‘s’ is blocked according to the contraction rule. The same account applies to the ungrammaticality of (23).

Out of the same account, Chomsky explains the ‘wanna’ contraction failure of contracting

(26) Who do you want to die

into

(27) Who do you wanna die (ungrammatical)

in virtue of the fact that there is a missing constituent of ‘who’ in between ‘want’ and ‘to’ in the D-structure of (26)

(28) (That) you want who to die.

That is to say, the trace of ‘who’ in between ‘want’ and ‘to’ blocks the contraction of ‘want to’ into ‘wanna.’

8. CONJUNCTION RULE

I suggest that we treat conjunction failure along the similar line of contraction failure. Perhaps we might want to say something like this

(29) A jolly good day (that) he had.


(Conjunction-Rule) Conjunction is blocked if there is a missing constituent after the general term concerned.

If so, we must look for the missing constituents in sentences such as

(8) The chair is hard,
(9) The question is hard,

so that we can block

(10) The chair and question are hard.

In fact, we might have what we want here. But first let us compare

(29) John's arthritis is deadly

and

(30) John's punch is deadly.

We see that arthritis is deadly only to John himself while his punch is deadly to someone other than John. When an English speaker hears (29) and (30), she understands them in the manner of (31) and (32), respectively,

(31) John's arthritis is deadly [to John himself]
(32) John's punch is deadly [to someone other than John].

Because of this tacit knowledge, she would not accept (33), the conjunction of (29) and (30)

(33) John's arthritis and punch are deadly.

The parallel between the failure of contraction and that of conjunction in (33) is striking. In both cases, a competent speaker sees something still functioning in her linguistic understanding (or the D-structure) but missing in the surface structure of the sentences concerned. The missing constituents are often unconsciously filled up by the competent speaker whenever she comes upon those sentences. In fact, if we spell everything out, it is very easy to see why conjunction in (33) fails. Compare (31), (32) and (33) to (31'), (32') and (33'):

(31') John's arthritis is deadly to him,

(32') John's punch is deadly to him,

(33') John's arthritis and punch are deadly to him.

We can see that the pronominal ‘him’ in (31') and (32') refers to different persons (to John himself in (31'), to someone other than John, say, Fred in (32')). And (33') is blocked because the two occurrences of ‘Deadly to him’ are not the same type of general term, for one is ‘Deadly to John’ while the other is ‘Deadly to Fred.’

Conjunction can fail as long as one of the sentences has a missing constituent. (10), ‘The chair and question are hard,’ is illegitimate because there is also a missing constituent in (9). When one reads (9), ‘The question is hard,’ she must tacitly understand it as an abbreviation of

(34) The question is hard [to solve].

Otherwise, suppose (9) is complete as it is, it must allow a nominal transformation such as

(35) The question’s hardness

or

(35') The hardness of the question

just as (8) allows

(36) The chair’s hardness

or

(36') The hardness of the chair,

so that a question like ‘Does the chair have hardness?’ or ‘What about the hardness of the chair?’ can be posed. But (35) and (35') are unacceptable. In no circumstance can one make sense of the question ‘Does the question have hardness?’ or ‘What about the hardness of the question?’ This shows the incompleteness of the term ‘hard’ in (9). If we complete it as (to repeat (34))

(34) The question is hard [to solve],

its nominal transformation (37) and (37') would be acceptable, awkward as it is,

(37) The question’s hard-to-solveness,

(37') The hard-to-solveness of the question.
Sometimes the incompleteness of the term stems from the inseparable bond between the adjectival and nominal phrases because of the existence of an idiom-like phrase. Let us examine (38) and (39).

(38) The landing is soft,
(39) The moon is new.

The particularity of the two sentences lies in the fact that each predicate is somehow attached to the nominal phrase in the subject position. The propriety of using ‘soft’ to describe ‘landing’ depends on the presence of the idiom ‘soft landing,’ while the acceptability of ‘The moon is new’ presumes the idiom or quasi-idiom or complex noun-phrase ‘new moon.’ The evidence of this tight predicate-subject bond is the insubstitutability of the general terms in question by their exact synonyms. (38’) and (39’) are unacceptable,

(38’) The landing is impressionable (or easily yielding to pressure),
(39’) The moon is novel.

In contrast, (40) and (41) allow such substitutions:

(40) The ball is soft,
(40’) The ball is impressionable (or easily yielding to pressure),
(41) The garage is new,
(41’) The garage is novel.

As such, (38) cannot be conjoined with (40), forming ‘The landing and ball are soft;’ nor can (39) with (41), forming ‘The moon and garage are new.’ A native speaker always understands (38) and (39) under the influence (often subliminal) of complex noun phrases like ‘a soft landing’ and ‘a new moon.’ And it is this tacit registration of the fact that terms like ‘soft’ and ‘new’ in such contexts cannot stand by themselves the prevents substitutions of the kind shown in (38’) and (39’).

The Conjunction Rule needs to be modified because of the obvious counterexamples such as ‘The first and second landings are soft,’ ‘January 15th’s and February 15th’s moons are new,’ or even ‘John’s punch and hepatitis are deadly.’ In the last case, when John’s punch and hepatitis are both deadly to Fred, nothing can prevent such a conjunction. So, the modified Conjunction Rule should be

(Conjunction-Rule)* Conjunction is blocked if there is a missing constituent after the general term concerned and the general terms of the two sentences are not identical after all the missing components are added on.

9. CONCLUSION

Our position stands between Russell and Quine. Russell bars conjunctions like ‘The chair and question are hard’ on the ground that ‘hard’ is ambiguous, whereas Quine acknowledges the identity of ‘hard’ in its two occurrences and therefore sanctions the conjunction. We agree with Quine that ‘hard’ is indeed the same general term meaning a certain degree of impenetrability, but with Russell’s conclusion that the conjunction should somehow be prohibited. In fact, it is not difficult at all to find a footing in the middle ground. One could say that, although the different occurrences of predicates like ‘hard’ are of the same type of a general term, they have different implications in different contexts such that the conjunctions would be barred because of the divergence in implicature. This pragmatic approach should work, but misses the important general feature shared by the sentences that thwart such conjunctions. We have tried to capture this general feature by offering a syntactic explanation for an intuitively semantic impropriety.

We do not fancy that our explanation, which is produced after the model of contraction failure in transformational grammar, must be correct or even has great explanatory power. If it has any success at all, it must be limited. For instance, we still have to let such an odd conjunction, ‘The night and wooden beam are long’ (from ‘The night is long’ and ‘The wooden beam is long’) pass as legitimate.8 There is no ground for us to object to this sentence, for

8 This example is discussed in the ancient Chinese Mohist writings dated between the 4th and 3rd century BC. Similar examples discussed by Mohists include: ‘His wisdom and grains are plentiful’, and ‘His official position and the price are high’. According to Mohists, one should not compare wisdom and grains (or title and price) in this way because they do not belong to the same type. Applying our Conjunction-Rule* to these sentences, we would legitimize ‘His wisdom and grains are plentiful’ but not ‘His official position and price are high’ due to the fact that ‘high’ is idiomatically attached to ‘position’ in the sentence ‘His position is high’.
we cannot possibly say something like “The predicate ‘long’ in ‘The night is long’ is somehow incomplete.” This might be a great discomfort for us, for the sentence ‘The night and wooden beam are long’ is just as weird as ‘The chair and question are hard.’ It is up to the reader’s judgment whether or not to deem the sentence ‘The night and wooden beam are long’ as a decisive counterexample to our Conjunction Rule*.

Our best case is the example of (33) ‘John’s arthritis and punch are deadly’ out of (29) ‘John’s arthritis is deadly’ and (30) ‘John’s punch is deadly.’ It is very clear that the two tokens of ‘deadly’ are of the same general term, meaning ‘capable of causing death.’ But it is equally clear that (33) ‘John’s arthritis and punch are deadly’ is unacceptable. We must come up with a theory, which should be different from either Quine’s or Russell’s, to explain this conjunction failure. Our Conjunction Rule* is the first attempt toward offering an explanation. Like every other initial experiment, its significance is fortunately largely independent of its explanatory success.

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REVIEW

A FAITHFUL COMPANION
KEVIN KLEMENT


We can at last release our breath: the long-awaited Russell volume in the popular Cambridge Companion series has finally arrived. It contains fifteen chapters written by well-known Russell scholars dealing with a wide array of Russelliana, along with a quite extensive introductory essay by the volume editor. It is not difficult to see what took so long. Russell’s corpus, even considering only his philosophical writings, outstrips in both breadth and volume almost all the other figures covered in the Cambridge Companion series. A further complication in Russell’s case is his characteristic habit of so frequently changing his mind even about fundamental issues. Dealing with such a vast amount of information must have required a tremendous amount of sustained collaboration. Obviously, the volume could not cover everything; but the editor and authors have done a tremendous job selectively choosing topics and themes within Russell’s philosophical work to focus on. While falling short of perfection, the result is a collection of pieces that together provide the sort of sophisticated introduction to a complex philosopher that is able to make his work accessible to relative beginners without disguising the subtlety, complexity and still controversial nature of his views.

Griffin’s introductory essay provides the requisite biographical information on Russell, along with a summary of the evolution of his philosophical views. His discussion of those views is terse, but this is understandable given that most are treated in greater length in the pieces that follow. The value of the introduction is that it provides an overall framework and chronology in which to situate the more detailed discussions that follow.

(1) The first chapter is entitled “Mathematics In and Behind Russell’s Logicism, and Its Reception,” written by Ivor Grattan-Guinness. It describes how Russell first became interested in the
foundations of mathematics in the 1890s, and how his interests were transformed in 1900 and the following years by the influence of Giuseppe Peano, his associates, and others, to grow into Russell’s logicist project. It also describes the changes in Russell’s thinking brought about by the discovery of the set-theoretic paradoxes plaguing his initial formulations of logicism, his realization that his earlier proofs of an actual infinity were fallacious, and the changes to his treatment of mathematical functions with the discovery of the theory of descriptions. Grattan-Guinness also discusses the details of Russell’s collaboration with Whitehead, the writing process of Principia Mathematica, and its reception and influence among mathematicians in the decades following its initial publication.

(2) This first chapter is nicely complemented by the second chapter, entitled “Russell’s Philosophical Background,” by Griffin. Here we find discussion of Russell’s inculcation into the mindset of British (largely neo-Hegelian) idealism during his study at Cambridge, and detailed treatment of Russell’s positions during his early idealist phase. The essay immediately shows the subtlety and complexity of Russell’s philosophical thinking even during this early period, and helps counterbalance the tendency—promulgated by latter Russell himself—to think of this early idealist work as simply a host of confusions engendered by rejecting relations. Russell’s positions on such matters as the nature of relations, the debate over monism and pluralism, the dependency of mathematical and geometrical truths on the mind or experience, and so on, are far more sophisticated than is generally acknowledged, as Griffin aptly demonstrates.

(3) The next piece, by Richard Cartwright, is entitled “Russell and Moore, 1898-1905.” This entry discusses the break with British idealism made by Russell and Moore in the late 1890s and their adoption of a robust realism, including commitment to propositions as mind-independent objects of belief. Russell credited Moore as leading the way in the development of this “new philosophy” (as he called it in 1903). Cartwright discusses how further investigations into the nature and make-up of propositions developed into Russell’s doctrines of philosophical logic exposited in the Principia Mathematica, and outlines certain major features of these doctrines with regard to ontological commitment, the nature of relations, necessity and change.

(4) Michael Beaney follows with a similarly titled entry, “Russell and Frege.” Frege and Russell are together often heralded as the two primary founders of analytic philosophy, and the two primary forces behind logicism in the philosophy of mathematics and the “revolution in logic” that lead to the abandonment of Aristotelian syllogistic logic in favor of modern quantificational logic. Beaney charts Frege’s main contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics, such as the development of quantificational theory capable of treating multiple generality, the definitions of hereditary properties and ancestors of relations, the analysis of equinumerosity in terms of one-one correspondence, and the resulting definition of cardinal number. He then discusses their relationship to Russell’s views, and compares and contrasts their views on the importance of relations and order, Russell’s paradoxy, the unity of propositions or thoughts, and the nature and purpose of philosophical analysis. Beaney also discusses their joint influence on analytic philosophy.

Disappointingly, the entry does not discuss much regarding the influence of the two philosophers upon one another (even negatively), nor does it delve into their very interesting correspondence beyond the initial letters concerning the contradiction in Frege’s logical system. In the first chapter, Grattan-Guinness had suggested that many commentators exaggerate the influence of Frege on Russell. Perhaps Beaney would agree since he does not mention a single way in which Russell’s views changed due to his reading of Frege. While it is no doubt correct that Russell did not adopt many views directly from Frege, and the most well known points of overlap between them are views they developed independently, Russell’s confrontation with Frege’s views in the years 1902-1905 lead him to rethink many of his own views on the nature of classes, functions and meaning, and while the final views Russell adopted do not coincide with Frege’s, it is unlikely they would have taken the form they did without Frege’s influence. (See, e.g., Klement 2003.)

(5) The fifth chapter bears the title “Bertrand Russell’s Logicism,” and is co-authored by Martin Godwyn and Andrew Irvine. It begins with a brief discussion of earlier logicist theorists, then sketches (what the authors take to be) Russell’s “new” type-theoretic form of logicism, which attempts to solve the contradictions plaguing Frege’s form, moves on to a discussion of Russell’s on-
thought that mathematical claims such as “2 + 2 = 4” could, when properly analyzed, be deduced from purely logical axioms, he thought that, epistemologically, the mathematical truths were more certain, and that indeed, non-self-evident logical principles are sometimes to be justified in virtue of the epistemological status of their logical consequences. Russell therefore did not share the epistemological goals of those other logicists who hoped to secure the epistemological status of mathematics by showing it to be reducible to self-evident logical principles.

However, much of the remainder of the essay is either redundant or out of sorts with other chapters on related topics in the volume. The chapter begins with a discussion of Leibniz, Frege and Dedekind, but does not make it clear to what extent the details of Russell’s logicism were influenced by these figures, and in any case the discussion seems redundant given Grattan-Guinness’s more sophisticated look at the historical background to Russell’s logicism. The descriptions of both simple and ramified type theory are unrecognizable when compared to Russell’s actual writings, and seem to owe more to later formulations of type-theory by logicians such as Tarski and Church than to Russell’s own work. Their claim that Russell’s 1908 “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types,” abandoned Russell’s 1905 “no-classes theory” in favor of a new approach directly contradicts Landini’s claim later in the Companion that the substitutional theory (a direct descendent of the 1905 “no-classes theory”) undergirds the logical system of that paper. Their acceptance of Quine’s criticism that Principia Mathematica’s second-order logic is based on a confusion of use and mention, and therefore, no more a reduction of mathematics to logic than a reduction of mathematics to set theory, ignores the responses made by sympathetic commentators in the past few decades (see, e.g., Sainsbury 1979, Chap. 8; Hylton 1990, pp. 217-218; Landini 1998, Chaps. 9-10, Linsky 1999, Chap. 6).

This is followed by a chapter written by Peter Hylton entitled “The Theory of Descriptions.” This entry begins with a summary of the mechanics of Russell’s influential analysis of descriptive phrases within first-order logic, then attempts to place Russell’s 1905 discovery of this theory within the context of his developing philosophical views. Rival theories such as Frege’s distinction between *sinns* and *bedeutungen* and even Russell’s own earlier theory of denoting concepts involve an indirect sort of representation according to which the thoughts or propositions we entertain, instead of containing the entities they are about, contain intermediate entities (senses or meanings) that represent the entities they are about. These theories are out of sorts with the direct realism Russell had adopted in his rejection of idealism, and according to Hylton, this is Russell’s primary motivation for adopting the theory of descriptions in their stead. Perhaps wisely, however, Hylton devotes only a paragraph’s worth of discussion to the arguments found in the infamous Gray’s Elegy passage of “On Denoting” against theories similar to the theory of denoting concepts, noting that space constraints rule out full consideration of the argumentation there. Instead, Hylton moves on to address the importance of the theory of descriptions for Russell’s philosophy after 1905, and finally discusses a number of influential objections to Russell’s theory which have surfaced since 1950. Interestingly, one lesson Hylton conveys is a warning against the traditional interpretation that Russell’s primary motivation for the theory of descriptions was the avoidance of (“Meinongian”) ontological commitment to non-existent entities such as the round-square, the present King of France, the planet Vulcan, and so on, noting that this seems like the central motivation only in retrospect. This lesson is apparently still worthwhile, given that even other authors in Companion still focus on this aspect of the theory when presenting it (e.g., Beaney in Chapter 4, p. 162).

(7) The seventh chapter, by Gregory Landini, is entitled “Russell’s Substitutional Theory,” and deals with the highly original and interesting logical system adopted by Russell from 1905-1907 to solve the paradoxes facing logicism in which the notion of ontological substitution of one entity for another within propositions as objective complexes is taken as fundamental. Specifically, it employs a four place relation written “p/abcq”, which means that q results from p by substituting b for a. For example, this relation would hold when p is the proposition *Socrates is wise*, a is Socrates, b is Plato, and q is the proposition *Plato is wise*. (Here we are dealing with the substitution of the *man* Plato for the *man* Socrates within a mind-independent proposition, and not the substitution of
one name for another within a sentence.) This logical system is strictly speaking type-free and employs only one style of variable—ranging over all entities whatever (including propositions)—and yet is able to proxy or do all the work required of a higher-order logic employing a simple theory of types, including providing a replacement for talk about sets or classes.

Landini sketches in some detail the origin and nature of Russell’s substitutional logic, as well the changes that it underwent as he encountered certain problems: e.g., the abandonment of quantified propositions as entities in his 1906 “On ‘Insolubilia’ and their Solution by Symbolic Logic,” as a way of resolving certain contradictions present in his initial formulations of the theory. Landini goes on to discuss that which eventually lead Russell to abandon the substitutional theory. However, against many traditional interpretations, Landini argues contentiously that certain key doctrines explicitly realized in the substitutional theory, such as the doctrine of the unrestricted variable, are maintained in a disguised form even in Principia Mathematica when one properly understands its semantics. Landini concludes that the substitutional theory is the “conceptual linchpin” connecting Russell’s work in the Principles of Mathematics with his mature logical system, and thus any proper understanding of the latter must involve an understanding of its relationship with the substitutional theory.

Alasdair Urquhart follows with a contribution entitled “The Theory of Types,” which aims to summarize Russell’s type-theory, its historical roots and influence within logic, mathematics and computer science. It begins with a short discussion of Russell’s early 1903 theory of types found in Appendix B of the Principles of Mathematics and its demise, mentions briefly Russell’s intermediate non-type-theoretic solutions to the contradictions attempted from 1902-1907, and then moves on to a discussion of the more complicated ramified theory of types found in Principia Mathematica. Urquhart notes the importance of the “vicious circle principle”, stated by Russell as the principle that “whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection,” in providing philosophical support for ramification. I think Urquhart perhaps gives it too large a place and applies it too sweepingly, given that for Russell the principle was not thought to be “itself the solution of the vicious-circle paradoxes, but merely the result which a theory must yield if it is to afford a solution of them” (Russell 1906, p. 205). While Russell accepts the vicious-circle principle, it is not the philosophical rationale or explanation of ramification, but a result of it.

Urquhart moves on to a summary of the technical details of ramified type-theory, but explicitly bases his exposition not on Russell’s own, but instead on later formulations of ramified type-theory given by Church, Myhill and others, explaining that the “original presentation in Principia Mathematica is both imprecise and notationally clumsy, ... [and] there is no precise presentation of the syntax of the system” (p. 295). Given that the Companion is supposed to provide a philosophical entrée to Russell’s own work, this decision is disappointing. Whitehead and Russell’s exposition of the details of their logical language is lacking when compared to modern standards, but this does not mean that an exact statement of what they had in mind would be impossible. There is unfortunately a long precedent of ignoring Russell’s own presentation of his type-theory, and an equally long precedent of attributing to him views he did not hold on the basis of later logicians’ formulations. Thankfully, in recent years there has been a movement away from the precedent. However, Urquhart ignores these attempts to understand Russell on Russell’s own terms, and neglects to mention recent findings and debates about the extent to which Principia’s formal system can be assimilated to later formulations (see e.g., Landini 1998; Chap. 10; Linsky 1999).

Urquhart’s exposition of ramified type-theory also wedds that theory to precisely the sort of metaphysics of propositions Russell held prior to adopting the multiple-relations theory of judgment circa 1910. His rationale is that Russell still describes propositions as the values of propositional functions, and therefore they are required as part of the very motivation of the system. However, this is odd given that Russell’s acceptance of ramification seems to coincide chronologically almost exactly with his eschewal of a metaphysics of propositions. Again, Urquhart ignores recent attempts to clarify Russell’s seemingly-inconsistent position (see, e.g., Sainsbury 1980; Cocchiarella 1987, Chap. 5; Rodriguez-Consuegra 1989; Landini 1998, Chap. 10).

Urquhart then discusses the simplifications to ramified type-theory that were developed in the decades following Principia’s publication, especially the simple type-theories developed by
Ramsey, and later, by Russell himself for the 2nd edition of *Principia* (1925). He lastly discusses the fate of type-theory in more recent mathematical and logical work, noting that while axiomatic set theories, based on the work of Zermelo others, are far more popular in contemporary mathematics, the ideas behind type-theory continue to play a role in inspiring certain advances in the foundations of set theory, as well as in the theoretic foundations of programming languages and study of algorithms.

(9) Next we find Paul Hager’s “Russell’s Method of Analysis,” which describes Russell’s self-conscious methodology for philosophical research. This methodology is a two phase process. In the first phase, one begins with a certain body of knowledge or set of “data”, conceived of as propositions within a certain domain of discourse which are thought to be obvious or self-evident, but somehow vague, in need of clarification or unification. The bulk of the first phase, the phase of “analysis”, consists in attempting to discover a number of logically more simple, but less self-evident, premises or principles, employing a smaller vocabulary, in which a reconstruction of the original body of knowledge is thought to be possible. The second stage of method, the “synthetic” stage, consists in building, reconstructing or demonstrating the original body of knowledge—or at least the indispensable part of it—from the premises and concepts discovered in the analytic phase. Mathematical examples of this methodology are easily found in Russell’s early work, and Hager goes on to describe Russell’s much later *Human Knowledge* as an example of this methodology applied to scientific knowledge. Hager argues that this methodology can be seen as representing the strongest continuous thread running through Russell’s philosophical work. Hager makes note of certain misunderstandings regarding the nature of analysis and its relation to language, such as the construal of analysis as having solely to do with the relationship between wholes and their parts, or thinking that analysis does not have to do with *both* language and the world. He argues that such misunderstandings underlie certain misconceptions about Russell’s work, most recently exemplified in Ray Monk’s well-known biography.

(10) The tenth chapter is entitled “Russell’s Neutral Monism,” written by R. E. Tully. Here we find a lengthy treatment of Russell’s consideration of neutral monism: the theory that there is only one kind of stuff making up reality, which is itself neither fundamentally mental nor physical, but out of which both mind and matter can be thought of as being formed. Tully begins with some philosophical background to Russell’s confrontation with the theory as found in the work of James and others, followed by discussion of Russell’s initial reaction and arguments against it in the early 1910s, stemming mainly from worries regarding its ability to explain fully the nature of first hand experience and its compatibility with the nature of acquaintance. Tully then discusses Russell’s gradual acceptance of the theory, at first provisionally in the late 1910s, and then explicitly in his writings in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the maturation and changes to the doctrine in such works as *An Analysis of Mind, An Outline of Philosophy* and *An Analysis of Matter*. He goes on to describe the role the theory has, even when not mentioned by name, in later works such as *An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth* and *Human Knowledge*.

There are a number of passages of the essay that are somewhat unclear, and parts, especially when discussing Russell’s earlier views, in which Russell’s doctrines are misleadingly stated. To focus on a single example, on p. 348, Tully suggests that Russell’s multiple relations theory of judgment was a reaction against a doctrine according to which “propositions are entities occupying an intermediate position between the minds and facts,” a doctrine “associated with Meinong.” In fact, neither Russell nor Meinong ever held such a view. Russell’s early view of propositions did not make them out as being intermediates between the mind and facts, and indeed, on that theory, facts and true propositions were identified. (This point is aptly made in the *Companion* itself by other contributors, e.g., by Griffin on pp. 27-28, by Cartwright on pp. 110-111, by Landini on pp. 253-255, etc.). The advance of the multiple relations theory was not that it allowed, as Tully suggests, “treating propositions as objects in their own right separate from facts.” Instead, it was that it allowed not treating propositions as singular objects at all. There are similar difficulties elsewhere in the essay; but such small difficulties—given the aim of Tully’s essay—are perhaps forgivable. However, more problematically, nowhere does Tully offer the non-specialist a simple overall statement of Russell’s neutral monism, nor a simple explanation of how Russell or others believed that either physical objects or minds should be conceived on this
position. (For this the reader has to wait until Grayling's contribution later in the Companion, pp. 461-463.) Tully mainly concerns himself with details of the theory, problems within it, or changes to it without giving a simple description of the overall theory.

(11) Next we find a chapter called “The Metaphysics of Logical Atomism,” written by Bernard Linsky. Linsky discusses in general Russell’s characterization of philosophy as an “atomism,” arguing that this should primarily be understood as commitment to analysis as a method coupled with a rejection of idealistic monism, rather than a pretense to have discovered the genuine metaphysical “atoms” making up the world of facts, or even the belief that such a discovery is possible. Linsky also discusses the epistemological aspects of Russell’s logical atomism, his notion of logical construction, as well as a number of related questions regarding the nature of Russell’s metaphysical views on propositions, propositional functions, universals, extensionality, atomic facts and the relationship between logical constructions and eliminative metaphysics, not all of which can be discussed in detail here. I will restrict my comments to two relatively small points. First, Linsky oddly claims that Russell introduces the name “logical atomism” in his 1918 lecture series The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, whereas in actuality, that phrase first occurred in Russell’s writings at least as early as the 1911 “Analytic Realism” paper (see Russell 1992, p. 135). Secondly, Linsky seems to assume that giving a nominalistic reading of Russell’s use of higher-order propositional function variables in his logic would amount to ascribing to Russell a nominalism about universals. However, these two issues are unrelated. On my own interpretation of Russell, he became a nominalist about “propositional functions” as early as 1905, but was never throughout the period in question a nominalist about universals. At least prior to his having been influenced by Wittgenstein, Russell never equated in his mind the propositional function “x is red” with the universal of redness— as Linsky knows full well (see Linsky 1999, chap. 2)—and so a realism about the later would not entail a realism about the former. However, I cannot fully elaborate this point here.

(12) William Demopoulos’s contribution, “Russell’s Structuralism and the Absolute Description of the World,” appears next. Demopoulos sketches Russell’s “structuralism”, i.e., his view that perception alone provides us directly at most with knowledge of structural features of the physical world—a view Russell held explicitly from 1919 through 1948, and perhaps implicitly as early as 1912. Demopoulos discusses its relation to Russell’s theories about propositional understanding, and how these lead him to consideration of difficulties regarding the proper interpretation of scientific theories, as well as Russell’s solution taken from the standpoint of the program of logical construction. Demopoulos also discusses certain questionable assumptions within Russell’s position. For example, he sketches Russell’s subjectivist treatment of color vocabulary according to which color predicates such as “yellow” or “blue” are to be understood as first and foremost representing qualities of subjective percepts or sensations, upon which our understanding of these predicates as applied to external surfaces is thought to be derivative. Demopoulos contrasts this with a “relativist” view, according to which while it is admitted that our initial understanding of such predicates is given in terms of perceptual criteria, with the advancement or our scientific understanding of color, this understanding is replaced by an “absolute form” of description that abstracts away from the particularities of our perceptual systems. The pre-theoretic and post-theoretic understandings can nevertheless be co-extensional. Demopoulos sketches certain other difficulties with Russell’s position, and while he does not find Russell’s position to be incoherent, he suggests that his rival position accommodates much of Russell’s insights while ending up as less revisionary with regard to our ordinary discourse and conception of the physical world.

(13) The thirteenth chapter is written by Thomas Baldwin and has the title “From Knowledge by Acquaintance to Knowledge by Description.” Baldwin charts over 35 years’ worth of the development of Russell’s epistemology, beginning with 1912’s Problems of Philosophy and the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. He then proceeds to discuss the changes to Russell’s conception of a priori knowledge first made explicit in the 1918 Philosophy of Logical Atomism lectures brought on by his rejection of logical objects due to the influence of Wittgenstein, and his movement towards a more linguistic notion of analyticity and a prioricity. Baldwin continues on to discuss the more radical changes to Russell’s epistemology from 1921’s Analysis of Mind, when Russell abandoned his former understanding of ac-
quantinace as a relation between the mind and non-mental objects in line with his newly adopted neutral monism. Baldwin also discusses how Russell's epistemological work during this period anticipates later discussions in the theory of knowledge such as the debate between internalism and externalism, as well as the causal and reliabilist theories of knowledge. Baldwin continues on to consider further changes to Russell's epistemological doctrines in An Outline of Philosophy (1928), and An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (1940), finally concluding with a discussion of the role causation plays in Russell's final epistemology in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948). In particular, Baldwin discusses what Russell calls "weakly a priori" truths such as the principle of induction. Unlike standard a priori truths, our belief in these principles cannot be justified by reason alone; however, our belief in them is at least amenable to a sort of causal explanation that shows it to have a kind of validity based on the fact that it reliably leads to other true beliefs.

(14) The penultimate chapter, "Russell, Experience and the Roots of Science," contributed by A. C. Grayling, sketches Russell's long-running project of attempting to explicate the relationship between sense experience and scientific knowledge. Grayling argues that it should be understood quite differently from the traditional Cartesian project of attempting to justify scientific claims on the basis of experience. Russell's task was rather to clarify how the objects of the sensible world and of scientific discourse relate to the data of immediate experience. He first discusses Russell's approach to the issue in Problems of Philosophy and works of that period, in which Russell conceived the problem as having to do with how we are able, beginning only with our direct acquaintance with sense-data, to achieve "knowledge by description" of the objects of the external world. He then proceeds to sketch how Russell reconceived the project after initially accepting neutral monism, when he abandoned both the distinction between the act of sensing and what is sensed, and the distinction between sense-data or sensations and objects themselves. Baldwin then discusses Russell's later return to an inferential view about our knowledge of physical objects in The Analysis of Matter, and finally Russell's naturalistic epistemology in Human Knowledge. The chapter overlaps heavily in theme and substance several previous chapters in the Companion (specifically, those by Hager, Tully, Demopoulos and Baldwin), but Grayling does an admirable job tying together the various themes discussed by others into a unified account of the development of Russell's philosophy from the 1910s through the 1940s.

(15) In the final chapter, "Bertrand Russell: Moral Philosopher or Unphilosophical Moralist?", Charles Pigden switches gears and examines Russell's contributions to moral philosophy. Pigden outlines six phases in the development of Russell's ethical theorizing, challenging the views of many that Russell's writings in this area were mostly derivative by highlighting significant points of originality, including influence on Moore's ethical work, as well as anticipations of both Mackie's error theory and the emotivism of Ayer and Stevenson. Even more contentiously, Pigden argues against Russell's own evaluation of his popular writings on political and moral themes as being unphilosophical, noting by way of example that Russell's call for world government involved a number of philosophically interesting convictions and arguments.

Finally, it should not escape mention that the volume also contains an up-to-date and extensive 36 page bibliography, with separate listings of Russell's own book-length works, prominent articles, collections, as well most of the important monographs and articles in the secondary literature. The bibliography of course is not comprehensive—remember that the extensive bibliography of Russell's own writings published by Kenneth Blackwell and Harry Ruja in the mid-90s was itself a three volume affair! The bibliography also contains some minor mistakes: for example, in the listing of Russell's philosophical articles, those that actually appear in Volume 4 of the Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell are all erroneously listed as appearing in Volume 3. Nevertheless, the bibliography provides an invaluable resource for anyone wishing to pursue further research on any aspect of Russell's philosophy covered in the Companion.

In summation, the Companion consists of four essays addressing Russell's logic and philosophy of mathematics, three essays primary concerned with Russell's philosophical background and interactions with other philosophers, three essays concerned with Russell's metaphysics and theory of meaning, four essays addressing Russell's epistemology, philosophy of science and theory of philosophical methodology, and one essay dealing with Russell's
ethics. If Pigden is right that much of Russell's writings concerning political, social and moral affairs constitute philosophy, then much of Russell’s philosophy is not covered in the Companion, from his early writings on German Social Democracy to his later writings on nuclear warfare and disarmament. No doubt, these omissions will disappoint certain die-hard Russell fans. However, I think by and large the choices regarding coverage were wise. The titles in the Cambridge Companion series are aimed primarily at working philosophers and philosophy students. The topics chosen are those that are most likely to be of use to that audience. While in a perfect world, a “companion” volume to Bertrand Russell would have covered all of Russell’s work, in reality, this would have doubled its size and price and left it without a single identifiable market.

Even if largely restricted to works easily and uncontroversially “philosophical” in the mainstream sense, the Companion’s coverage is by no means limited to the “usual suspects”. While Griffin apologizes in the introduction that Russell’s later philosophy is given “relatively sketchy treatment” (p. 46), in fact by comparison to other treatments of Russell’s philosophy, the Companion contains a number of chapters that contain serious engagement with Russell’s philosophical writings from the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Even among Russell’s earlier philosophical career, the Companion covers areas of Russell’s thought that are not widely known, such as the works of his idealist period and the substitutional theory.

If I were to give any criticism of the coverage of the anthology, it would be a small complaint about the lack of a single piece tracking the development of Russell’s thinking about truth, perhaps in connection with his views on representation and judgment. While these topics are covered in a piecemeal fashion in various selections, a single exposition of the changes in Russell’s views would have served to reconcile some otherwise contradictory-seeming statements found in chapters dealing with different phases of Russell’s thought—and indeed, would also have shed light on those few instances in which the statements made by the authors are in fact at odds with one another. Room for this might have come from eliminating one of, or amalgamating, either the two chapters on Russell’s logicism or the two chapters on Russell’s epistemology.

With regard to quality, most of the entries are both well-written and show an excellent grasp both of Russell’s writings and their historical situation. Certainly, some of the chapters fare better than others in this regard. I have noted some minor difficulties in my discussion above, and with one or two chapters there are some more systemic difficulties which space limitations preclude me from elaborating upon here. However, such problems are far outweighed by the strengths of the Companion as a whole. Moreover, while there are some disagreements and even direct contradictions between the various authors on certain points—some of which I’ve noted above—I do not take this to be a fatal flaw of the Companion. While sometimes the disagreements are straightforwardly due to a misreading by one of the authors which could be cleared up by consulting the primary texts, more often they reveal the sort of disagreements about interpretation that are inevitable when engaging with a highly original and productive philosopher such as Russell.

A good introduction to a philosopher need not and should not hide the fact that there remains serious contention about certain aspects of his work. Instead it should highlight the unresolved disputes in a way that invites the interested reader to investigate them for her or himself. This is the spirit of many of the more controversial passages in several of the chapters, though there are a few occasions in which a contentious point is made without attention being drawn to it.

It should perhaps be noted that the Companion is not—or do I think the authors intended it to be—an anthology containing new and cutting edge research. Indeed, there is remarkable overlap between it and previous writings by the same authors. The chapters by Griffin and Landini are largely just summaries of their respective books (Griffin 1991, Landini 1998), and the information contained in the chapters by Grattan-Guinness, Hylton, Hauer, Linsky and Pigden overlap heavily with their previous writings (see Hager 1994, Hylton 1990, Linsky 1999, Grattan-Guinness 2000, Pigden 1999). Specialists already familiar with these authors’ works won’t find anything remarkably new here, but it is certainly convenient and useful to have a single source-book bringing all the recent secondary literature together in a summary form. As it reads on the back cover of the book, the Companion aims to be a “conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Russell,” and in this regard it certainly fulfills its aim.

Yet in the end, it is not specialists for whom the collection
KEVIN KLEMENT

will be most useful. Currently, there is nothing to compare to it in providing an accessible but comprehensive introduction to Russell’s philosophy for advanced students, particularly, intelligent undergraduates and graduate students capable of doing work on Russell at a high-level. To be sure, there are some introductions on the market, but most are usually too short or too unsophisticated to give students a sense of the nuances and detailed rigor of Russell’s philosophy. Most of the writings in the Companion are pitched at a level that make them accessible to someone with a solid background in analytic philosophy and only minimal exposure to Russell’s own writings. Some of the contributions are pitched higher than others (e.g., those by Grattan-Guinness, Landini, Urquhart and Demopoulos), but in general these are precisely those dealing with topics that would likely only be tackled by relatively more advanced students and specialists. I can speak from first hand experience from having taught a graduate seminar on Russell’s philosophy in the most recent term; the Companion had appeared just in time for me to recommend it to my students. Their feedback was nearly uniformly positive, and this, perhaps more any anything else, speaks to the quality of Griffin’s anthology.

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WORKS CITED


Russell in the News—The First American News Reports

**AT THE HOTELS**

James Coats of Providence is at the Waldorf.
- Ex-Mayor W.G. Thompson of Detroit are at the Plaza.
- Prof. H.G. Jessop is at the Windsor.
- John D. McDonald and T.R. Hoyt of Boston are at the Plaza.
- Commander E.T. Strong, United States Navy, is at the Park Avenue.
- F.E. Warren of Boston and John B. Greer of Newport are at the Everett.
- Bishop Bickerseth of Tokio, Japan, and Congressman W.W. Groat of Vermont are staying at the Murray Hill.
- H.H. Glassford of Chicago, W.W. Birdsall of Toledo, and C.F. Riely of Albany are at the Metropole.
- J.L. McVey and Edward L. Mulholland of Philadelphia and John C. Schroeder of Rochester are at the Imperial.
- Grove L. Johnson of Sacramento, W.B. Gordon of Cleveland, and J.W. Rudd of Richmond, Va., are at the Marlborough.
- W.C. Ralston of San Francisco, M.D. Helm and G.W. Ashley of Baltimore, and J.S. Tolman of Boston are at the Manhattan.
- F.W. Hoeninghaus and F. Hong inhaus of New York; William L. Harris of Washington D.C.; Mrs. M.G. Worthington, Philadelphia; Mr. and Mrs. Bertrand Russell, and Miss Amos of London are at the Brevoort.

Dec 25, 1896

**A SUFFRAGIST CANDIDATE**

Women at Wimbledon Put One Up Against Harry Chaplin

LONDON, May 2—The woman suffragists have decided to oppose the election to the House of Commons of Harry Chaplin, ex-president of the Local Government Board, who is the Unionist candidate for the seat for Wimbledon made vacant by the resignation of Charles E. Hambro, Conservative. The Liberals are not contesting the seat, and Mr. Chaplin thought he had a walkover, but the veteran anti-suffrage leader was today confronted by an active woman suffragist campaign on behalf of Bertrand Russell, brother and heir presumptive of Earl Russell. Mr. Russell's wife, a daughter of Robert Pearsall Smith of Philadelphia, has been closely identified with women's political work.

NYT May 3, 1907

**RATS AS POLITICAL AGENTS**

Used Successfully to Break Up Woman Suffrage Candidate's Meeting

LONDON, May 11—A new use has been found for rats. They have been drafted into politics, and have shown themselves marvelously efficient in the line of work to which they have been assigned. Out at Wimbledon the Hon. Bertrand Russell, woman suffrage and Liberal candidate for Parliament, decided to open his campaign with a public meeting. The hall was crowded, mostly with women. The meeting was no sooner opened than a plain, organized attempt was made to break it up.

"We are here tonight to pledge ourselves to a worthy candidate," said the Chairman in opening the meeting.

"Really," exclaimed a man in the back of the hall, and then there were guffaws, shouts, shrieks, catcalls, and toots on motorcar horns.

"I trust we will have order in this meeting," pleaded the Chairman.

"Will you please sit down?" demanded a man with a megaphone, and then came a great uproar, which lasted five minutes. So the meeting progressed, until candidate Russell rose to speak. He had said about three words, when the man with the megaphone shouted:

"Let 'em loose.

That was the signal for the rats to make their debut in British politics. An instant later, forty whopping big fellows were scampering over the floor, terrorizing the audience, and especially the women. To say that the meeting adjourned in great disorder is an extremely conservative statement. In subsequent meetings in Mr. Russell's interest it was notable that a small number of women were present.

NYT May 12, 1907

**CHAPLIN AN M.P. AGAIN**

Chamberlain's Candidate Beats Woman Suffragists' Candidate

LONDON, May 15—At the by-election at Wimbledon yesterday the Right Hon. Harry Chaplin, Unionist, ex-president of the Local Government Board, whose candidacy was opposed by the woman suffragists, was elected by the great majority of 6,964 out of a total vote of 13,562. Mr. Chaplin was Mr. Chamberlain's first lieutenant throughout Mr. Chamberlain's protectionist campaign.

Bertrand Russell, the candidate of the woman suffragists, was heavily handicapped by the fact that the Liberals declined officially to nominate a candidate for the vacancy caused by the resignation of Charles E. Hambro, Conservative, and many liberals declined to support the nominee of the suffragists.

NYT May 16, 1907

**YALE NAMES LECTURERS**

Student's Registration 3,263—Gifts of $89,000 reported

NEW HAVEN, Conn., Oct. 20.—The Rev. Hastings Rashall, Canon of Hereford, England, the Hon. Bertrand Russell, a fellow of the Royal Society, and Prof. Etienne Boutroux, of the University of Paris, were appointed Woodward Lecturers at Yale at the regular meeting of the Yale corporation today. Arthur D. Dewing, of Boston, was also appointed lecturer on Corporation Economics.

The preliminary list of students in all departments shows a registration of 3,263, exactly the same number as last year. A considerable gain is shown in the college, with decreases in the law and medical schools.

Gifts aggregating $89,000 were reported since the Commencement meeting of the Corporation.

NYT Oct 21, 1913

**Bertrand Russell Here to Lecture.**

The Hon. Bertrand Russell of Trinity College, Cambridge, one of the foremost lecturers on philosophy, arrived yesterday on the Cunarder Mauretania to lecture at Harvard University under the Lowell trust. This work will cover thirteen months he said. Mr. Russell, who is heir presumptive of Earl Russell, married Aly Smith, the second daughter of R. Pearsall Smith of Philadelphia, in 1894.
OFF FOR EUROPE TODAY

Some of the Passengers Sailing on Two Steamships—The Arrivals.

Transatlantic liners sailing today and some of those booked to leave on them are:

BERLIN (Naples)—Count Charles Bonde, Mr. and Mrs. O. M. Clark, Mrs. Allen Curtis, Miss Evelyn Curtis, Mr. and Mrs. A.B. Emmons, Dr. and Mrs. C. W. Fox, W. Cadby, Dr. W. H. Hennings, Miss A. G. Ervines, Lester King, Dean C. Molleson, Miss Caroline L. Morgan, Mrs. F. Peck, Mrs. H. Richmond, Mrs. A. Rowitch, Mrs. M. H. Tweed, Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Whitney, Dr. and Mrs. P. B. Wyckoff.

DANUBE (Southampton via West Indies)—T. H. Betts, C. H. Burwell, C. C. Carpenter, H. W. Castle, S. G. Farwell, Mr. and Mrs. H. Hughes, A. D. Irving, Jr.; R. H. Russell, W. Murray, Mr. and Mrs. F. W. Stillman, W. D. Walton, C. J. Landon, James Willis, Mr. and Mrs. Herbert J. Giddons.

CAMERONIA (Glasgow)—Mr. and Mrs. Robert Buchanan, Mr. and Mrs. J. A. Doyle, Miss Kathleen Irwin, C. L. McDonald, Mrs. F. R. Peters, Miss Marion J. Peters, Mr. and Mrs. E. H. Whipple.

Transatlantic liners arriving yesterday, and some of their passengers were:

MAURETANIA (Liverpool)—Mrs. D. Alexander, Sir Hugh and Lady Bell, E. W. H. Beales, Capt. Charles E. Booth, Mr. and Mrs. F. T. Busk, Miss M. L. Cameron, Mr. and Mrs. L. W. Campbell, Mrs. H. A. Cushing, W. C. Davison, H. L. Dudley, Mr. and Mrs. W. H. Fares, and Mrs. Albert French, John C. Goold, Mrs. H. T. Harkness, Mr. and Mrs. Lewis Iselin, F. Orr Lewis, J. T. Lenfesty, J. H. McFadden, J. A. Nelson, Miss G. Moreland, S. R. Parsons, A. J. Paynter, William Prime, Miss M. A. Robb, Dr. and Mrs. J. T. Rogers, the Hon. Bertrand Russell, Mr. and Mrs. F. Morse Smith, Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin Stein, Mrs. R. E. Strawbridge, Mr. and Mrs. H. Van Dam, Capt. E. C. T. Warner, Earl de la Warr, Mrs. N. Whitehouse, Mrs. L. G. Young, Sir Francis Younghusband, K. C. L. E., E. C. Otis, W. Woods, C. A. Tissler.

CHICAGO (Havre)—Roger Flory, J. F. Florence, Mrs. F. F. M. Hurst, Miss Hurst, W. Jamison, Clementi Heaton, C. Furban, M. Werner, Leon Thebaut.

COLUMBIA TO GIVE METALS.

Recipients of the Barnard and Butler Prizes Chosen.

It was announced at Columbia University yesterday that the Barnard gold medal for meritorious service to science and the Butler gold and silver medals for contributions to philosophy and education would be awarded at commencement.

The Barnard gold medal for meritorious service to science, established and endowed by the will of the late President Barnard, is awarded every fifth year, on the recommendation of the National Academy of Sciences. The award for 1915 is made to William H. Bragg, D. S., F. R. S., Cavendish Professor of Physics in the University of Leeds, and to his son, W. L. Bragg, of the University of Cambridge, for their researches in molecular physics and in the particular field of radio-activity.

The Butler gold medal, established by an anonymous donor a year ago, is also awarded every fifth year. On the recommendation of a Committee of Advice, consisting of Dean Woodbridge, Professors Adler, Bush, Dewey, Russell, Suzzallo, and E. L. Thorndike, the medal is to be awarded to Bertrand Russell, Mr. F. R. S., Lecturer and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, for his contribution to logical theory. The contributions to educational administration.

The Butler silver medal is to be awarded to Professor Ellwood Patterson Cubberley of Leland Stanford, Jr., University for his contributions to educational administration.

WANTS OLD MEN TO FIGHT.

Mrs. Bertrand Russell Favors Armies Made Up of the Aged.

Mrs. Bertrand Russell, suffrage worker and philanthropist, daughter of the pioneer suffragist of America, Hannah Whitall Smith, and wife of the English philosopher, Bertrand Russell, speaking on the subject, "Why English Women Need the Vote in Time of War," at Rumford Hall, 50 East Forty-first Street, yesterday afternoon said she did not believe in women fighting or drilling and that she would not send any except the older men to the battlefield.

It was at the close of the address that a woman in the audience asked Mrs. Russell if she would allow the French women to go to the front with the men.

"Some of the French women have done it, but I am thankful to say no Englishwomen have done so," said Mrs. Russell. "It would be the end of all things if the women were allowed to fight. For the women even to practice shooting is..."
a great mistake. We don't want to increase the number of combatants. If I had my way, I'd say, 'don't let any of the men go to the battlefield before they are 60 or 70.' We don't want to lose our healthiest and youngest. It would be perfectly fair, wouldn't it, if everyone did the same?"

Mrs. Russell continued:
"The women in England are very capable, and as we win battles not only with the men in the field, but with the workers at home, the Englishwomen have answered the question that I have argued so many times with army and navy men that women should not vote because they cannot fight. We cannot fight and I am glad of it, but we can work." Mrs. Winston Churchill presided.

NYT Mar 23, 1916

CAMBRIDGE DROPS RUSSELL.

Rector, Who Married American,
Convicted Under Defense of
Realm Act.

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Friday, July 14—The Times says the Council of Trinity College, Cambridge, has removed the Hon. Bertrand Russell from his rectorate in logic and principles of mathematics in consequence of his conviction under the Defense of the Realm act.

Russell was fined at Mansion House on June 5 for making statements in a leaflet issued in the "No Conscription Fellowship" which were intended to prejudice recruiting.

Russell married Alys Smith of Philadelphia.

NYT Jul 14, 1916

The Hon. Bertrand Arthur William Russell, who is the heir of Earl Russell, was fined $500 and costs, with the alternative of sixty-one days' imprisonment, for having written a leaflet defining the "Conscientious Objector" to service in the British Army.

He is well known in this country, having been for several years visiting lecturer on mathematics and philosophy at Harvard University, while his wife is the daughter of a Quaker merchant and preacher in Philadelphia, R. Pearsall Smith. Her mother was the famous Hannah Whitall Smith, author of "A Christian's Secret of a Happy Life," which has been translated into many languages and has reached a circulation of more than 1,000,000. During March she was here delivering a series of lectures on behalf of the National Union of Women Suffrage Societies.

The Hon. Bertrand Russell was a lecturer and late fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and had a most distinguished career at the university. While a student there he took the first class in mathematics and moral sciences, and has since written a number of widely read books, the last of which, published in 1914, was "Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy."

He is one of several of the "intellectuals" of England who have gone on record as opposed to conscription. Others of these are Professors Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford University; C. P. Trewellyan, M. P., son of the private secretary of the late Queen Victoria.

NYT Jul 14, 1916

The Problem of History

These newspaper articles from the New York Times are that paper's earliest reports on Bertrand Russell. They cover both mundane and important events, but even the most banal clippings provide glimpses of Russell's fin-de-siecle world in England and America before the war.

The first article, from 1896, is drawn from the society pages of the Times, and lists the notable people staying in New York hotels that day, including Russell and his wife. Note that as well as listing the people themselves, it also lists the very hotel they are staying at. Even by today's celebrity media standards, this careful attention to the comings and goings of "notables" seems to refute the idea that the cult of celebrity is a recent invention.

Leaping ahead eleven years, the next news articles, from 1907, concern Russell's run for Parliament that year. Russell was the first person to run on a women's suffrage ticket in England, and the event was a genuinely newsworthy one. Following this are three articles concerning Russell's 1914 visit to America and the award of a prize to him by Columbia University in 1915. At this time, Russell is an intellectual celebrity and the articles appeared mainly for that reason.

The next three articles concern Alys Russell's 1916 visit to America to lecture for the woman's suffrage movement. As the articles reproduced here show, Alys possessed a bit of celebrity status in her own right — there seems to have been a real interest in her by the press apart from her position as Russell's wife. The last article, also from 1916, announces Russell's dismissal from Cambridge University for anti-war activities. It is just the first in a long series of press reports about Russell and the war.

One of the things of interest in these news clippings is the fact that they are so full of (what are now known to be) obvious errors, and even contradictions, as well as containing many assertions that beg further examination and explanation. Such news clippings are part of the historian's primary data, and these show clearly what
the real data of history are like for most historians most of the time – confused and confusing contradictory reports, and other puzzling anomalies.

In most cases, one can tell that the articles contain errors only by comparing one questionable source with other equally questionable ones. Often, looking more carefully at the record will only produce a quagmire of ever more conflicting information and you just pick the most authoritative looking claims, though other times, you are lucky enough to find one version that fits the known facts better than the other versions, and that becomes the “truth”. With that in mind, here is a list of what seem to be the major errors or questionable claims in these newspaper articles, as nearly as can be determined.

The Rats
The biggest whopper in these articles may be in the second article from 1907 (May 12th). It tells a somewhat questionable story of 40 live rats being let loose at Russell’s first public meeting at Wimborne in his campaign for Parliament there as a woman’s suffrage candidate. According to this report, the flood of rats terrorized the women and effectively broke up the meeting. The article also suggests – with a broad wink to the “fellows” out there – that considerably fewer women attended Russell’s later campaign meetings.

Russell himself supports this version of the story by retelling it in his 1967 Autobiography. There, he not only repeats the story as told in the papers – and in fact, publishes a news account of it in the Autobiography from some paper other than the NYT – but also elaborates on it a little, saying: “At my first meeting, rats were let loose to frighten the ladies, and ladies who were in the plot screamed in pretended terror with a view to disgracing their sex.”

But don’t close the case yet, because Russell tells a quite different story in a letter written to Helen Flexner on June 7th, just three weeks after the incident – whatever it was. In that letter, Russell says “[The campaign] was a funny time – partly horrid, partly amusing. The first meeting was the worst – a huge hall absolutely packed, about half violently hostile, and come only to make a row, whistling, cat-calling, getting up free fights, pretending to have fits, and getting carried out – everything imaginable to make speaking indescribable. The papers averred that rats were let loose, and the myth grew – I never saw them, and no one I asked did, until at last I found a man who said two had been let loose at the very end, and he had seen one dead.”

Yet another version of the events comes from Ray Monk’s recent biography of Russell. While Monk simply repeats the rat story as described in the papers and Russell’s Autobiography, he also asserts that Russell’s meetings were well attended, thus contradicting the newspaper story that attendance at them, at least by women, dwindled after the rat debacle. Since the newspaper’s reported lower attendance mid-campaign, it is unreliable, though it is not clear how much more reliable Monk’s assertion of good attendance at the meetings is, as he does not give his evidence for the claim.

As for the rats, which story should be believed – the one in Russell’s 1907 letter to Helen Flexner or the press accounts of 1907 and Russell’s 1967 Autobiography? Had Russell simply come to repeat the press accounts by 1967 because they made a better story, although the more modest 1907 version he gave in his letter to Helen was closer to the truth? Or did later reflection and further evidence force Russell to admit that the press accounts, which he was not willing at that time to credit, were actually true?

In the same article in which the rat story appears (May 12th), Russell is referred to as a “Liberal” candidate. But as Monk tells it (p. 189), the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies asked Russell to stand for election when the Liberals had declined to even field a candidate at Wimbledon because it was such a strong Tory district. This is also the version told in the May 3rd newspaper report. Griffin elaborates on this view (p. 313), saying that the Liberals gave Russell no official recognition during the campaign. And this last claim is supported by the next newspaper clipping from the
Russell's American Tour
The next three articles concern Russell’s 1914 trip to America. The first of these (Oct 21, 1913) adds some information to what is already known about the trip, and raises new questions. The article reports that Russell was appointed a “Woodward Lecturer” at the October 20th meeting of Yale’s governing board, without specifying what the responsibilities of a Woodward Lecturer are. Getting a position to teach one or several courses for a term or more is commonly referred to as an “appointment”, so that it sounds as though Russell is being hired for at least a semester, to teach a course or two.

But we know that Russell gave only one lecture at Yale while in America. Moreover, numerous other people who likewise received such Woodward Appointments also only delivered one lecture there that year. It is likely, then, that the Yale appointment announced in the paper was just for the one lecture there that Russell in fact gave.

In a discussion of this article, Jack Clontz has pointed out that the name of one of the lecturers referred to in the Yale announcement is misspelled. It should say that Hastings Rashdall (not Rashall) will also lecture there. Kenneth Blackwell found a copy of the Yale Daily News for May 15, 1914 in the Russell Archive at McMaster University which reports that the title of Russell’s Yale talk was ‘The World of Physics and the World of Sense’. Nicholas Griffin points out that the chronology of vol. 8 of The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell identifies the lecture as essentially the same as Chapter 4 of Our Knowledge of the External World. And Robert Riemenschneider adds that according to Victor Lenzen’s notes from Russell’s 1914 Harvard lectures, Russell made some significant changes in his views on the construction of time (and potentially of space) from those expressed in Our Knowledge of the External World. In particular, Russell no longer treated simultaneity as a primitive relation, but defined it in terms of precedence — roughly, x and y are simultaneous iff x does not precede y and y does not precede x and x does not equal y. These changes were made prior to his Yale lecture, so Russell may have included them in the Yale talk as well. However, when Russell revised Our Knowledge of the External World, for the 1926 English and 1929 American editions, he did not incorporate these changes into the text.4

The next of these articles, from May 14, announces Russell’s arrival in the States to lecture at Harvard. It reports Russell saying that he will be there for thirteen months, when he actually planned on staying, and actually did stay, for just three months. For example, he writes in a March 19, 1914 letter to Ottoline Morrell that he plans to depart for Europe on June 6th.5

On the same day that the article above was published (March 14th), the Times published a list of all of the notables departing for or arriving from Europe and includes Russell on the list of those arriving on the Mauretania. In his Autobiography, Russell gives this account of the trip: “I sailed on the Mauretania on March 7th. Sir Hugh Bell was on the ship. His wife spent the whole voyage looking for him, or finding him with a pretty girl. Whenever I met him after the sinking of the Lusitania, I found him asserting it was on the Lusitania he had sailed.” Besides its more colorful points of interest, this account confirms that the Times’ spelling of Mauretania was likely the correct one.6

Many of the articles here make reference to Russell’s “American wife” and indicate a certain fascination on the part of the press with this fact. Though Alys’ family was itself notable, and Alys similarly had her own celebrity status, this fascination by the press in Russell having an American wife is no doubt also due to the great interest Americans had marrying their daughters to European aristocrats. Just in the March 14 list of notables arriving from or departing for Europe, one can spot three pairs of mothers and daughters traveling together to or from that continent.

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5 Griffin 1992, p. 497.
The New York Times article from May 19, 1915 announces an award to Russell from Columbia University for his logical work. Its appearance indicates the extent to which Russell had already become an intellectual celebrity and how quickly *Mathematica Principia* was recognized as being a major intellectual achievement. The previous three articles, about Russell coming to America and lecturing in 1914, also indicate this, as the trip itself is only newsworthy because it was Russell who has come to lecture.

**An Infamous Rector**

The next three articles, from March 1916, are about Alys’ visit to New York to speak on woman’s suffrage. The first of these (March 14th) seems to get the date she was to speak wrong, while the second corrects the date but gets the address of the Hall where she was to speak wrong, and only the third article finally gets them both right at once.

Cambridge gave Russell the boot in 1916 for his anti-war activity. That notorious decision is reported in the last of these articles from the New York Times (July 14th). The article refers to Russell as a “rector” who was removed from his “rectorate” at Cambridge, though he was instead a lecturer removed from his lectureship. The article also errs in claiming that Russell had been a visiting lecturer on mathematics and philosophy at Harvard for several years, when he had in fact been a visiting lecturer on logic and theory of knowledge there for only a few months, though in the same paragraph, the writer is now at least calling Russell a lecturer rather than a rector.

So much for our adventures in reading primary data. Readers who note other errors, contradictions, or anomalies in these articles are welcome to write to the Quarterly about them. We will print all such corrections in future issues.

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New York, NY 10038
ongley@iit.edu

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Traveler’s Diary / Conference Report

I’m not afraid of planes, but I am sick of them. Instead of flying to the Eastern Division of the APA, this year I took the celebrated Acela, luxury liner of trains, a futuristic beauty with clean, comfy seats, and all the stretching and walking room you long for while airborne. I reached Washington D.C., where the conference was to be held, three hours after leaving New York’s Penn Station. Washington is a lovely city: spacious, clean, and calm compared to New York’s thronging masses, dirt, and anxieties. Our hotel, however, was like every other, and so was the conference—with one exception. The check-in: What! No Conference Programs! The Conference Aide explained that a delivery from the warehouse was overdue; I offered to get the programs from the warehouse myself, but apparently no one thought I was serious. Lacking a program, I felt aimless, out-of-it, deaf. I huddled in my room.

Next morning — rise and shine, grab coffee, and rush to an early morning meeting on—Russell! The session was well attended, better than recent years, and I took the opportunity to display Society related materials. Though David White couldn’t attend (he’d spent all his travel money on his trip to Istanbul), I spotted other Society members in the audience and among the speakers. The papers were worth hearing and the discussion sessions especially so: Sorin Costreie (University of Western Ontario) gave the first talk, “The Epistemological Difficulty in Russell’s Theory of Denoting Concepts”; Kevin Klement (University of Massachusetts—Amherst) was commentator. Next up was “Russell on Appearance, Reality and Color”, delivered by Derek Brown (University of Western Ontario) and with commentary by Justin Leiber (University of Houston).

At the APA, days tend to blend into one another. Was it the first or second day that I heard the Joongal Kim speak on Frege (“Are Numbers Objects?”), while Christopher Pincock responded? At this session, Matthew McKeon’s paper “Russell and Logical Ontology” prompted a longish informal conversation on Russell in which Gregory Landini grabbed the floor, patiently but urgently demanding the disentangling of problems bearing on Russell’s epistemology from those belonging to his logic, and in general adding many points of clarification. The papers here segued interestingly into the last session I attended at the conference: a symposium between Peter Sullivan (University of Stirling) and
TRAVELER'S DIARY

Thomas Ricketts (University of Pennsylvania), with Michael Friedman (Stanford University) chairing and Michael Kremer (University of Chicago) commenting. Both speakers at this symposium addressed how to read Frege—as a man whose work is philosophical, and who is not simply a mathematician, or as a mathematician to be understood only by looking at the history of mathematics—and neither quite got around to the topic of the symposium: Analytic Philosophy: Past and Future. On this, the last day, I spent considerable time (which, we all know, is money) at the book booths, returning with aching arms and bursting bundles to the DC terminal for the quick and quiet, civilized trip home. RC

MORE SOCIETY NEWS (continued from page 10)

RUSSELL IN ROCHESTER. In December, the Greater Rochester Russell Set met at Daily Perks for the last time. As of January, it has been meeting at Writers & Books in Rochester (740 University Ave, ph: 585-473-2590). Meetings are at 7 pm on the second Thursday of each month. Admission is $3, free to members of W&B (for those who attend regularly, basic membership in W&B costs less than paying at the door). David White says that W&Bs is Rochester’s best-known literary institution and is expected to be an excellent venue for the GRRS. W&B faculty are all published authors or university professors, but since W&B does not give “credit” or award degrees, the tuition charge is far less than at colleges and universities.

As indicated on the cover, the BRS Quarterly is now published with the support from the Humanities Division at Lehman College, City University of New York. Specifically, it has received a grant from the Dean of Humanities at Lehman College, Marlene Gottlieb, for $3000. We hope to use the extra money to make small improvements in the Quarterly throughout the following year.

The editors of the BRS Quarterly would like to thank BRS Treasurer Dennis Darland for all the help he has given them since they began editing the Quarterly in August. Only when they started working on the Quarterly did they discover how much work Dennis does for the Society, and how he is always there for people when help is needed with Society business. We feel lucky to have Dennis managing the Society’s day-to-day business.

SPECIAL THANKS TO THE CONTRIBUTORS TO THE BRS IN 2003. Twenty people contributed money to the BRS last year over and above their regular membership fees. We would like to thank them for the concrete and substantial support that have given the BRS. Such contributions are essential to the continued vitality of the Society, and we appreciate this support very much. The contributors were:

* Patron ($250 and up) David Goldman,
  * Sponsors ($100 and up) Congressman Neil Abercrombie, Robert A. Reimenschneider, Warren Allen Smith, and Yvonne Jonath,
  * Sustainers ($65 and up) Fred Bomberger and James A. Judkins,
  * Contributors ($50 and up) John J. Fitzgerald, James Gordon, Earl Hansen, Justin Leiber, Gladys Leithauser, Stephen J. Reinhardt, Michael A. Sequeira, John J. Fitzgerald, John Philip Ebersole, Robert K. Davis, D.M. Daugharty, Bae Dong-In, and Jay Aragona,
  * Other Donor, Ricard Flores.

~ A CALL FOR PAPERS ~

THE 2004 MEETINGS OF THE EASTERN, CENTRAL, AND PACIFIC DIVISIONS OF THE APA

The Bertrand Russell Society requests submissions for talks to be given at the BRS session of the 2004 Eastern Division* APA meeting in Boston next December.

Submissions should
1. fit within a 20-30 minute time frame
2. bear on any aspect of Russell’s philosophy or related issues
3. be sent by email as a Word document to:
   rcarey@lehman.cuny.edu
4. be received no later than: May 21, 2004*

Suggestions for panel meetings and/or “author meets critics” sessions are also welcome.

* Those wishing to present talks at the Central or Pacific division meetings should submit abstracts to rcarey@lehman.cuny.edu no later than June 15, 2004.
ELECTION RESULTS – A PREORDAINED LANDSLIDE TAKES PLACE ON SCHEDULE.

With only seven nominations and one well announced write-in candidate for eight three-year term positions on the BRS Board of Directors, results were not entirely unforeseen. Those elected for the 2004-2006 term are: Ken Blackwell, Dennis Darland, David Henehan, John Lenz, Stephen Reinhardt, Tom Stanley, David White, and David Blitz.

Here are the votes for each: Ken Blackwell: 29, Dennis Darland: 29, David Henehan: 25, John Lenz: 29, Stephen Reinhardt: 27, Tom Stanley: 29, David White: 23. The number of write-in votes are as follows: Edgar Boedeker: 2, David Blitz: 12, Don Jackanicz: 1, Kevin Klement: 2.

Congratulations and best of luck to the 2004-06 Directors. Thanks also to Tom Stanley for being the election committee and collecting and counting all the votes and to Chad Trainer for verifying them.

CURRENT SOCIETY OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF BOARD:

Officers of the Bertrand Russell Society:
President: Alan Schwerin
Vice President: Ray Perkins, Jr.
Treasurer: Dennis Darland
Secretary: Chad Trainer
Chairperson of the Board: David White.

Society Board of Directors:
(2003-2005) Andrew Bone, Peter Stone, Nick Griffin, Ruili Ye, David Goldman, Cara Rice, Justin Leiber, C. Padia

: RUSTLINGS! : by Gerry Wildenberg

Numbers 1 and 2 below are coded Russell-quotes in which each letter stands for another letter. (E.G., BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENA HEFFRY, O=B, R=E, etc.) The quotes below use different codes. After solving them, try to identify the source.

1. SEXIUI YC E ZYGN BZZMFIYK WN EP
   BFFXICCYDI EXUN CIXDYPT OSEG EUBMPGC GB EP
   BMYCYKIF BOIX

2. In the cipher below the word separations are disguised and punctuation is removed. The grouping into 5 letter "words" is meant only to help readability and does not relate to the actual quote.
   IXBPA XKVAJ VYUJO CXMPB WRKXU KFWRJ HMQMP
   UJRRJ UPWSJ SAPQJ HWVYX YHSAJ KNAAP VYUBJ
   SUKQO PUOCK HMBUP XMJKU HQQRY BNMBN SAPRY
   SSPXJ JCRJF FXSOX BMWBM Y

3. The puzzle below is not a substitution cipher. The quote below has had its spaces and punctuation removed and some of the letters have been exchanged with nearby letters. For example, "The puzzle below" might be changed to:
   tuhepzebelwo
   ihaeevrymysapthyiwthoryhiswotcovntretoyruy
   fainceoofeerhtougthihtinkwoheevrathyohuyds
   uleoeicrseoscemtuaiosnasregdrasesuxalbcmk
   ali

Last Issue's : RUSTLINGS! :

1. One of the most important elements of success in becoming a man of genius is to learn the art of denunciation. - "How to Become a Man of Genius" in Columns From the Hearst Newspapers, 1932.

2. Logic, in the Middle Ages, and down to the present day in teaching, meant no more than a scholastic collection of technical terms and rules of syllogistic inference. - Our Knowledge of the External World 1914, 1928.
Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process. Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.  
2003 ANNUAL TREASURER'S REPORT

Cash Flow: 1/1/03 Through 12/31/03

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| **OUTFLOWS**         |                  |
| Bank Charges         | 52.16            |
| BRS Paper Award      | 223.44           |
| Library Exp          | 72.16            |
| Meeting Exp          | 712.04           |
| Newsletter           | 3,396.06         |
| Other Exp            | 20.00            |
| RUSSELL Sub          | 2,601.00         |
| **TOTAL OUTFLOWS**   | **7,076.86**     |
| OVERALL TOTAL        | **-1,301.85**    |
| **BALANCE 12/31/03** | **5,440.32**     |

Compiled 1/15/04 by Dennis Darland
BRS Treasurer, djdarland@qconline.com
GREATER ROCHESTER RUSSELL SET

Celebrating Six Years of Monthly Russell Meetings
Open to the Public

2003-2004 PROGRAM

January 8
February 12
March 11
April 8
May 13
June 10
July 8
August 12
September 9
October 14
November 12
December 9

Humor in Russell
Problem of Continuity
The Scientific Outlook
Cheerful Pessimism
Portraits of Russell from Memory: A Panel Discussion
Defenders of God
International War Crimes Tribunal
Satan in the Suburbs
Lady Ottoline
D.H. Lawrence
Why I Am Not a Christian
Marriage and Morals

Meetings are held at Writers & Books’ Verb Café, 740 University Avenue, Rochester, NY, at 7 pm (note new meeting time and place). Admission is $3, free to members of Writers & Books. For information, please call Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184, or email him at: tmadigan@rochester.rr.com. Dates and topics are subject to change.

BUY A BRS T SHIRT TODAY!

Don’t be caught without something distinctive to wear! BRS t-shirts always make you stand out in a crowd (except at BRS Annual Meetings, of course). So why not order yours today? The shirts are available for $10 each plus $3 postage. U.S. funds only, please. Make check payable to the Bertrand Russell Society, and send it to BRS Vice President Ray Perkins, 854 Battle ST, Webster, NH 03303, USA. Send queries to perkins@earthlink.net. Please specify size (M,L,XL) and color (black, yellow, or white).