THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society News and Proceedings, as well as essays and discussions pertaining to Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the Quarterly are peer-reviewed.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work, and writings of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement: "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (What I Believe, 1925)

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

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CONTENTS

In This Issue 3
Society News 5

Features
Russell and Wittgenstein: A Study in Civility and Arrogance
JUSTIN LEIBER 11

Letter to the Editor, Time Magazine, September 28, 1942
BERTRAND RUSSELL 23

Russell on Monistic Theory
JANE DURAN 25

Reviews
Dr. Ramendra Nath, M.N. Roy's New Humanism and Materialism
PHIL EBERSOLE 33

Peter Denton, The ABC of Armageddon: Bertrand Russell on Science, Religion, and the Next War
CHAD TRAINNER 37

Discussion
Reply to Klement
ARTHUR SULLIVAN 40

End Matter
Conference Report by Gregory Landini, Rustlings!, Treasurer's Report

IN THIS ISSUE

The past two issues of the BRS Quarterly have focused on ideas – what did Frege think of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, what are we to think of Russell’s and Quine’s views about a general term that subsumes wildly different kinds of things, did Russell have a modal logic, etc. In this issue, the focus shifts to personalities, with Justin Leiber exploring the very different intellectual styles of Russell and Wittgenstein. Justin takes exception to Ray Monk’s characterizations of these two outsized individuals in Monk’s Russell and Wittgenstein biographies, and argues for his own, different view of their personalities.¹ By way of providing evidence for his case, Justin relates a few stories about his own philosophical education which give us some insight into how analytic philosophy was practiced and understood in its heyday.

Moving back to philosophical issues, Jane Duran provides an illuminating comparison of Russell’s arguments against both neo-Hegelian idealism and pragmatism. She demonstrates that Russell viewed the two schools as sharing the same underlying assumptions and weaknesses, and so subjected them to the same criticisms.

We continue our series of letters by Russell – this one is a 1942 letter to the editor of Time Magazine on Gandhi’s demand at that time for immediate Indian independence. Ray Perkins has written an introduction to the letter that sheds further light onto Russell’s thinking on the issue. Also concerning India, Phil Ebersole reviews a biography of the Indian intellectual and adventurer M.N. Roy, while Chad Trainer reviews Peter Denton’s recent examination of Russell’s views on science, religion, and war. Both reviews are highly informative.

This issue’s conference report is by Gregory Landini, who covered the recent History of Early Analytic Philosophy Conference at Purdue University for us. The conference seems to have been packed with exciting work, and those of us who missed it hope

that these papers will appear in print sometime soon. Arthur Sullivan writes about logic and language in his reply to Kevin Klement's review of Arthur's recent anthology of writings by Frege and Russell.

In ‘Society News’, Tony Simpson of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has sent an account of a recent ‘citizen’s’ tribunal in Brussels modeled on Russell’s Vietnam Tribunal and Phil Ebersole of the GRRS reports on the recent resolution of Dr. Tunis Shaikh’s persecution in Pakistan for blasphemy. Finally, Gerry Wildenberg, also of the GRRS, provides us with yet another Ruflings! crypto-cipher, and in addition, offers some advice on how to solve them. Note: Of the three puzzles Gerry writes for Ruflings! each month, the third is a kind recently devised by Gerry, who has not yet had an opportunity to try solving one himself. He wonders how “solvable” people find them. Has anyone solved one of these sorts of puzzles yet? Send us an email and let us know.

February’s Russell letter to the editor was reprinted with the permission of the Bertrand Russell Archive of McMaster University.

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Contents of Past and Present Issues, Plus Selected Replies by Readers to BRSQ Articles are at
http://www.lehman.edu/deanhum/philosophy/BRSQ

SOCIETY NEWS

WORLD TRIBUNAL ON IRAQ. A series of citizens’ tribunals on Iraq, modeled on Bertrand Russell’s Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal, are occurring in cities around the world now and in the coming year. One of them, which took place this April in Brussels, was in fact called ‘The BRussells Tribunal’ in honor of Russell’s inspiration for this form of public forum. The idea for the Iraq tribunals seems to have occurred spontaneously in a number of places around the globe, but the specific details for them were worked out in June 2003, at a conference of the European Network for Peace and Human Rights that was sponsored by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. Tony Simpson of the BRPF attended both the Brussel’s tribunal and another BRPF conference of the European Network held in Brussels later that month. Here is his report of the two conferences:

April proved to be a fine month to visit Brussels, twice. The sun shone, and people gathered outdoors in the parks and the squares. Meanwhile, far away in Iraq, the siege of Falluja was claiming hundreds of lives, and in Baghdad the horrors of Abu Ghraib prison were already well known to General Taguba, the Red Cross, and Ambassador Bremer, even if President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, and Prime Minister Blair were trying to look the other way. But what was really happening in Iraq?

My first journey to Belgium was to attend the BRussells Tribunal. The organisers had deliberately wished to invoke the tradition of earlier Russell Tribunals – hence the pun. The organisers, and in particular, Lieven de Cauter, himself an independent philosopher, seemed keenly aware of a responsibility to “prevent the crime of silence” with respect to Iraq, as Russell had been with Vietnam a generation before.

The subtitle of their Tribunal was ‘A hearing on the Project for the New American Century’. It proved remarkably faithful to its purpose in probing the activities of that neo-conservative think-tank. Jim Lobe and Tom Barry, for the defence, manifested an encyclopaedic knowledge of the public statements and backdoor connections of this highly influential
lobby. Hans von Sponeck, who along with Tribunal Commissioner Denis Halliday resigned his UN post in Iraq in protest at the severe sanctions regime to which the country was subjected, provided candid testimony of the long gestation of the wars on Iraq, and the involvement of the United States in arming the country during its war with Iran in the 1980s. François Houtart presided gently over the proceedings and the Tribunal Commission, whose judgment can be found on the web (www.brusselstribunal.org). One Commissioner, the Egyptian feminist writer Nawal El Saadawi, recalled her visit to Russell at his home in Wales long ago, in 1960.

One revelation of the Tribunal concerned what is really happening in Iraq. Ghazwan Al-Mukhtar, an Iraqi scientist and writer, testified that, contrary to claims, there is no appreciable reconstruction to benefit the civilian population. In fact, when Iraqi engineers offered to help restore the electricity, water and telephone services, their offer was turned down flat. Instead, workers are brought in from abroad, mostly disappearing inside the stockades and garrisons of the occupying armies. Living conditions are desperate. Meanwhile, the killing at Falluja was claiming hundreds of lives. Opposition to the occupation was spreading throughout Iraqi society. Such well-informed Iraqi testimony to the Tribunal threw a sharp light on the true state of Iraq, and in so doing contributed to the wider process of the World Tribunal on Iraq, of which the Brussels hearing was one of a series of scheduled international sessions, destined to conclude in Istanbul in 2005.

By the time I returned to Brussels at the end of April for the conference of the European Network for Peace and Human Rights, the death toll in Falluja was reckoned at more than 600. Stark video evidence of the slaughter taking place there had reached us just in time. Al Jazeera television had promptly responded to a request from the Russell Foundation for film of the siege of Falluja to show at the Network’s conference in the European Parliament in Brussels. This was a truly shocking documentary which troubled all those who saw it. Opposition to the war is clearly gathering strength, and we’re bound to wonder how long its perpetrators can continue in their chosen course. Tony Simpson, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, www.russfound.org 28.05.04

Further information about the World Tribunals on Iraq can be found at the following websites: www.worldtribunal.org www.worldtribunal-nyc.org and www.brusselstribunal.org

THE ORDEAL OF DR. SHAIKH. Past issues of the BRS Quarterly have reported on the ordeal of Dr. Yunis Shaikh, who was tried, convicted, and jailed for blasphemy in Pakistan, and members of the BRS have written letters in protest of his treatment. Dr. Shaikh’s ordeal finally seems to be at an end. Phil Ebersole gives us this report.

Dr. Yunis Shaikh, a humanist who was under sentence of death in Pakistan on charges of blasphemy, has been freed by an appeals court. He had been imprisoned, mostly in solitary confinement, for three years. Appeals for his release were made by humanist groups and publications all over the world, including the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly.

Dr. Shaikh, a medical lecturer, was a controversial figure in Pakistan, partly because of his advocacy of a peace settlement with India. He was arrested in October, 2000, and accused of stating in class, in response to a student’s question, that Mohammed could not logically have been a Muslim prior to his receiving his revelation from God, nor could Mohammed’s parents, who died before he received his revelation.

The complaint was lodged by leaders of an organization called the Committee for the Protection of the Prophethood, an organization of fundamentalist Muslims who harass and attack Muslims they believe to be unorthodox. None of his accusers were present in the classroom when Dr. Shaikh allegedly made his remarks. The threat of violence at his trial was so great that the court’s last two sittings were held in camera in the premises of the Adiala Jail where Dr. Shaikh was being held.

Dr. Shaikh was convicted and, on Aug. 18, 2001, sentenced to death. He appealed to Pakistan’s High Court, the second highest court below the country’s Supreme Court, and was tried in July, 2002. No decision was made because the
judges could not agree. A new trial was held and Dr. Shaikh was acquitted on November 21, 2003.

This decision did not invalidate Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. Rather the court found there was no proof that Dr. Shaikh said what he was alleged to have said. Dr. Shaikh said his accusers were simply lying.

Dr. Shaikh was released from jail in secret. He was offered, but refused, a police bodyguard. He went into hiding for several weeks, meeting with family and friends and participating incognito in a discussion of human rights. His release was not generally known until early this year. He is now living in Europe.

His case is not an isolated one. More than 100 other Pakistanis are currently in prison on blasphemy charges and in jeopardy of the death penalty. They include not only humanists, but Christians, members of minority Muslim sects, and members of other religions, as well as victims of personal vendettas. This must have a chilling effect on any honest discussion of political or religious issues.

Bertrand Russell devoted much effort to interceding on behalf of prisoners of conscience. BRSQ subscribers who wrote letters on behalf of Dr. Shaikh were acting in the best Russellian tradition. More information about Dr. Shaikh may be found at www.iheu.org

OBITUARY. Long time west coast member of the BRS, Shohig Sherry Garine Terzian died in Los Angeles on July 12, 2002, at the age of 86. Born in 1915 in Constantinople of Armenian parents, she came to the United States with her parents at age six and grew up in New York City. As a student at Radcliffe College, she wrote her senior thesis on ‘George Santayana and the Genteel Tradition’, corresponded with Santayana, compiled the bibliography for The Philosophy of George Santayana – volume two of Paul Schilpp’s Library of Living Philosophers – and revised the bibliography for a subsequent edition of the work. A medical librarian by profession, Ms. Terzian contributed articles to the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, The Santayana Society Bulletin, the Armenian Ararat Quarterly, and numerous letters to the Los Angeles Times.

BRS MEMBERSHIP REPORT. Here are the current membership figures for the BRS. As of June 5th, there were 115 members who had paid for 2004, with another 30 (honorary members, life members, and freebees) in the database who also get the BRS Quarterly. As well, there are 37 members who paid for 2003 who haven’t yet paid for 2004. Here is how these figures compare with BRS membership at this time last year.

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2003</th>
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<tr>
<td>Paid for the year</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>115</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honorary, Life, or Freebees</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paid for previous year but not present year</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
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Dennis Darland, Treasurer, BRS

CALL FOR PAPERS. The Bertrand Russell Society will be holding sessions at the American Philosophical Association again in the coming year. The deadline for submitting abstracts of talks for the Eastern Division meeting is already past, but anyone interested in giving a talk on any aspect of Russell’s philosophy or related issues at either the Central meeting of the APA (to be held in Chicago April 27-30, 2005 at the Palmer House) or the Pacific meeting (to be held in San Francisco March 23-27, 2005, at the St. Francis Hotel in Union Square) should submit an abstract to Rosalind Carey at rcarey@lehman.cuny.edu no later than November 1, 2004.

We hope everyone will plan on attending these sessions in the coming year, but west coast members of the BRS are especially encouraged to attend the Pacific meeting in San Francisco. We will have a regional meeting of the BRS there, with lunch or dinner after the talks and meeting. The west coast session promises to be a real jamboree, so mark your calendars and be sure to attend.

NEW BRSQ WEBSITE ADDRESS. The BRS Quarterly has a new web address. It is: http://www.lehman.edu/deanhum/philosophy/BRSQ so please delete your old bookmarks for this site and bookmark the new page. And visit it often, as the content is constantly being updated.
In 1956, when I was a callow sixteen-year-old sophomore early entrant to the University of Chicago, I read my first twentieth century philosophical book, A. J. Ayer’s *Language, Truth, and Logic*. While I had already gorged on the Russian novelists, read through the then obligatory Hemingway and Faulkner, consumed Freud and a raft of popular sociologists, and managed to get myself expelled from my tenth grade social science class for issuing disparaging quotes from Marx and Schopenhauer, I was only then being introduced to classical philosophical and scientific texts through the marvelous and soon-to-be-by-stages-dismantled Robert Hutchins’ three year great books curriculum, in which the Natural Sciences sequence began with Aristotle’s *Physics*, Bk. II, continued with Galileo’s *Dialogue*, selections from Newton’s *Principia*, and on to papers by Laplace, Mach, Jeans and Einstein. Mathematics ABC was a simplified version of whole stretches of *Principia Mathematica*, the content of Russell’s great work having become common collegial culture for logicians and mathematicians.

I soon read some of the less technical works of Russell, whom Ayer cast as Hamlet to his own humble Horatio, and of David Hume, whose skeptical contentions Ayer claimed merely to update and cast into a linguistic vein. With the further help of Hume and Russell, I emended Rene Descartes’s insufficiently skeptical “I think, therefore I am” to the minimalist “There are experiences”. I wryly chuckled in agreement with Russell’s saucy contention that the only materialists in the world were Russian commissars and

* An earlier draft of this paper was read at The Bertrand Russell Society session of the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, March 2003, with Professor David White commenting.
American behavioral scientists. Common sense realism about physical objects leads to science, which inevitably refutes naïve realism.

Disaster and apostasy loomed in my first concerted encounter, at the graduate course level, with 20th century Anglo-American philosophy. Young, newly-appointed Vere Chappell—a confident Yale acolyte of ordinary language philosophy—assigned us two G. E. Moore essays that comfortably asserted common sense realism, “proving” the existence of the external world of objects by raising one hand, and then, to make it plural, the other, and then stoutly insisting that he was surer of their existence than of any dissenting assertion. Taking this to be an argument comparable to Samuel Johnson’s here-to-fore impossibly crude “refutation” of Berkeley, which consisted of kicking a stone, I submitted a scornful and confident critique of Moore to Professor Chappell, who gave me a failing grade of C and appended the comment “cavalier” in his neat red script.

Next up we read Russell’s 1918-19 Philosophy of Logical Atomism, which I soon realized was supposed to exemplify the very worst sort of building houses out of cards, just the sort of language-on-holiday scientific popularizing poppycock that Wittgenstein’s Investigations, our final reading, righteously scourgéd, Wittgenstein now cast in the role of fully-realized Savior to Moore’s John the Baptist. Philosophy, my would-be profession, now had nothing to do with science! Rather, “doing philosophy” had now become an esoteric form of linguistic psycho-analysis that fought off the mind’s bewitchment by language, and left everyday experience and our common old city as it is, undistorted by grand card-house illusions. Indeed, it guarded the world of everyday experience from the arrogant and improper intrusions of science.

While the Investigations and his lecture books make clear Wittgenstein’s skepticism about set theory and introspective psychology, we must be grateful for Ray Monk’s copious demonstration, in his 1990 biography of Wittgenstein, The Duty of Genius, that in his more informal comments, Wittgenstein came to disparage, despise, and condemn science in general as perhaps the chief evil of our age. Aside from mentioning that Wittgenstein disdained Russell’s attempts to write philosophy for the general reader, Professor Chappell never said anything about Russell’s vigorous and radical political and moral advocacy, but it was obvious to us that such gadfly-on-the-body-of-the-state activity was, conveniently, neither professional nor philosophical, and indeed the furthest thing from “doing philosophy”.

While I had first understood my C grade rather as the third grader in a Catholic school understands how “three can be one” after the nun has suitably ministered to his knuckles with her ruler, I soon learned to do linguistic analysis in Professor Chappell’s ordinary language manner. I received an A+ on my term paper, and “paradigm case argument” and “don’t look for the meaning, look for the use!” soon slipped as easily from my lips as “you can’t get an ought from an is”. Even in the full throes of conversion, I did notice a few incongruities. Professor Chappell wore three-piece J. Press suits, Wittgenstein, scruffy leather jackets (although Monk tells us these and the rest of his wardrobe were very carefully selected in shopping expeditions). And when I briefly took to following Wittgenstein’s example in my philosophical prose, writing short conversational sentences, addressing my reader as “you”, dropping erudite footnotes, and avoiding all technical, scholarly, or philosophical terminology, the reaction was far more negative than the earlier “cavalier”.

And why were people trying to extract philosophical theses, theories, arguments, and general views, from a text that relentlessly disavowed and railed against such activity—to ascribe a philosophy of language to a man whose unsystematic sketches displayed our linguistic, perceptual, and cognitive life as full of incoherence, families of resemblances, and illusions that tempt us to specious philosophical card house building? Further, Wittgenstein perpetually claimed, from the Tractatus to the Investigations, that philosophy was a trivial, non-genuine, deluding, and deeply pointless enterprise (except perhaps as practiced by himself). Going from Hamlet to a minor Horatio, I am reminded of a frustrated 1983 Oxford graduate student who remarked, after hearing another demolishing lecture from linguistics Professor Roy Harris, that it was hard to study a subject—linguistics—that her professor denied existed. But Wittgenstein cast such a magnetic spell that those who did not walk out generally fell under it.
J. L. Austin claimed that a good motto for a philosopher is “neither a be-all or an end-all be”. Wittgenstein’s remarkable arrogance is that he was always trying to do both. In the Tractatus, after confessing that perhaps his “expressive craftsmanship” might have occasionally faltered, Wittgenstein said:

On the other hand the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved… The value of this work secondly consists in the fact that it shows how little has been done when these problems have been solved.

(Wittgenstein 1922, p. 29)

Hard to be more be-all and be-endian than that. In the preface to the Investigations, Wittgenstein says he has decided to publish because his results, variously misunderstood, more or less mangled or watered down, were in circulation. This stung my vanity.

(Wittgenstein 1953, p. v-vi)

Latterly, he adds,

if my remarks do not bear a stamp which marks them as mine, – I do not wish to lay any further claim to them as my property. (Wittgenstein 1953, p. vi)

This is of course the proud statement of an artist or poet, insisting on the inimitable trademark of his style, his voice. But it is inappropriate to a common collegial enterprise.

Although he did enjoy having students, Wittgenstein, as the quotes above from the Investigations suggest, did not want philosophical disciples who would spread his views any more than a Jackson Pollock would want to spawn a second generation of Pollockians or a Faulkner, Faulknerian novelists. Nonetheless Wittgenstein did get disciples, lots of them. There are Wittgensteinians, just as there are or used to be Whiteheadians, Hegelians, Marxists, and so on. But there are no Russellians in the relevant sense. When Ayer said he was happy to be Horatio to Russell’s Hamlet, he was speaking for the collective field of logical positivism or, better, analytic philosophy more generally.

It could be said that Russell originated analytic philosophy, but the collegial and civil Russell wouldn’t have said or thought this. Russell, in fact, handsomely credited Gottlob Frege for much of the initial work; indeed Frege might well have rested in obscurity had not Russell publicized his work. And through the 1910s, Russell frequently said that Wittgenstein was his natural successor at Cambridge and would take the next great steps in philosophical logic. It is impossible to imagine Wittgenstein behaving in this way: previous philosophy, of which he read little and found what little he read full of errors, was hopeless; and there was for him no good prospective for subsequent philosophy – at least in the near future. While Russell might enthusiastically refer to Wittgenstein as his natural successor in mathematical logic, it is impossible to imagine Wittgenstein regarding anyone as his worthy successor. Indeed he clearly did not feel he was engaged in a common enterprise to which one or another might make contributions to a collective project.


`Few could long withstand your haggard beauty,  
Disdainful lips, wide eyes bright-lit with scorn, 
Furrowed brow, square smile, sorrow-born 
World-abandoning devotion to your duty.  

And Monk adds:

Wittgenstein’s lecturing style, and indeed his writing style, was curiously at odds with his subject-matter, as though a poet had somehow strayed into the analysis of the foundations of mathematics and The Theory of Meaning. He himself [Wittgenstein] once wrote: ‘I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said:

1 Monk 1990, p. 290; Richards 1990, pp. 159-162.
philosophy ought to be written as a poetic composition.'
(Monk 1990, pp. 290-91)

A keen example of this is Wittgenstein’s relationship with Friedrich Waismann, an Austrian Jew of the Vienna Circle but latterly an ally in, and public representative of, Wittgenstein’s attack on set theory and formalism in mathematics. Waismann followed Wittgenstein to England and Cambridge, and assiduously worked with Wittgenstein on co-authoring an account of his new philosophical views. Wittgenstein let him proceed with the project for some time but eventually detached himself, apparently telling Waismann that he must proceed on his own. The ensuing book, The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, was in galley proofs in the late 1930s when Wittgenstein finally put his foot (or jackboot) down, using his considerable influence on Waismann and the press to stop publication. (Waismann continued to painstakingly work, rework, and expand the galleys until his death in 1959, and the book was finally published in 1965.) Wittgenstein also made a passing effort to, unsuccessfully, prevent Waismann from getting a philosophy post in England.

This story may be profitably compared to the more well-known case of Wittgenstein’s attempt to get the Tractatus published shortly after the end of World War I. After several rejections, Wittgenstein pleaded with Russell to write an introduction so that a publisher might take a chance on publication, given the endorsement of a world famous philosopher. Russell dutifully complied, only to have Wittgenstein thunder that he had completely misunderstood the work. Russell went on to ensure its publication. A decade later Russell also cooperated with G. E. Moore in helping Wittgenstein get a teaching position in Cambridge.

For his long and intermittent philosophical career, Russell worked within a common collegial community, respectfully reading and referring to other philosophical work. There is a common myth, abetted by Wittgenstein’s disciples among others, and occasionally by Russell himself, that Russell’s serious philosophical work, as opposed to popularizations and political and social commentary, ceased shortly after World War I. Nonetheless, Russell returned to technical philosophy in the late 1930s and the 1940s and did innovative and important work. Monk notes incredulously that W.V. Quine opined that Russell’s 1940 Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth was “Russell’s most important book” (Monk 1990, p. 144). Initial drafts of Inquiry were delivered to a University of Chicago class attended by Rudolph Carnap, Charles Morris, and others; Carnap later recalled, “Russell had the felicitous ability to create an atmosphere in which every participant did his best to contribute to the common task” (Monk 1990, p. 221). Inquiry was followed in 1948 by Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, in which Russell emphasized the importance of empirical science to philosophy – a view that many then found hopelessly dated but which now appears prescient.

Wittgenstein, by contrast, was not only a poetical artist, he was specifically an epigrammist. In perhaps the best essay written on Wittgenstein’s work, Stanley Cavell likens him to La Rochefoucauld (Cavell 1962, p. 92). That is decidedly the point of Wittgenstein’s famous comment that his worthy “sketches” were trademarked as his own. Russell, on the other hand, occasionally wrote idiosyncratically in his least philosophical pieces – and he did write short stories. But his most philosophical writing, as Carnap’s remark suggests, is part and parcel of a common philosophical tradition (which is perhaps why my University of Chicago Mathematics ABC course contained no specific Russellian prose).

In 1955, The Prisoner appeared, a movie in which Alec Guinness played a Polish Cardinal and Jack Hawkins his communist inquisitor/confessor (Grenville 1955). Roughly conforming to historical fact, the Hawkins interrogator, through sleeplessness and ingenious questioning, manages to convince the Cardinal that he is a proud and vain man who can only expiate his sinfulness to a working class populace through confessing to collaborating with fascists during and after World War II. Captivated inquisitorially, caught by memories of his childhood and distaste for his humble origins, the Cardinal confesses in open court. His suave confessor then has the best line in this remarkable, and remarkably political, movie. He says of the Cardinal, “A proud man would have been more skeptical.”

The same might be said respecting Russell in Monk’s increasingly insistent indictment of him as a monstrously vain and prideful egotist. To invert Churchill’s remark that modest Clement
Atlee had much to be modest about, Russell had much to be proud of. But what is extraordinary in Russell’s history are the instances in which he humbly submitted to a younger and less accomplished inquisitor who impressively insisted to Russell that he, Russell, was fraudulent, incapable of serious thought, lacking moral or personal integrity or genuineness. Russell fell for this gambit most famously to Wittgenstein, but also to D. H. Lawrence and, to a lesser degree, others.

After Russell completed *Principia Mathematica*, his next substantial philosophical work was *The Theory of Knowledge*, but Wittgenstein’s attack in 1913 on this and his other work, affected Russell so deeply that he felt, for many years, that he was incapable of serious technical philosophical work (the manuscript itself was not published until years after Russell’s death). Russell turned to writing on political and social topics and fiction. Through the Bloomsbury circle he came under the spell of D. H. Lawrence. For a time Russell was inspired by Lawrence’s wild, fascist talk and his penchant for criticizing Russell. But when war came, Russell eventually turned away from Lawrence’s anti-democratic and blood thirsty views. One of Lawrence’s parting shots may have seriously wounded Russell, “You are too full of devilish repressions to be anything but lustful and cruel. I would rather have the German soldiers with rapine and cruelty, that you with your words of goodness...It is not the hatred of falsity which inspires you. It is the hatred of people, of flesh and blood” (Monk 1996, p. 426). Doubtless a proudly cruel man would have been more skeptical.

And presumably a proudly cruel man would have been less engaged. While Monk might have found the suggestion for his title in Richards’ line, “World-abandoning devotion to your duty,” Monk saws off “world-abandoning” part and adds “of genius” to get his title *The Duty of Genius*. We know Wittgenstein deplored Russell’s attempt to write about philosophy for the general public and we may suspect that he was no more pleased with Russell’s attempts to address the general public about moral and political matters. Familiarly, Russell vigorously campaigned for a quick and equitable end to World War I, losing many of his friends and his Cambridge lectureship, and spending six months in prison. Wittgenstein, on the other hand dutifully joined the Austro-Hungarian army, eventually becoming termed the “bible soldier” because of his attempts to recommend Tolstoy’s version of the Gospels. Tolstoy’s version avoids attributing any supernatural actions to Christ. Subsequently, Wittgenstein vigorously defended a view of religion that made it irrefutable to any scientific discovery, and his scorn for science was matched by his respect for religion. After his manifest failure as a schoolteacher, Wittgenstein sought to become a monk but was discouraged in this venture. “World-abandoning” does seem appropriate.

When Russell visited the Soviet Union in 1920, he deplored the totalitarian regime long before Stalin’s ascendancy. Wittgenstein, however, held a rather romantic view of the Soviet Union long into the Stalinist era, even seeking jobs there as common labor for himself and one of his student companions. This was rather to the consternation of the Soviet authorities, who, in suspicion and puzzlement, were inclined to suggest an academic position to Wittgenstein.

Monk’s remarks at the beginning of his second volume on Russell suggest that he is aware that someone else might put together the many facts he collected in a very different picture. That is certainly true. Yet Monk is perplexed that Russell’s apparently rational and intelligent daughter Kate sees a near wholly admirable Russell while more intimately contemplating the same data that Monk finds so appalling. Again he reports with astonishment that Russell’s first wife Alys retained a marked affection for Russell to her death several decades after their separation.

What seems to particularly outrage Monk was Russell’s involvement in the Cuban missile crisis and his subsequent highly public anti-American activities. Or, even more, what enrages Monk is his belief that Russell might think his actions had any influence on the world’s events and that a professional philosopher should disgrace himself and the profession by egotistically engaging in public affairs. There is more than a little of Professor Chappell’s attitude in Monk’s screed against Russell. Philosophers shouldn’t address the general public, particularly about political matters, and they should never have the gall to believe that they can ever have any effect on political matters. Just as for Professor Chappell, no gadflies on the body of the state, please!
When the Cuban missile crisis brewed up, with the USSR clearly trying to give Cuba some protection against repeated US invasion attempts, JFK produced a naval blockade of Cuba and demanded the removal of the partially installed missiles. Both actions were acts of war and ones without the slightest support from international law or the UN. Russell dispatched telegrams to Kennedy and Khrushchev, suggesting what in fact became the eventual solution – namely, that the US should forswear the invasion of Cuba and that the USSR should in turn remove its missiles, with the eventual removal of US missiles in Turkey. Khrushchev responded with a telegram to Russell, seemingly as an informal way of announcing his sentiments to the world. Kennedy did not address Russell directly, aside from the response to a reporter’s question that Russell did not speak for the Free World. Monk is quite right to insist that there is no credible evidence that Russell’s intervention had an effect on the event. However, there is no obvious evidence that it had no positive effect whatsoever. It may not be the duty of genius but it is the duty of anyone to speak out to the degree that they can for legality, morality, and peace in human affairs. Russell had a loud voice and took it as his duty to make it as loud as he could and use it rationally and well. Surely, in the Cuban missile crisis he did the best a man in his position could do. He also spoke civilly and with worldly concern to his fellow citizens about common concerns.

Wittgenstein’s reaction to the atomic bomb was rather different. Monk writes “In a curious sense he even welcomed the bomb” and he quotes Wittgenstein as saying:

> The hysterical fear over the atom bomb now being experienced, or at any rate expressed, by the public almost suggests that at last something really salutary has been invented. The fright at least gives the impression of a really effective bitter medicine. I can’t help thinking: if this didn’t have something good about it the philistines wouldn’t be making an outcry. But perhaps this too is a childish idea. Because really all I can mean is that the bomb offers a prospect of the end, the destruction, of an evil, – our disgusting soapy water science.... there is nothing good or desirable about scientific knowledge and...

Monk goes on to remark, “Thus, his ‘dream’ of the coming collapse of science and industry was an anticipation of an age in which his type of thinking would be more generally accepted and understood. It is linked with his remark to Drury: ‘My type of thinking is not wanted in this present age ... Perhaps in a hundred years people will really want what I am writing.’”

Toward the end of *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919) Russell committed one of his few deviations from standard philosophical prose, remarking that he would stress the ambiguity of the verb “to be” even if he were dead from the waist down and not “merely in prison.” Much latter, in his eighties, Russell was briefly jailed for his opposition to British possession of nuclear weapons. This led to an immortal cartoon in *Punch* in which we see gadfly Russell between two large bozos in prison uniform against a prison wall with a large hole in it. Surrounding them are several thick-headed policemen of whom one says “Now who’s the brains behind this?” Arrogantly “world-abandoning” Russell was not. Socratic philosopher he was.

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Russell's involvement in India's struggle for civil liberty and national independence has gone largely unnoticed by all his official biographers, even though Russell was Chair of the India League in London during the 1930s and penned five letters to the Manchester Guardian in support of Indian social reforms and in general sympathy with the aspirations of Gandhi's National Congress Party. While in the US during World War Two Russell continued to concern himself with Indian politics and wrote five more letters to the editor during the war.¹

At the time of this letter to Time magazine, the Cripps' mission had been initiated by Churchill to secure Indian cooperation in the war in exchange for Indian independence at the war's end. But negotiations broke down, and Gandhi's demand for immediate independence and British withdrawal from India led to his arrest in August. Russell had already expressed disapproval of Gandhi's position in a letter to the New York Times in early August.²

In this letter, to my knowledge not published in full since its initial appearance in Time magazine, Russell compliments Time's account of Indian events, explains the rationale for the British position and expresses his hopes that a compromise may be yet reached.

¹ See Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell, pp. 182-90.
² Yours Faithfully, pp. 182-83.
PHILOSOPHER’S HOPE

Time Magazine
September 28, 1942

Sirs, I have read with much interest the account of Indian events and persons in Time, Aug. 24. I admire the impartiality with which highly controversial matters are treated. I deplore the present conflict in India, but I do not think it would be possible, as the Congress party demanded, to hand over the Government to a professedly representative collection of Indians hastily assembled in the middle of a war, and bitterly at odds among themselves on many important questions. Apart from the difficulties necessarily involved in a change while a Japanese invasion is imminent, the replies to Sir Stafford Cripps made clear that a British withdrawal now would leave India in chaos and anarchy, if not actually in civil war, which would result in an easy conquest of India by Japan.

I still hope that a compromise may be reached, perhaps by the British Government inviting suggestions from commissioners appointed by the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China, such suggestions to be made after conference with Indian leaders. Such articles as yours are extremely useful in helping American readers to understand the very complex problems involved.

Bertrand Russell
Malvern, Pa.

RUSSELL ON MONISTIC THEORY

Jane Duran

ABSTRACT: In comparing Russell’s two short essays, ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’ and ‘Pragmatism’, it is shown that Russell finds similar problems with the notion of truth used both in neo-Hegelian idealism and pragmatism, and that he also finds an unacceptable murkiness in the ideas of each.

Two essays by Russell collected in his 1910 Philosophical Essays, ‘Pragmatism’ (1909) and ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’ (1906-07), are remarkably united in a way that seems to ask for commentary.1 While ‘Pragmatism’ has received extensive comment from an enormous range of sources, the relatively encapsulated views of ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’ have not been given the same amount of attention. Since each piece is brief, light shone on the two of them simultaneously may help to elucidate some of the main points of both.

I.

In ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’, Russell continues his lengthy project of turning the tables on neo-Hegelianism by making it clear that simply setting out what it is that H.H. Joachim and other neo-Hegelians actually hold will destroy their argument. This is so, Russell claims, because some sort of correspondence theory of truth — even if unacknowledged — is required in order to make even minimal sense of the “coherentist” or “monistic” position that the neo-Hegelians espouse. For example, in Part I of ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’, Russell sums up his larger argument against the

1 References throughout this paper are to the 1966 Simon & Schuster edition of Philosophical Essays.
cohering side with four brief points, the last of which is as follows:

In order to prove that there can be only one coherent whole, the theory is compelled to appeal to “experience”, which must consist in knowing particular truths, and thus requires a notion of truth that the monistic theory cannot admit. (p. 139)

As Russell has argued at an earlier point in the text, the proposition “Bishop Stubbs was hanged for murder” cannot be meaningfully experienced unless we can assign a truth-value to it, but the monistic theory, an earlier sort of super-holism, asks us not to assign a truth value to isolated propositions because such an assignment is “no help towards constructing the whole of truth”. (p. 138) Because, as Russell claims, this position ultimately undermines itself, it cannot be maintained.

This same line of argument is used in ‘Pragmatism’. The crux of both essays, though this is perhaps more obvious in ‘Pragmatism’, revolves around the notions of truth and correspondence – Russell believes in correspondence and pragmatists don’t, or in Rortian terminology, Russell believes in mirrors, and the pragmatists do not. Russell’s argument here is similar to that used in ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’ – the pragmatists’ conception of truth not only abuses natural language, but must somehow be less than straightforward. It would appear to rest on a correspondence notion of what would count as true. On Russell’s view, any anti-foundational theory of truth – such as those espoused by both the pragmatists and the neo-Hegelians – fails to capture what modern logic has shown, e.g., about the nature of truth and of assertions of truth.

II.

Part of what Russell aims to do in ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’ is to show – by establishing the incoherence of what the monists are calling the “axiom of internal relations” – that no sense whatsoever can be made of the doctrine. This is comparatively easy to do; Bradley, Joachim and the others assume that since all is ultimately one, no meaningful predication can be made of the parts of the totality. Russell is able to show convincingly that without meaningful predication at some lower level (such as that needed to state the axiom), no predication can be made of the whole, so that the doctrine of internal relations is incoherent.

In typical close analysis, he exposes the inconsistencies of the doctrine while allowing the reader to wonder how it is that grown adults ever came to formulate such a theory in the first place. For example, he writes with respect to the “axiom”:

A more searching argument against the axiom of internal relations is derived from a consideration of what is meant by the ‘nature’ of a term. Is this the same as the term itself, or is it different? If it is different, it must be related to the term, and the relation of a term to its nature cannot without an endless regress be reduced to something other than a relation. Thus if the axiom is to be adhered to, we must suppose that a term is not other than its nature. In that case, every true proposition attributing a predicate to a subject is purely analytic, since the subject is its own whole nature, and the predicate is part of that nature. (pp.144-145)

Thus, contra the idealists and their axiom of internal relations, there is predication between a term and its “nature” (or really, between expressions of them). As Russell goes on to explain, this analysis also destroys the notion that coherence can meaningfully be predicated of the collection of propositions as a whole, since the very notion of predication is under attack.

Again, the point of Russell’s analysis is to establish that which is now taken for granted philosophically, and that is that predication and propositional content are relations, and that we can characterize those relations. Because this notion is so familiar to us, we find it difficult to distance ourselves from it sufficiently to come to grips with the novelty of what Russell is saying. Both ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’ are attacks on doctrines that imply that there is some meaning to ‘truth’ other than a correspondence relationship. But if truth is not understood as
correspondence with things, no proposition can be examined with respect to experience and assigned a truth-value, and all doctrines become unintelligible. The Bradleyan system under examination in ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’ is incoherent and nonsensical; the pragmatist tradition, as presented in Russell’s examination of it, is probably slightly less nonsensical but cannot survive much scrutiny.

Russell himself sometimes draws the two doctrines of idealism and pragmatism together, as when he says,

I do not observe that idealists distinguish these two meanings [of the notion of ‘relation’]; indeed, speaking generally, they tend to identify a proposition with its consequences, thus embodying one of the distinctive tenets of pragmatism. (pp. 141)

If there is no correspondence notion of truth – no conception that propositions can be examined with respect to experience and then assigned a truth value – there can be no intelligible doctrine of either consequences or of the nature of things. But in order to come to this conclusion, Russell must engage in a close analysis that has devastating ends for his opponents.

III.

In addition to difficulties with theories of truth that do not live up to their billing, Russell has an understandable difficulty with what might charitably be termed philosophical vagueness, and both ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’ and ‘Pragmatism’ attack their opponents on these grounds.

The charge of vagueness is related to the lack of development of any kind of view of truth, but it is possible to at least minimally make some distinctions between the two. One of the areas that Russell finds the least praiseworthy in the work of Joachim is the appeal to “organicity”; it is this very organicity, as Russell repeatedly maintains, that prevents the doctrine from being comprehensible in such a way that it can be clearly articulated, let alone maintained. (p. 132) As Russell himself says, his opponents frequently characterize his own philosophical work as “crude”;

what they must really dislike is that it is so clear that it can actually be understood. (p. 132) On his view, a philosophical doctrine ought to be able to be clearly grasped and articulated. Russell abhors any sort of philosophical view that proceeds as if it is so intellectually sophisticated that it cannot be understood. As he says of the neo-Hegelian stance, “The position which I have been trying to represent is always considered, by those who hold it, a very difficult one to apprehend...” (p. 132)

Although Russell does not find the pragmatists guilty of the same degree of imprecision, he does find it difficult, in many cases, to delineate the precise claim being made. With the Jamesian version of pragmatism, it is not clear, whether it is the actual will to believe, the pragmatist temper, that is constitutive of the doctrine, or whether the doctrine stands independently. As he notes,

[The] essay on the will to believe is important, because it has been widely read and much criticized, both adversely and favorably, and because it affords a good introduction to the pragmatist temper of mind. Some practice in the will to believe is an almost indispensable preliminary to the acceptance of pragmatism; and conversely pragmatism, when once accepted, is found to give the full justification of the will to believe. (p. 83)

In each case, then, part of what causes, for Russell, the lack of appeal of the doctrine in question is that it is very hard, ultimately, to come clear as to just what that doctrine is. For the “monistic theory”, there is apparently no such thing as an individual truth, even though, as Russell notes, the full-scale “organic” doctrine would require such a notion were it able to make any predication of any kind, including of its organic whole. In what the “organicity” consists is left more or less to the reader’s imagination, in the same way that the conclusion of a novel or literary work might not be fully set out. Although the pragmatists in general have been somewhat more specific, it is not clear whether some emotional dynamic drives the establishment of the epistemological
portion of the doctrine, or whether it can be maintained independently of the emotional dynamic.

Russell quite rightly excoriates this lack of clarity, and the more scathing parts of his rebuttal, particularly in ‘The Monistic Theory’, are actually quite humorous and fully up to his usual standard. A good deal of levity informs the following part of ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’, even though it is employed to make a philosophical point:

As for the deus ex machina, the ideal experience in which the whole of truth is actualized, I will merely observe that he is in general somewhat discredited, and that idealists themselves are rather ashamed of him, as appears by the fact that they never mention him when they can help it, and that when they do, they introduce him with apologetic words, such as ‘what is true in the end, – as though what is true ‘in the end’ were anything different from what is true. (p. 138)

Although we may be laughing so hard that we lose track of Russell’s greater point here, the crux of the matter is, of course, that there is no way to unpack the “monistic theory” that leaves it with any credibility.

IV.

In both essays, then, Russell makes use of the modern predicate calculus, ignored, as he sees it, by both sets of philosophers, to make the point that the doctrines in question do not make sense. Part of the pretentiousness of the belief systems, as I have indicated here, resides in their vagueness, and Russell is easily able to criticize the vagueness since it appears early on given close examination. The monistic view has a certain Leibnizian appeal, for example, but unlike some parts of Leibniz’ views which can be at least set out explicitly, the monistic view cannot be adequately stated, since any attempt to state it clearly undermines it. The variety of views subsumed under pragmatism are not quite as easily undermined, but as Russell is at pains to make clear, it is not at all obvious what motivates them, or at what philosophical goal they aim.

Russell is also clear on how it is that a philosophy should hang together, if in fact it does hang together. As he says at the very outset of ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’, logical monism is related to ontological monism. (p. 131)

If it is indeed the case that it is the metaphysical monism that is the driving force here – and this, apparently, is what the thinkers in question would like us to believe – then that part of the view should be patently clear and susceptible of ready articulation. But it should also be related to logical monism, and it is the attempt to set out the logical monism that undoes the view. Russell is not only on sure ground here; the clarity and brilliance of the essay derive from the fact that logical monism is used to destroy the notion of the metaphysical monism that is, allegedly, the heart of the doctrine.

Insofar as pragmatism is concerned, Russell remarks that [The pragmatists] point triumphantly to the influence of desire upon belief, and boast that their theory alone is based upon a true psychological account of how belief arises. With this account we have no quarrel; what we deny is its relevance to the question: What is meant by ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’? (pp. 96-97)

In other words, it might well be thought that the one set of questions precedes the other, but as Russell makes clear, the pragmatists do not seem to show that they have understood this.

I have argued here that there is a close tie between the comparatively brief essays in question. But that argument has not been difficult to make. The clarity of Russell’s work, the time period, the development of logic, and a number of other features all bring the writings of this period together. Of greater interest, perhaps, is a feature that might initially be thought to be non-philosophical. There is a great humanism behind these essays, a humanism which informed Russell’s life. It is a humanism that refuses to swallow the murky and superficially palatable for the sake of some purported wondrous goal. Insofar as that clarity and
concern for the general intellectual welfare dominated most of Russell's life, thought, and work, the two essays in question are – and one hesitates to use the word – merely “parts” of the great driving work that consumed Russell throughout his life and motivates our admiration to this day.

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REVIEWS

M.N. ROY'S HUMANIST ODYSSEY

PHIL EBERSOLE


Bertrand Russell is a fascinating subject for study because he was not only a significant thinker in his own right, but was also involved with so many of the controversies and key people of his time. The same might be said of the Indian thinker M.N. Roy (1887-1954).

Roy's intellectual odyssey took him from militant Hindu nationalist to communist to humanist and radical democrat. He was acquainted with Einstein and Gramsci, collaborated with Lenin, inspired Nehru, and was a political opponent of Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek and Gandhi. I confess I was ignorant of Roy's life and ideas until I read Dr. Ramendra Nath's new book, *M.N. Roy's New Humanism and Materialism*, published by the Buddhiwadi Foundation.

*M.N. Roy's New Humanism and Materialism* provides a succinct and clear exposition of Roy's thought and a brief but fascinating sketch of his life. Roy became an active nationalist at the age of 14 and left India in 1915 in a quest to buy arms for a planned uprising against British rule. He wandered through most of eastern Asia and then came to the United States, where he discovered the thought of Karl Marx in the New York Public Library. In 1919, he was in Mexico and participated in the founding of the Mexican Communist Party. He was invited to Russia in 1920 for the second conference of the Communist International (Comintern), where Lenin asked him to present his own thesis on national liberation movements. By 1926, Roy was a member of all four policy-making bodies of the Comintern—the Presidium, the Political Secretariat, the Executive Committee, and the World Congress.
The Comintern sent him to China in 1927 with the mission to forge an alliance between the communists and the Kuomintang nationalists. His arrival coincided with the massacre of the communists by the Kuomintang forces of Chiang Kai-shek. He returned to Russia in disfavor, and was expelled from the Communist International in 1929. He said the real reason he was expelled was his claim to the right of independent thought.

He returned to India in 1930, and was jailed in 1931. While in prison, he wrote some of his major works, in which he tried to work out a humanist and democratic philosophy appropriate to Indian conditions. He joined the Indian National Congress when he was released in 1936, but resigned in 1940 because he opposed Gandhi’s Quit India campaign. Roy’s view was that the war against the Axis powers temporarily took priority over the independence struggle.

In 1944, Roy prepared a draft constitution for India, emphasizing decentralization, devolution of power and a kind of syndicalism or Jeffersonian democracy, consistent with his humanistic desire to restore sovereignty to the individual in society. He founded the Indian Renaissance Institute in 1946, and published *New Humanism: A Manifesto*, whose 22 theses are included as an appendix to Dr. Ramendra’s book. Roy rejected both Communism and capitalism, and put forth a philosophy of decentralized “radical democracy” as an alternative to parliamentary democracy.

In 1948, he launched the Radical Humanist Movement, a nonpartisan political movement, to make India what he considered a true democracy. He was a founding vice president of the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU); the Radical Humanist Movement was one of the original IHEU member organizations. The IHEU has in his honor created the M.N Roy Human Development Campus in Mumbai (Bombay).

Dr. Ramendra places Roy’s ideas in the context of the history of materialist philosophy, including a tantalizingly brief mention of Lokayat or Charvaka, an ancient Indian school of materialist thought. While Roy opposed the glorification of India’s so-called spiritual heritage, he favored a rational and critical study of ancient Indian philosophy. He thought it might do for India what the rediscovery of ancient Greek thought did for Europe in the Renaissance.

Roy’s version of materialism was an ethical philosophy. He believed that human beings have the power to make free and rational choices, and that they have a duty to do this without debasing themselves before imaginary supernatural beings.

Dr. Ramendra explains how Roy’s thought differed from Marxian materialism. According to Roy, Marxian determinism did not allow for human freedom and it neglected ethics. Like Bertrand Russell, Roy perceived there is no logical connection between Marx’s philosophical materialism (there is no supernatural reality) and his historical materialism (everything in history has economic causes).

Roy preferred to call his philosophy “physical realism,” meaning that the physical world comprises all of reality, and a supposed supernatural or spiritual realm is not necessary to explain the world. He did not think the discoveries of modern physics invalidate physical realism. The universe may not be mechanistic, but it is still understandable through rational inquiry, according to Roy.

Dr. Ramendra points out there is the same logical disjunction within M.N. Roy’s thought that Roy observed in Karl Marx, in that physical realism neither contradicts nor supports Roy’s new humanist political philosophy. While this is true, I would add that there is a psychological, if not a logical, connection between the two aspects of Roy’s ideas. The person who is able to reject supernatural beliefs and apply his own understanding to the physical world is a person likely to desire political freedom and the right to apply his own understanding to society.

Dr. Ramendra deserves credit not only as a writer but as a publisher. He and his wife, Dr. Kawaljeet Kaur, together with relatives and friends, founded the Buddhivadi Samaj (the Bihar Rationalist Society or BRS) in 1985, following a wave of religious riots and killings sparked by the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh guards. They have persevered through the years to give a voice to humanism. One can only guess at the difficulty of their effort.

They launched the Buddhivadi Foundation in 1996 as an independent affiliate of the BRS. The foundation publishes books and newsletters in Hindi and English, and maintains a humanist
library and research center. At present Dr. Ramendra and Dr. Kawaljeet are collaborating on a new work – *Rationalist, Humanist and Atheistic Trends in Twentieth Century Indian Thought*, a study of seven leading Indian thinkers.

The Buddhiwadi Foundation web site at http://www.buddhiwadi.org is well worth a look. It contains, among other things, 10 online essays by Dr. Ramendra and two by Dr. Kawaljeet in English. Dr. Ramendra is very much in the Bertrand Russell tradition. He says in his online essay “Is God Dead?” that Bertrand Russell is his favorite philosopher. His Ph.D. thesis was on the ethics of Bertrand Russell, and is available from the Buddhiwadi Foundation. A briefer essay on Russell’s ethics is available online. Another online essay, “Why I Am Not a Hindu,” was partly inspired by Russell’s “Why I Am Not a Christian.”

I would particularly recommend the essay, “Why I Am Not a Hindu,” to North American humanists. We North American humanists sometimes think of Indian philosophy in terms of swamis and yogis, and to give them the benefit of the doubt which we do not extend to the Christian religion. Dr. Ramendra’s book on M.N. Roy reminds us that there is another tradition in Indian philosophy, one which it would behoove us to learn about.

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DENTON ON SCIENCE AND RELIGION
AND NOT ON THE NEXT WAR

CHAD TRAINE


The British philosopher Bertrand Russell will probably be remembered most through the ages for his contributions to mathematical logic at the beginning of the 20th century. But the First World War proved to be a watershed event for Russell personally. He spoke of how one of the war’s effects on him was to render the world of abstract ideas “thin and rather trivial” in the light of the suffering perpetrated by the prevailing havoc.

Peter Denton is Assistant Professor in the Department of History, Philosophy, and Religious Studies at the University of Winnipeg. In his book *The ABC of Armageddon: Bertrand Russell on Science, Religion, and the Next War*, he treats Bertrand Russell’s interwar period relative to the problem that Denton never tires of describing as “the old savage in the new civilization”. To be sure, Russell had brooded over how science liberated us from needs in certain areas, on the one hand, while, on the other, fostering an industrial culture that is less free. Above all, Russell had warned that “Material progress has increased men’s power of injuring one another, and there has been no correlative moral progress.” And Denton explains that, however disinclined Russell had become to the “abstract world of ideas”, he had hardly “become a disciple of Henry Ford.” Rather “[t]he misrepresentation of science as nothing more than technique, in which the value of knowledge was measured not by its truth but by its utility, aroused Russell’s ire throughout the interwar period.”

Denton begins his book with a discussion of Russell’s contemporaries who also addressed science’s role in society. Chapter 2 is basically a synopsis of Russell’s *Prospects for Industrial Civilisation* and *The Scientific Outlook*. Chapter 3 covers
Russell's views on religion and the implications for religion of the then new revelations in physics. Chapters 4 and 5 are about the philosophical implications of the advances in physics for the rivalry between science and religion and how Russell saw the differences between science and religion as ultimately irreconcilable. Finally, Chapters 6 and 7 are a discussion of how the endeavors of Russell to cope with "the old savage in the new civilization" were doomed to failure because of his philosophy's lack of an "operational metaphysic".

The ABC of Armageddon is highly readable. The footnotes are good, and many helpful summaries are provided. This enables the book to be used as a convenient guide for the relevant primary source material. In the book's preface, Denton expresses his hope that, by concentrating on Russell's "largely neglected" contribution to the public discussion of the world's state between the world wars, as well as the assorted notions to which Russell was responding, he can contribute to "a similar conversation at the start of our century". The book's biggest disappointment, however, is that it ultimately fails to make any headway in providing such a contribution.

Rather than propose fresh insights into the 21st century's counterparts to such problems, Denton is content to have his narrative culminate in contentions that Russell's irreligion prevented a coherent context for checking the growth of science as technique. As Denton would have it, "Russell's support of the inevitable conflict between science and religion...doomed his attempt to distinguish science as the pursuit of knowledge from science as the application of technique." Again, "In considering religion primarily as a social phenomenon, and in criticizing the social and historical role of Christianity in western culture, [Russell] robbed himself of a basis on which to discuss the universal character of 'values'...Russell found himself without defensible reasons for maintaining the interests of the individual against the organization of the State." And, finally, "Russell's failure to articulate a functional social morality other than one based on power may be attributed to his separation of facts from values, a separation of the knowledge proper to science from the values proper to ethics."

While it is one thing to claim (however debatably) that Bertrand Russell's philosophy suffers from the foregoing defects, it is altogether another thing to suggest that Russell himself experienced any such misgivings about his own philosophy. Indeed, Denton's narrative in this area is ambiguous enough that readers not directly familiar with Russell are easily led into believing that Russell himself experienced misgivings about his philosophy that are in reality only Denton's. While Denton's reservations about Russell's philosophy are enough to render his book suspect, Denton's tendency to imply that his own misgivings about Russell's philosophy were shared by no less than Russell himself make this work all the more so.
DISCUSSION

REPLY TO KLEMENT

ARTHUR SULLIVAN

In his review of my anthology Logicism and the Philosophy of Language: Selections from Frege and Russell, Kevin Klement raises some fair criticisms. For example, he points out that the anthology does not contain nearly enough philosophy of mathematics to give beginners grounds for informed conclusions about the logicist thesis. (p.41) I agree, and I did struggle with this point (see p. 9 of my Preface). Given the constraints I was working under, including budget restrictions, I chose to cover the philosophy of language as well as possible, rather than to cover some philosophy of language and some philosophy of mathematics.

The main aim of this note is to briefly discuss two of Klement’s criticisms of my Introduction: [1] “It ... oddly claims that Russell, contra Kant, wanted to restore the ‘analyticity’ of arithmetical claims, whereas Russell actually claimed that both logic and mathematics were synthetic *a priori*” (pp. 42-3); and [2] “The editor ... insinuates that Russell never fully engaged with dualistic theories of meaning ... which is easily shown to be false by a study of his 1903-1905 manuscripts.” (p. 43)

[1] Klement is right that Russell (1903, p. 457) claims that both mathematics and logic are synthetic *a priori*. However, by 1919, Russell’s view had evolved considerably: “It is clear that the definition of ‘logic’ or ‘mathematics’ must be sought by trying to give a new definition of the old notion of ‘analytic’ propositions.” (Sullivan, p. 296) To get to the bottom of this would require extensive investigation of such matters as precisely what Russell means by ‘synthetic’ in 1903, precisely what he means by ‘analytic’ in 1919, and precisely which factors lead to this change of doctrine. In any case, in this short note, I respond to this charge of uttering a falsehood by pleading guilty to the lesser charge of oversimplifying this complex issue.

[2] It is true that Russell spent much time and effort from 1903 to 1905 working on theories that distinguish between two semantic notions, such as meaning and denotation. However, this *per se* is not negatively relevant to my claim (p. 81) that the arguments in ‘On Denoting’ that Russell directs at Frege’s theory do not succeed in engaging with Frege’s brand of semantic dualism.

Following Coffa (1991, p. 79), I define semantic dualism as the view that the content of what we say is distinct from the objects, events, and states of affairs that we say it about. A semantic dualist, in this sense, holds that every significant linguistic expression is systematically correlated with two different sorts of entity – something like Frege’s senses (i.e., the content of what we say) and references (i.e., what we say it about). Each term expresses a sense, and a sense is a way of representing, or pointing to, a reference.

The arguments in ‘On Denoting’ do not engage with this type of semantic dualism, in my opinion, because the arguments rely on some assumptions that this dualism explicitly rejects – for instance, that co-referential words make exactly the same contribution to propositional content, or that if a term does not refer to anything actual, then sentences in which it occurs must express nonsense. Indeed, concerning the relevant notion of semantic dualism, Russell made his position perfectly clear in the famous “Mont Blanc” letter to Frege: “I believe that in spite of all its
snowfields Mont Blanc is itself a component of what is actually asserted in the proposition ‘Mont Blanc is more than 4000 meters high’. … If we do not admit this, then we get the conclusion that we know nothing at all about Mont Blanc” (Frege 1980, p. 169).

So, clearly, in the 1903-1905 manuscripts, Russell engages with several views that deserve to be called ‘semantic dualism’, in some sense or other. However, by 1905 Russell considers the view that I, following Coffa, call ‘semantic dualism’ to be a total non-starter – on the questionable grounds that if what we say does not literally consist of what we say it about, then we are cognitively cut off from the worldly referents of our thought and talk. My claim is that no arguments in ‘On Denoting’ engage with this notion of dualism, I do not see how this claim could be refuted by that anything one might point to in the 1903-1905 manuscripts.

WORKS CITED


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Traveler's Diary / Conference Report

3RD ANNUAL EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE. Brain child of David McCarty (Indiana University) and Gregory Landini (University of Iowa) while at the Munich Conference celebrating 100 years of Russell’s Paradox, the Early Analytic Philosophy Conference convened at Purdue University this year for its third annual meeting. The conference was organized by Christopher Pincock, of Purdue, with support from Rod Bertolet (Chair of Philosophy at Purdue) and Purdue’s College of Arts and Sciences. The theme of the conferences, which aim to include talks by advanced graduate students, is early analytic philosophy.

It was a full two days. David Taylor (University of Iowa graduate student) opened the conference with a talk on how to refurbish McTaggart's often forgotten C-series, a series McTaggart invented to explain the nature of time. Taylor did a nice job explaining why McTaggart's admittedly obscure thesis teaches important lessons concerning time. David McCarty then discussed Paul du Bois-Reymond's conception of "completeness". The historical development of these ideas on formal systems of arithmetic is eye-opening; McCarty never ceases to amaze. Next was William Taschek's thought provoking paper on Frege's horizontal and the nature of logic. The paper inspired quite a bit of debate as Frege scholars lined up on different sides of the issues.

The keynote address, which followed these three papers, was 'Quine and the Aufbau' by Peter Hylton (University of Illinois, Chicago). The paper generated a wonderful discussion of Quine's philosophy and its departure from Carnap's *Aufbau*. I'm still thinking about the many issues that came out in that discussion.

The second day began with Christopher Pincock (Purdue) reading a paper on Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment. Pincock offers an new interpretation that pulls together the work of several current interpretations of the theory. We are eager to learn more of his many interesting ideas in the coming years. Following Pincock, was André Carus (University of Chicago) with an exciting discussion of, dare I say, Carnap's "ontological" development. Investigating the historical papers left by Carnap, Carus explained the very important, and yet often unappreciated, changes occurring in Carnap's philosophy. Carus also heralded the appearance of a new
thirteen volume series, The Collected Works of Rudolf Carnap (Open Court), as well as a companion series called Full Circle: Publications of the Archive of Scientific Philosophy, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. The first volumes in the companion series are Frege's Lectures on Logic: Carnap's Student Notes 1910-1914 and Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena. Also in the series will be Intellectual Autobiography, by Rudolf Carnap, in its original, unabridged form.

Gary Ebbs (Illinois) gave an inspired presentation entitled "Quine and Carnap on Truth by Convention." Ebbs holds that in order to fit logic into a naturalized conception of science, Quine developed a distorted view of Carnap's conception of truth by convention. Correcting the distortion sheds important new light on Carnap's philosophy. In the afternoon sessions, the present author offered a new perspective on the relevance of Russell's type-theory to Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" and Quine's debate with Carnap on ontology. Finally, Chris Tillman (Indiana University graduate student) awakened the audience to a radical new view of the 19th century algebraic tradition in logic and its relevance to Wittgenstein's tractarian conception of calculation.

The conference was run superbly and a very pleasant time was had by all. The open and friendly discussion of issues, despite what are sometimes radical differences of opinion, is refreshing and inspiring. It is hoped that a tradition is developing and the conference on early analytic philosophy will continue next year.1

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1 Details of the conference, including abstracts of the talks, can be found at: http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~cpincock/eap2004.htm

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**New! Answers Online**

Flummoxed by Gerry’s ciphers? Impatient to see the results? Don’t wait till next issue! See the answers (or just hints) to current puzzles at the BRSQ Online, at http://www.lehman.edu/deanhum/philosophy/BRSQ

1. Harlem is a city occupied by an oppressive army serving what amounts to an outside power.

2. Mr. Nehru, who was my friend, pursued policies opposed to the Cold War, although he was not successful in seriously changing the pattern of poverty in India.

3. …I have every sympathy with your wish to convert your fiance to free thought... I think however, that you should exercise some caution as regards sexual blackmail...
Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process. Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.
Puzzled?
Gerry’s Cipher-Solving TIPS

Here are a few techniques for solving simple substitution ciphers with word divisions. In the future I’ll give some suggestions for the variety without word divisions.

(1) Notice the frequency of letters in English text is roughly: e t a o i n s h r d l u.

That is, e is the most frequent letter and t and a are also very frequent. Though few passages follow this exactly, this is a starting point.

(2) Look out for these common letter positions:

Common first letters: The letters t, o and a.
Rare first letters: The letter e.
Common final letters: The letters e, f, d, and s.
Common letter pairs (in English): The pair th

(3) Look for three- or two-letter words (in text where no attempt has been made to make the solution difficult):

The common three-letter words: the, and, are and for.

The two-letter words are often suggestive: For example, if our code included AB and BC, we would look for (2) two-letter words in which the 1st letter of one was the 2nd letter of the other, as in these cases: on-to or am-my or to-it.

(4) Look for words containing patterns:

For example, if the pattern is CDD, trying out ‘all’ and ‘off’ is a good way to proceed. If the pattern was ABCDBB, some good choices are ‘degree’ and ‘degree’ (there are others).

(5) The following websites contain additional information on ciphers:

http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/cpsc/cryptography/substitution.html
http://deafandblind.com/word_frequency.htm

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
1ST QUARTER 2004 TREASURER’S REPORT
CASH FLOW 1/1/04 - 3/31/04

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Compiled 4/8/04 by Dennis J. Darland

Dennis J. Darland
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Celebrating Six Years Of Monthly Russell Meetings
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2003-2004
June 10  Defenders of God
July 8   International War Crimes Tribunal
Aug. 12  Satan in the Suburbs
Sept. 9  Lady Ottoline Morrell
Oct. 14  D.H. Lawrence
Nov. 11  Why I Am Not a Christian
Dec. 9   Marriage & Morals

*Topics & dates are subject to change*

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