THE WORLD OF BERTRAND RUSSELL

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~ DEADLINE: OCTOBER 1 ~

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ACT NOW!

IN THIS ISSUE

AT THIS YEAR'S ANNUAL MEETING of the Bertrand Russell Society, held June 18-20 in Plymouth, New Hampshire, there were several strong talks by scholars new to the Russell community. Those who missed the annual meeting will be pleased to know that some of these talks will be published in this and future issues of the Quarterly. Iva Apostolova, a graduate student from the University of Ottawa, one of these new Russell scholars, spoke on some problems that drove Russell's shift 'From Acquaintance to Neutral Monism'. That talk appears in this issue of the Quarterly. In her essay, Iva argues that Russell's problems in accounting for the cognitive faculties of sensation, memory, and imagination within his theory of acquaintance were important factors in his adoption of neutral monism. Look for more of these talks from the most recent BRS annual meeting in future issues of the BRS Quarterly.

MCMASTER UNIVERSITY in Hamilton, Ontario is the home of the Bertrand Russell Archives and Bertrand Russell Research Centre. Based on his talk from the 28th annual meeting of the Society (May 25-27, 2001, at McMaster University), Nicholas Griffin, in his essay 'How the Russell Papers Came to McMaster', tells the story of how McMaster University acquired Russell's papers and became the world center for Bertrand Russell studies. As will be seen, it was first of all Russell's involvement in Cold War political struggles that led to the papers going to McMaster.

SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, a growing number of studies have appeared describing Cold War politics in greater detail than has previously been available, telling the story with more complexity than was admitted at the time. This has been particularly true in recent discussions of the role of intellectuals in the Cold War and the effects of the Cold War on them and their disciplines. This discussion begins with Ellen Schrecker's 1986 No Ivory Tower, which documents the influence of McCarthyism on American academics, particularly on the dismissal of many academics from their teaching positions, and the general political quiescence on campuses during that period.

Following in Schrecker's footsteps is John McCumber's 2001 Time in the Ditch, which considers the effects of McCarthy-
ism on the discipline of philosophy in the 1940s and 1950s. McCumber argues that not only were philosophers dismissed and politically silenced then, but that the philosophy of the period itself became depoliticized and bereft of values and of the possibility of taking a moral stand, and that this accounts for the dominance of analytic philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s, though he admits that the continental philosophy of that period had similar problems.

A more detailed and complex view of the effects of the Cold War on logical positivists and logical positivism, as well as a more sympathetic one which argues that analytic philosophy was more the victim than the villain of the story, is George Reisch’s forthcoming book (in 2005, from Cambridge University Press) How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic. Other recent works have documented the role that intellectuals themselves played in the Cold War and the role that governments and government funding played in the lives of these intellectuals. Leading this list is Frances Stonor Saunders’s 2000 The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World Of Arts and Letters, but there have recently been many others of the same sort.

The question for this journal, of course, is what Russell’s role in all of this was, and especially what is new and of interest about Russell that we can learn from all of these new materials. The BRS Quarterly hopes to review much of this literature in coming issues, in an attempt to work out some of the details of Russell’s place in the emerging picture. As an introduction to this subject, Jack Clontz has written a review for this issue of the Quarterly of recent charges by Timothy Garton Ash about Russell’s cooperation with British government propaganda agencies during the Cold War. In particular, Garton Ash has charged that the publication of three books by Russell was not only financed by the British Foreign Office, but that Russell knew of this at the time. Jack considers the details surrounding these allegations and enlarges on the story.

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE, Thom Weidlich reviews a new play, Boise, by David Folwell, which is centered around the sayings of Bertrand Russell, and interviews the author. Tony Simpson, of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, sends us a report from the Boston Social Forum and the plans discussed there to coordinate peace efforts in the U.S. with other such efforts around the world. Ray Perkins has selected another letter to the editor by Russell, this time, one written to the Times arguing for the right to stage an anti-nuclear rally in Trafalgar Square. When the authorities denied permission for the rally, it was held anyway, and with the help of a forceful police response, a melee occurred. Meeting minutes by Chad Trainer from the Board of Directors and General Membership meetings held during the BRS June Annual Meeting, and a Treasurer’s Report by BRS Treasurer Dennis round out this issue of the BRSQ.
ANNOUNCING
PACIFIC & CENTRAL
DIVISIONS OF THE APA

A CALL FOR PAPERS

PACIFIC
The Bertrand Russell Society (BRS)
And
The History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society (HEAPS)
March 23-27, 2005, San Francisco, CA,
Westin St. Francis Hotel, Union Square
*Submission Deadline: Nov. 1, 2004*

CENTRAL
The Bertrand Russell Society (BRS)
And
The History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society (HEAPS)
April 27-30, 2005, Chicago, IL, Palmer House Hilton Hotel,
*Submission Deadline: Nov. 15, 2004*

Send submissions (in Word format) to:
rosalind.carey@lehman.cuny.edu

SOCIETY NEWS

The Bertrand Russell Society celebrated its 30th anniversary in Plymouth New Hampshire this past June 18-20 when it held its 31st Annual Meeting, hosted by Ray and Karen Perkins on the campus of Plymouth State University. The conference was well attended, with 50 Russelians of various stripes there from 4 or 5 different countries. The talks were excellent, as was the company. It was a special affair.

The conference began Friday night with a meeting of the Society's Board of Directors, which passed a resolution on Iraq condemning the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq "as contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter which Bertrand Russell long advocated" and calling for the "immediate withdrawal, under U.N. auspices, of U.S. forces in Iraq and for the concurrent establishment, also under U.N. auspices, of a democratic secular state by the Iraqi people themselves."

On Saturday and Sunday, papers of high quality and great interest were read and discussed. Talks by three young graduate students attending the meeting, Irem Kurtsal of Syracuse University, James Connelly of York University, and Iva Apostolova of the University of Ottawa, were especially strong. Everyone was pleased to have these new Russell scholars in attendance.

The talks began with a "master class", really an open discussion, on Russell and the soul, led by BRS President, Alan Schwerin. Materials for the session had previously been made available, and a lively discussion ensued comparing Russell's views on values, especially on the value of philosophy, to certain aspects of Buddhism.

Irem Kurtsal, one of two BRS Student Essay Prize winners this year (James Connelly was the other) followed with a talk on 'Russell on Matter and Our Knowledge of the External World', in which she argued that in the light of Russell's claims that he never abandoned either a causal theory of perception or realist understanding of objects, his seemingly phenomenalistic use of the method of logical constructions in the 1914 Our Knowledge of the External World, can be explained by the collapse of his 1913 Theory of Knowledge project. James Connelly, the other Student Essay Prize

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winner, followed with a talk on ‘Russell and Wittgenstein on Propositions’, in which he argued that difficulties with Russell’s views of propositions in his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics*, and his attempts to solve them, ultimately lead to the picture theory of propositions in Wittgenstein’s 1921 *Tractatus*.

After Saturday lunch, David Blitz cut short his own talk on ‘Russell and Kant on War and Peace’ to present a televised debate between Edward Teller and Russell on the arms race. Blitz has been working at McMaster University this past year collecting such radio and television appearances of Russell and preserving them for the Russell Archives there in digital form.

Henrique Ribiero, of the University of Coimbra in Portugal, followed this with a talk on ‘Wittgenstein and Russell on “A believes p”’, which was concerned with the *Tractatus*’s impact on Russell’s views on prepositional attitudes. During his talk, Ribiero introduced the idea of a partial semantic holism that he attributed to Russell, and a syntactical holism that he attributed to Wittgenstein. A lively debate ensued about the possible sense and validity of these views. This debate continued in the following weeks in the online discussion group, russell-l, and a further explanation of these ideas will appear in the November issue of this journal. Jane Duran, from the University of California, Santa Barbara, finished the session with a talk ‘On Russell on History and Intrinsic Value’ concerning Russell’s anti-causal view of historical events.

Sunday’s talks were equally enjoyable. Iva Apostolova, a graduate student from the University of Ottawa, began the session with a talk entitled ‘From Acquaintance to Neutral Monism’, in which she argued that Russell’s shift from acquaintance to neutral monism was driven by his problems in describing the cognitive faculties of sensation, memory, and imagination with his acquaintance theory. Her talk is published in this issue of the BRSQ. Chad Trainer followed with a delightful talk on Russell’s stay in Pennsylvania, based on his own trips to the places Russell stayed while there, together with local newspaper accounts of Russell’s stay and reminiscences from people with first hand accounts that Chad contacted on his visits to Russell’s old haunts. Kevin Klement finished Sunday’s session with a paper on ‘The Origins of the Propositional Functions Versions of Russell’s Paradox’. Less narrowly focused than the title might suggest, Klement’s talk went a long way to explaining what Russell was doing between 1902 and 1904, when he claimed to have sat before a blank sheet of paper for two years, unable to proceed.

Saturday evening’s banquet was a pleasure, and closed with the presentation of awards, and delivery of memorable remarks and stories by the Society’s special guests that night. Nicholas Griffin received the BRS Book Award for *The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell*, which he edited [and which was reviewed in the February 2004 issue of the BRSQ]. Arguably, Nick’s introduction to the *Companion* alone qualifies him for the award this year, for in that introduction, one will find as succinct and yet accurate and insightful a description of Russell’s life and work as one could imagine. Ronald Jager, author of an early authoritative work on Russell (the 1972 *Development of Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy*) that is still the most comprehensive view of Russell’s entire work, won a special book award this year. In accepting the award, Jager entertained the audience with a story of his visit to Russell in the early 1960s, where he found Russell to be dauntingly lucid. Honorary Russell Society member, Taslima Nasrin, a special guest at the dinner, was also asked to speak afterwards, and she told of her flight from persecution in Bangladesh, hidden under clothes in the back of a car and in a bare upstairs room without food or water.

The winner of the Annual Bertrand Russell Society Award this year was Daniel Dennett. While Dennett could not attend the evening’s ceremonies, he sent the following letter of acceptance, which was read aloud to the assembly after dinner:

*To Members of the Bertrand Russell Society:*

I am deeply honored to receive the Bertrand Russell Society Award for 2004, and truly regretful that I cannot attend your meeting in New Hampshire – one of my favorite states, where I spent many boyhood summers.

Bertrand Russell was one of my heroes, and I even had the opportunity of corresponding with him once. He was the “Patron” of the Voltaire Society, the student philosophical society in Oxford when I was a graduate student in 1963-5, and it fell to the President of the Society to write a letter to
Russell each term, informing him on the term's program and inviting him to attend. He never attended, but usually sent back a suitably quotable note.

My term as President (Michaelmas Term of 1964) I wrote him the official letter, including the program card for the term. (Our speakers were Alan Anderson on 'Minds and Machines', Richard Hare on 'Searle on Promising', and Peter Geach, with Geoffrey Warnock responding, on 'The Perils of Pauline'.) Russell had just made a big splash in the British press by supporting Mark Lane's book, *Rush to Judgment*, the first of the books criticizing the Warren Commission Report on the assassination of JFK.

I myself was deeply involved in researching the Warren Commission Report, so my letter raised a few points of agreement and disagreement with Russell's views. He responded in a brief message, which I duly read to the assembled members at our next meeting, and then placed in the bulging box of Voltaire Society correspondence that got passed from President to President. On the dissolution of the society that box disappeared for many years, but I found out inadvertently who had it, and asked him if I might have my letter to Russell and his reply for my scrapbook, but he informed me that those letters (and some others I mentioned to him) were no longer in the collection. Alas.

I never met Russell face to face, but saw him often on British telly in those days, and Gilbert Ryle once told me a wonderful story about Russell. When Ryle publicly refused, as Editor of *Mind*, to review Ernest Gellner's book, *Words and Things*, which was viciously critical of ordinary language philosophy and Austin's work in particular, there was a great brouhaha in the papers (this was in 1961 or 1962, as I recall, memorably recounted by Ved Mehta in *The Fly and the Fly-bottle*, which was first published in the *New Yorker*). Ryle told me that in retrospect he realized that he'd made a great mistake, and that it was Russell who had given him the best retrospective advice — and Russell had written the foreword to Gellner's book!: "When you get such a hateful book, don't publicly refuse to review it, you silly man! Wait a year and then publish a brief, critical review with the author's name misspelled!"
The focus of my paper is the shift in Russell’s view of sensation, memory and imagination in the period 1910-1925 from what is known as the "acquaintance" theory of knowledge to neutral monism. I will argue that the changes in Russell’s views about sensation, memory and imagination are crucial to understanding his epistemology in this period, since he considered the theory of cognitive faculties to be the basis of the theory of knowledge. Russell’s interest in theory of knowledge after 1910 focused on the theory of acquaintance. However, in 1918 Russell realized that the theory of cognition based upon the acquaintance theory faced insuperable difficulties in explaining how the cognitive faculties work. This resulted in the abandonment of key concepts such as the “subject of cognition”, the “cognitive relation between subject and object”, and “sense-data” which eventually led to the adoption of a new theory of knowledge altogether, which he worked out in detail in the period 1918-1925. By investigating the development of Russell’s theory of cognition and the problems associated with it, I hope to show its importance for this major shift from the acquaintance to the neutral monism theories that his later views of the nature of knowledge, judgment, and philosophy were based on.

I.

In 1910 Bertrand Russell’s philosophical interest was directed towards an epistemology based on the analysis of experience. Experience comprises our present experience, or sensations, our past experience, or memories, our imaginings, and our knowledge of properties and relations such as those of logic and mathematics.1 Our present, past and imaginary experience is described by what Russell called in Theory of Knowledge “acquaintance with particulars”, while the experience of properties and relations is described by the “acquaintance with predicates”.

According to Russell, certain and indubitable knowledge presupposes direct awareness of things without the intermediary of

images or of inferences from images to things. Knowledge by acquaintance, as opposed to knowledge by description, provides this direct knowledge of things and is considered the foundation for all other types of knowledge. Of the two types of knowledge by acquaintance, acquaintance with particulars, or knowledge of things as they appear to us, is for Russell the most certain knowledge which underpins our knowledge of complex facts and truths. Three cognitive faculties, sensation (which at this time includes perception, introspection, attention, and anticipation), memory, and imagination (which includes hallucination and dreaming) exhaust the types of acquaintance with particulars.

Russell analyzed acquaintance as a two-term relation between subject and object of cognition, i.e., as a direct relation between the mind and matter (sense-data). Although Russell later abandoned the acquaintance theory and its subject-object structure of knowledge and embraced the theory which states that there is only “one neutral stuff”, he did not give up the idea that the faculties of sensation, memory and imagination are the foundation of knowledge, and he continued to explore how they relate to each other to build certainty. I believe that Russell’s theory of the cognitive faculties from 1912-1913, as outlined above, helped him realize that the theory of knowledge by acquaintance has flaws which eventually caused its replacement with a theory that could better explain cognition.

II.

As we saw earlier, acquaintance with particulars comprises the three main cognitive faculties of sensation, memory and imagination. Russell defined acquaintance with particulars as acquaintance with objects which are “all present to me at the time when I experience them”. However, the sense in which objects are “present”, Russell admitted, is troublesome. Not all objects of acquaintance are present in the temporal sense. Temporal presence is problematic for the faculties of memory and imagination. It seems that only the objects of sensation are both present to the mind and present in the sense of being simultaneous with the act of sensation. Objects of memory are in the past, yet somehow they are present to the mind that is acquainted with them; objects of imagination are neither in the present, nor in the past, being imaginary, yet they are somehow present to the imagining mind too.

The difficulty is that the acts of sensation, memory and imagination are all happening now, and so in some sense their objects are all present to them at that moment. According to Russell’s theory, the objects of these acts are in different temporal relations with the subject, so while the objects of sensation are in the present, the objects of memory are in the past, and those of the imagination are in the imagined (not in the real-time) present, past or future. The problem is that Russell insists that the distinction between the faculties is not based on the nature of their objects but in the temporal relation between object and subject. But whenever the objects relate to the subject they are present to it. Objects of sensation, memory and imagination are all present to the subject of acquaintance and so the temporal relation of subject and object does not account for the distinction between sensations, memories and imaginings.

Another important issue concerns the faculty of memory. According to the acquaintance theory of knowledge, memory plays a pivotal role in extending acquaintance and so foundational knowledge. Memory extends knowledge by acquaintance beyond the “specious present” of sensation and thus releases the subject from the trap of the present moment. In other words, the role of memory, as Russell argued, is to connect our momentary awareness with our past experience of things.

Apart from the general question of how it is possible to be acquainted with the past at all, that is, how we can be directly aware of past objects and events without the mediation of mental entities such as images, the analysis of the faculty of memory which Russell

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3 Bertrand Russell, Theory of Knowledge, pp. 45-47.
4 Ibid., pp. 53, 79, 100.
5 Ibid., p. 34.
6 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
7 Ibid., pp. 58, 64-66, 70-72.
8 Ibid. p. 79.
9 Ibid., pp. 11-12. See also B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, p. 48.
10 Bertrand Russell, Theory of Knowledge, p. 12.
provides in *Theory of Knowledge* raises other difficulties for his theory. The three types of memory for Russell are "physiological", "immediate", and "remote" memory. Physiological and immediate memory are memory by acquaintance, while remote memory is knowledge by description. Physiological memory deals with the most recent past, which nevertheless belongs to the specious present. Immediate memory is also memory of the recent past but its objects do not belong to the specious present. There is something in immediate memory, says Russell, which makes us believe that its objects are in the past and thus are different from sensations or sense-data, even though we are acquainted with them the same way we are acquainted with sensations or sense-data. Unfortunately, Russell does not elaborate on what the role of physiological memory is in his theory of memory, since it virtually belongs to the faculty of sensation. Furthermore, he does not provide a clear account of what distinguishes physiological memory dealing with present objects from immediate memory which deals with recent past objects, and thus does not answer the question of how the objects of memory by acquaintance differ from the objects of sensation (whose objects are in the specious present as well) and imagination (whose objects could be in an imagined recent past).

Another difficulty that arises for the relations between the three types of memory is that Russell does not address the issue of how the objects of the three types of memory differ from one another. If the difference is only in their distance in time, then the objects of physiological and immediate memory which deal with the specious present and recent past, can become in due course objects of remote memory. This leads to the conclusion that knowledge by acquaintance could become knowledge by description, which is a far from desirable outcome for Russell’s acquaintance theory.

Yet another problem for Russell’s theory of the cognitive faculties concerns imagination. According to Russell’s definition, “imagination differs from memory and sensation by the fact that it does not imply (though it does not exclude) a time-relation of subject and object”. It seems that what Russell has in mind is that although any imagined object is real, it does not exist in physical time, which means that its temporal status is imaginary. The problem is how the faculty of imagination is distinguished from sensation and memory. Since imagination neither implies nor excludes temporal relations, there is nothing in the nature of the relation of subject and object to distinguish it from memory or sensation.

In *Theory of Knowledge*, Russell says that the objects of imagination (which include hallucinations and dreams) are usually easily identified because they are unusual and strange compared to the ordinary objects of sensation and memory. Russell acknowledges, however, that this cannot be the basis of distinguishing imagination from sensation and memory because the cognitive faculties are defined by the difference in the relation between the known object and the knowing subject, and not the difference in the objects themselves. Applying Russell’s criterion, I will not be able, for example, to distinguish between a memory of my deceased grandmother and my imaginary vision of her, since both objects are experienced as past.

One conclusion to be drawn from the above is that Russell’s theory of acquaintance with particulars fails to provide a criterion of distinction between the cognitive faculties which it initially aimed for, because it cannot explain their temporal differences.

III.

The period 1918-1919 is one of change for Russell’s epistemology. He realized that the subject-object structure of knowledge which is essential for his acquaintance theory is probably not the steadiest epistemological structure, and certainly not the simplest one. The first important consequence of the abandonment of the acquaintance theory is that Russell no longer believes that we are directly aware of the things around us. Images and inferences of things from images of them, which were rejected as intermediaries between the subject and the object of knowledge in the previous theory, are now acknowledged to be “the only ingredients required in addition to sensation” to build up our cognitive picture of reality.\(^{12}\)

Secondly, the concepts of “subject” and “object” of cognition which were regarded as separate entities in the acquaintance

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 170.

theory, are now deemed dispensable for the analysis of knowledge. And so, sensation, memory and imagination, with all other "mental occurrences" such as introspection, attention, and anticipation, are no longer conceived as cognitive relations between subject and object. The direct awareness of things provided by sensation is not considered knowledge per se, since knowledge requires habit and the association of images which involve elements foreign to sensation. However, it is important to note that the three faculties of sensation, memory, and imagination were still believed by Russell to be the basis of knowledge. This line of thought began with The Analysis of Mind and persisted throughout the remainder of Russell's life.13

IV.

In Russell's new 1921 "neutral monism" theory of knowledge, perceptual knowledge, which he still regarded as the basis of knowledge, is now explained without appeal to an irreducible duality between a mental subject and material object. The first consequence for the theory of the cognitive faculties of 1921, which drops the theory of acquaintance, is that sensation is now conceived as a part of perception and not as a separate cognitive faculty. Sensation is "extracted [from perception] by psychological analysis".14 Perception constitutes the "actual experience" which involves "sensation", "biography", "perspective", "habit", and application of the so-called "mnemic laws" which connect the present with the past experience.

Perception now comprises the "momentary experience" of things as well as the different perspectives from which each of us experiences them, which forms what Russell calls our "integral experience of things in the environment".15 The core of the epistemological analysis, experience, now also includes interpretation, expectation, habit, and belief, which were ascribed earlier to knowledge by description. Sensation is indispensable for the faculty of perception, but it is not the bearer of knowledge. The direct awareness of things provided by sensation is not knowledge, since knowledge requires habit and association of images. The view that sensations are transformed into perceptions is not an isolated consequence of the shift, it actually entails a change of the definition of all cognitive faculties and in this way, of the nature of knowledge in general. The Analysis of Mind is where Russell lays out the details of his new theory of knowledge inspired by neutral monism to which, with certain modifications, he remained faithful for the rest of his life.

The new theory of knowledge was adopted by Russell as a better explanation of how the human cognitive apparatus works and what the nature of knowledge is. However, Russell did not abandon the search for certain knowledge. In the light of this search, the new theory proved to be attractive because, Russell says, it dispensed with the epistemological concepts of "subject", "object", and the "dual relation between subject and object" which were at the center of the acquaintance theory, and thus offered a simpler picture of knowledge.

I argue that as a result of the failure of the acquaintance theory to distinguish between the cognitive faculties and between the acts and objects of sensing, remembering, and imagining, the task of Russell's new theory was rather to explain the common features that make the faculties a part of the "integral experience" of reality. The focus in the new theory of cognition, is shifted from providing a criterion of distinction to exploring the causal mechanisms of the faculties whose operation is explained by a general theory of habit and association of images.

Russell thus changed his mind considerably concerning the faculty of sensation in his shift from the theory of acquaintance to neutral monism. His conviction that having a sensation of something does not mean being in a cognitive relation to an object grew stronger with time. In The Analysis of Mind Russell argues that sensation supplies perception with "data" from the external world but does not amount to knowledge, since knowledge requires an association of images that sensation does not provide.16 Habit transforms these sensational data into images which can be remembered.

13 In his article "Russell's Neutral Monism" (Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, Ed. Nicholas Griffin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 332-371), Robert Tully argues that Russell's mature neutral monist theory was developed not earlier than 1940. This thesis deserves serious consideration. However, for the purposes of my paper, I will accept Russell's claim in The Analysis of Mind that his theory at the time sided with the theory of neutral monism.
14 Ibid., p. 157.
associated, imagined, or expected. The “immediate” and “remote” types of memory work through habit, association, and three types of “feeling”. Through the “feeling of familiarity” images of past events are recognized as memories rather than mere imaginations. Memory is also distinguished from imagination by the “feeling of belief” and “feeling of pastness” which accompany our memory-images but not our imagination-images. Since all our memories are images, they are “wholly analyzable into present contents”. In other words, memories represent past events, but are not themselves in the past, and thus the difficulty of having direct knowledge of the past which the acquaintance theory faced is avoided. From Russell’s analysis it follows that what connects the three faculties is the concept of “image”. Images are “occasioned, through association, by a sensation or another image”, and they are also believed to be “copies of sensations which have occurred earlier”. Thus, through images all data coming from sensation, perception, memory and imagination are turned into an “integral experience” of reality.

V.

I hope to have established two main points. First, the three main cognitive faculties of sensation, memory and imagination should be analyzed together, as elements of one theory of the cognitive faculties which plays a crucial role both for Russell’s acquaintance theory and his post-acquaintance philosophy. Second, overcoming the difficulties which the acquaintance theory faced in defining and distinguishing the three cognitive faculties, while keeping the basic epistemological project alive, was for Russell the attraction of neutral monism.

HOW THE RUSSELL PAPERS CAME TO MCMASTER

NICHOLAS GRIFFIN

In 1967 Bertrand Russell needed money. To be more precise, the peace foundation that Russell had established in 1963 needed funds to establish an International War Crimes Tribunal to investigate the war in Vietnam. Russell’s papers would be highly prized possessions and most likely fetch a sizable sum from libraries, museums and possibly private collectors. Perhaps the papers could serve as the primary source of the needed funds for the tribunal. Thus begins the intriguing story of a famous philosopher, money, a buccaneering librarian, Newsweek, and last but not least, a small university with Baptist roots.

McMaster University acquired the papers in 1968. But how did the papers of the world’s most famous campaigner for nuclear disarmament come to be housed at a university that prided itself on its own nuclear reactor and its close association with the nuclear research conducted by Harry Thode, president of McMaster from 1961 to 1972, at Chalk River during the war? Oddly enough, the nuclear reactor is part of the story. During the 1960s, humanities at McMaster, then as now under-resourced and under-appreciated, had been looking for something that would put it on the map in the way the nuclear reactor had put the Faculty of Science on the map. Quite what they had in mind before the Russell papers came on the market, I don’t know. But the Russell Archives, in the minds of several humanities administrators, was the institutional equivalent of the nuclear reactor.

This, of course, only explains why McMaster wanted the papers. It does not explain how it came to get them. A large part of the answer to that question lies in the fact that the University had, in

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16 Ibid., p. 144.
17 Ibid., p. 160.
18 Ibid., pp. 150, 155.

* I would like to thank Alan Schwerin and Kenneth Blackwell for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, which improved it greatly.

1 Thode had been a McMaster professor since 1939, but during the war he had worked at the Canadian nuclear research facility at Chalk River, the original purpose of which was to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. After the war, largely through his influence, McMaster became the first Canadian university to have an experimental nuclear reactor
Will Ready, an enterprising and imaginative librarian. Ready had barely been at McMaster a year when the Russell papers came on the market. He had come to McMaster from Marquette University in Wisconsin, where he had already had considerable experience buying archives: he had bought J.R.R. Tolkien’s papers and those of Dorothy Day of the Catholic Worker movement for Marquette. To describe Ready as enterprising, however, barely does justice to the man. It may seem like an oxymoron to describe a librarian as buccaneering, but such was Will Ready. In his autobiography he takes pride in what he called his “cavalier” and “headlong ways” – and in the trouble they got him into and which he always managed to get out of.

Ready learned the Russell papers were up for sale by accident. He read of it in the newspaper when he was visiting Britain in the autumn of 1967. Apparently with no more than the newspaper article to go on, he returned to Canada and in November persuaded the Ontario Council of University Libraries to support an application to the Canada Council for money to buy the papers. By December he had a promise of $150,000 from the Canada Council and by the end of that month had returned to Britain to actually see the papers for the first time. However, the money promised by the Canadian Council was far short of the asking price.

The papers were not being sold by Russell himself. Indeed, Russell himself did not own the papers. He had given them to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, and a company, Continuum 1, had been set up to catalogue and sell them. Continuum 1 wanted two hundred thousand British pounds (just over half a million Canadian dollars). Ready returned to Canada for more money. Cyrus Eaton, a wealthy financier and McMaster alumnus, and the Laidlaw Foundation contributed, but the lion’s share was put up by the Atkinson Foundation. By the end of March 1968, the money was pledged and Ready was back in Britain to sign the contracts. The papers arrived that summer. It had taken Ready all of six months from learning of the papers’ existence to actually completing the sale.

I don’t know what support Ready got from inside the University to help acquire them, but sadly, he seems to have had little from the philosophy department. One of my former colleagues told the press at the time that he wouldn’t have paid two cents for the papers. These varying estimates of the papers’ worth notwithstanding, it seems to me that at two hundred thousand pounds they were quite a bargain. As Ready himself noted, dealers could have formed a cartel to buy them and made many millions selling them off piecemeal.

The conventional wisdom is that the price was kept low because Russell would not sell to the Americans, who would have paid more for them, because of his opposition to the war in Vietnam. Indeed, I have told this story myself. It turns out, however, not to be true, as I learned by going through the recently acquired papers of Anton Felton, Russell’s agent in the sale. The truth is, in fact, much more interesting.

Russell needed to sell the papers to support his political work. In 1963 he had set up the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation to continue his work after his death. And in 1967 the Peace Foundation was in urgent need of cash to pay for the International War Crimes Tribunal that Russell was setting up to inquire into American conduct in Vietnam. This was a hugely expensive undertaking and, although there was some hope (never realized) that the Tribunal would be able to raise money for its own expenses, the Peace Foundation was bankrolling the Tribunal throughout its entire existence.

Russell had already given the Peace Foundation the proceeds from his Autobiography, the American rights to which were sold by auction (in those days, a rare event). The Autobiography had been mostly written much earlier and Russell had intended it to be published after his death. The urgent needs of the Peace Foundation, however, caused him to change his mind. His other main asset at this time was his papers and these, as I’ve said, he had given to the Peace Foundation to sell.

This, in itself, ruled out certain institutions. The British Museum couldn’t afford them, and Cambridge University, which probably could have, sat on the sidelines hoping that Russell would leave them to Cambridge in his will. There was considerable irritation at Cambridge that this didn’t happen. Indeed, there was considerable irritation in Britain that the papers were leaving the country. Questions about the sale were asked in Parliament, and the hapless bookseller that McMaster engaged to export the papers was subsequently fined for exporting historical manuscripts without a
licence. This referred not to Russell's own papers, but to some of his family papers, especially those of his grandfather, Lord John Russell, which had been included in the sale and which were over 100 years old. The laws concerning the export of historical manuscripts were subsequently tightened.

Although the Peace Foundation wanted as much money as it could get for them, there were limits on how they would allow them to be sold. I doubt that Russell would ever have allowed them to be bought by a cartel of dealers and sold off individually to collectors, though this would likely have been the most profitable option. Russell wanted them to be housed in a publicly accessible institution, which would look after them and make them available to researchers. With a few exceptions, the sale stipulated that the papers were to be available to whoever wanted to see them. (The exceptions concern some personal documents which were to be embargoed until five years after the deaths of the people concerned. There is very little material still embargoed - most of it concerns Russell's children, his grandchildren, and his third wife, who are still alive.)

Nonetheless, American institutions would likely have paid more for the papers than McMaster did, and, despite the Vietnam war, Russell was not averse to selling to an American university. This was hardly inconsistent: the American universities themselves were, by this time, hotbeds of opposition to the Vietnam war. Indeed negotiations with American universities were underway in 1967, before Ready even knew the papers were up for sale. There was one plan for them to be bought jointly by the University of Chicago and Harvard. Russell had taught at both places. The social and political papers would go to Chicago and the philosophical ones to Harvard. (Given what happened to the Peirce papers at Harvard, as a Russell scholar I am profoundly grateful that they didn't go there.)

But the big player here was the University of Texas at Austin. Backed by Texas oil revenues, Austin would have had no trouble meeting the asking price. It had, moreover, an aggressive acquisitions policy for its Humanities Research Centre, which already had a fabulously rich collection of papers, many of them of direct relevance to Russell. By any objective standards, the Humanities Research Centre at Austin would have been the natural home for the Russell collection.

The University of Texas was already negotiating with Russell's agents before Ready even knew of the papers and would no doubt have concluded the deal, but for a curious mischance. The negotiations, of course, were conducted in private. But news that they were going on was announced in an extraordinary story in *Newsweek*. This would have been bad enough, but *Newsweek* went on to assert that Russell intended to send the proceeds from the sale to North Vietnam to support the war effort. There was absolutely no truth to this claim at all. Russell's lawyers went to work and got the offending issue of the journal pulled from the newsstands in Britain. But the damage had been done. Texas withdrew from negotiations and other potential American buyers backed off.

It is hard to believe that *Newsweek* would publish a completely fabricated story, and it seems most likely that the magazine was set up. By whom is not clear. It could have been a patriotic American, perhaps an employee of the University of Texas, who knew of the negotiations and objected to Texas oil revenues being used to support the War Crimes Tribunal. Or it might have been the American authorities. They were going to extraordinary lengths to prevent the War Crimes Tribunal from taking place. Pressure was brought to bear on the French government to revoke permission for the Tribunal to be held in Paris. And when it finally took place in Stockholm, Walt Rostow publicly berated the Swedish prime minister about it at Konrad Adenauer's funeral. Russell himself was the subject of a campaign of vilification in the American press - some of the worst of it, e. g. an article by Flora Lewis in *Look*, under the auspices of the American embassy in London. The idea that they would plant a false story in *Newsweek* is certainly not beyond the bounds of credibility.

The result of the article was that the papers had become unsaleable in America. The thinking at Continuum 1 was that they should be withdrawn from sale until the fuss had died down. It was at this point that Ready entered the picture. It seems altogether likely that *Newsweek* cost the Peace Foundation many thousands of dollars. By the same token, McMaster got one of the best bargains in its history. It acquired, not only the papers themselves, but copyright in most of Russell's unpublished writings.

McMaster was not unaware of the political controversy surrounding the papers. As Ready forged ahead in his "cavalier"
way, more timid administrators were fearing the criticism that might fall on McMaster for buying the papers of so notorious a rebel. There was no fear that the money would be channelled to Hanoi, but it was known that it would go to furthering Russell's various political causes, and McMaster was quite anxious not to be seen to be directly supporting those. For this reason, McMaster was not willing to buy the papers directly from the Peace Foundation, which owned them, but insisted instead that a company be set up to take possession of the papers and sell them to the University. This was done, and the money was then passed from the company to the Foundation.

So far as I know, McMaster ran into no trouble for allegedly supporting Russell's political causes. It did, however, run into trouble over its very efforts to keep a safe distance between itself and the Peace Foundation. The selling price was supposed to be kept secret, but the day after the deal was completed, The Observer published an article speculating on the price and claiming it was a world record sum. It also reported that the money had gone to Russell and not the Peace Foundation. Further reports along similar lines appeared in the press over the next few days.

The impression was given that Russell was only interested in making money from the papers. He was furious. He had, moreover, no doubt that Ready was the source of the stories. Whether Ready had actually revealed the price is unclear, though Russell certainly thought that he had. But the University was so anxious not to appear to be supporting Russell's politics, that it had gone out of its way to insist to all who would listen that it had not bought the papers from the Peace Foundation. The press, not unreasonably, concluded that it had bought them from Russell himself and that he had made a personal fortune from the deal.

Russell wrote sternly to Ready about this:

I have complained to Mr. Felton about the story in The Observer of March 31, but should point out to you that the story in the Daily Telegraph of 2 April emanated from Hamilton and is in direct breach of the agreement entered into with you not to reveal the price of the archives. This failure appears to me to be entirely your responsibility, and there is nothing in your letter to suggest you recognise this fact.
The embers of a forlorn hope have long smoldered in the breasts of a considerable segment of what might be called "the progressive intelligentsia". This seldom realized hope is that surely there must have been important Western intellectuals who, during the long political struggles of the Cold War, actually belonged to the independent left. However, it is not as easy as it initially seems to give a cogent characterization of what it would mean to be "independent" in the appropriate fashion.

It might seem obvious that an independent leftist should not be employed by government agencies, but this is too restrictive. For example, should we condemn Noam Chomsky for accepting grants from the U.S. Navy to fund some of his linguistic research? Or should Gilbert Ryle be condemned for having been an officer in the British army during World War II?

A more interesting case is that of the Marxist scholar Herbert Marcuse, who was employed by the U.S. government for about nine years (1942-51). Marcuse first worked for the Office of War Information, then for the Office of Secret Services (the immediate predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency), and finally for the U.S. State Department's Eastern European Division, even at last becoming Acting Head of the Eastern European Division. Claiming to have become disenchanted by U.S. foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War, Marcuse resigned, though it is equally true that this was at the time Senator Joseph McCarthy was making his assaults on the U.S. State Department. Marcuse then took successive research and teaching positions at Columbia and Harvard and involved himself in the study of Soviet Marxism. He ended his career in the midst of intense controversy in successive positions at Brandeis University and the University of California, San Diego.
What do these cases have in common? Only that the three intellectuals were somehow being funded or paid by agencies of a national government for certain services. But a crucial difference is that Chomsky and Marcuse are well-known as uncompromising critics of the U.S. government, especially in regard to foreign policy, so that had it been their political writings that had been subsidized by the government, their independence as leftist intellectuals would have been at least suspect. But similar observations do not pertain to Ryle in the U.K., even apart from the fact that Ryle was participating in a war against the odious German Nationalist Socialist regime, for he had no serious reputation as a critic of the West to compromise.

On the other hand, what should we say in the case of Bertrand Russell, an obvious candidate for the role of spokesman for the independent left in the Cold War period? The issue is vexed because there was an apparent radical shift in Russell’s views on the Cold War between the end of World War II and the early 1960s, when Russell went from being a zealous anti-communist to being a critic of the West some of whose writings could have emanated from the propaganda machines of one of several communist countries. But it is even more vexed by the fact that only recently have we learned that Russell worked as an agent of propaganda for a secret arm of the British foreign office during one of the most dangerous phases of the Cold War. It appears, then, that our idol had at times feet of clay that were decidedly pointing in different directions, and that Russell had been at different times an abettor of both anti- and pro-communist propaganda machines. As such, it is difficult to maintain confidence in his political judgment. But these are larger issues. Here I shall be principally concerned with the context of Russell’s 1953 anti-communist writings that were sponsored by a secret branch of the British Foreign Office.

Timothy Garton Ash, who now has joint appointments at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford University and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, has achieved a wide hearing as the polyglot chronicler of the Eastern European anti-communist movements that led to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Much of his commentary on these dramatic events in Eastern Europe was published in such venues as The New York Review of Books prior to its appearance in book form.

More recently, Garton Ash has turned his attention to George Orwell’s last years when the desperately ill Orwell had just gone through the arduous task of getting Animal Farm published and 1984 in publishable form. Although the author of the earlier Homage to Catalonia had become a strong opponent of communism, these last major works represented an extremely bitter Orwell who had become the prototypical Cold Warrior. After all, the Oxford English Dictionary cites Orwell as the first to use the term ‘Cold War’, in 1945 and 1946. (Only in 1947 did the term come into common usage, when Walter Lippmann used the expression in the title of his book The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy, and the New York Times also began using the term. And according to a JSTOR keyword search, only in 1948 did academics begin using the term in scholarly journals.) Nevertheless, Orwell has also frequently been acclaimed as that rare specimen of modern humanity, the genuinely “virtuous man”, the term used by the Cold War liberal Lionel Trilling to describe Orwell’s character in Trilling’s 1952 Introduction to the American edition of Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia. But such veritable apotheosis becomes almost risible in view of what we now know.

In The New York Review of Books of September 25, 2003, Garton Ash published an article called ‘Orwell’s List’. In this article, Garton Ash gives an account of his research concerning an astonishing list of thirty-eight names of journalists, politicians, and others compiled by Orwell. In some cases, Orwell appended comments, some being anti-Semitic or homophobic, as well as vocational information. Those on the list were generally labeled as “crypto-communists” or “fellow travelers”. Others were said to be merely “appeasers” (of the U.S.S.R.), “reliably pro-Russian” or “sympathizers only”. Quite a few on the list are well known to those in Russell studies, for they include such figures as E.H. Carr, Isaac Deutscher, Kingsley Martin and J.B. Priestley.

Orwell turned this list over to a secret department of the British Foreign Office on May 2, 1949 through the agency of a close friend, Celia Kirwan, an employee of the department and a woman to whom Orwell was emotionally bound in unrequited love. Orwell had met Celia in 1945 when he spent Christmas in Wales with his friend Arthur Koestler and Koestler’s wife Mamaine,
Celia's twin sister. Ironically, Mamaine had once been the object of unwelcome amorous advances from Russell. As a result, relations between Koestler and Russell became strained to the extent that their working together in the anti-communist cause was for a while curtailed.

At the time Orwell sent his list to Celia Kirwan she had recently been employed by the Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD). Among other tasks, this secret department was officially charged with conducting what Labor foreign secretary Ernest Bevin, its founder, called "anti-communist publicity". At first the department was primarily engaged in gathering information concerning Soviet and communist misdeeds and sharing this information with sympathetic journalists, politicians and trade unionists. It is therefore unsurprising that the department employed the now well-known historian of Stalinist terror, Robert Conquest, who at one point shared an office with Celia Kirwan. In the course of events, however, the department came to sponsor anti-communist publications. It goes without saying that this sponsorship was hidden from public view.

In particular, the IRD was eager to sponsor publication of anti-communist works by well-known and reputedly "independent" leftists. It is therefore clear why the IRD would be eager to have Russell, a well-known anti-communist on the political left, as one of their authors. At the same time, the IRD was equally eager to weed out prospective authors who were not politically reliable. This is a major reason why the IRD welcomed Orwell's list. For, as Orwell himself said, such individuals should be prevented from writing works under the aegis of the IRD.

But what Garton Ash does not mention is that in case of need, this list was also to be used to ferret out suspicious intellectuals and others, perhaps in a political crisis, though there is no indication Orwell himself knew this. Accordingly, in a telephone interview conducted by Francis Stonor Saunders, Adam Watson, a senior IRD veteran and Celia Kirwan's supervisor, would not categorically deny that the list was to be used against those on it. He would only say in an artfully qualified way that "Its immediate usefulness was that these were not people who should write for us," but went on to add that "[their] connection with Soviet-backed organizations might have to be exposed at some later date".\(^1\) It thus seems to have been intended that the list could be concomitantly used as a tool of ideological suppression or even political control under certain unspecified untoward circumstances.

Notice, moreover, that it has previously been thought that the U.K. never approximated the virulent and destructive anti-communism dominating American culture and politics at this very time. However, this new information concerning the IRD would suggest the need to slightly revise this received view. In addition, attention is called to the fact that anyone associated with the IRD at this time would almost certainly have been looked upon as suspect by those who prize civil liberties and individual human rights. Any liberal-minded observer would pay close heed to the possibility that an individual running afoul of the IRD would at the least run the risk of losing his or her livelihood, as was not unusual in the U.S. in analogous circumstances.

Russell had three short political books published by Batchworth Books in their Background Books series, *Why Communism Must Fail* (1951), *What is Freedom?* (1952), and *What is Democracy?* (1953). And we now know that their publication was financed by the IRD. According to Garton Ash, IRD insiders told him that Russell, unlike some others, knew full well that Background Books was surreptitiously funded by a propaganda wing of the Foreign Office. Presumably, the earnings received by Russell from the sale of these books were funneled through the IRD as well. Even more disconcerting is the fact that Russell chose to reprint two of these short booklets as component essays in his collection *Fact and Fiction*.

*Fact and Fiction* was published in the U.K. by Allen and Unwin in 1961 and in the U.S. by Simon and Schuster in 1962. It is noted in both editions that the two pieces were revised in 1960. Obviously, this revision was undertaken to take account of what Russell believed were positive changes in the U.S.S.R. in the early post-Stalin period. Nonetheless, it goes without saying that there is no

mention of the fact that the original publication by Batchworth Press was subsidized by the IRD.

In my view, the upshot is that Russell compromised himself in two important respects. The first is that he violated his own belief in the paramount importance of the individual being able to make judgments on their merits without societal or political pressure, in the full light of evidence that should be freely available to all. By hiding the fact that he had engaged in surreptitious propaganda Russell deeply compromised himself. He also compromised himself by presenting himself as a detached, independent observer of political trends, one who was not beholden to hidden or special interests. In effect, therefore, Russell lied to his readers by not revealing the provenance of the writing of these works.

Some historians of the IRD, for example, Paul Lashmar and James Oliver in their book on the IRD entitled Britain's Secret Propaganda War (1998), and Lyn Smith in 'Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department 1947-1977' (in Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1980), have asserted that there is no evidence that writers' views were trimmed to fit a particular line, but that Background Books simply picked authors whose independent opinions were congruent with its requirements. (Lashmar and Oliver, p. 102.)

For example, Lashmar and Oliver quote Bryan Magee, who wrote a book for the IRD without knowing of their government affiliation, that "No one had attempted to influence what I wrote, and my book was published just as I wrote it, down to the last comma." (Ibid.) Nonetheless, when he discovered the full truth about IRD Magee was outraged at being used for political ends of which he knew nothing. I shall simply observe that a vast moral chasm opens between Magee and Russell regarding what they had done in writing for IRD, and pass on without even the suggestion of an invidious comparison since the matter speaks for itself.

In contrast to the historians just cited, however, Andrew Bone, of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University, has pointed out (in an email message of 9/24/2003 to the online Russell Studies Discussion Group russell-l) that in Russell's correspondence with his editors at Background Books, Colin Wintle and Stephen Watts, "the ideological thrust of the project comes across quite clearly." And, moreover, that Russell even received explicit editorial guidelines from Wintle for What is Freedom?, namely, that Russell "should accept the proposition that the prospects of freedom are better outside Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and develop arguments to show why this is so."

Thus, as letters in the Russell Archives at McMaster University reveal, Russell clearly wrote anti-communist propaganda on explicit instruction from the anti-communist propaganda machine of a government agency. In addition, in these letters, Russell indicates that he well understands the direct ideological nature of the publications he was to prepare. This gives some reason to believe that what the IRD veterans have said is true and that Russell did know the function of Background Books and the identity of its backers.

The next task would be to analyze What Is Freedom?, What Is Democracy?, and Why Communism Must Fail in order to determine their precise ideological content, and to compare the results with what we now know of the policy of the IRD and other contemporary propaganda agencies. We would thus be in a better position to see concretely how Russell managed the task he was given and to see how strictly he conformed to official policy in writing these three short works in 1951-1953, an ominous period in the history of the Cold War. I hope to present such an analysis in a future issue of the BRS Quarterly.

To anticipate, perhaps even worse to say is that further analysis will reveal that the three works are mediocre and as a whole detract from Russell's reputation on purely scholarly grounds. They contribute virtually nothing to political theory or analysis when compared with other anti-communist writers like Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper, émigré scholars in Great Britain with at least broadly comparable political views who wrote on similar themes at about the same time. But then, Russell's purpose was not to make a scholarly contribution to political theory or analysis. On the contrary, the purpose was to persuade those intellectually incapable of grasping the limitations of the works they were reading that the views being expressed were both cogent and correct. But the tools of persuasion were little more than the considerable grace with which the works were written and the great intellectual and social prestige enveloping their author.
This episode in Russell's life lamentably once again illustrates that the greatest of figures can yet be guilty of Benda's infamous *trahison des clercs*, and this even in the midst of a world situation redolent of impending cataclysmic. At least Pugwash and the Russell-Einstein Manifesto will fairly soon go far in redeeming Russell's blemished reputation. Nonetheless, it must be said that it would have been much better had Russell at least frankly acknowledged his unsavory association with the IRD. No doubt Russell had his own reasons for not broaching the issue when he had ample opportunity to do so, but to scout such possible reasons would be so speculative as to be tangential to what has been attempted here.

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LETTER TO THE TIMES, 4 AUGUST, 1961*

by BERTRAND RUSSELL

INTRODUCTION

by RAY PERKINS, JR.

The Committee of 100, with Russell at its head, came into being in the autumn of 1960 as a means of incorporating civil disobedience into the British anti-nuclear movement. In this letter, hitherto unpublished, Russell speculates on the British government's reasons for denying permission for an anti-nuclear rally in Trafalgar Square on September 17, 1961. A sit-down demonstration resulted in an excessive police response which the Committee was able to use to gain considerable public support in the following months. Russell was not arrested in the September 17 melee because he and Edith were already in prison for an action in Hyde Park on Hiroshima Day, just two days after this letter to the *Times* was written. He and Edith were sentenced to two months in prison, reduced to one week for reasons of health. They were released from prison on September 18.

4 August, 1961
To the Editor of the *Times*: [in BR’s handwriting – RP]

Some months ago the Committee of 100, of which I am president, applied for permission to hold a meeting in Trafalgar Square on September 17. No answer was received until a few days ago, and, when received, it was a refusal. It is very much to be hoped that the Authorities will reconsider this refusal.

* This letter is reprinted with kind permission of the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University.
Perhaps what influenced the Authorities was the knowledge that a non-violent demonstration of civil disobedience was likely to occur later on the same day. Such a demonstration, however, would be distinct from the meeting in Trafalgar Square. Moreover, if the legitimate outlets for expressions of opinion are refused, many, who might otherwise hesitate, will be driven to civil disobedience as the only opening left for them.

Another thing which may have influenced the Authorities is that September 17 is Battle of Britain Day. Perhaps they consider it inappropriate that a meeting should be held on that day by those who seek to persuade their countrymen not to permit further suffering, further death – perhaps the complete extinction of the human race and the obliteration of all that the splendidly brave people suffered and died for during that Battle. New times require new methods: and the salvation of Britain is as much our aim as it was that of those, both fighters and civilians, who gallantly endured the perils of that time.

Yours faithfully,

Bertrand Russell

The Battle of Britain Day is a national holiday commemorating the heroic efforts of the British Royal Air Force against Hitler’s Luftwaffe from July to November of 1940 in which “Churchill’s Few” gave the Nazis one of their first defeats of World War II.

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**REVIEW**

**BOISE**

TOM WEIDLICH

This summer, the Rattlestick Theater in New York City’s West Village produced *Boise*, by David Folwell. The play liberally quotes Bertrand Russell and raises issues he was concerned with – marriage, truth, and Judeo-Christian morals versus a more rational code. But the protagonist takes Russell’s ideas further than they want to go.

(Interesting, at the same time, and further uptown on Broadway, another play, a revival of Tom Stoppard’s *Jumpers*, also invoked Russell throughout. The main character, a moral philosopher named George Moore – no, not that one – ponders: “Do I say ‘My friend the late Bertrand Russell’ or ‘My late friend Bertrand Russell’? They both sound funny.” To which his wife retorts: “Probably because he wasn’t your friend.”)

In *Boise*, the main character, Stewart, is a married thirtysomething office worker in the throes of a mid-life crisis. In addition to being dissatisfied with his work, he has lost sexual interest in his wife.

He meets and becomes intrigued with Tara from human resources. He is partly attracted to her because she makes him think – she quotes Bertrand Russell. When Stewart asks who Russell is, Tara replies, “Philosopher, mathematician. He’s a cool guy.”

Tara and Stewart quote Russell throughout the play. The first invocation is from Tara: “Well, Bertrand Russell said that public opinion is an unnecessary tyrant and we should respect it just enough to avoid starvation and to keep out of prison.” She recites, “One symptom of an approaching nervous breakdown is the belief that one’s work is terribly important.”

Stewart goes out and buys a Russell book (it is not named in the script but on stage he carries around the Liveright paperback edition of *Marriage & Morals*). “He’s so funny,” Stewart says, and quotes, “Patriotism is the willingness to kill and be killed for trivial reasons.”
Most relevantly to the play’s theme, at one point Stewart quotes Russell, “We have, in fact, two kinds of morality side by side: one which we preach but do not practice, and another which we practice but seldom preach.”

Stewart coaxes Tara out for a drink. (“We both like Bertrand.”) They discuss marriage and cheating. Stewart argues that it’s okay to cheat out of biological need. He says that, like Russell, he is arguing for marriage, though it seems more a ploy to get Tara in bed. Tara says she is opposed to marriage and instead argues in favor of hedonism. Marriage makes people liars, she says.

Tara and Stewart start falling for each other. But she refuses to sleep with him unless he informs his wife. This he is loath to do.

Meantime, Tara hooks up with Stewart’s friend Owen. Tara is evidently Russell’s St. Paul, because Owen too is soon quoting the philosopher. (“To fear love is to fear life, and those who fear life are already three parts dead.”)

At one point Stewart is in a bar with his wife and encourages her to cruise the bar (“This is what the Judeo-Christian ethic doesn’t take into consideration,” he says. “That we are still animals, really. These are all strictures enforced on us by an outmoded dogma”).

Stewart becomes increasingly unraveled to the point that, in the climax, he makes a play for his unlucky-in-love sister, Jackie. When he conjectures that ancient roaming tribes probably slept with family members, Jackie says, “Those were SAVAGES!” To which Stewart replies, “YOU HAVE NO RIGHT TO BE SO JUDGEMENTAL.”

When Jackie cries, Stewart says, “It’s hard. It’s all new. We are in a new world.”

After smashing a computer monitor on a co-worker, Stewart ends up in jail where he continues to read Russell. He says he is happy there and quotes Russell, “To be without some of the things you want is an indispensable part of happiness.”

Anita Gates’ review of the play in The New York Times said, “It’s not clear whether Mr. Folwell simply enjoys the ridiculous or wants to say something about contemporary values, the limits of rejecting them and the semi-quiet desperation of middle-class white American men.”

In early August, David Folwell did a phone interview with the BRS Quarterly about his play and Russell’s role in it. Following are excerpts.

THOM WEIDLICH: When did you first become aware of Bertrand Russell?

DAVID FOLWELL: I had my first experience with Bertrand Russell in the back of a cab. I was in New York and somebody left Education and the Social Order in the cab. So I took it home and I just started reading it and I thought it was really interesting. Like Stewart in the script it made me laugh. Not derisive of course. The stuff he said was so commonsensical and logical and the things that we don’t like to think about every day. And just for somebody to say it out loud I really appreciated it.

TW: How long ago was that?

DF: I would say about three years ago maybe. It wasn’t that long ago. In college I studied a lot of philosophy. I didn’t study any Bertrand Russell because I went to a Catholic school [the University of St. Thomas in Texas]. They didn’t want to talk about him. It’s a liberal arts school in Texas. As part of the core curriculum you have to study philosophy and theology. And you had to have like 24 credit hours, which is a lot. So I took more philosophy than I did theology. So I’ve got a little bit of a background in philosophy but it’s one of those things. I don’t even acknowledge it very much. It’s just kind of there. And then every once in awhile I can say something that makes me sound intelligent to people.

TW: How integral is Russell to the theme of the play?

DF: Actually the Russell stuff came in very late. I’d been working on the play for maybe three years and it started off just as an examination of sexuality. I just wanted to write a dirty play. I wanted to write something my mom would be ashamed of. I was married maybe five, six years at the time. I started having these conversations with people. I guess when we get into our thirties we just have these very frank conversations about sex. I remember I met this one lady who was a poet and she started telling me about
her dom. She had just gotten into town and she had met this guy from the Village Voice. And she was really excited about this dominant-submissive relationship. Which I thought was fascinating and kind of funny too. I tried to joke with her about it, you know, once she finally broke up with the guy, I said, “Can you do that?” [There is such a character in the play. -TW] We were getting to this point in our lives where sex is something I just really wanted to examine. It was becoming obsessive. And also a theme that I like to think about a lot in my stuff is this idea of people - who they are and what they want to become and this idea that we're kind of just a few steps out of the cave but we have these high ideals for ourselves and we’re so disappointed and guilty when we can't achieve them.

In the play, it was good but I think most people's reaction was it was a play about a sex addict, which I didn't want. I didn't want it to be about a disease or a disorder. I just wanted him to be a regular guy. I started working with [playwright] Craig Lucas on the play and he really urged me to broaden it, to make it more about a person's mid-life crisis and more of an existential crisis that he's going through. And I think that was right. That's really what I was trying to go for. Really the way Russell came into it was I was looking for something clever for a character to say. So I started looking up quotes and I found a quote and I put it into Tara's mouth. And then I was looking for other things, just random things for people to say. I kept on going back to the Russell quotes. The Russell stuff just worked so perfectly. It's an appealing philosophy to a guy like Stewart because it strips away all the superstitions and what he would consider just bullshit about society. And Russell is somebody who states it plainly and cleverly and I think it really appealed to Stewart. So it just really worked.

TW: But also I was thinking especially with the book, Marriage & Morals, that Stewart was carrying around on stage, that's a book where Russell was talking about creating a new morality. Do you see that as a big part of the play?

DF: Yeah, I do. I think that's what Stewart ultimately wanted. All of a sudden he wakes up and sees the world in a new way. In the original version of the script I had him go off - y'know, he makes love to his sister and he goes off and he starts a new society in Boise. They start this whole cult. And people just thought that was too weird. So when I got up to that point I just kind of changed it. It's actually more reasonable if [Jackie says], “What the hell are you doing, you're trying to drag me down with you.” I haven't read Marriage & Morals, I have to say. I've only read several essays and parts of books and things like that.

TW: I was wondering about that. I'm not exactly sure where most of the quotes come from. And I was wondering if most of them come from Marriage & Morals.

DF: I'm not sure. They're random quotes that I found on the Internet and things like that to tell you the truth. So I am a bit of a fraud. But I think a lot of them had to do with the strictures that societies impose on us. And I think that was appealing to Stewart. But in the end it also was a cover for just bad behavior and having him let his id take over and justify anything by saying, “It's going to be a new morality” and he's going to create something new. I think that’s where it kind of goes awry for him.

TW: It's interesting that you say that because that goes further than Russell would go. Do you agree with that?

DF: Oh, I do. And this was one of my concerns because I really like what Russell had to say. I don't want people to think I was blaming Bertrand Russell for this guy's downfall. Because I don't think that's the case. It's a case of a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. What I suffer from as well as the character.

TW: I think the main thing Russell was trying to do in Marriage & Morals was create a new morality. He was mostly opposed to Christian morality. Which didn't mean anything goes. Which I think is more where Stewart is heading.

DF: Yes I think so. I think he would have gotten there if he could have. If he could have just looked at it rationally. I think there was so much emotion involved and also guilt. But he didn't really have the mechanism for it. He couldn't really look at it rationally because he was so angry and bitter. And he felt entitled. I think he feels entitled to a better life without having to really work for it. That was a big part of the hubris too.
TW: Right. And that's not something that Russell would agree with.

DF: Oh, no I don’t think so at all.

TW: Any other thoughts?

DF: I'm going to be better about reading more Russell. Especially now with all that's going on. I mean, I was watching CNN this morning and it's all about terror alerts and Tom Ridge was on there. This kind hysteria that's building up right now, I think Russell might be a good person to turn to. He'd come up with some sort of solution. Better than just creating this illogical superstition and fear. I was reading in Unpopular Essays about how the [clergy] came out against the lightening rod. It was God's domain only to be able to strike people down, and for someone to thwart that is morally wrong. We tend to as human beings slip back into superstition. And I think that's what Russell was trying to do, to strip away those things and force us to look at things logically. We could use a little Russell right this very minute.

thom.weidlich@verizon.net

END MATTER

REPORT FROM THE BRPF:
BOSTON’S TEA-TIME PEACE PARTY

TONY SIMPSON, July 28, 2004

The keepers of the Peace Vigil gather every Thursday tea-time in Depot Square in the small town of Lexington, a dozen miles north of Boston. ‘End the Occupation – Bring the Troops Home Now’ is inscribed on one banner; ‘The US used to be against Tyranny’ on another. The banners are held up by a straggly group of residents who exchange greetings with the passers-by. Drive-time commuters on nearby Massachusetts Avenue honk their support.

‘There is overwhelming sympathy for our position,’ says a local Democratic Party activist and vigil organiser. This is especially significant as we are on the eve of the Democratic National Convention, or ‘DNC’, at the Fleet Center in Boston. Kerry/Edwards bumper stickers sprout along Mass Ave.

Whether or not to vote for Kerry was the subject of long debates across town, at the University of Massachusetts, or UMass, where the Boston Social Forum met on the weekend prior to the Convention. The prevailing view appeared to be that getting rid of Bush was the first priority. ‘Then the work really starts, on November 3rd’, as Lesley Cagan, the canny organiser of United for Justice and Peace, put it. UJP want to fill the streets of New York with protesters on 29th August, the eve of the Republican National Convention. That will pose some interesting questions for the authorities.

In Boston, UJP and others refused to comply with the ‘Free Speech Zone’ established by the city authorities near to the Fleet Center. This walled cage, allegedly for up to 4,000 people playing 'sardines', was the subject of a legal challenge by the American Council for Civil Liberties. The judge found that the cage was certainly inimical to free speech, but nevertheless upheld that it was necessary to put people in it if they wished to register a protest during the Convention. In response, the UCJ and others refused to be complicit in their own muzzling and caging.
Not surprisingly, Palestinian groups protesting against Israel’s wall and land-grab, did decide that the walled cage was a fitting venue and symbol for their own protests. Otherwise, as long-time South African activist Dennis Brutus told the Forum, let’s declare ‘Free-Speech Zones’ all round the city. ‘After all, isn’t all the US supposed to be a free-speech zone?’

‘It’s never been easier to talk to people about the war’, according to Jim Caplan of the Somerville Teachers’ Association, during a workshop on ‘Organised Labour Against the War’, which receives much of its funding from the US public services union, SEIU. ‘More and more people are against it.’ Tony Donaghy, President of the RMT, spoke of a similar situation in Britain and Ireland. Mention of Tony Blair elicited loud hisses from Forum audiences.

The ‘Peace Track’ within the Forum was organised by the American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker organisation. The impetus for this came initially from Ken Coates and the European Network for Peace and Human Rights (ENPHR), whose meetings in the European Parliament in Brussels were initiated by the Russell Foundation. The European Network had long wanted to strengthen its contacts and establish a dialogue with peace movement organisations in the United States. AFSC picked up the ball and ran with it at the Forum, broadening the participation to include activists from Asia, Africa and Europe, as well as from the United States, under the rubric of ‘A World Working Together for Peace’.

War and peace will certainly be amongst the issues to the fore when the European Social Forum comes to London, from 14 to 17 October. Thousands are expected to participate. ‘We are many, they are few’, as Rae Street of CND reminded the closing session of the Boston Social Forum.

Meanwhile, back in Lexington, where, in 1775, the ‘shot’ that echoed round the world marked the beginning of the removal of the British from their American colonies, Fahrenheit 9/11 continues to play to packed houses at the Lexington Flick, just across the street from Depot Square. The US peace movement is becoming altogether harder to ignore.

Tony Simpson works at the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (www.russfound.org).
Meinong conference (May 14-18, 2005) commemorating the centennial of Russell's essay 'On Denoting'. Ray Perkins expressed concern with possible scheduling conflicts between the timing of the proposed McMaster meeting and university examination periods in the U.S.

Rosalind Carey mentioned Lehman as an option at some future point, and also mentioned Pace University (John Ongley's school) as a possibility, that, unlike Lehman, possesses dormitories.

Attention was drawn to Gregory Landini's offer at the 2003 meeting to have the University of Iowa host the 2005 meeting. David Blitz suggested that Nick Griffin's presence at the 2004 meeting, and Nick's express willingness to host the meeting, should prevail. Peter Stone suggested that the merits to meeting at McMaster the same year they were commemorating the centennial of Russell's 'On Denoting' essay there were strong and obvious to him, and that Landini would probably concur. Alan Schwerin indicated his willingness to obtain a formal clarification from Landini.

Concern was expressed about excessively technical papers resulting from the Russell vs. Meinong conference's focus on 'On Denoting'. Alan Schwerin assured those concerned that the BRS meeting's papers would in no way be bound by the Russell vs. Meinong conference's criteria. David Blitz moved to have McMaster designated as the host of the BRS 2005 meeting. Rosalind Carey seconded the motion, and it carried without opposition.

Rosalind Carey expressed her hope that the present surplus of money would not be spent in other ways by the Society but would be saved for them in the coming year. She then indicated her interest in a motion clarifying that residual monies from the production of a given issue of the Quarterly could accumulate, or "carry over", to production of subsequent issues, as opposed to a "use it or lose it" scenario. Ken Blackwell assured Rosalind Carey that this would not be controversial, Alan Schwerin assured Rosalind Carey that a motion was not necessary, and Rosalind Carey requested that this understanding be made part of the minutes.

The Quarterly's editors had expressed their desire to spread out the aforementioned grant because they had not had time this year to look for further funding for next year. (It was explained that such applications have to be made a year in advance.) They reported that they will be looking this summer for more funding for the year after next. They suggested the possibility of a general BRS fundraising drive of which their own efforts to find money for the Quarterly would be a part — with perhaps the partial goal of creating an endowment for the BRS. Nick Griffin seconded the motion, and it passed by acclamation.

In order that he could introduce a motion of his own, at this point, Ken Blackwell temporarily removed himself as acting chairman and was replaced by Alan Schwerin. Ken Blackwell explained that it had been 4 years since the BRS last agreed to an increase in the special rate for Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies. The BRS has been paying $17 postpaid per member, including most honorary members, and in 2000 that was 63% of the regular individual rate of $27. In common with many academic journals in the electronic age, Russell has lost subscriptions while printing and mailing costs have increased. In 2003 the rate went up to $32 and in 2004 to $35. An increase to $21 would maintain the BRS rate at 60% of the regular rate.

Additional costs include creating an electronic version for direct library reference, and putting all the back issues since 1971 on the web and making them searchable. Ken Blackwell said he is investigating means of doing this, and he further said that it would surely assist the study of Russell, given that very few Society members have journal sets extending back that far. The electronic version may bring new revenue, but that remains to be seen.
Ken Blackwell moved to raise the BRS's special subscription rate for Russell to $21 starting this year. Thom Weidlich seconded the motion, and it passed unanimously.

The issue of declining membership was raised next. Peter Friedman mentioned that the Russell Society's current Web site (http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html) is out of date. To reach "critical mass", regular assistance with his own BRS site, (http://www.bertrandrussellsociety.org/default.asp?STID=1), he said, will be necessary.

The overall indication from the Board was that investigation and evaluation of this new site was of genuine interest. Friedman was careful to stress that volunteers would be crucial to the site's maintenance.

Ken Blackwell made a motion to assist Peter Friedman in "creating a new BRS Web site by disclosing the URL to the Board of Directors with the intent that the Board will vote on replacing the current Web site in due course." Peter Friedman seconded the motion, and it passed unanimously.

Finally, Ray Perkins and Peter Stone made a motion to introduce a motion proposing a resolution from the BRS condemning the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. The resolution read:

The Bertrand Russell Society condemns the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq as contrary to the principles of international law, which Bertrand Russell advocated throughout his long life. Given the shameful role the U.S. government has played in the region – from its years of support for Saddam Hussein to its contemptuous refusal to submit to U.N. jurisdiction in matters of war and peace – the Society is suspicious of any U.S. effort to maintain control of the destiny of Iraq. Accordingly, the Society calls for an immediate withdrawal, under UN auspices, of U.S. forces in Iraq and for the concurrent establishment, also under UN auspices, of a democratic secular state by the Iraqi people themselves.

David Blitz seconded the motion, and it passed by a vote of 13 to 2. Peter Stone moved to end the Board meeting, Alan Schwerin seconded the motion, and it carried without opposition.

Chad Trainer, BRS Secretary

Gerry Willemsen's
SLING*STUR!

These quotes will be familiar to some Russell fans. After solving the ciphers, try to identify the source.

1. In this puzzle – and number 2 below – each letter stands for another letter. (For example, if O=B, R=E, etc., BERTRAND RUSSELL becomes OREGENAQ EHFFRYY.)

VOZJPLXB GAO VAZPHGPJL 20XPEPYL RJJ OHGJQXPHAOK OLGPZOXB RPGAYIG GAO AQXS YM OPGAOZ OYLYUPV YZ UPXPGJZB SYROZ.

2. I have made this puzzle harder by disguising word separations and removing punctuation. The letter grouping help readability; they don't relate to the actual quote.

QVMQB RVMWJ XAWGX CFVGW KQBGW HQXBN QBVMW TQEDD WKNV VXAQV MMXDE XQDOC VMWZD QREWQN BXVKV KDDKE WNQGK LDWRQ BEXCV MQB

3. The puzzle below is not a substitution cipher. Spaces and punctuation have been removed and the quote has been permuted slightly by exchanging some letters with nearby letters. As an example, "the puzzle below" appears: tuhepzelbelwo.

BGINEINTREESTEDLNREIOGIINELMOTLOOOINTQHE TUTSEIOHOFWNETSHRHERERASNOTIBELOEVET

NOTE: Solutions to Rustingel may be found in this issue
The Bertrand Russell Society held its 2004 general membership meeting after lunch from 1:10-1:30 p.m. (An abbreviated business meeting as a result of making time for the audio-visual presentation of the broadcasted debate between Russell and Teller.) The meeting began with Ken Blackwell asking about the status of membership and the measures being taken to improve it. John Ongley's new position as Vice President of North American Outreach was cited as a factor that could improve membership, and Ongley explained that membership figures are featured at the end of the Russell Society Quarterly. These figures indicate that as of June 5th, there were 115 paid up members of the BRS, up from 97 on June 5th, 2003. Ongley also explained that personalized letters encouraging renewal had been sent to ex-members, as well as members.

Alan Schwerin encouraged the membership to reflect upon why decline in membership was really a problem. David Henehan expressed his view that the size of the Society is crucial to getting Russell's ideas out there for society in general. Peter Friedman stressed the propriety of the BRS doing what the historic Russell would want it to do. He stressed the advantages of people being able to become members over the Internet, but he explained his need for volunteers in this area.

Thorn Weidlich expressed pleasant surprise at the number of current members while Ken Blackwell pointed to the Society's 312 members in 1990 as grounds for concern regarding current membership levels. Ken did express optimism, though, about the potential of Peter Friedman's new web site and the creation of a second vice president for outreach. Phil Ebersole implied that apathy about membership levels could spell the end of the Society.

Thom Weidlich asked for a clarification of whether there had indeed been a vote at Friday night's Board meeting on the site of next year's annual meeting. Chad Trainer explained that, at the Friday night Board meeting, David Blitz had moved to have McMaster University designated as the host of the BRS's 2005 meeting. Rosalind Carey had seconded the motion, and that it had carried without opposition.

Chad Trainer, BRS Secretary

1 At that same meeting, after hearing that John Ongley had received 2 thank you letters for contributing $50 to the Lehman College library, David Goldman said that he would contribute $250 for his 2004 membership fees if he was written 5 thank you letters. The BRS officers accepted this condition and Goldman wrote the Society a $250 check on the spot. This is at least the 3rd year in a row David Goldman has contributed $250 to the BRS.
Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process. Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.
Solutions to the August *Rustling* puzzles by Gerry Wildenberg

All of these quotes were taken from “Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind”, the transcripts of a series of interviews on British television.

1. Certainly the Christian religion was established entirely without the help of either economic or military power. (p. 66)

2. I think the power of certain regions in the Middle East to withhold oil if they like is not at all a desirable kind of thing. (p. 66)

3. ...[B]eing interested in religion led me ... to look into the question of whether there was reason to believe it. (p. 19)

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Visit The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly Online
Contents of Past and Present Issues, Plus Selected Replies by Readers to BRSQ Articles are at http://www.lehman.edu/deanhum/philosophy/BRSQ

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Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
2nd Quarter 2004 Treasurer's Report
Cash Flow
4/1/04 – 6/30/04

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†† These were for the 1st Quarter BRSQ.
††† From advance registrations. There will be both more income, and expense, for the meeting.

Dennis J. Darland, Treasurer
djdarland@qconline.com
Celebrating Six Years Of Monthly Russell Meetings Open to the Public

2004 SCHEDULE
June 10  Defenders of God
July 8   International War
         Crimes Tribunal
Aug. 12  Satan in the Suburbs
Sept. 9  Lady Ottoline Morrell
Oct. 14  D.H. Lawrence
Nov. 11  Why I Am Not a Christian
Dec. 9   Marriage & Morals

*Topics & dates are subject to change*

Meetings are held at Writers & Books' Verb Café, 740 University Avenue, Rochester, NY, 7 pm.
Admission is $3 and free to members of Writers & Books.
For Information, call Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184, or email: tmadigan@rochester.rr.com