BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE COLD WAR

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IN THIS ISSUE

JUST WEEKS AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR, in 1989, a frenzy of activity began among historians in cold war studies. The reason for this activity, which has only intensified in the subsequent 16 years, is simple: after every major world event, history must be rewritten, for we then know things we didn’t know before. For example, only when an event is over do we know its outcome and can then properly judge it. With the fall of the wall, historians were in a unique position to understand the cold war and they were not about to waste time in taking advantage of it.

Ever since this activity began, increasingly complex, and increasingly interesting pictures of the cold war have emerged. One subject—the study of the so-called “cultural” cold war, that is, of the role played by intellectuals in the cold war, and the influence the cold war had upon them—has raised the question of the effects and propriety of covert government support for intellectual activity during the cold war. It is that question that concerns us here.

In its August 2003 issue, the BRSQ published a brief report on allegations by Timothy Garton Ash that Bertrand Russell had not only been paid by secret British government agencies to write anti-communist tracts that were then published and distributed with funds by the same government agencies, but that Russell had known at the time that it was government agencies that were paying him and publishing the pamphlets. After a lengthy and intense discussion of these charges by a wide variety of Russell scholars in the online Russell discussion group, russell-l, JACK CLONTZ wrote a systematic account of them for the BRSQ that was published in its August 2004 issue.¹

In this issue, ANDREW BONE, Senior Research Associate at the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University, examines Clontz’s claims in greater detail and with further evidence, and essentially agrees that Russell not only wrote his anti-communist tracts knowing that he was being paid by the British government,

but that he took very specific instructions from his publishers about what he should say. But more importantly than this, Bone goes on to provide a comprehensive survey of Russell’s entire anti-communist work for the British government and supplies a richer context for Russell’s activities and writings in the early cold war than we have previously had.

This is the first comprehensive discussion of Russell’s work for the British government as an anti-communist cold warrior. It is, I think, significant both for Russell studies and cold war studies, for the story Andy tells is not yet standard even among Russell scholars and certainly not among cold war historians. For example, Francis Stonor Saunders has written the most widely read book on the cultural cold war, and yet, as David Blitz has pointed out, she did not even consult the Bertrand Russell Archives when writing her book.²

And if one were to look for a picture depicting Russell as an anti-communist cold warrior, one would look in vain. Every photograph of Russell and the cold war in any book on Russell this editor knows of either depicts him as an anti-nuclear campaigner or anti-Vietnam War activist, but none as a cold war anti-communist. Since photographs in such books serve mainly as icons of various aspects of the subject’s life, it seems that the idea of Russell as an anti-communist cold warrior working closely with his government in the conflict is not yet a part of the standard view of him, even among Russell scholars, and so is still in need of emphasis and exploration.

Also in this issue, Nikolay Milkov writes about Russell studies in Germany—past and present—in his review of Guido Imaguire’s recent book on Russell’s early philosophy Russells Frühphilosophie: Propositionen, Realismus und die sprachontologische Wende. Of special interest is information Milkov provides about the roles played by Kurt Grelling and Leonard Nelson in early German studies of Russell.

Milkov, the author of two books on the history of 20th c. English philosophy, several detailed studies of the influence of Rudolf Hermann Lotze on Russell and Moore, and several other articles on early German influences on analytic philosophy, will spend the 2005-2006 academic year in the United States as a Research Fellow at the University of Pittsburgh’s Center for the History and Philosophy of Science. This coming December, he will speak at the BRS session of the Eastern APA meeting in NYC on Lotze and Russell. David Sullivan, who has written an excellent article on Lotze for the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, will comment on Milkov’s talk. Everyone is encouraged to attend. It promises to be a significant session.

This year is both the 100th anniversary of Russell’s groundbreaking study, ‘On Denoting’, and the 50th anniversary of the equally groundbreaking anti-nuclear statement, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. ‘On Denoting’ was celebrated at a conference this past May at McMaster University in conjunction with the Russell Society’s own annual meeting. The next issue of Quarterly will report on both the ‘On Denoting’ conference and the BRS annual meeting. In this issue, we have a report from Ray Perkins, Jr. on the continuing relevance of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. As Joseph Rotblat reminded us in a recent New York Times editorial (May 17, 2005), today we face the possibility of nuclear terrorism, the former superpowers still hold enormous nuclear arsenals, North Korea and Iran are advancing in their capacities to build nuclear weapons, and other nations are increasingly likely to acquire them on the excuse that they are needed for their own security. The work of Russell and Einstein 50 years ago indeed continues to be relevant.

Christopher Pincock, of Purdue University, discusses another article from a past issue of the BRSQ when he questions some of the claims made by Justin Lieber in Lieber’s May 2004 BRSQ essay on Russell and Wittgenstein. Those questions have provoked Justin to dig deeper into the story and provide further evidence for his claims. Finally, Rosalind Carey’s Conference Report of the BRS session at the Pacific APA and Dennis Darland’s Treasurer Report of the Society’s presently healthy finances, which are published in the back, round out this issue of the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly.

SOCIETY NEWS

REPRESENTING PEACE. On June 16, 2005, Representative Neil Abercrombie, Democrat of Hawaii, BRS member since 1989, and man of peace, and Walter Jones (R-NC) introduced a Joint Resolution into the House calling for an end to the Iraq war. If put into effect, the bill would require President Bush to draft a plan for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq starting October 2006. The resolution now has a total of 30 co-sponsors, both Democrats and Republicans. It will be recalled that the Bertrand Russell Society, at its June 2004 BRS Annual Meeting, passed its own resolution calling for an end to the Iraqi war and withdrawal of the troops, with the establishment of a secular democratic state by the Iraqi's themselves under U.N. auspices. Both resolutions seem clearly representative of the Russellian tradition of peace.

TILL DEATH DO US PART. Since the start of year, two more names have been added to the list of BRS life members: Warren Allen Smith, Humanist, BRS founding member, BRS Vice President from 1977-1980, and decades-long member of the BRS board of directors, and William Calder III, professor of classics at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign and BRS member since 1996. Not since 1992, when Don Jackanicz and Jim Reid both became life members, have two people become life members of the Russell Society in a single year. We would like to thank our new life members, Warren and William, for their generous contributions to the Society and its activities.

Prior to Warren and William, the Society’s life members were: Dennis Darland of Rock Island IL (BRS since 1977), Don Jackanicz, of Chicago Illinois (BRS founding member—since 1974—and rumored owner of the last stock of Red Hackle in the world), Jim Reid of Wellesley MA (BRS member since 1991), and Charles Weyland of Fountain Valley CA (BRS since 1977). Dennis thinks there was previously a fifth life member—a friend, now deceased, of founding member Peter Cranford—but can’t remember his name. Warren and William are welcome additions to this special group of friends of the BRS.

NEXT YEAR, IOWA CITY. The BRS Board of Directors met twice at this year's BRS annual meeting and elected the following members as officers: President, Alan Schwerin; Vice President, Raymond Perkins, Jr.; Secretary, David Henehan; Treasurer, Dennis Darland; Board Chair, Chad Trainer. It was decided that next year’s annual meeting will be hosted by Gregory Landini and held at the University of Iowa. Located in Iowa City, the University of Iowa is readily accessible by plane and public transportation. The date has not yet been set, but the Quarterly will be sure to convey this information to you when it becomes known. The minutes of this year’s board meeting will be published in the next issue of the Quarterly.

HURRY! SPACE IS LIMITED! Warren Allen Smith is revising his magnum opus Who’s Who In Hell (Barricade Books, 2000, $125.00) in order to put it on the web. If you didn’t make the cut the first time, here’s your chance. The deadline, as it were, is November 15, 2005.

NEW YORK, NEW YORK. The BRS will host a group session at the forthcoming meeting of the Eastern APA, which will take place at the Hilton in New York City December 27-30, 2005. Speakers and titles include Gary Cesarz on “McTaggart and Broad on Leibniz’s Law”, Nikolay Milkov on “Lotze’s Influence on Russell” (David Sullivan commenting), and John Ongley on “Lotze at Cambridge”. Related talks at the Eastern APA will be hosted by the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society (HEAPS) and include Sandra Lapointe on “Husserl and Frege on Formal Meaning”, Chris Pincock on “An Overlapping Consensus Model of the Origins of Analytic Philosophy” (Aaron Preston commenting), and Karen Green on “Fregean Existence and Non-Existence” (Kevin Klement commenting). BRS members are urged to attend for a great time and great talks in a great city.

BRS AWARD: CALL FOR NOMINATIONS. Each year, the BRS bestows an annual award to an individual or organization whose work best furthersthe interests and commitments of Bertrand Russell. Any member of the Society can nominate a person or organization that meets these criteria.
If you have someone you would like to nominate, please submit the nomination, with a short paragraph on why they should be considered for the award, to Kevin Brodie at kevin.brodie@lebanonct.org or mail them to: Kevin Brodie Chair, Awards Committee, 147 Dunn Rd, Coventry, CT 06238. The deadline is September 15th.

If you submitted in the past, but your choice did not win, feel free to resubmit your nominee. Nominations not accompanied by reasons for the nomination—in other words, a submitted name and nothing else—will not be considered.


THE BENEFITS OF THEFT OVER HONEST TOIL. Delete all email requests for information ostensibly from Paypal: Paypal does not send requests for information to its members, and the people sending these requests are not your pals.

NEW HELP AT THE Q. It is our pleasure to introduce Cory Hotnit, our new editorial assistant, to the Russell Society. Cory is a student at Lehman College and the recipient of a $2,000 work-study grant to work at the Quarterly. Special bonus: Cory knows HTML. Please visit the BRSQ's newly updated website to see the fruits of his labor at: http://www.lehman.edu/deanhum/philosophy/BRSQ/.

FEATURE

BERTRAND RUSSELL AS COLD WAR PROPAGANDIST
ANDREW G. BONE

Jack Clontz's review essay in the August 2004 BRS Quarterly includes a harsh indictment of propaganda activities engaged in by Bertrand Russell at the height of the Cold War. Specifically, Clontz condemns Russell's writing for a series of publications (Background Books) subsidized clandestinely by the Information Research Department (IRD), a shadowy branch of the British Foreign Office entrusted since 1948 with the covert dissemination of anti-Communist propaganda at home and abroad. In preparing these publications, Clontz argues, "Russell compromised himself in two important respects":

The first is that he violated his own belief in the paramount importance of the individual being able to make judgments on their merits without societal or political pressure, in the full light of evidence that should be freely available to all. By hiding the fact that he had engaged in surreptitious propaganda Russell deeply compromised himself. He also compromised himself by presenting himself as a detached, independent observer of political trends, one who was not beholden to hidden or special interests. In effect, therefore, Russell lied; of course revealing the provenance of the writing of these works.

These are serious charges which, if possible, warrant corroboration for readers of the Quarterly with evidence from the Russell Archives. This will be assayed in the first two parts of this article. Part One will try to shed some light on Russell's involvement with the Background Books enterprise, while Part Two will probe further into his association with the IRD. Not all Russell's anti-Communist

2 Ibid., 34.
activities, however, were carried out in the rather cloak-and-dagger fashion associated with the intelligence and security community. In his Autobiography he was perfectly candid about acting as an unofficial spokesman for the Foreign Office in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This more transparent side to Russell the Cold War propagandist will be examined in the third part of the article. The final part will review Russell’s troubled relationship with another secretly funded Cold War project, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). It will offset any negative portrait that may have emerged of Russell as a dupe or agent of powerful forces beyond his control, by showing him to be a far from pliant or passive honorary chairman of this CIA-backed organization of the international anti-Communist Left.

1. RUSSELL’S BACKGROUND BOOKS

According to Clontz, Russell was at fault less for the sometimes strident anti-Communist arguments employed in his contributions to Background Books and more for failing to disclose that these publications were sponsored by a secret propaganda arm of the British Government. Moreover, Russell did not even take advantage of a perfect opportunity to set the record straight when he decided to reprint two of these works, What Is Freedom? and What Is Democracy?, in his 1961 collection of essays, Fact and Fiction. But exactly how aware was Russell of the connection between Background Books and the IRD? Clontz cites anecdotal evidence used by Timothy Garton Ash to suggest that Russell was fully cognizant of the sources of funding for the Background Books series.

The publishing correspondence for “What Is Freedom?, What is Democracy?” and Russell’s other contributions to Background Books was not conducted through the IRD (not surprisingly), but by the “journalist and literary agent” (the description is from his letterhead) Colin Wintle. As a wartime officer in the Special Operations Executive, Wintle had been involved with the conduct of political warfare in Nazi-occupied Europe. In 1946 he co-founded a public relations firm that would be called upon by MI6 to conduct clandestine media operations. Meanwhile, the editor of Background Books, Stephen Watts, also had an intelligence and security background, having served in MI5 during the Second World War.

In his letter of approach to Russell, dated 12 December 1951, Wintle reported that Watts was “interested in obtaining an authoritatively written contribution for a booklet under the title What Is Freedom?”. There is nothing odd about this correspondence. Russell received numerous solicitations of this kind, some of which he accepted and rather more of which he declined. The handsome fee of £262.10 (or US $734 at 1951 exchange rates) no doubt had some bearing on his acceptance of this particular commission. More unusual is the following memorandum which Wintle enclosed with his letter:

Inherent in the discussion would be the contrasts between the freedoms enjoyed outside and those enjoyed inside the Communist world.

While the writer should not assume that his readers will have more than a layman’s knowledge of politics and philosophy, it would of course be inappropriate to deal with the theme in unmodified blacks and whites, or by an emotional approach. Full allowance should be made for the imperfections of the non-Communist world, but a firm stand taken about absolute standards of individual freedom—a point upon which one could well afford to dogmatise.

Education perhaps provides the most telling contrasts between the two worlds. However deplorable the quality of education may be in large regions of the non-Communist world, it can claim to be free from the explicit aim of the Soviet system to confine the mind within the limits of a doctrine which is philosophically untenable.

Briefly, the editor envisages an essay which would accept the proposition that the prospects of human freedom are better...

5 See P. Lashmar and J. Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War (Stroud: Sutton, 1998), 31. I am grateful to Amanda White of the BRRC for supplying me with this reference.
6 RAL 410 (Wintle), the archival location for all correspondence between Russell and Wintle referred to in this section.
outside Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, and would develop arguments to show why this is so.

While Russell was often asked to write on particular topics, he was not used to following such precise editorial or ideological directions. After the manuscript of *What Is Freedom?* had been submitted early in 1952, Wintle sent Russell a long and detailed letter asking him to tone down his criticisms of American anti-Communism. He made this request with a certain diffidence but also by reference to the opinion of “a very intelligent publisher’s reader”, who thought that “both the effectiveness and, in some quarters, the commercial acceptability of the booklet would be increased by these slight modifications” (21 March 1952). Russell’s marginal notations convey his compliance with each of Wintle’s suggestions.7

The next letter from Wintle in the Russell Archives, dated 17 February 1953, contains an offer to undertake on the same terms a “companion booklet” to *What Is Freedom?*. The editorial instructions for this book, *What Is Democracy?*, were less detailed than those for its predecessor, although Stephen Watts (the Background Books editor) had asked Wintle to suggest “two things”:

1) that a start might be made from the point that two opposed systems are now being called by the same name—an extreme example of the corruption of words—so that in certain contexts (e.g. ‘People’s Democracy’ in Eastern Europe) it stands for the opposite of what is meant in the West. This might clear the way for explaining that neither meaning is the original one—and then giving an historical review of the word and the idea.

2) that the conclusion might be, in effect, that however faulty Western democracy is, it is in practice at least not the negation of everything we mean by the word, as is the Communist version.

Again, this advice was far more explicit than that which Russell customarily received from his editors. The proposed thrust of the new Background Book, however, would have been congenial to Russell, for he had frequently lambasted the political hypocrisy of Soviet-style democracy from the earliest days of the Cold War, such as in his essay “What Is Democracy?”, published in *The Manchester Guardian* seven years before his Background Book of the same title.8

Shortly after the arrangements for *What Is Democracy?* had been settled, Wintle had asked Russell for a 1,250-word article using as a “topical starting-point” the forthcoming Moscow show-trial of the Jewish doctors implicated in a fabricated anti-Soviet conspiracy. “You will, of course, know best how to elaborate the theme”, he continued in his letter of 24 February 1953, “but if you feel so disposed, I would like you to take a ‘high line’ and pour as much scorn as you please upon a political, social and philosophic system which produces manifestations of such barbarity while simultaneously expecting the societies of the West to admire and imitate them”. Russell’s acceptance of this request is indicated by his customary “Ans. Yes” in the upper-left corner of Wintle’s letter of 24 February. As it turned out, Stalin’s death provided Russell with an even more dramatic point of departure for this rhetorical attack on the Soviet Union. Wintle had intended the typescript9 for overseas circulation only, but he told Russell in his letter of acknowledgement that “it would be a pity not to submit it to one of the more serious-minded provincial publications in the United

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7 The letters and enclosures pertaining to *What Is Freedom?* were not Wintle’s earliest contacts with Russell. The first correspondence from him in the Russell Archives is dated 3 May 1951. From that letter it is apparent that Wintle had also shepherded to publication Russell’s first contribution to Background Books, the essay “Dictatorship Breeds Corruption” in the symposium *Why Communism Must Fail* (London: Batchworth Press, 1951). Wintle then wanted 1,200 words from Russell on “What Communists Really Think of Christian (or Islamic) Socialists”. Wintle explained further that he had in mind something with a strong anti-Communist flavour: “As I view it, one of the points is the essential dishonesty of present Communist attempts to encourage the establishment of ‘popular front’ governments—especially in the East—in which Communists and various brands of Socialists are supposed to combine, and the Socialists’ unawareness that they are being invited to sup with their Communist ‘brothers’ in order that the latter shall eat them!” The notation on Wintle’s letter indicates that Russell responded affirmatively to this suggestion, although it is not known whether the typescript “Communism and Christian Socialism” (RA1 220.019220) ever appeared in print.

8 4 May 1946, p. 4 (B&R C46.05).

9 “Stalin’s Legacy”, RA2 220.148003.
Kingdom as well" (7 April 1953). However, no record has been found of its appearance in print either in Britain or abroad. The typescript is not to be confused with a similar one used by Russell for a broadcast on the late Soviet dictator which the BBC’s Central European Service supposedly decided not to air.

Russell’s last known assignment for Background Books appeared in another symposium, entitled Why I Oppose Communism. Noteworthy among the other contributors were the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper and the poet Stephen Spender, the ex-Communist co-editor of Encounter whose apostasy had been recounted in that Cold War classic The God That Failed (1950). Russell was asked by Wintle “to write as an internationalist” (26 March 1954), although his contribution eventually appeared under the heading of “The Philosopher”. Commissioned in March 1954, publication of the pamphlet was delayed for two years, when Russell’s piece was run more or less simultaneously as “The Marxist Fraud” by the News Chronicle. Later in the year the essay was reprinted again, as “Why I Am Not a Communist”, in Portraits from Memory (1956).

Prior to its appearance in this collection of essays, Russell transformed some of its harsh and blanket criticism of Soviet political practice into retrospective censure of a bygone Stalinist dictatorship. Similar changes would be made on a larger scale for the reprinting of What Is Freedom? and What Is Democracy? in Fact and Fiction. Russell was prepared to soften the anti-Communist content of his Background Books as his own views changed and as a thaw in the Cold War set in later in the 1950s. He was arguably remiss, however, in failing to reveal the rather dubious publishing history of these works, although Russell himself may have regarded the involvement of the IRD as irrelevant to the writings in question since they merely reiterated long-held political opinions of his own.

Some forty Background Books were in print five years after the series started in 1951. Roughly 300,000 copies in all were in circulation in English by this date, and a number of foreign-language editions had been produced as well. The literature for export would be dispatched to British diplomatic posts, and consular and other officials were encouraged, irrespective of costs incurred, to enlist local publishers to further assist with the distribution. The Indian impression of Why Communism Must Fail, for example, may have been printed on such terms.

Aside from its anonymous authorship, the inaugural Background Book, What Is Communism?, set the tone for much of what followed. Many of the subsequent publications—including the two pamphlets of which Russell was sole author—offered condensed, laymen’s guides to large or controversial questions. Among titles available when Why I Oppose Communism appeared in 1956 were Leonard Schapiro’s How Strong is Communism?, Edward Atiyah’s What Is Imperialism?, and Robert Bruce Lockhart’s What Happened to the Czechs?. The literature was pitched at a mass rather than elite audience. As explained by Batchworth Press—one of the publishers of Background Books—each work was intended “to provide ordinary people, interested in what is going on in the world today, with some background information about events, institutions and ideas”. They were also economically packaged and sold. Most Background Books ran to no more than forty pages and were for sale at a shilling or one shilling and six pence (US $0.14 to $0.21), although a smaller number of book-length studies retailed for five or ten times these modest sums.

The IRD also arranged for the dissemination of a few previously existing and independently created works, such as R.N. Carew-Hunt’s The Theory and Practice of Communism and Orwell’s Animal Farm and 1984. But securing copyright over books in

12 26 March 1956, p. 4 (B&R C56.03).
16 Bombay: Democratic Research Service, 1951 (B&R B101.1b).
17 See the list of titles on the back cover of Why I Oppose Communism.
18 Quoted in Hayhurst, “Russell’s Anti-Communist Rhetoric”, 71.
print could be problematical, and it made more sense, therefore, for the IRD to act as its own commissioning editor. Sometimes the department would solicit contributions from trusted authors (like Bruce Lockhart) with Foreign Office or intelligence credentials. Whenever possible, however, they preferred to enlist authors or intellectuals whose views, like Russell's, just happened to be more or less congruent with those of the British Government.\(^\text{19}\)

\(\text{2. RUSSELL AND THE INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPARTMENT}\)

The very foundation of the IRD in 1948 had been a reflection of the Labour Government's anxiety that recent setbacks in the Cold War—the Berlin Blockade and the Communist coup in Prague most notably—required Britain to pursue a more aggressive anti-Communist strategy. Some permanent officials at the Foreign Office wanted to turn the new department into a full-fledged instrument of political warfare, aimed at destabilizing the Communist bloc as much as shoring up domestic, allied and neutral opinion. The Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin tried to resist these pressures exerted by his departmental hard-liners, but after the Conservatives regained power in 1951 the "offensive" orientation of the IRD became rather more pronounced—a reflection in part of Prime Minister Churchill's fascination with propaganda as a tool of politics and diplomacy, together with his "well-known appetite for covert operations."\(^\text{20}\) Most routine work of the IRD, however, remained focused on the Western side of the Cold War divide.

Unlike the more conspicuous and overt approach characteristic of American propaganda, the British preferred to wage the Cold War by more discreet means. This is not to suggest that the IRD was half-hearted or genteel, merely that it tended to dwell less than did American agencies on the threat posed by a powerful and belligerent Soviet Union, and more on the defects of Communism and the manifest superiority of Western democratic institutions and ideals.\(^\text{21}\) The Background Books series certainly conformed with this general approach to propaganda of the IRD, as did its other line of approach (indeed, its main one) to people such as Russell—namely, the circulation of (presumably) factually accurate but ideologically slanted information in sub-classified reports for unattributed use by those privy to them.

It is highly likely that Russell would have been regarded as a prize asset by the IRD, whether an independent author of works such as *What Is Freedom?* and *What Is Democracy?* or a trusted recipient of the semi-confidential intelligence documents described above. By the late-1940s Russell commanded world-wide recognition and respect. Many of his shorter political writings were commissioned by or reprinted in newspapers overseas, and he also reached a wide and varied international audience from his broadcast work for the BBC's external services.

One revealing gauge of the esteem in which Russell was held by the IRD is that even routine correspondence with him was conducted by successive departmental chiefs, John Peck and John Rennie. A close confidant of and former wartime private secretary to Churchill, Peck had taken over as head of the IRD from Ralph Murray after the Conservative Party's general election victory in October 1951. Peck, in turn, was succeeded by Rennie late in 1953. Rennie held the office until 1958 and subsequently (1968–1973) served as director of MI6. Although it is not clear whether Russell knew Peck and Rennie headed the IRD, they conducted their correspondence with Russell on stationary with Foreign Office letterhead or bearing the address of the IRD's headquarters at 12 Carlton House Terrace in south-west London.

On 15 November 1951 Russell thanked Peck for sending him some documents on "Rural Life in Russia", which he promised "to study with care".\(^\text{22}\) Unfortunately, neither this report nor a companion investigation of "Town Life in the Soviet Union"\(^\text{23}\) appear to be in the Russell Archives. Among the substantial holdings of typescripts, manuscripts and off-prints by other authors, however, is a cache of Foreign Office documents from the early Cold War years, containing among other things two other reports in the same

\(^{19}\) See Defty, *op. cit.*, 165.

\(^{20}\) *Ibid.*, 182, and (more generally) 246–9.


\(^{22}\) RA1 710.054249.

series of critical exposés of Soviet tyranny and backwardness: "Education in the Soviet Union" and "Religion in the Soviet Union". On at least two separate occasions, Russell also received documents from the IRD detailing the ideology, activities and objectives of the Communist-aligned peace movement. The second of these enclosures, Peck promised, would "explain the true nature of the [World] Peace Congress to be held in Vienna in December 1952".

On 14 July 1952 Peck had dispatched to Russell a copy of the "Interpreter", an obviously official study which "purposes to show the salient facts of Soviet policy during the month and to demonstrate how Soviet diplomatic activity and propaganda and the activities of the Soviet political warfare network throughout the world form a coherent whole". Peck also asked if Russell might be interested in receiving this briefing paper every month. (Russell accepted the offer but, rather innocently perhaps, wondered whether a subscription fee would be required.) Further correspondence from Russell, dated 15 May 1953, suggests that Peck had also sent Russell some material on the political persecution or "brainwashing" of Chinese intellectuals by the Communist regime.

In his letter to Russell of 14 July 1952, Peck had alluded to translations from Soviet sources which he had been forwarding to Russell "from time to time". There is a considerable quantity of such material at the Russell Archives. These translated items include several polemical attacks on Russell in the Soviet press, where he was frequently pilloried in the decade after the Second World War. On 1 September 1951, for example, Peck sent Russell the "latest bouquet from Pravda", a piece entitled "The Prophecies of an Obscurantist" from the issue of 20 August 1951. Beginning in April 1950, Russell would also receive from the IRD every few months or so a batch of translations from Soviet journals and newspapers illustrating the relationship between science and the state behind the Iron Curtain. This was a topic of particular interest to Russell, and, as one IRD official promised, the translations would reveal "the exact nature of the Kremlin's assault on freedom in science".

The last batches of material on Soviet science (Russell seems to have received nothing more after early 1956) also contained translated reports of Soviet military thinking about nuclear weapons which Russell referred to anecdotally in a couple of his anti-nuclear writings. All of these enclosures were accompanied by instructions from the IRD that recipients were "free to use the information contained in these translations, but we should be grateful if you did not refer to the Foreign Office as your source". From the point of view of attribution the same guidelines were applied by the IRD to the intelligence reports and notes which were sent to Russell on occasion and distributed fairly widely on the same semi-confidential basis.

Although the evidence in the Russell Archives pertaining to the IRD is somewhat fragmentary, it reinforces what historical accounts have said about the department's cultivation of such prominent public intellectuals as Russell. Sponsored book publishing became one of its "favoured methods of disseminating information as the Foreign Office believed that the public would more readily accept information which did not emanate from official sources, and that the most effective propaganda was attributable to authoritative or prominent authors". The IRD obviously hoped that the reasoned anti-Communist arguments of its Background Books (not to mention the other publishing fronts used by the IRD) would reach a wide audience. But its overall strategy was perhaps better illustrated by the premium attached by the IRD to its distribution to a wide range of public figures of material such as that sent to Russell.

26 RA1 710.054250.
27 RA2 750.
28 See RA2 910 F14a.
31 See Peck to Russell 29 June 1952, ibid., F14b.
32 Defy, op. cit., 165.
by Peck and Rennie. This indirect *modus operandi* clearly reflected a Foreign Office preference (which the post-war Labour Government tried unsuccessfully to challenge) for targeting the shapers of opinion at home and abroad—journalists, academics, politicians, trade unionists, student and youth leaders—rather than appealing directly to the masses.33

As Lynn Smith has written of these IRD briefing papers:

All of this was energetically reproduced and distributed to a great variety of recipients. These included: British Ministers, M.P.’s and trade unionists, the International Department of the Labour Party and UN delegates, British media and opinion formers including the BBC World Service, selected journalists and writers. It was also directed at the media all over the non-communist world, information officers in British Embassies of the Third World and communist countries, and the Foreign Offices of Western European countries.34

By such means, the most critical accounts of post-war British propaganda have alleged, Labour politicians, leftist intellectuals and institutions such as the BBC were co-opted into a titanic ideological struggle being directed by some of the most reactionary elements in British public life.35

Such interpretations perhaps over-estimate the influence of the IRD and the credulity and pliability of the journalists and others, including Russell, who were privy to the IRD’s reports. According to the then head of the BBC’s Eastern European Service, the IRD was regarded as “just another source of factual information” to be taken or left alone as desired.36 It is difficult to conceive of him being entirely credulous of these official documents, especially since his assessments of the international situation tended to draw on a range of sources.

Yet, it seems that, on occasion, Russell’s published work did draw on information supplied to him by the IRD. His critical commentary on the Lysenko affair, for example, was based upon two pages of notes in Russell’s hand taken from a mimeograph that is not present among the Foreign Office documents in the Russell Archives but is similar both in physical appearance and content to some of the other IRD material.37 Interestingly, when his relationship with the IRD was petering out in the mid-1950s, Russell used translations from the Soviet armed forces journal *Red Star* to bolster an anti-nuclear case that was definitely at odds with policies pursued or approved by the British Government.38 A meticulous analysis of Russell’s political writing between, say, 1948 and 1955 would be necessary to determine the precise nature and extent of his use of IRD material. Nevertheless, at the very least, it is disconcerting to think that Russell felt at all comfortable in using non-attributable material to which he was privy only because of a covert propaganda agency’s desire to influence (perhaps even deceive) opinion-shapers such as himself.

3. “GLOBE-TROTTING FOR THE FOREIGN OFFICE”

If Russell was conscripted, either unwittingly or (as the balance of evidence presented here suggests) knowingly, into Britain’s covert Cold War propaganda campaign, he was only a small cog in a very large machine. As Andrew Defty has written in his recent study of the IRD, propaganda in the post-war era was employed on an unprecedentedly grand scale by peacetime standards and for a variety of purposes besides combatting Communism, however central that political objective was to the overall effort.

The Labour Governments of 1945–51 presided over perhaps the greatest expansion of the British Government’s propaganda apparatus until the election of the Labour Government in 1997. Propaganda was used widely by the Labour Govern-

35The literature is reviewed by Defty in his introduction.
36Quoted in Defty, op. cit., 6.
ments: to explain their policies at home and abroad; to reassure Britain’s allies, most notably the USA, about Labour’s socialist policies; to promote trade; to counter colonial insurgency; to promote good relations with the newly independent colonies; and to undermine Britain’s enemies.  

In addition to his clandestine cooperation with the IRD, Russell was also part of the public face of British propaganda during the early Cold War. The IRD was merely one of several Foreign Office branches concerned with propaganda work; other government departments engaged in similar activities—openly as well as in secret. The more benign and transparent (yet sometimes indistinguishable) counterpart of covert government propaganda operations was official publicity.

At the apex of the institutional structure for the production and dissemination of material in this category, both at home and abroad, stood the Central Office of Information (COI). Established in 1946, the COI was a successor organization of sorts to the much-derided wartime Ministry of Information. The new agency lost the departmental ranking that had been enjoyed by the Ministry of Information, but it remained independent—notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of the Foreign Office to subordinate the COI’s overseas role to its departmental control.

Rather than directing information policy across the board—this remained the preserve of each Cabinet-level department—the mandate of the COI was more of a coordinating one, to ensure publicity for material produced in other official circles. Additionally, an Overseas Press Services Division was responsible for keeping foreign news sources informed about government policy, for promoting balance in their coverage of British affairs, and for publicizing British accomplishments in industry, science, technology and culture. In tandem with these functions, this Division also commissioned feature articles about current events—ideally from prominent authors like Russell—and the COI regularly acquired the overseas rights to a range of articles from the British national, weekly and periodical press. The COI operated from the premise that “every British newspaper or book sold abroad, every film show, and every photograph or article published helps to determine the way in which the peoples of the world think and feel about Britain; and it is the way in which the world thinks and feels about Britain that is the basic concern of the Information Services”. The overseas representatives of the British Council—set up by the Foreign Office in the 1930s to foster a positive image of Britain abroad—performed a complementary role by sponsoring a wide variety of “British” cultural activities all over the world.

In the fulfilment of these essentially cultural and educational objectives, Russell made a small but not insignificant contribution. A number of his writings were reissued by the COI in the manner described above, including his series of BBC talks on “Living in an Atomic Age” (reprinted in *New Hopes for a Changing World*), his 1956 radio broadcast on “The Story of Colonization”, and the last of his contributions to Background Books, the essay “Why I Am Not a Communist”. An article entitled “British Opinion on Hungary” was specially commissioned by the Overseas Press Services Division in response to the Soviet suppression of the anti-Communist uprising in that country in 1956. But this seems never to have been circulated, perhaps because Russell took aim not only at Soviet actions in Hungary but also those of Britain and France in Suez. If Russell’s earlier attractiveness to the COI reflected the convergence of his political outlook with that of the British Government, the waves created by his Hungary piece suggest that the official mind was beginning to grasp that his views were becoming, by this time, increasingly antithetical to their own.

In addition to this miscellany of contributions to the more indirect side of Britain’s Cold War propaganda efforts, Russell also worked more directly for the British Government. By his own admission, for example, he was sent to Berlin during the 1948 Blockade “by the Government ... to help to persuade the people of Berlin that it was worthwhile to resist Russian attempts to get the

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39 Defty, *op. cit.*, 17.

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41 Quoted in Taylor, “Projection of Britain Abroad”, 17.
42 See *Papers* 29: 123–4.
Reinforcing the “official” character of this mission in 1948, Russell was given a military passport and temporary standing in Britain’s armed forces, allowing him, he recalled with amusement, for his “first and only time ... to parade as a military man.” Russell’s Autobiography placed a similar interpretation on his visit earlier the same month (October 1948) to Norway, where “the Government sent me ... in the hope of inducing Norwegians to join an alliance against Russia”.

More than two years previously, in June 1946, Russell had undertaken a lecture tour of Switzerland arranged by the British Council. He also visited Holland and Belgium in September and October 1947 and Sweden in May 1948, although his speaking engagements on these trips abroad do not seem to have been carried out under official auspices. The tour of the Low Countries had been sponsored by the New Commonwealth Society, a political movement which, like Russell, was dedicated to promoting international control of atomic energy—by coercive means if necessary. On returning to Britain Russell was alerted by C.R.A. Rae of the Foreign Office to the “honey’s nest in Moscow” which his lectures on world government and atomic energy had stirred. Enclosed with this letter were some translated copies of Soviet newspaper criticisms of Russell, including a piece from the journal Tруд deriding him as a “Philosopher Bomb-Thrower”. Russell’s reply is missing from the Russell Archives but Rae’s next communication acknowledged with thanks “your letter about your tour in the Low Countries”.

The correspondence is interesting because it shows that Russell was privy to Foreign Office material even before the inception of the IRD, and suggests that he already enjoyed a close and comfortable association with the department. Russell may also have been in contact with senior figures in Britain’s armed forces at this time. In private correspondence he alludes to “conversations with professional strategists”. Among other things, such discussions may have been responsible for one of the most intriguing public speaking engagements that Russell was asked to take on during the early Cold War—namely, the annual lecture on “The Future of Mankind” which he gave to the Imperial Defence College each December from 1947 to 1952.

In their respective biographies of Russell, Ronald Clark and Ray Monk both imply that Russell’s autobiographical recollections exaggerated his role as a roving emissary for the Foreign Office in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Yet, Clark especially uses evidence that conveys a contrary impression. On 28 December 1949, Russell told his friend Irina Wragge-Morley that his impending visit to Paris (to lecture at the Sorbonne and at the Centre d’Études de Politiques Étrangères) was “for the Foreign Office”. The following March, three months before embarking on tours of Australia and the United

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46 Founded in 1932 by the wealthy Liberal businessman and politician David Davies (Baron Davies of Llandinam), the New Commonwealth Society had always stood for a tough-minded internationalism. Dismayed by the ambivalence towards sanctions of the League of Nations Union in the early 1930s, the rival organization patronized by Davies had campaigned for international arbitration by a tribunal whose decisions would be enforced by an International Police Force.
47 5 Nov. 1947, RA2 910 F14a.
48 19 Nov. 1947, *ibid.* Enclosed with this letter was a confidential assessment made by Britain’s Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow of the latest ideological offensive launched by the high priest of Stalinist cultural policy, Andrei Zhdanov.
49 To Walter Marseille, 5 May 1948. Six years later this letter was published (see *Papers* 28: 72), adding to the controversy that dogged Russell throughout the 1950s—not to mention posthumously (see below, n. 57)—and arising from his alleged prior advocacy of preventive war.
50 See Ronald Clark, *The Life of Bertrand Russell* (London: Jonathan Cape and Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975), p. 523. Only the first of Russell’s six annual lectures to the Imperial Defence College was published; it was reprinted subsequently in *Unpopular Essays* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950), Chap. 3.
51 *Autobiography* 3: 19.
States, Russell told the same correspondent that he was "busy globe-trotting for the Foreign Office." The Russell Archives also contains letters from the Foreign Office itself, deepening the impression left by the personal correspondence quoted by Russell's biographer Clark (and referenced to "private sources") that Russell indeed made trips for the Foreign Office.

On 2 October 1951 Angus Malcolm of the Information Policy Department—a "purely propaganda section" of the Foreign Office according to Philip Taylor—thanked Russell for informing him of his intention to visit France early the following year en route to England from Germany. Malcolm had already "written to our Embassy in Paris and asked them what subjects they would like you to speak on". A couple of weeks later Malcolm again wrote Russell, asking if he would be willing to visit Brussels as well as Paris on the same trip to the continent, "particularly as the Ambassador [to Belgium] is so keen on the project". As it turned out, these lecturing plans were scuttled by Russell's cancellation of his German trip. But the correspondence suggests that the Foreign Office regarded nothing unusual about the arrangements that were planned. Moreover, the initiative for them, on this occasion, had not come from the department but from Russell himself.

4. RUSSELL AND THE CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM

This article has so far presented Russell as a public intellectual whose reputation for independence and integrity was at best tarnished by overly cozy relations with various official agencies and at worst much more seriously damaged by his participation in covert propaganda work. As seen in Part Three, however, Russell's actions were broadly consistent with the energetic and open support which he extended to the anti-Communist foreign policies of the post-war Labour Governments and of the last Churchill administration in its early years.

Recent contributions to Russell studies have debated the extent of Russell's belligerence towards the Soviet Union during his so-called preventive war phase, when he had seemed willing, at the very least, to threaten Russia with atomic weapons to force its acceptance of a system of international governance more binding than that of the United Nations. Regardless of its degree, the mere fact of this belligerence is worthy of comment, for it separated Russell from sections of the Left with whom he would have been comfortable in association at previous and subsequent points of his political life. This is not to suggest, however, that anti-Communist tendencies were alien to the democratic socialist movement in Britain (or elsewhere for that matter). The Labour Party was steeped in anti-Communism, owing in large part to the determined resistance mounted during the inter-war period by people such as Ernest Bevin (Foreign Secretary from 1945 to 1951) to Communist encroachment in the trade unions. But for Russell, as is well known, the formative influence on his anti-Communist political thinking was rather different: namely, the disillusioning experience of his journey to revolutionary Russia in 1920, from which the highly critical account, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, emerged later the same year. And nothing in the political development of the Soviet Union prior to the death of Stalin had caused Russell to soften the stand taken in his book.

It is not difficult, therefore, to fathom the attractiveness to Russell of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. This international movement of anti-Communist leftist intellectuals was founded in 1950; the following year Russell agreed to serve as one of its honorary chairmen, along with Benedetto Croce, Karl Jaspers, Reinhold Niebuhr, John Dewey, Jacques Maritain, and Salvador de Madariaga. The

53 Clark, Life of Bertrand Russell, 504.
54 "Projection of Britain Abroad", 16.
55 RA1 710.052346.
56 19 Oct. 1951, RA1 710.052347.
58 See the contrasting accounts of Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1989) and Frances S. Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York: New Press, 2000), as well as reviews of these two works by, respectively, Louis Greenspan ("Liberal Conspirators", Rus-
founders and sponsors of the CCF, including Russell, believed that culture no less than politics was a critical arena of Cold War conflict and that it was imperative to challenge the perceived domination of the arts and letters by Communists and fellow-travellers. This intellectual struggle was to be waged through academic conferences and seminars, writers’ congresses, and literary and political journals. The institutional base of the CCF was in Paris, but a number of national affiliates were created and operated with considerable autonomy.

Both the CCF and the journals which were published under its auspices—Encounter in Britain, Preuves in France, and Cuadernos in Latin America—received clandestine subsidies via fake charitable foundations set up by the CIA. It is apparent, however, that Russell (and many other CCF luminaries) were genuinely unaware of their organization’s sources of financial support, which were exposed in 1967.

Russell regarded the CCF as a liberal bulwark not only against Communism but also against the excesses of right-wing anti-Communism. When the organization appeared to Russell to be insufficiently vigilant in the face of this second threat, he became alienated from it and eventually resigned in 1957. By the latter date, Russell’s views on the Soviet Union had undergone some modification, at least to the extent that he no longer saw any good in placing on record his fundamental objections to Soviet-style dictatorship. He even exhibited on occasion a modicum of optimism about the prospects for internal reform being carried out by the post-Stalin leadership, as indicated by some revealing revisions that were introduced to the reprint in Portraits from Memory of “Why I Am Not a Communist”. When Russell had written this essay for a Background Book in 1954 he thought that it was merely “possible that in the course of time Russia may become more liberal”. Two years later he altered this passage to suggest that there were “signs” that it “will” proceed in this direction.

At the same time that Russell’s hitherto staunch anti-Soviet posture was beginning to soften somewhat in the mid-1950s, he was growing increasingly disturbed by the reactionary side-effects of Cold War anti-Communism on American political and intellectual life. Ever since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 (if not before) he had regarded the threats to civil liberties and academic freedom posed by the phenomenon of McCarthyism as intrinsically bad. But he also came to harbour a deeper fear—namely, that any further escalation of the Senator’s brand of strident anti-Communism, would be ruinous of the (already attenuated) prospects for a stable peace. He felt that it was particularly irresponsible and reprehensible, therefore, for an ostensibly liberal organization such as the CCF to be complicit in promoting this form of anti-Communism in the highly charged atmosphere of American domestic politics.

Russell’s first challenge to what he regarded as the misdirected anti-Communism of the CCF arose in 1953 after he discovered that its U.S. branch, the American Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF), had smeared as pro-Communist (with classic guilt-by-association tactics) a symposium on the Bill of Rights hosted by the purportedly fellow-travelling Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. Russell asked his name to be removed from the CCF’s letterhead list of honorary chairmen and was dissuaded from this course only by assurances that the fractious American affiliate had been acting independently of the parent body of which he was a sponsor. He again reacted angrily the following year, when the ACCF asked him to withdraw his endorsement of a seventy-fifth birthday tribute to Einstein that was being staged at Princeton by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.

Two years later, in 1956, Russell drew the ire of the ACCF once more when he publicly (and polemically) protested the conviction and continuing imprisonment of Morton Sobell, a co-accused of the executed Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. What especially irked critics such as Sidney Hook and Norman Thomas (both directors of the ACCF) were Russell’s sweeping condemnation of criminal justice in the United States and the bolstering of this critique by reference to a book on American civil liberties by Corliss Lamont, a

sell n.s. 10 [winter 1990–91]: 180–3 and David Blitz (“Cultural Cold War”, Russell, n.s. 21 [winter 2001–02]: 176).

59. “I have taken a great deal of time to sift truth from propaganda in regard to Communist countries”, he had told a Mr. Beer on 1 February 1955, “and I am left with a conviction that Communist régimes are very bad. But I no longer think that much purpose is served by saying so in public” (quoted in Papers 29: 54).

60. See Papers 29: 58.

61 See Papers 28: 179.
notorious fellow-traveller. After Russell's opening salvo in Sobell's defence provocatively compared "Nazi atrocities" with "atrocities committed by the FBI", he opened himself up—neither for the first nor the last time in his public life—to charges of anti-Americanism. Given Russell's impeccable anti-Soviet credentials, it was more difficult to smear him as pro-Communist, but after his campaign for Sobell was publicized in the National Guardian (a progressive New York weekly), Sidney Hook accused Russell of "being used—and effectively used—as a weapon in the Communists' political war against the United States". The ACCF objected strenuously to the manner in which Russell had defended Morton Sobell. Russell took their open letter to him as an inexcusable ad hominem attack and as a cue, at last, to resign the honorary chairmanship of the parent body which he had been holding with some reluctance for the past three years. This decision was deferred for almost a year as the executive of the international organization strove desperately to deter one of their "biggest attractions" from taking such a regrettable step. This characterization of Russell was made by the CIA's most highly placed operative in the CCF, the latter organization's executive director, Michael Josselson.

Russell's break with the Congress for Cultural Freedom is significant in two respects. First, it reveals how seriously the non-Communist left was divided over the types of anti-Communism that were desirable. The controversy had pitted Russell against liberal or social democratic intellectuals for whom he might otherwise have felt a certain affinity. As he told the American Socialist Party leader, Norman Thomas: "You and I are on the same side in most matters, and I have every wish to avoid magnifying our differences." Where Thomas (and Sidney Hook) differed from Russell was in the enduring intensity of their anti-Communism and especially in the persistence of their determination to avoid all political contact with Communists and fellow-travellers. Russell was far from naive about the risks of such associations but had decided by the mid-1950s that the pressing need for an ideologically diverse peace initiative outweighed the risk of such an enterprise being tarnished as pro-Soviet or captured by the Communist-aligned peace movement. Second, and of more direct relevance to the present article, Russell maintained a vigorous independence throughout his troubled association with the CCF. Indeed, his relations with the organization grew progressively more combative. While his future in the CCF remained in doubt in the fall of 1956—on account of his still unresolved dispute with the American Committee—Russell took umbrage at the failure of the international Congress to denounce the Franco-British-Israeli attack on Egypt with the same vigour that it had canvased Soviet military intervention in Hungary.

Clearly Russell was not following a script that the CCF's paymasters in the CIA (and IRD) may have expected him to act out.

62 "The Sobell Case", The Manchester Guardian, 26 March 1956, p. 6 (B&R C56.04); Papers 29: 153.
64 See "Bertrand Russell Taken to Task", The Manchester Guardian, 6 April, p. 6.

66 "The State of U.S. Civil Liberties", The New Leader, 40, no. 7 (18 Feb. 1957): 16–18 (B&R C57.04); Papers 29: 175. Before long, as it turned out, the passionate commitment of both Thomas and Russell to the cause of nuclear disarmament had revived a "basis for cooperation ... which transcended their sharp disagreement about the impact of the Cold War on American civil liberties" (James Duram, "From Conflict to Cooperation: Bertrand Russell, Norman Thomas, and the Cold War", Russell, nos. 25–8 [1977]: 66).
67 See the present author's "Russell and the Communist-Aligned Peace Movement in the mid-1950s", Russell, n.s. 21 (summer 2001): 31-57.
68 See Papers 29: xxxvii–xxxviii.
69 For example, the British CCF publication Encounter received a small and secret stipend from the IRD, which also bought up copies of the monthly magazine for overseas distribution (see Defy, op. cit., 205). Other ties existed between the IRD and the British Society for Cultural Freedom (the CCF's British affiliate). Two of its executive officers, secretary Michael Goodwin and national organizer John Clews, had connections to the Foreign Office or IRD, while a third, chairman Malcolm Muggeridge, helped set up a covert subsidy to the British organization from M16 (see Wilford, "British Intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom", 49, 56–7).
Like other British intellectuals in the Congress, Russell evidently "favoured a definition of cultural freedom that was more expansive than, and therefore, sometimes in conflict with, that of the CCF". Far from accepting the guiding hand of the CIA, their behaviour "often confounded and frustrated the intentions of their secretive American patrons". Russell's truculence was a source of acute consternation to the parent body in Paris which, as indicated already, regarded Russell as an invaluable patron—especially of its work in Europe and Asia. Michael Josselson might privately dismiss Russell as an "old fool", but he was nevertheless furious with the CCF's American affiliate for provoking the dispute which led to the latter's relinquishment of his honorary chairmanship.71 Favouring a more subtle approach to the cultural Cold War than the liberal anti-Communists in the American Committee, the CIA's Josselson believed that it was imperative for the CCF to find room for those who wished to criticize the United States.

But perhaps Russell's breach with the Congress could not have been averted. His departure was, in a sense, a telling reflection of a sea change in outlook on the Cold War that had taken place since he agreed to sponsor the organization some six years previously (around the same time that he embarked upon the publishing venture with Background Books). The most succinct appraisal of this transformation has been supplied by Russell himself:

I was brought around to being more favourable to Communism by the death of Stalin in 1953 and by the Bikini test in 1954; and I came gradually to attribute, more and more, the danger of nuclear war to the West, to the United States of America, and less to Russia. This change was supported by developments inside the United States, such as McCarthyism and the restriction of civil liberties.72

When Russell tendered his resignation from the CCF for a final time in January 1957, he had already embarked on an anti-nuclear quest which led first to the inauguration of the Pugwash movement and then to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The heroic years of public protest which followed are of course integral to Russell's biography. But they may also have served to divert attention from some murkier activities engaged in by Russell the Cold War propagandist. It is to be hoped that the present article has added some clarity to this earlier phase of Russell's political life simply by laying out some of the pertinent evidence in a systematic fashion. For a still clearer picture to emerge, however, it will be necessary to scrutinize more closely all of Russell's Cold War associations and contacts, perhaps from other as yet untapped sources of archival information.

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70 Wilford, "British Intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom", 58, 42.
71 See Coleman, Liberal Conspiracy, 166.
German philosophers were among the first to creatively assimilate Bertrand Russell’s philosophy. In 1908 Kurt Grelling and Leonard Nelson, two pupils of David Hilbert and Edmund Husserl in Göttingen, published the paper “Remarks on the Ideas of Paradox by Russell and Burali-Forti” in which the so-called Grelling paradox was first formulated. (Grelling and Nelson 1908) Hilbert made many efforts to establish a chair in exact scientific philosophy based on the model of the program for exact philosophy put forward by Russell.¹ Eventually he succeeded, and the newly founded chair was occupied by his protégé and friend Nelson in 1919. Soon after he received the chair, however, Nelson became obsessed with political activity against the rise of the right radicalism in Germany which absorbed all his powers – this to such an extent that he died of physical exhaustion in 1927 at the age of 45. (Torbov 2005)

Grelling was estranged by the political strivings of his friend Nelson and soon moved to Berlin to work with Hans Reichenbach. Among other things, in 1929 he published the well-informed and insightful paper “Realism and Logic: An Investigation of Russell’s Metaphysics” in *The Monist* and in 1936 “The Logical Paradoxes” in *Mind*. At the same time, Grelling translated Russell’s *The Analysis of Mind* into German in 1927, *The ABC of Relativity* in

¹ On Russell’s influence on Hilbert in the years 1910-14 see Mancosu 2003.
Another example of the creative reception of Russell’s philosophy in Germany during this period is that of Rudolf Carnap. We know from his “Autobiography” that Russell’s influence on him was formative. Indeed, Carnap’s Der Raum (1922) and Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928) were, pace alternative claims by Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson, decisively inspired by Russell’s ideas. Unfortunately, this tradition of productive reception of Russell’s philosophy in Germany was soon ended. Carnap moved in 1926 to Vienna and then to Prague, only to immigrate to the United States in 1936. After Hitler came to power in 1933, Grelling immigrated to Belgium but was subsequently captured by the Nazis and sent to Auschwitz where he died in September 1942.

The situation in Germany today with regard to Russell studies is different from that of the early years of the twentieth century. It is true that for decades now, serious efforts have been made to revive analytic philosophy in the country. Unfortunately, Russell is not among the authors who are seriously investigated; he is used mainly for didactical purposes as propaedeutic. In line with these developments, many of Russell’s books have been translated into German. (So well developed were Russell studies in the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s in Germany that many Russell translations today simply remix translations of these years.) Some of them, especially The Problems of Philosophy, are regularly discussed in undergraduate seminars of philosophy departments. This, however, scarcely promotes a profound knowledge of his philosophy.

Evidence for Reichenbach’s substantial knowledge of Russell in these years is provided by his early paper (Reichenbach 1967), first published in German as “Bertrand Russell”, Vierteljahrschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie, December 2, 1928.

Richardson and Friedman claim, in contrast, that Carnap was primarily influenced by the German neo-Kantians of the period. (cf. Richardson 1998, Freedman 2000) For a critique on their thesis see Milkov 2004.

This state of Russell studies in Germany is reflected in the following two facts: (1) There are several publishing houses in the country which issue series on “Past Masters” in philosophy: Campus Verlag (Frankfurt), Junius Verlag (Hamburg), Beck Verlag (Munich), Herder Verlag (Freiburg), and Fischer Verlag (Frankfurt), among others. But there is no book on Russell in any of these series. The only introductory book on Russell in German today is the Ernst Sandvoss volume (Sandvoss 1990) published by Rowohl Verlag that appeared in the “Bildmonographien” series in which biographical data (with pictures), at the cost of philosophical analysis, have prominence.

(2) Indeed, there are some good investigations conducted by German authors on early analytic philosophers. These early analytic philosophers are, however, all German-speaking authors. Such investigations are Wolfgang Carl’s book on Frege (Carl 1994) and Joachim Schulte’s books on Wittgenstein (Schulte 1992, 1993), which were both translated into English. Thomas Mormann’s book on Carnap (Mormann 2000) is also of good quality. Unfortunately, there is no book on Russell of a similar standing. The books on Russell published in Germany in the last decades are typically dissertations which demonstrate that the post-graduate student has reached a certain level of knowledge of parts of Russell’s philosophy (e.g., Bernet 1991, Rheinwald 1988, and Tatievskaya 2005). They are anything but mature achievements in Russell studies. Even the newly published book One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox, edited by Imaguir’s dissertation supervisor, Godhard Link (Link 2004), does not disprove this claim. There are few German authors in it who discuss Russell’s paradox in the context of his philosophy.

2. MY OVERALL IMPRESSION OF IMAGUIRE’S BOOK

Guido Imaguir’s recent book, Russell’s Early Philosophy: Propositions, Realism, and the Linguistic-Ontological Turn, is a typical example in this respect. It is the work of a young scholar who is familiar with Quine, David Lewis, and other recent analytic philosophers. He apparently sees his task as that of putting the philosophy

2 Evidence for Reichenbach’s substantial knowledge of Russell in these years is provided by his early paper (Reichenbach 1967), first published in German as “Bertrand Russell”, Vierteljahrschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie, December 2, 1928.

3 Richardson and Friedman claim, in contrast, that Carnap was primarily influenced by the German neo-Kantians of the period. (cf. Richardson 1998, Freedman 2000) For a critique on their thesis see Milkov 2004.


5 Gérard Bernet’s dissertation was actually written and published not in Germany but in the German-speaking part of Switzerland.
of Russell in the scheme of analytic philosophy as he understands it. The knowledgeable student of Russell, however, can easily see that the author is entering the realm of Russell studies for the first time. Imaguire’s endeavor is apparently to outline and deliver a unifying picture of Russell’s philosophy. As we will see in the pages to come, he succeeds in this, though only at the cost of a series of oversimplifications.

The author claims, in particular, that the whole philosophy of Russell is divided into two parts: before and after July 1905 and the composition of “On Denoting”. His philosophy before “On Denoting” is called by Imaguire “Russell’s early philosophy”, and his philosophy after this paper is called “Russell’s later philosophy”. According to Imaguire, Russell’s early philosophy was radically realistic, and his later philosophy moderately realistic. This moderateness is claimed to be a consequence of the use of Occam’s razor which does not tolerate the assumption of superfluous existences. (p.188)

Few readers will welcome these claims. (1) The mainstream interpretation of Russell, with which I agree, is that his philosophy can be divided most instructively in four periods: early, till his realistic turn and his acquaintance with the works of Peano (1898/1900); early middle, until he met Wittgenstein (November 1912); mature (1913-1919); later, which started with his embrace of neutral monism in 1919. (2) Russell started using the term Occam’s razor in print only in 1914. (Russell 1914, p.112)

The book profits from the newly published manuscripts in Volumes 2, 3 and 4 of Russell’s Collected Papers; it is actually the first book in German in which this new material is used. Furthermore, the book is strongly influenced by Peter Hylton’s 1990 Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, and is also influenced by Paul Hager’s 1994 book, Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell’s Philosophy.

Russell’s Early Philosophy has four chapters: Chapter 1, Propositional Realism – Chapter 2, Theory of Relations and Pluralism - Chapter 3, Foundations of Mathematics – Chapter 4, Critical Realism: Russell’s Linguistic-Ontological Turn. My impression is that Chapters 1 and 4 are organically connected and together state the main thesis of the book, while the other two chapters only deliver additional information about what the author calls “Russell’s early philosophy”. This point determines the order of my exposition of Imaguire’s book. After some general comments, I shall review Chapters 1 and 4 of the book, after which I shall go to Chapters 2 and 3.

3. IMAGUIRE’S GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF RUSSELL’S PHILOSOPHY

According to Imaguire, the principal metaphysical position of Russell’s philosophy was that of realism. Russell started with a Platonic realism, and transformed it in 1905 into a kind of critical, or reductionist realism. (Only a few will find this claim of Imaguire’s convincing. Russell’s 1912 The Problems of Philosophy was still informed with a kind of Platonic realism.) This was a turn from naive and extreme realism to a critical form of realism. (p. 216)

The author further claims that the most important concept in Russell’s philosophy is that of a proposition. (p. 3) Russell changed the term “judgment” to “proposition” in his 1899 paper “The Classification of Relations” (Russell 1899) after his and Moore’s realistic turn of the summer of 1898. It is not by accident that in the same paper Russell introduced the logic of relations: the two conceptions are intrinsically connected.

Russell’s method in philosophy is, according to Imaguire, that of analysis of propositions. (p. 2) This method constitutes the unity of Russell’s philosophy. (p. 3) This reflects the influence on Imaguire of Paul Hager’s book, in which Hager asserts that the unity of Russell’s philosophy results from the method of analysis (as such) and the role of relations in this analysis. There is not only unity in Russell’s philosophy, there are many changes as well. But a single method runs through all of these changes, and this is the method of analysis of propositions. The claim also holds true for all other aspects of his philosophy. Russell’s realism, his pluralism, and as well, his philosophy of mathematics are all run through with a certain kind of analysis of propositions. (p. 217)

4. CHAPTER 1: PROPOSITIONAL REALISM

The task of Chapter 1 is to show that the central concept of Russell’s investigation is that of a proposition. For this purpose Imaguire first reviews Moore’s and Bradley’s notions of a proposition. Russell introduced propositions into his ontology, following these two authors, in the summer of 1898 with his turn towards realism.
My impression is that Imaguire primarily treats Russell’s propositions like those of the Austrian realists, in particular Meinong. Indeed, to Imaguire, Russell’s propositions are Meinong’s possible objects of judgments (p. 38) or his subjective complex objects of judgments (p. 120); Imaguire compares them expressly with the concept of “states of affairs” of Reinach, Stumpf and Marty. (p. 34) This explains why Russell’s 1904 paper “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions”, and its critical 1905 pendant “On Denoting”, occupy such a prominent place in Imaguire’s book.

Imaguire argues that Russell, in his early pre-1905 theory of propositions, accepts the view that there are entities which exist and other entities which subsist; objects in space and time exist, while abstract entities, such as propositions, subsist. Only contradictory objects, such as round squares, do not exist. Russell’s attitude towards contradictory objects distinguishes him from Meinong in 1904: Meinong embraces even them. Thus, Imaguire notes, existence and subsistence are primitive concepts for Russell. The objects in the world obtain their metaphysical status (as non-existing, existing, or subsisting) through their relation to these two primitive concepts. Further, a fact is an existing proposition. This means that it is not the facts (the world) which determine which propositions are true or false, but the other way round: the true propositions determine what exists in the world. Imaguire notes further that Russell’s identification of the sum of all true propositions with existence, also accepted in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*, paves the way for the ontology of possible worlds. (p. 58) It remains unclear why Wittgenstein’s logical atomism was closer to the Russell of 1898-1903 than to Russell after 1905 (and especially to Russell from 1912-1918).

Unfortunately, Imaguire fails to mention in his discussion of Russell’s propositions that these disappear from his writings with the introduction of the multiple relation theory of judgment around 1910. Another criticism of Imaguire’s treatment of Russell’s theory of propositions from 1898-1904 is that in the *Principles*, e.g. in §§ 43 and 65, Russell often speaks as if propositions consist of words. It is thus far from clear that his propositions are only ontological (non-linguistic) entities. It is also frustrating that the author is silent about the “Russellian propositions” introduced into recent discussion of propositional attitudes by David Kaplan as a way of explaining his notion of “direct reference”.

This chapter treats the most important turn in Russell’s philosophy, according to Imaguire — that of 1905. In “On Denoting”, Russell allegedly introduced the principle of ontological reduction, also called by Russell “Occam’s razor”. The idea of logical construction plays a central role in the principle of reduction: indeed, only constructed entities can be reduced. (p. 201) That interpretation of Imaguire is certainly incorrect. Russell started to speak of “logical constructions” only in *Principia Mathematica*.

Imaguire’s interpretation of “On Denoting” is made wholly in (Dummett’s interpretation of) Fregean terms. On the differences between Russell and Frege, so widely discussed in the literature, Imaguire says nothing. Here is his story:

Until 1905 Russell believed that language is a “transparent medium” which gives us an unproblematic access to ontology. That is why he claimed that “the study of grammar ... is capable of throwing far more light on philosophical questions than is commonly supposed by philosophers.” (Russell 1903, § 46) Russell jettisoned this belief in “On Denoting” when he argued that there are defects in ordinary language. In particular, he showed that the form of a sentence hides and disguises the form of the proposition. That is why philosophers must concentrate their efforts on criticizing language. To be more specific, language must be purified in the direction of an ideal language. This was a real linguistic turn!

In connection with these ideas of Russell, Imaguire sees the theory of descriptions as the beginning of a new critical realism. It critically views assumptions of existence which are suggested by the form of our particular language. (p. 194) This disproves naïve realism and establishes a much more consistent and moderate realism. This is due to the fact that “On Denoting” eliminates Meinong’s presupposition that there is a real object corresponding to every meaningful expression. (p. 185)

This may be a fair appraisal of Russell, but calling Russell’s post-1905 realism a “critical” realism is at least a bad choice of
words, since the expression has been used at least since 1916 to refer to American realists such as Roy Wood Sellars, George Santayana, and A. O. Lovejoy, who had little in common with Russell. The expression “critical realism” has also commonly been opposed to “direct realism”, and as long as Russell had a theory of acquaintance, even after 1905, he is probably more of a direct realist than a critical realist in this latter sense of the term.

In the last pages of his book, Imaguire claims that this interpretation also explains Russell’s philosophy from 1912-1918. The main change in his philosophy of these years was that Russell now eliminated the physical objects he accepted in The Problems of Philosophy and replaced them with logical constructions. According to Imaguire, all these developments were a consequence of ideas articulated in “On Denoting”. Finally, Imaguire takes the main claim of the theory of descriptions to be that denoting phrases never have meaning in themselves. (p. 183) With this claim, Russell accepted the context principle.

I have three criticisms of this interpretation of “On Denoting”:

1. I do not believe that we can explain the changes in Russell’s philosophy of 1912-1918 in terms of his ideas expressed in “On Denoting”. There were other considerations (other tasks) in play now, some of them suggested by Wittgenstein.

2. Something similar to the context principle was already accepted in the Principles with the theory of denoting phrases which Russell elaborated after he became acquainted with the works of Peano. (There, he claimed that the terms in denoting phrases do not have meaning in isolation; their meaning is contextually determined.)

3. Russell was always uncertain about the correctness of the context principle. So his logical atomism, as we find it in “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars”, Our Knowledge of the External World, and in some papers of Mysticism and Knowledge, accepts as atoms some individuals (particulars and universals). Only in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism did he accept facts as logical atoms. All this is evidence for the fact that Russell did not become an ardent supporter of the context principle in 1905. Rather, his position on this point was ambiguous.

6. CHAPTER 2: THEORY OF RELATIONS AND PLURALISM

As already noted, Chapters 2 and 3 of Imaguire’s book are not a part of the main story which it tells. Here is the content of Chapter 2 in short:

Russell used his thesis of irreducibility and hence thesis of the reality of relations in order to disprove idealism and to justify his propositional realism. (p. 61) In the Foundations of Geometry, he claims that the objects of cognition are complex: in order to know them, we must be able to differentiate them, and in order to differentiate them, they must be external (divergent) to one another. This is the principle of differentiation, which is based on the form of externality of individuals (i.e., “terms”). There are at least two forms of externality, space and time, which are most important for humans: indeed, two time-points can be different only when they are mutually external; in contrast, two events can happen together in time. This is our most fundamental a priori knowledge about space and so is the first axiom of geometry.

Russell claims further that points are the main category of geometry; geometry is understood by him as investigating relations between points. (pp. 67 f.) This conception identifies geometrical and physical points. In his early philosophy of time Russell criticizes people’s inclination to accept the view that time is a property, whereas space is a relation: This belief in the asymmetry between space and time is a prejudice. In fact, space and time have the same relational structure. (p. 70) At the end of this chapter Imaguire emphasizes that even before his anti-idealistic turn, Russell was convinced of the importance of relations and believed that they cannot be reduced to properties.

7. CHAPTER 3: FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS

Chapter 3 of Imaguire’s book discusses Russell’s philosophy of mathematics in relation to his realism and his method of propositional analysis. Imaguire’s (neo-Fregean) thesis is that “the analysis
of propositions is the methodological basis of Russell’s philosophy of mathematics” as well (p. 120). Indeed, Russell’s fundamental concepts of logic and mathematics originated and were founded in connection with the analysis of propositions.

Imaguire substantiates his interpretation of Russell’s philosophy of mathematics with the fact that in the Principes Russell defines mathematics as the set of all absolute general propositions with the form of implication “p implies q”. Further, the essence of the proposition is the propositional function with a variable. Only when all constants except logical ones are replaced with a variable can a proposition reach the realm of mathematics. This means that only the introduction of variables, and the method of generalizing mathematics, which Russell accepted after he became acquainted with the work of Peano, made possible the transition from the theory of propositions to the theory of mathematical propositions.

In a generalization typical of him, Imaguiré claims that “English analytic philosophy initially came into being (and similarly in Germany for Frege) within the framework of the procedure of analysis of mathematical propositions.” (p. 121) In truth, Russell introduced the concept of “analytic philosophy” only in March 1911 (Russell 1911). Three years later, in Our Knowledge of the External World, it was characterized as being apart from other sciences and mathematics, a discipline which typically starts from complex and vague data, which are analyzed to simple but most general items. In contrast, science starts from what is simple, and its results are complex. (see Russell 1914, pp. 240 ff.) This description of analytic philosophy surely has little to do with the procedure of analysis of mathematical propositions.

8. SOME QUESTIONS OF STYLE

The style of the book is worse then the book itself. Above all, there is a problem with the system of reference; in particular, Imaguiré uses two different systems of reference. In some cases, he lists sources cited in the book in a six-page Bibliography printed at the end of the book. When a work from this list is cited, Imaguiré puts the name of the author and the year of publication together with the page number of the cited material in brackets immediately after the citation. The problem is that he uses another method of reference along with this one, which places the references in footnotes.

This confusion of two methods of reference in one book is annoying enough. Unfortunately, it is not the whole story. More than this, the author often mixes the two methods of reference into one. Then, he often cites sources according to the first method, but does not list the source in the bibliography. For example, on p. 198 he refers to a passage from “Smith 1985: 385” despite the fact that there is no “Smith” in the bibliography. The same failure is repeated on the next page, where he speaks of “Makin (1995)” despite the fact that there is no “Makin” in the bibliography. Only on p. 203 do we find the source “Janet F. Smith The Russell-Meinong Debate (1985)” in a footnote, though without the specification of where it was published. (In fact, it was published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 45, pp. 305-350.) Even worse, in some places the author simply gives false bibliographical information. For example, Gideon Makin is referred to on p. 195 n. 143 as “Gideon Making” and his paper “Making Sense of On Denoting” is claimed to have been published in 1985 when in fact, it was published in 1995 in vol. 105 of Synthese on pages 383-412.

There are also problems with hyphenation: In several places, the first vowel is divided from the rest of the word, e.g., “E-xistenz” (pp. 34, 206). That kind of hyphenation is not acceptable in any European language. At other times, the words are not hyphenated at all (for example, “Propositionssujekt [subjects of propositions]” on p. 188), so that the words in the line above are separated with enormous spaces between themselves. And with quotation marks, a passage is often started with German quotation marks only to end with English quotation marks. (see, e.g., p. 147)

The index, shorter than two pages, is also strikingly poor. It combines, unusual for German standards, the index of names and of concepts into one. I have already mentioned that Imaguiré often appeals to the authority of Peter Hylton, and occasionally also to that of Paul Hager. Unfortunately, we do not find these two names in the index nor the names of approximately two-thirds of the other authors referred to in the book. The concepts are even more badly indexed than the proper names.
9. EPILOGUE

In my comments above, I made a number of critical remarks about Imaguire’s book. In this last section of my review, I want also to emphasize that the author’s exposition of Russell’s thought is for long stretches clear and persuasive. Especially well written are parts of Chapter 2, an extract of which was recently published in Grazer Philosophische Studien. (Imaguire 2001) Students of Russell’s philosophy will find these fragments of Imaguire’s narrative interesting, even stimulating. Imaguire’s overall picture of Russell, however, has little to do with the real Russell.

My guess is that Imaguire’s failure to give a true picture of the whole of “Russell’s early philosophy” is due only to the fact that his theme is too far flung for him at this stage. However, I can not preclude that after further study of Russell, he will deliver a more precise treatment of a part of Russell’s philosophy. His momentary failure shows only that Russell studies is a rather difficult field of investigation, in which academic excellence is only possible after many years of continuing efforts.

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BERTRAND RUSSELL AND
THE RUSSELL-EINSTEIN MANIFESTO
RAYMOND PERKINS, JR.

Bertrand Russell, the great 20th century philosopher and peace activist, has been gone for 35 years. Russell wrote widely and made many contributions to our understanding of the world, but he was especially concerned with the human problem of war and peace in the nuclear age. His internationalist message—today as relevant as ever—is one which we ignore at our peril.

The great evil of his time, no less than today, was what he called "fanatical dogmatism". Its main manifestations were in politics and religion. Its causes were rooted in a certain narrowness of intellect and emotion which he believed the study of philosophy could remedy by the cultivation of impersonal thinking and generalized sympathy, and by the practice of rational skepticism—suspending judgment where lack of evidence precluded knowledge. His philosophy was an antidote to dogmatic "certainty", with its inevitable intolerance, cruelty and violence, and it was an affirmation of the importance of reason in pursuit of world peace.

This July marks the 50th anniversary of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. With the growing intensity of the Cold War and the advent of the H-bomb, Russell came to believe that the continued existence of the human race was in doubt. With the support of Albert Einstein (who died soon after he signed the Manifesto) and other eminent scientists on both sides of the Iron Curtain, an international plea was issued to renounce war and nuclear weapons as instruments of national policy. The essence of the Manifesto, fashioned after Russell's 1954 BBC Christmas talk, "Man's Peril", was as powerful as it was simple: "We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, nothing lies before you but universal death." The Manifesto stopped short of advocating the remedy Russell and Einstein favored—a system of world governance with a monopoly on weapons of war and the democratic machinery to make, interpret and enforce world law. But it did call on the international scientific community to work to publicize the perils of nuclear annihilation. The Manifesto led directly to the international Pugwash Conferences first convened in Pugwash, Nova Scotia in 1957. The Pugwash Movement was a prime mover in nuclear arms control, helping to establish Nuclear Free Zones, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) which ended atomic testing in the atmosphere, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), now ratified by 189 nations, which has done much to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In recognition of its work, the Pugwash Conference received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995.

Russell died in 1970, when the SALT process was just getting underway, and never saw the great progress in arms control and the end of the cold war. But he did live to see the advent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by which the nuclear weapons states share nuclear technology with the non-nuclear states who forswear nuclear weapons. And the Treaty requires that the nuclear weapons states too must eventually abolish their nuclear weapons: they must seek "... the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and ... nuclear disarmament, and ... a treaty on general and complete disarmament..." And most heartening for Russell must have been the Treaty's insistence that the disarmament be "under strict and effective international control"—a phrase suggestive of the world authority that Russell and Einstein had long felt necessary for world peace.

What would Russell say about the state of the world were he alive today? Certainly he would have been amazed and greatly uplifted by the end of the Cold War. But he would see the world as having squandered the opportunity of the last decade to abolish nuclear weapons, what Jonathan Schell has poignantly called our "gift of time". No doubt, he would rightly assign much of the blame for this political waste to the unilateralist policies of the sole superpower whose leadership could have fostered a truly international turn in world history and put us on the way to the "new Paradise" that the Manifesto envisages. Indeed, the world since 9/11 has in some ways slipped back into the perils of nuclear madness stimulated by the Pentagon's new doctrines of usable nukes and preemptive war. And the unsolved problem of nuclear war has been compounded by the problem of nuclear terrorism. This is a development that Russell might have predicted for a lawless world where
RAYMOND PERKINS, JR.

“might makes right”—a world ultimately incapable of providing either justice or security. If he was right, the solution for our nuclear nightmares will require a new way of thinking based on open minds and open hearts—and a genuine commitment to the idea of world peace based on world law. This is the legacy and lesson of Russell and the Manifesto for the 21st century.

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DISCUSSION

COMMENTS ON LIEBER’S “RUSSELL AND WITTGENSTEIN”

CHRISTOPHER PINCOCK

I very much enjoyed Justin Lieber’s account of his philosophical education at the University of Chicago in the 1950s and the differences between Russell and Wittgenstein in his essay “Russell and Wittgenstein: A Study in Civility and Arrogance”, but he makes two remarks in passing which I believe should be corrected. These corrections do not affect his main interpretative claim about Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s personalities.

First, Lieber claims that the result of the Wittgenstein-Waismann collaboration, *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, “was in galley proofs in the late 1930s when Wittgenstein finally put his foot (or jackboot) down, using his considerable influence on Waismann and the press to stop publication” (16). However, one of the foremost experts on the Waismann-Wittgenstein relationship, Gordon Baker, has recently claimed “The German invasion of Holland scuppered the publication of the German text of the book. For unknown reasons the scheme for publishing the English translation was aborted.” There is no evidence that I am aware of that Wittgenstein’s misgivings about Waismann’s manuscript were the reason for its failure to appear as planned.

Second, Lieber repeats a common misunderstanding of Russell’s reactions to Wittgenstein’s criticism of the *Theory of Knowledge* manuscript in the spring of 1913, stating that it “affected Russell so deeply that he felt, for many years, that he was incapable of serious technical philosophical work (the manuscript itself

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1 *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* no. 122 (May 2004): 11-22

was not published until years after Russell’s death). Russell turned to writing on political and social topics and fiction” (18). This view of how Russell reacted can most likely be traced to Russell’s infamous 1916 letter to Ottoline Morrell, reprinted in his Autobiography, where he laments that “I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy. My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed to pieces against a breakwater.” Even the hyperbole of this letter should not lead us to ignore the fact that Russell wrote some of his most interesting and influential material in the period between June 1913 and the composition of this letter. These include the lectures published as *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy* and the papers “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”, “On Scientific Method in Philosophy” and “The Ultimate Constituents of Matter”. While perhaps it is possible that Russell did not view this as “fundamental work in philosophy”, we should certainly classify it as “serious technical philosophical work”.

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4 B. Russell, *Our Knowledge*. Chicago: Open Court, 1914. The papers mentioned have been reprinted in J. Slater (ed.), *op. cit.*

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I am delighted and encouraged that Christopher Pincock agrees with the main thrust of my essay, “Russell and Wittgenstein: A Study in Civility and Arrogance.” Still, respecting the withdrawal of Waismann’s book from Oxford Press in the late 1930s, I think Pincock’s comments may stand in need of correction or, perhaps, amplification. On the issue of Wittgenstein’s negative influence on Russell, however, there is certainly some justice in his rejection of what may be my overreliance on Russell’s almost certainly exaggerated claim that due to Wittgenstein’s criticisms he “could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy.” I probably should have emphasized that Russell felt that he was incapable of serious technical philosophical work and not that he was in fact incapable of it, although he still came to devote much of his time to political and social matters rather than to technical philosophy after his encounter with Wittgenstein. Still, as usual, there is more to be said.

Pincock quotes Gordon Baker’s comment that a German language version of Waismann’s book was “scuppered” by the German invasion of Holland, while “For unknown reasons the scheme for publishing the English version was aborted [it eventually appeared, much emended, as *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, in 1965].” Pincock adds that he knows of no evidence that Wittgenstein’s “misgivings” caused this failure to publish. However, we do have the following reports about the publication of the book.

First, Rom Harre, editor of *Principles*, writes in its preface:

> The original version of this book was written and prepared for publication before the Second World War, but was withdrawn by Waismann on the eve of publication. Thereafter he worked over and over the galleys adding to and developing the material, and compiling hundreds of sheets of inserts. (p. xii)

* Received January 23, 2005.

And Marie McGinn writes in her review of the Baker-edited *The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circles:*

Waismann eventually conceded that the whole [collaborative] scheme was unworkable [because at each meeting, Wittgenstein would passionately demolish ideas he had expressed at the previous meeting], and he and Schlick persuaded Wittgenstein to abandon the idea of co-authorship and authorize the two of them to write the text. After Schlick’s murder in June 1936, Waismann felt he owed it to his former mentor to see the project through to completion, although it seems clear that Wittgenstein became increasingly hostile to Waismann’s use of his ideas. The hostility is not altogether impossible to understand. The thoughts that Wittgenstein expresses in ‘Dictation for Schlick’ are ones that form the basis of many of the themes of the *Philosophical Investigations,* and it must have been extremely difficult to watch someone else give a presentation of them in which they can still be recognized but in which they have also been completely transformed. Gordon Baker concedes that Waismann is almost certainly one of the people Wittgenstein has in mind when he speaks, in the Preface to the *Philosophical Investigations,* of his ideas being “variously misunderstood, more or less mangled or watered down”. In the circumstances, it may seem an act of exceptional generosity by Baker — prompted in part, perhaps, by the poignant story of Waismann’s life — to suggest that we hear Wittgenstein’s voice in Waismann’s text.\(^2\)

So we do seem indeed to know the reason why the book, which was already in galley proofs and so already, expensively, set in type, was withdrawn: Waismann withdrew it. We also have some evidence as to why Waismann might have withdrawn it. Moreover, Waismann continued vigorous philosophical publication until his death in 1959, while at the same time working away at the galleys but making no attempt to publish it, which he easily could have done. In the 1970s, I was told by a scholar in a position to be quite sure about it that Wittgenstein demanded that Waismann withdraw the book from publication. Although this individual did not purport to say this in confidence, I am unable now to get permission to identify him.

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Russell’s case is more complex. Respecting the *Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript,*\(^3\) its editor, Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, comments:

It is strange that Russell, who seldom retreated from recounting his own failures or faults, should have not reported the fact that he had written a large part of a major work on the theory of knowledge which had been intended as his first important philosophical work after *Principia Mathematica* and which he was forced to abandon under circumstances which constituted an “event of first-rate importance in my life.” In fact, the existence of the partial book manuscript was not known until the Bertrand Russell papers were catalogued in 1967, prior to their sale, and, at that time Russell did not respond to inquiries about it (*ibid.*, viii).

Eames also tells us that Russell “leapt over” the theory of knowledge in the immediately following work that Pincock cites. Respecting “On Scientific Method in Philosophy,” which Russell delivered as a lecture prior to publication in 1914, Eames quotes Russell to Ottoline Morrell:

> It worries me, because I can't get interested, or feel that it matters … It will bring me 20 but it will be a miserable pot boiler (p. 55)

Throughout this period, Eames suggests, Russell’s pressing need to earn what money he can forces him to put together the lectures that become *Our Knowledge of the External World,* and the three essays that Pincock cites, which she suggests derive from the lectures, and thus also from his financial circumstances. Furthermore, it is not absurd to suppose that Russell regarded all this work to derive from the thinking he had done before Wittgenstein’s criticisms of 1913; *Our Knowledge of the External World* is commonly thought to have been what Russell intended to write as a part of the 1913 manuscript, had he finished it. In any case, with the exception of “The Relation of Sense Data to Physics,” he may well have thought of this work as popularization.

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Still, in keeping with his civility and his modesty, Russell had, even before 1913, made it clear to a number of people that he supposed Wittgenstein to be his successor, who would take the next important steps in philosophy. It is surely in keeping with the Socratic tradition that the man who was the greatest philosopher of the Twentieth Century should have, again in his civility and modesty, under-estimated his own achievements and capacities.

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END MATTER

Traveler's Diary / Conference Report

Right up until the last moment, whether the Pacific APA would actually occur in San Francisco was an open question. Rumors of striking hotel workers flew back and forth, causing many to ask whether the APA could in good conscience break faith with the workers of the world (who have nothing to lose but their jobs) or whether it perhaps ought to meet in San Diego.

I hear from a colleague that the conference did come off, but you can’t blame it on me.

When I departed New York for the conference the weather was clear and fine and I was excited. Big hills, blue sky, and the sun setting over the ocean were in my future. Though I would drive 7 hours to Erie, PA and fly to San Francisco in the morning I was carefree: work was over, the Easter weekend was imminent, and life was good. My optimism remained untouched by the snow and rain that worsened as traffic crept towards Pennsylvania’s Pocono mountains; and after driving several hours along I-80 my principle concern was simply to find a place to stop. I was to get my wish.

Around 6 pm our painful stop-and-go slowed to a stop. Like well-trained dogs that both sit and stay, we were immovable. An hour passed, two, then three: I ate raisins, read a book, cleaned out my car in the center of a ring of diesels, back-lit by towering klieg lights. Outside the circle was snow and ice and black night.

By midnight a tiny amount of shuffling forward and sliding managed to open a gap next to me through which I could squeeze, perpendicular to my by now good friends. Having done so, I turned my car onto the breakdown lane and limped off in a snit. I passed alongside an endless queue of trucks and cars, learning that I-80 was “closed”, that I should abandon all hope. But I was defiant. My options being what they were (slim), I took a side-road, driving in righteous wrath the road and into a ditch, where I stuck, blinkers blinking, like a candle in a birthday cake.

[Fade to black]

On the road again around 1:00 am, I crept ever so cleverly and stubbornly along an unfamiliar road in the wake of a number of
Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process. Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.
colossal plows. Turns out they were going my way, since I was eventually brought past the mountains and back to I-80.

Even out of the mountains the scene was apocalyptic. Everywhere cars lay strewn: belly up on the meridian, on the shoulder, snow-covered and abandoned, or fallen to a terrifying doom in the depths beyond the guardrails. Like Cerebus guarding Hell's gate, a police car blocked the entrance to the interstate. Perhaps it too was stranded. In any event, I slipped by it undeterred. Conceding that I had missed my flight — it was 3:30 am, the airport was still 6 hours away, and I was exhausted — I found a motel. There I slept, rose, and rushed to the highway by 7:00 am, driving to the Erie airport in hopes of a later flight only to discover that no seats were to be had on any plane going anywhere. Ah, Easter: symbol of the Resurrection, of the spirit traveling from death to life, no doubt by plane.

I wasn’t the only casualty of the BRS session. One speaker dropped out early; fortunately, Bob Riemenschneider was able to step in to replace him. Jane Duran, another speaker, became ill and missed the session altogether. A similar fate must have hit the audience, who, according to Sandra Lapointe, the third speaker, was also missing from the session.—ROSALIND CAREY

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**BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.**
1st Quarter 2005 Treasurer’s Report
Cash Flow
1/1/2005 - 3/31/2005

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<td>$5,182.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Dues</td>
<td>$5,322.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Income**</td>
<td>$234.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL INCOME</td>
<td>$6,031.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPENSES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Charges</td>
<td>$31.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library Expenses</td>
<td>$94.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PayPal Fees</td>
<td>$31.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL EXPENSES</td>
<td>$156.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL OVERALL</td>
<td>$5,874.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALANCE 3/31/05</td>
<td>$14,164.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes two members who renewed as Life Members. We recommend they take professional advice on the tax status of their dues.

** We still haven’t paid about $500 for the *Quarterly* for the 3rd & 4th quarters, 2004, & 1st quarter, 2005. This is after Lehman College’s contribution of about $800. This will be paid shortly. We haven’t yet paid for the 2004 *Russell*. This runs about $2500 to $3000 a year.

Dennis J. Darland, Treasurer
djdarland@qconline.com
GREATER RUSSELL ROCHESTER SET
Call (585) 424-3184  7 pm, $3/Free to WBV Members

Writers & Books’ Verb Café
740 University Ave.
Rochester, NY

7/14 Phil Ebersole: Bertrand Russell’s Essay “Philosophy and Politics”
8/11 Joint Meeting with the Chesterton Society of Rochester
9/08 David White: Beyond Wittgenstein’s Poker by Peter Munz
10/13 George Campbell McDade: The Prospects of Industrial Civilization by Bertrand & Dora Russell
11/10 G. Wildenberg: Bertrand Russell’s Short Story “The Theologian’s Nightmare”
12/08 Phil Ebersole: Bertrand Russell’s Essay “The Essence of Religion”

BAY AREA RUSSELL SET
8/7 The University Café
Bob Riemenschneider and Peter Stone discuss the OS Bertrand Russell Society Annual Meeting and answer questions about the Society.

*As of 8/7 the Bay Area Russell Set will meet the 1st Sun. each month at:

271 University Avenue
Palo Alto

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Manifesto 50
Edited by Ken Coates
Requiem - Kurt Vonnegut
Building the Bomb - Michele Ernsting, Joseph Rotblat & Ken Coates
The Russell-Einstein Manifesto
Bertrand Russell & Albert Einstein
Convert & Disarm - Seymour Melman
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Doctrines & Visions - Noam Chomsky
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