THE RETURN OF NATURALISM

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IN OUR LAST ISSUE of the Quarterly, Andrew Lugg argued for the controversial thesis that Russell was a naturalist (one who presupposes scientific theories to answer philosophical questions, so that philosophy is a part of science) from at least 1912 on. Most Russell scholars would disagree and respond to Russell’s claims that his philosophy is scientific by saying: “Well, yes, he says that, but you have to understand that what he means by ‘scientific philosophy’ is not at all what we would call science, but something wildly metaphysical and purely philosophical.” In contrast, Lugg has taken seriously Russell’s claims to have been doing scientific philosophy, and has constructed a systematic interpretation of Russell’s philosophy from them that seems to be an accurate account of Russell’s views.

Several people besides Lugg have taken Russell’s claims to have been doing scientific philosophy seriously: these are Thomas Baldwin, Graham Stevens, Paul O’Grady, and the recently deceased Ned Garvin. But each has viewed Russell’s naturalism differently, with each emphasizing different aspects of it. In this issue, Graham Stevens responds to Lugg’s views, agreeing with parts, disagreeing with others and presenting an alternative view of Russell’s naturalism. Lugg replies to Stevens with an elaboration of his own views of the matter.

FRIEDRICH WAISMANN was a student of Wittgenstein’s philosophy for most of his adult life, but because Wittgenstein repeatedly insisted that Waismann did not understand him, Waismann’s philosophy, especially his views on Wittgenstein’s philosophy and ordinary language philosophy, is not highly regarded by most philosophers today. In this issue’s feature essay, ‘A Road Less Traveled’, Mazi Allen gives us a detailed sketch of Waismann’s philosophy on the way to correcting Richard Rorty’s misrepresentation of it. The picture of Waismann’s philosophy that Mazi presents us with is one that makes Waismann sound much more interesting than the standard view has it.
Waismann was one of the original members of the Vienna Circle and a student of Moritz Schlick – it was in fact Schlick who assigned Waismann the project of speaking with Wittgenstein in Vienna and writing a systematic exposition of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. However, Wittgenstein’s philosophy was in constant transition and the project soon evolved from providing a systematic exposition of the *Tractatus* to one of recording Wittgenstein’s post-*Tractarian* thought and then to one of describing his philosophy that emerged still later. Waismann worked at this task from 1927 to 1939, but in 1936 Wittgenstein withdrew from the project completely. Waismann continued with the project alone and his book on Wittgenstein was set for publication in 1939, only to be withdrawn by Waismann at the last minute. It was finally published in 1965, six years after Waismann’s death.

Because of all this, Waismann is often thought of as having been a mere expositor of Wittgenstein and a poor one at that, one who in the end simply failed to appreciate Wittgenstein’s thought. After all, the master himself had made this judgment, hadn’t he? Moreover, A.J. Ayer, in his anthology of the Vienna Circle philosophers, *Logical Positivism*, includes just one article by Waismann, ‘How I See Philosophy’, and he puts that at the very end of the book, as though including the essay out of a sense obligation or as an afterthought, as if to say: “Well, Waismann was a member of the Vienna Circle, so I guess we should include something by him; but let’s stick it in the back out of the way; we’ll put Schlick and Carnap up front; theirs are the important essays.” However, after reading Allen’s essay on Waismann, and I hope after also going back and reading or rereading one or more of Waismann’s own essays, the reader may well come away with a new appreciation of Waismann. I know I have. It now seems to me that his later philosophy is the most mature of the analytic philosophers of the period – the most grown-up and subtlest. Perhaps, then, Ayer didn’t put Waismann’s essay in the back of his book as an afterthought and because he thought it the least important of the essays in that volume, but because he thought it the aptest conclusion for Logical Positivism, the best ending for his book and for analytic philosophy as well. If this is so, perhaps Ayer’s philosophy itself had more subtly than it’s usually given credit for having. It’s possible. I may go back and take another look soon.

Also in this issue, we include a 1946 review by George Orwell of Russell book *Power*, with an introduction by Peter Stone (and a thanks to Phil Ebersole for suggesting the review for inclusion in the BRSQ), and a new review by Chad Trainer of Chris Shute’s book *Bertrand Russell: “Education as the Power of Independent Thought”*. Chad provides us with a detailed view of Shute’s book. And finally, we have at the back of the issue, in the traveler’s diary, report of the 2006 BRS Annual Meeting held in Iowa City and the minutes for the BRS Board of Directors meeting held there.

**An invitation**

*To a relaxing, learned weekend*

**The 34th Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society**

**June 8-10, 2007**

**Monmouth University, New Jersey**

And a **Call for Papers**

*The annual meeting wants your papers and ideas!*

Send papers or ideas for master classes on any subject related to Bertrand Russell’s life and work to BRS President Alan Schwerin at aschwerin@monmouth.edu
SOCIETY NEWS

AFTER 27 YEARS OF REMARKABLE SERVICE TO THE BRS, our treasurer, DENNIS DARLAND, has resigned from that position. More than anyone else, Dennis is responsible for having kept this Society on a steady keel and functioning reliably from one year to the next. Thank you, Dennis. We are grateful for everything you have done for us and won’t soon forget it.

AS OF THIS WRITING, the Society is looking for someone to replace Dennis as its treasurer. The only requirement for being treasurer that is stated in the Society bylaws is that you must have belonged to the Society for at least one year. If you fit that description and are interested in being the Society’s treasurer, please contact any BRS executive officer or board member at once. For the interim (until the BRS June Annual Meeting), KEN BLACKWELL will be acting treasurer of the Society.

IT’S TIME TO RENEW YOUR MEMBERSHIP to the Bertrand Russell Society! If you have not yet done so, we hope you will renew your membership now, using the form enclosed with this issue of the BRS Quarterly. For those wishing to pay their dues online using a credit card, you can now pay via PayPal. Just go to https://www.paypal.com and open a free account. When prompted for the recipient’s email address, enter brs-pp@sbcglobal.net. There is no charge to make PayPal payments, which – foreign members take note – will be handled in US dollars. When prompted for a message to send to our treasurer, state the purpose of the payment and any change of address but do not include your credit card information. Our treasurer will send you an email receipt and update the membership records accordingly.

CURIOUS TO KNOW WHO’S NEW ON THE BOARD OF THE BRS?

The fall election results for the Russell Society Board of Directors are as follows: Ken Blackwell (28 votes), David Blitz (28 votes), Philip Ebersole (26 votes), David Henehan (27 votes), Kevin Klement (28 votes), Tom Stanley (29 votes), Russell Wahl (27 votes) and David White (26 votes).

The election results were not much of a surprise – eight people were elected from a slate of eight candidates. But two of those elected, Kevin Klement and Russell Wahl, are new to the board. It is healthy for the Society to have fresh voices on its executive board and a quick look at the recent past shows a reassuring regularity to this influx of new people on the board. In the 2005 election, Gregory Landini and John Ongley were elected to the board both for the first time, and Marvin Kohl (board chair from 1989 to 1995) was re-elected to it after a long absence. In 2003 David Blitz and David Henehan were both elected to the board for the first time, in 2002 Andrew Bone and Cara Rice were new board members, in 2002 Rosalind Carey was elected for the first time, and the pattern continues back to the founding of the Society in 1974.

A list of Society Board members going back to 1995 can be found at: http://www.user.drew.edu/~jlenz/BRS_Officers_past.htm. If you have any information as to who was on the Society’s board of directors before that, please contact the editors of this journal and those names will be added to this list at the Society’s website.

COMING SOON!
THE 34TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BRS!

This happy event, hosted by BRS President Alan Schwerin, returns to Monmouth University in New Jersey June 8-10, 2007. Rooms are available on campus for the event, but space is limited, so contact Alan at aschweri@monmouth.edu soon with your requests. Details of the meeting will follow, but if the future resembles the past it will be a weekend of engaging talks, good company and an overall good time. We hope to see all of you there.

A CALL FOR ANNUAL MEETING PAPERS. The annual meeting’s success turns in large part on its papers, and for this we need you. Are you working on a paper or presentation? Do you have an idea that would be a hot topic for the annual meeting? Share it with us! How about running a seminar on readings from Russell that you have found interesting? The master classes have all been well attended in the past and generate a good deal of response from the floor. So be sure to contact BRS President Alan Schwerin soon (at aschweri@monmouth.edu) with your ideas and contributions on Russell’s thought and his life. They will be most welcome.
CALL FOR APA PAPERS. If you're interested in reading a paper on Russell at the BRS session or on the history of early analytic philosophy at the HEAPS session of the Eastern or Central meetings of the APA (in Baltimore December 27-30, 2007 and at the Palmer House in Chicago April 14-20, 2008 respectively), please be sure to contact Rosalind Carey (rosalind.carey@lehman.cuny.edu) about it soon. (HEAPS is the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society that often co-hosts APA sessions with the BRS.)

RUSSELL SPEECH ON THE INTERNET. The Bertrand Russell Society Librarian, Tom Stanley, reports that Russell's 1959 address to the CND is available for download as ‘Bertrand Russell on the Arms Race’ from the website of the Talking History Project at: http://www.albany.edu/talkinghistory/arch2006july-december.html. Here is their description of the speech: “Bertrand Russell, the Nobel prize-winning philosopher, mathematician, and author, became a vocal critic of the arms race in the post-WWII Cold War era. In this selection of a speech on nuclear disarmament, first recorded in Manchester England on May Day of 1959, Russell expressed some of his concerns about the fate of humanity in the face of the growing arms race.” The speech is approximately 12 minutes in length. Tom also reports that there are a large number of speeches, interviews and other recordings by Russell that are available for downloading from Sveinbjorn Thordarson’s excellent Russell web-pages at: http://www.sveinbjorn.org/russell. These recordings include many of the Woodrow Wyatt interviews with Russell, and an audio book of readings from Russell’s Religion and Science.

ALAN SCHWERIN, PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSELL SOCIETY, has recently had a new collection of papers on Russell accepted for publication. It is scheduled to be published January 2008 by Cambridge Scholars Publishing and will be called Revisiting Russell: Critical Reflections on the Thought of Bertrand Russell. It will include papers from the past two annual meetings of the BRS. This volume follows an earlier collection of essays edited by Schwerin from Bertrand Russell Society annual meetings called Bertrand Russell on Nuclear War, Peace, and Language: Critical and Historical Essays. There is an online review by David Blitz of this earlier volume at: http://russell.mcmaster.ca/blitz_schwerin.pdf.

ETHAN HOUSER, AN AMERICAN SCULPTOR now living in Mexico City, has just completed a sculpture bust of Bertrand Russell. He describes it as depicting “a younger Russell with a suppressed smile at the height of his productive life” and says that it is a piece he has wanted to do for a long time. The piece is 31 cm. high (slightly over 12”) and will be cast in bronze, given a deep rich 19th century type patina, and mounted on a base of black granite. The base will bring the total height of the piece to around 17”. It will be a signed, hand numbered limited edition piece and no more than forty will ever be cast, with a price “under $2,000 USD”. Ethan Houser can be contacted at ethantaliesin@yahoo.com.

FINALLY, BRS MEMBER MIKE BEANEY will be publishing a collection of essays on analysis sometime next year with Routledge. It will be called The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology and will include the following essays on Russell, along with a host of essays on a wide variety of related analysts and topics: ‘Frege-Russell Numbers: Analysis or Explanation?’ by Erich H. Reck, ‘Analysis and Abstraction Principles in Russell and Frege’ by James Levine, ‘Some Remarks on Russell’s Early Decompositional Style of Analysis’ by Nicholas Griffin, ‘On Denoting’ and the Idea of a Logically Perfect Language’ by Peter Hylton and ‘Logical Analysis and Logical Construction’ by Bernard Linsky.
FEATURE

A ROAD LESS TRAVELED: THE LASTING SIGNIFICANCE
OF WAISMANN’S ‘HOW I SEE PHILOSOPHY’*

MAZI ALLEN

In his introduction to *The Linguistic Turn*, the anthology that established him as an authority on the history of analytic philosophy, Richard Rorty makes several questionable claims regarding various major philosophers—dismissing J. L. Austin as a lexicographer, Ludwig Wittgenstein as a self-styled therapist for philosophers and Martin Heidegger as a poet.\(^1\) However, his most questionable claim concerns Friedrich Waismann, member of the Vienna Circle and later (after 1939) lecturer at Oxford. Of Waismann’s later philosophy, Rorty says:

[For Waismann] methodological nominalism would be retained [the assumption that universals and concepts themselves do not exist and can be explained scientifically in terms of observations of particulars or else as misuses of language], but ... the demand for clear-cut criteria of agreement about the truth of philosophical theses would be dropped. Philosophers could then turn towards creating Ideal Languages, but the criterion for being “Ideal” would no longer be the dissolution of philosophical problems, but rather the creation of new and fruitful ways of thinking of things in general. This would amount to a return to the great tradition of philosophy as system-building – the only difference being that the systems built would no longer be considered descriptions of the nature of things or of human consciousness, but rather proposals about how to talk. By such a move, the “creative” and “constructive” function of philosophy would be retained. Philosophers would be, as they have traditionally been supposed to be, the men who gave one a *Weltanschauung*.\(^2\)

An earlier version of this essay was read at a History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society session of the December 2004 eastern division meeting of the American Philosophical Association.


\(^{2}\) Ibid., 34.
This account of Waismann’s aims and methods, though correct in some respects, is quite flawed in others. Is it true that Waismann no longer aimed for the “dissolution of philosophical questions”? Did Waismann really propose “creating Ideal Languages” and returning “to the great tradition of ... system-building”? Can we really say that Waismann conceived of philosophers as being “the men who gave one a Weltanschauung”?

In order to support his claims, Rorty refers to Waismann’s essay ‘How I see Philosophy’—a work which I will reengage in order to place Waismann’s views in their proper perspective. In doing so, I will show that Waismann’s method and aims are not exactly what Rorty presents them as being. Waismann’s method does not consist in system-building in the traditional sense, nor in giving a Weltanschauung, nor even in constructing an ideal language, but in fundamentally questioning all of the above endeavors in open dialogue.

1. The essay ‘How I See Philosophy’, originally written for the anthology Contemporary British Philosophy, begins with the claim that philosophy is not like science at all. Given the influence of the later Carnap and Quine, most analytic philosophers today would find this view shocking—but this in fact was the view held by many members of the Vienna Circle, including Moritz Schlick. Waismann further claims that philosophy offers no proofs nor admits of theorems nor even asks questions that can be decided decisively by arguments. “Philosophy” he says, is very unlike science; and this in three respects: in philosophy there are no proofs; there are no theorems; and there are no questions that can be decided, Yes or No.

Nor for Waismann does philosophy engage in the tradition of casting ... ideas into deductive moulds, in the grand style of Spinoza.

Hence, just two pages into the article, Waismann has denied one of the first views Rorty attributes to him, namely, the seeking of a return to the philosophical system-building of early modern rationalism. But if Waismann says philosophy should not try to construct deductive systems that conclusively establish truths through arguments, isn’t he also saying that philosophy—as a “quest for truth”—has come to an end? Fortunately not. What philosophy does offer, according to Waismann, are not answers but questions. If we are lucky, he contends, dialogues about these questions would lead us to new and interesting ways of speaking about and so observing the world. As an example of this way of doing philosophy, Waismann reexamines the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise (Zeno’s paradox).

In considering whether Achilles could ever catch the tortoise a few feet away from him if he had to cross an infinite series of intervals to do so, Waismann first notes that the common objection to Zeno’s paradox—that “of course” a finite end exists between the supposedly infinite series between two points (namely, the second point)—entirely misses Zeno’s point. The paradox is really concerned with the infinite series itself and how one could come to the end of it if it were possible to prolong the series merely by adding another term. Yet looked at another way, the problem is easily dealt with—for if we take the same principle of Zeno’s paradox (that an infinite series can be extended “forever”) and apply it to a temporal phenomenon such as a minute, we find that the paradox falls apart. Zeno would be forced to say that “at no time” would a minute come to an end, since a half-minute, quarter-minute, and so on, would all have to end in turn. Hence there could be no time whatsoever.

Thus, merely placing Zeno’s paradox in a different context reveals that the notion of sequence upon which it depends may be described in two different senses—temporally and atemporally. The paradox of Achilles and the tortoise merely confuses these senses. As Waismann put it, the question of Zeno’s paradox was never solved but “dissolved” as a question arising from the confusion of different senses of the same term. In clarifying the terms of the

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3 Ibid., 36, n.66.
5 D.S. Clarke, Philosophy’s Second Revolution: Early and Recent Analytic Philosophy (Chicago: Open Court, 1997), p. 110; 110, n.7.
6 Rorty, The Linguistic Turn, 50-51.
I.I.

MAZI ALLEN

Discussion and not merely answering the questions put before it - philosophy would find its use. But this is an example of the very thing Rorty says Waismann rejects - the “dissolution of philosophical problems”. Indeed, it is this possibility of “dissolving philosophical problems” that is essential to the method Waismann proposes for philosophical discussion. In fact, the method of questioning he proposes depends upon it. Therefore, we need to examine Waismann’s method of questioning in order to understand his view of philosophy. Here too, his proposal is quite interesting.

First, according to Waismann, one should never force the interlocutor - if the use of unusual terms is the only way in which a person can express an idea, such usages must be permitted. Further, the speaker should even be free to use the same term in widely differing - even contradictory - senses: the only requirement for such usage is that the speaker be aware of what he or she is doing and the consequences of doing it. At every phase of the account the speaker would be questioned, when necessary, as to the usefulness of terms that arise. If the terms are found necessary, the speaker would continue, if not, the questioner might propose a different set of terms and possibly even a different account. Again, we see that the goal of such discussion is not to prove the correctness of a system, nor to provide anyone with a complete, much less completed, Weltanschauung, but to engage in discussing and describing one’s experiences in dialogue with others.

In keeping with this dialogical method, Waismann further suggests that arguments to prove or disprove the view under examination in such a philosophical dialogue should not be used - the goal of such dialogue, and really philosophy itself, is to clarify the views in question, not to solve problems or derive proofs. Instead of argument and proof, the experience being spoken of would be discussed by all precisely as it presented itself to each of the discussants. In this way, through providing differing perspectives on the same subject, all of the discussants would aid in truly addressing the question. This would lead either to the clarification of the meaning of the terms used to describe such experience or dissolution of the worldview initially proposed. In this way, Waismann sought to strengthen philosophical debate - by moving it away from the rigid systemization of philosophers like Spinoza, and even away from the stiff formalism of present-day analytic philosophy, towards a more open method of analysis.

Finally, according to Waismann, what is sought in philosophy is a new way of describing the world, especially a new vocabulary and grammar with which to describe it. But note that this new way of describing the world would be neither a universal explanation nor a deductive one beyond which nothing more could be added. Instead, it would be a worldview constructed through dialogue and the clarification of language - continually open to modification by the same means. Waismann’s way of constructing a worldview, or rather world conception, through dialogue would affect the vocabularies and grammars of both the discussant and interlocutors - creating new problems for each in speaking about experiences, and so stimulating further discussions on the subject and further growth in vocabularies, grammars, and modes of thought.

Thus, Waismann’s later method presents a means of examining our most fundamental and deeply held views - either to clarify them through dialogue or eventually dissolve them if indefensible. Philosophy, then, is not merely a debunking of theories for Waismann, but a process of learning how and why certain descriptions of experience are used in the first place. In doing so, the practice of philosophy serves as a liberating force not only from the rigid bounds of language (both formal and ordinary) but even from the modes of thought and prejudices accompanying them. Take for instance Waismann’s criticisms of the then-current uses of language within philosophy.

Regarding the insistence on the ordinary use of language in philosophy, Waismann states in his article ‘Ordinary Language’ that, even if there were such a thing as a stock-use [of language], it need not matter much to the philosopher . . . I should say that, sooner or later, he is bound to commit the crime and depart from it - that is, if he has something new to say.

11 Ibid., 12.
12 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 13, 21.
15 Ibid., 187.
And in his article ‘Verifiability’, he claims that new ways of speaking even affect the way people perceive their environments, as was also supposed by the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in linguistic anthropology. Waismann also asserts this view in ‘How I See Philosophy’ and approvingly quotes Nietzsche as saying:

It is quite possible that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altaic languages ... will look differently “into the world” and be found on paths of thought quite different from those of the Indo-European....

And he further elaborates on these views later in the article, arguing that Frege could not ask “What is a number?” – with number being an ideal, even Platonic entity, as opposed to a symbol used in counting – if his language did not allow for Platonizing (which, apparently, Waismann believed the Chinese language did not allow for). However, such relativity – even in the conceptualizing of such things as number – need not be denied or seen as obstacles to understanding in Waismann’s view but rather seen as opportunities to understand differently, to “swim up-stream ... against the current of clichés.” Hence, far from the position of Quine and others, Waismann might have been expected to defend the usage of obscure terms even by thinkers such as Derrida – that is, if Derrida actually had “something new” to say.

2.

But what does all this say about Rorty’s claim that Waismann’s philosophy consists in creating ideal languages? Rorty uses Gustav Bergmann’s account of language as an example of an ideal language. According to the view Rorty lays out, analytic philosophers who advocate constructing an ideal language do so as a means of dissolving philosophical problems. Thus Bergmann, Rorty’s exemplar of such a view, states that an ideal language must serve to both (a) dissolve “philosophical puzzles” (b) “show, in principle, the structure and systematic arrangement of all major areas of ... experience.”

Although this view of an ideal language seems similar to what Waismann has said about the aim of his philosophy, there are important differences. Bergmann, among others, believed that such a language could be established once and for all. However, this type of ideal language – single, final and universal – is not what Waismann was proposing. Waismann would have considered such language a hindrance to philosophy – in fact, in ‘How I See Philosophy’, he compares such formalized language to “an axe of glass that breaks the moment you use it.” More importantly, for Waismann, the creation of such an ‘ideal language,’ or even a slightly improved one, could only occur through dialogue. Such dialogue would seek to test the supposed “ideal” (or at least adequate) nature of pre-existing language(s) used by participants in terms of how adequate they were for dissolving philosophical puzzles and presenting new insights into various sorts of experience. Only when these were found inadequate would the task of clarifying language and hence creating an “ideal” language (or really, a somewhat improved language) begin. Regarding the role of dialogue, however, Bergman was silent.

For Waismann, what was sought was to create language(s) adequate to the experience being described and hence to remove certain linguistic practices as well as the long-held prejudices accompanying them. This would be accomplished through an on-going, collective undertaking to create a fundamental change in our “angle of vision” as philosophers. Waismann thus proposed that “cases” for a certain view or other would be built up and dialogically contested as to their descriptive adequacy instead of a single ideal language being created to encompass every aspect of experience.

It seems that Waismann was on to something: language is “plastic”, shaped both by its use and the material conditions of its users. The particular linguistic turn made by Waismann was significant in going beyond Bergmann and others in conceiving of the use of language as being created in an open-ended (indeed “open textured”) dialogue, rather than being firmly,

16 Ibid., 59-60.
17 Ibid.
18 ‘Open Letter Against Derrida Receiving an Honorary Doctorate from Cambridge University’ The Times (London), May 9, 1992.
19 Rorty, The Linguistic Turn, 132-134.

20 Waismann, How I See Philosophy, 23.
21 Ibid., 30.
22 Ibid., 23.
definitively, set in rigid conventions. Thus his method, instead being of a return to rationalist metaphysics, was really a return to the older tradition of Socratic dialogue. This rediscovery of question and dialogue as a philosophical method is perhaps Waismann’s most overlooked as well as most important achievement.

3. In a discussion of an earlier version of this paper, David Godden brought up an interesting point regarding Waismann in asking “whether any employment of language (whether this involves the introduction of new vocabularies, or new uses to which an existing vocabulary might be put) would be either encouraged or accepted by Waismann” and whether “Waismann [would] really sanction the use of obscure terms by certain postmodernist thinkers ... as a matter of general principal?” For his example, Godden used Alan Sokal’s book *Fashionable Nonsense* and its account of Sokal’s well-known hoax perpetrated on the “postmodernist” editors of the journal *Social Text*. If Waismann were to allow the use of unusual senses unqualifiedly, Godden would indeed be correct in saying that this would be “certainly more permissive than we [philosophers] ought to be.” However, as Godden himself noted, Waismann does not. Instead he says:

we merely remind him of how these words have always been used by him, in non-philosophical contexts that is, and then point out that, to say what he wanted to say lands him in an absurdity. All we do is to make him aware of his own practice. We abstain from any assertion. It is for him to explain what he means.

Unlike Waismann, however, Godden was pessimistic as to whether the interlocutor could in fact “explain what he [or she] means” in such a situation where he or she was seemingly talking nonsense. Waismann, I contend, was far more of an optimist.

For Waismann, whether or not a point being argued was nonsense was an open question to be decided in discussion. If the ideas being presented were sheer nonsense – as was Sokal’s “physical reality is a social ... construction” article – a well executed philosophical dialogue would surely have brought this to the fore, allowing the “Sokal” figure to be caught in the linguistic trap he had laid for his audience. However if a person truly had something new to propose for which the terminology was not presently available, this too would become apparent. Indeed, the type of discussion proposed by Waismann would even help the philosophical interlocutor find the terminology needed to express the new idea. Hence, unlike the former editors of *Social Text*, who seemed to have accepted Sokal’s propositions uncritically, the philosophers engaged in discussion structured along Waismann’s lines would be in little if any danger of embarrassments like the Sokal Hoax.

4. Whether Waismann was really trying to build a system of philosophy or not would depend on the way we conceive of ‘a system of philosophy’. If we mean that he was trying to find one, complete, final system of meaning, the answer would be that Waismann was not engaged in this sort of thing, whereas Spinoza certainly was. Indeed, given the various factors that go into creating a philosophical system, Waismann would have probably thought such a system impossible. However, if constructing systems means clarifying pre-existing or emerging systems of thought, comparing their merits, or tentatively introducing new concepts into our vocabularies and so new ways of looking at the world into our languages, then for Waismann too philosophy works at system-building – though through open-ended discussion and an ongoing search for language adequate to everyday experience in the more modest style of Socrates as opposed to Spinoza. The Spinozist project described by Rorty was not a part of Waismann’s own conception of philosophy.

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23 Godden, now at the University of Windsor in Ontario, made these comments at my presentation of this paper at the December 2004 meeting of the APA.
24 Ibid., 11.
DISCUSSION

ON RUSSELL’S NATURALISM

GRAHAM STEVENS

In an article published recently in this journal, Andrew Lugg contends that Quine’s naturalized epistemology was pre-empted in most important respects by Russell’s epistemological project from roughly 1912 onwards. Contrary to the (arguably) standard interpretation of Russell as a Cartesian foundationalist in epistemology, Lugg presents the following portrait of Russell the epistemologist:

He is an empiricist in the Quinean mode, one who takes the doctrine that there is nothing in the mind about the world not first in the senses to be a finding of science (as opposed to a result of pure inquiry prior to scientific research). His empiricism is integral to his naturalism and he intends his claims about the evidence of the senses and our knowledge of the external world to be understood as hypotheses open to criticism and improvement.2

I share Lugg’s conviction that the naturalistic elements of Russell’s philosophy are important. The subject is one deserving of further attention. In the following paper, I will offer a somewhat different slant on Russell’s naturalism to the one Lugg presents. Although I am in agreement with Lugg’s general theses that (1) Russell’s naturalism is an important element of his philosophy that has been overly neglected in studies of him, and (2) Russell’s naturalism is an important precursor to Quine’s, I will take issue with the details of his take on each thesis. With regard to (1) I will argue that naturalism of the Quinean variety cannot be accurately attributed to Russell in as neat and simple a fashion as Lugg does. One reason for this is that Russell cannot be accurately characterized as an empiricist, even if the characterization is a qualified one of an empiricist “in the Quinean mode”. With regard to (2) I will argue that Russell’s greatest influence on Quine’s naturalistic project did not stem from his epistemology but from his semantics. In criticizing Lugg’s (2), I will therefore simultaneously be defending my own interpreta-

2 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
tion of Russell's naturalism as given in detail elsewhere. On that interpretation, Russell took the naturalistic turn when he looked to psychology to provide a new home for propositional content. Once located in empirical psychology, Russell then took the further natural step of seeking to explain content in purely causal terms. Russell's greatest contribution to philosophical naturalism was his attempt to naturalize content via a causal theory of meaning. It is not, as Lugg claims, Russell's empiricism that is integral to his naturalism; it is his psychologism. The point is important for two reasons: first, Russell's attitude to empiricism was variable and rarely resulted in unconditional subscription; second, it means that Russell was only really engaged in a project that can be usefully labelled "naturalistic" after he abandoned the anti-psychologism that was central to his early philosophy.

There is, as Lugg notes, plenty of evidence against the picture of Russell as a naturalized epistemologist. Russell repeatedly talks about the importance of establishing certainty in philosophy and it seems that the quest for such certainty was the original motivation for his interest in philosophy and, more particularly, for his desire to establish the truth of logicism in mathematics. But these issues are only apparent obstacles to Lugg's thesis. For one thing, he does not attribute any commitment to epistemological naturalism prior to 1912. (Lugg does not explicitly date the emergence of Russell's naturalism but he does cite 1912's Problems of Philosophy as evidence of it, so I will assume that he holds Russell's naturalism to be an active component of his philosophy from then onwards.) For another, even had he done so, it would be feasible to assume that one must tell a different epistemological story with regard to mathematical knowledge to that told about empirical knowledge. Whatever problems Russell's philosophy of mathematics might face when it comes to explaining how we access the logical truths that mathematical truths are taken to be, these problems may be safely kept in quarantine, leaving the rest of Russell's epistemology uninfected by them. Empiricists (of which, it will be recalled, Lugg thinks Russell is one) have always had to make a special case for logical and mathematical knowledge. If the influence of Wittgenstein's Tractatus on Russell was as great as some maintain, it may have convinced Russell, as it did the Vienna Circle, that mathematical knowledge is a special case because, being trivial knowledge of analytic truths, it scarcely counts as knowledge at all. It is knowledge of truths which are "all of the same nature as the "great truth" that there are three feet in a yard".

Furthermore, there is evidence for Lugg's claim that Russell was a naturalistic epistemologist. Aside from the Russell texts he cites, the portrait of Russell as an early proponent of naturalized epistemology fits well with Russell's own characterisation of his philosophy as a "a gradual retreat from Pythagoras" (that is, from the view that mathematical objects and the truths about them are wholly independent of the minds that grasp them). If Russell once believed that secure foundations for knowledge could be uncovered prior to (and distinct from) the gathering of scientific knowledge, he appears to have rejected it by the time he parted company with Pythagoras. It is no easy task, though, to determine just when Russell really did turn his back on Pythagoreanism, as he preferred to call the doctrine that most philosophers of mathematics nowadays would not distinguish from Platonism. Some rough location of that

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3 Stevens, 'Russell's Re-Psychologising of the Proposition', in The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy, ch. 5. 
4 See Anthony Grayling's 'Russell, Experience, and the Roots of Science' for detailed discussion of Russell's attitude towards empiricism and pp. 38-41 of Nicholas Griffin's introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell for an overview of the exegetical dispute regarding that attitude. 
5 See, e.g., Ray Monk's Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude. 
6 This might be thought to be difficult due to Russell's use of set-theoretic constructions in his analyses of the alleged denizens of the external world. E.g. physical objects are defined as series of classes of sense-data in Russell's logical atomist period. But there is no need to appeal here to our knowledge of the raw logical materials out of which classes and series are constructed according to the doctrines of Principia Mathematica in order to explain our knowledge of objects. Rather objects "in themselves" (insofar as it is admissible to use such a locution at all) are constructed out of the immediately available empirical information we already do have (sense-data).
7 Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 860. See pp. 54-58 of my 'From Russell's Paradox to the Theory of Judgement' for discussion of Wittgenstein's influence on Russell on this point.
8 See, e.g., My Philosophical Development, p. 17.
point in Russell’s philosophy is surely required, however, if Lugg is to establish his claim that the Russell of The Problems of Philosophy, Theory of Knowledge, and Our Knowledge of the External World is seeking to naturalize epistemology. It is doubtful, to say the least, that the class of Quinean naturalists and the class of Pythagorean realists intersect.

Russell’s memory, I believe, had a tendency to both accelerate and overstate his retreat from Pythagoras in his later recollections of it. This has encouraged some commentators to see Russell as one who, on discovering the theory of descriptions in 1905, wielded Ockham’s Razor with all the fury of a demented axe-murderer, slaughtering all but the most indispensable members of his ontology in a violent bloodbath that left reality as he envisioned it by the time Principia was completed, if slightly more populated than that envisioned by the nominalist, then nonetheless comparable in taste to the “desert landscapes” relished by Quine.9 This version of events, propagated in no small measure by Quine himself, has been severely challenged—arguably refuted—in recent years.10 As an account of Russell’s ontological development it is no more than a crude caricature. Russell’s retreat from Pythagoras was more complicated and drawn out than this. For one thing, the theory of descriptions played a somewhat different role in Russell’s philosophy than the one it played when absorbed into Quine’s. For Quine the theory of descriptions was a method of ontological pruning. For Russell it was something more: it was a method of logical construction.

It is not my intention to get drawn here into well-known debates about the ontological status of Russellian logical constructions. I do however want to point out that whatever the theory is employed in constructing, and whatever the ontological status of those constructions, the raw materials of construction are essential to the process. It is here that Russell’s epistemology famously infiltrates his logic, his semantics, and even his metaphysics: the raw materials from which logical constructions are constructed must be items with which the constructor has immediate acquaintance. The paradigm case, of course, is the case of definite descriptions. As sentences containing them contain no corresponding constituent when reparsed into their correct logical form, definite descriptions are “incomplete symbols” and their apparent referents are “logical constructions” the existence of which we need neither deny nor affirm.11 Note that the things we are going to have to be acquainted with in order to understand the propositions expressed by descriptive sentences according to Russell’s principle of acquaintance (“in every proposition that we can apprehend … all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance”)12 are going to have to be just the kinds of things that one would not expect to find obscuring the elegant view provided by any Quinean desert landscape: namely universals or attributes in intensity. Since, on analysis, the descriptive sentence ‘G[the F]’ has the logical form

$$\exists x((Fx \& \forall y(Fy \supset x = y)) \& Gx),$$

acquaintance with the universals F and G is needed for its proper understanding.13 Now for the most part, these universals are not of the kind where the problem of explaining our epistemic access to them can be conveniently restricted to the philosophy of mathematics in the way outlined above. When invoking the epistemic relation of acquaintance to explain my understanding of ‘the present King of France is bald’, no presumed privileged access to an a priori realm of mathematical truths will be relevant. Bearing in mind, then, the centrality of the acquaintance relation to Russell’s epistemology, how is it to be explained as a constituent of a naturalistic epistemology?

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10 This applies not just to the immediate motivations behind the development of the theory of descriptions, but also to Russell’s general ontological development, including the ontological status of the theory of types. See my Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy (especially chapters 1-4) for a detailed discussion of these points, including an overview of the recent exegetical disputes surrounding them.
12 ‘On Denoting’, p. 56.
13 I am deliberately giving Russell the benefit of the doubt by ignoring the questions of whether the existential quantifier, the conjunction and implication relations and even suitably ontologized variables must also be constituents with which we are acquainted in order to understand ‘G[the F]’ on his account as given in ‘On Denoting’. (Russell did not take the logical constants to be truth functions in 1905 but still maintained his view that they were relations. See chapters 1-3 of The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy for arguments in support of this claim.)
According to Lugg (p. 16), Russell’s obsession with acquaintance, while alien to Quine, is not fundamentally at odds with his epistemological project. Lugg thinks that the two following quotations, the first from Russell, the second from Quine, are so similar that Quine’s remark contains “more than a slight echo” of the view expressed in Russell’s remark:

The meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted. (Russell)\(^{14}\)

All inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence. (Quine)\(^{15}\)

Contrary to what Lugg says, I do not think there is the slightest hint of an echo here. Quine might not have disapproved of the intrusion of an epistemological principle into a semantic doctrine such as we find here in Russell’s comment. After all, Quine thinks that once naturalized, “epistemology now becomes semantics”.\(^{16}\) But the semantic theory Russell’s epistemological principle is associating with is one that Quine holds to be very bad company. To say that the meanings we attach to our words are things we are acquainted with is to say that the meanings we attach to our words are things we attach to our words. This is just the semantic theory that Quine dismissed as “the myth of a museum”.\(^{17}\) The view that Quine is offering in the above quote is antithetical to such a semantic theory. The inculcation of meanings of words rests on sensory evidence for Quine, because of his commitment to a behaviouristic account of how languages are first ingested by their speakers. The semantic theory associated with Quine’s behaviourism does not assign to our words “something with which we are acquainted”. On Quine’s semantic theory, there is nothing more to the “meaning” of a word than the systematic contribution it makes to determining the conditions under which sentences containing it are true.\(^{18}\) The assignment of truth-values to observation sentences is then bestowed on them by the “tribunal of sense-experience” not as individuals but as holistically united portions of the “web of belief”. There is no place for Russell’s atomistic principle of acquaintance with the meanings of individual words in Quine’s landscape.

The principle of acquaintance, it seems, is a greater obstacle to Lugg’s thesis than he thinks. This is partly because the principle captures the complexity of Russell’s attitude towards empiricism. It is easy to mistake the principle as nothing more than an elaborate statement of empiricism. But it would be mistaken to see the principle this way because it devalues the principle. Russell’s principle is not a recycled relic of early modern philosophy; it is a truly insightful and original contribution to contemporary analytical philosophy. But its proper home is in the philosophy of language, not in epistemology. It places a restriction on what counts as understanding in order to gain a better insight into what the things that we understand are. (At the time the principle is first enunciated these things are Russelian propositions.) Obviously it is an epistemic remark, but it is intended to motivate a semantic theory. That semantic theory is hard to square with an epistemology that “simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science”,\(^{19}\) as it is a semantic theory that relegates psychology to a position where it is unable to contribute anything to semantic matters.

Russell’s naturalism, in my view, emerges only after the rejection of his anti-psychologism. But this change of heart on Russell’s part was not the result of any epistemological considerations. Nor, for that matter, did it have much to do with his often self-advertised commitment to a scientific method in philosophy. Rather, as Russell made plain in later discussion of this development in his thought, the motivations again stemmed from reflection on semantics: “The problem of meaning is one which seems to me to have been unduly neglected by logicians; it was this problem which first led me, about twenty years ago, to abandon the anti-psychological opinions in which I had previously believed”.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{14}\) The Problems of Philosophy, p. 58.

\(^{15}\) ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p. 75.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., p. 89.

\(^{17}\) Quine, Ontological relativity and Other Essays, p. 27.

\(^{18}\) See Quine, Word and Object, ch. 2.

\(^{19}\) ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p. 82.

\(^{20}\) ‘The Relevance of Psychology to Logic’, p. 362. It is also worth noting the explicitly semantic flavour of the title of the paper in which Russell first sets out his new commitment to psychologism: ‘On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean’.
Having abandoned those opinions, Russell became persuaded that propositions, far from being mind-independent abstract objects, are mental occurrences of some kind. This is a dramatic alteration in Russell’s thought: the robust mind-independent reality of propositions was central to his and Moore’s rejection of Hegelian idealism and their development of analytical philosophy. In rejecting Russellian propositions, Russell was rejecting the very doctrine that most of us who are happy to be called “Russellians” subscribe to. Of course, Russellian propositions had been officially rejected for around a decade by the time Russell endorsed a psychological theory of propositional content. Throughout this period, however, Russell had seemingly nurtured the hope of replacing Russellian propositions with some alternative truth-bearers, such as the judgement-complexes of the multiple-relation theory, that would be compatible with his anti-psychologism. The psychologising of propositional content marks the moment when Russell conceded defeat for his semantic theory.21

Along with many others, I think that Russell was overly hasty in abandoning that semantic project and take it to be the most important of his many lasting contributions to philosophy.22 One philosopher who would certainly not have shared my view, however, is Quine. The psychologised theory of content, in contrast to its more famous Russellian predecessor, quickly took shape in Russell’s writings from 1919 onwards as a theory that is much more in tune with Quinean intuitions. Having located propositions within the domain of psychology, Russell embarked on an extensive attempt to “reconcile the materialistic tendency of psychology with the anti-materialistic tendency of physics”.23 I will not here enter into debate over the degree of success this project, carried out rather fitfully over several years and published in *The Analysis of Mind* and *The Analysis of Matter*, had. What is of interest to this discussion is the form that Russell’s psychological analysis of propositions took in that project. What emerges is a causal theory of meaning which substitutes for the principle of acquaintance a causal relation between a word and its meaning. In short, Russell offers an early naturalized semantic theory.

Very early in Russell’s philosophical career he wrote: “That all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions, is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand proof”.24 By the time he was endorsing a causal theory of meaning, he clearly could not have held to this view anymore. For now philosophy is surely entitled to help itself to scientific theory in explaining propositional content: meaning is just an object of study for empirical psychology (or perhaps other branches of empirical science) and is not something that can be explained in advance of scientific findings. It is just another element of the causal order. No doubt Quine approved. No doubt he saw similarities with his proposed revamping of epistemology. But the key to Russell’s naturalism is to be found in his theory of meaning, not his theory of knowledge.

I have argued that Russell’s naturalism cannot be present quite so early in his work as Lugg alleges. More importantly, I have argued that this is because the catalyst for Russell’s naturalistic turn was his psychologising of propositional content in 1919. I do not doubt that a naturalistic approach to epistemology is present in Russell’s work after this time. But to present Russell’s epistemology rather than his account of propositional content as the source of his naturalism is to paint a distorted portrait of Russell’s philosophical development.

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21 This is not to say that there weren’t benefits to be had from Russell’s psychologistic turn. See my ‘Russell’s Re-Psychologising of the Proposition’ for details.
22 I am not claiming that naturalism is incompatible with what we now call “Russellian” semantics. I am claiming that psychologism is.
23 *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 114.
24 *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, § 7.
Graham Stevens agrees that “the naturalistic elements of Russell’s philosophy are important” and “Russell’s naturalism is an important precursor of Quine’s”. But he believes I go astray since “Russell cannot be accurately characterised as an empiricist”, even a Quinean empiricist, and “Russell’s greatest influence on Quine’s naturalistic project did not stem from his epistemology but from his semantics”. In Stevens’s view, Russell’s change of heart regarding propositions in 1919 prompted him to adopt a naturalistic standpoint and he was not a naturalist, Quinean or otherwise, earlier in

MORE ON RUSSELL AND QUINE

A REPLY TO STEVENS*

ANDREW LUGG

In ‘Russell as a Precursor of Quine’, I argued that from 1912, if not earlier, Russell was “a naturalistically-minded epistemologist in the Quinean mould”. I drew attention to Quine’s view of Russell as a kindred spirit and expanded on a remark from Our Knowledge of the External World, which Quine quotes at the end of ‘Russell’s Ontological Development’, his most important discussion of Russell’s philosophy: “There is not any superfine brand of knowledge, obtainable by the philosopher, which can give us a standpoint from which to criticize the whole of daily life”. My central point was that though differing from Quine in many ways, Russell hewed to a similar philosophical line and was no less concerned to develop a system of the world from within the framework of scientific theory.

I was of the opinion then, as now, that an appreciation of the naturalistic cast of Russell’s thought is essential for understanding his philosophical views, and I wrote the paper in the belief that this is all too often overlooked.

Graham Stevens agrees that “the naturalistic elements of Russell’s philosophy are important” and “Russell’s naturalism is an important precursor of Quine’s”. But he believes I go astray since “Russell cannot be accurately characterised as an empiricist”, even a Quinean empiricist, and “Russell’s greatest influence on Quine’s naturalistic project did not stem from his epistemology but from his semantics”. In Stevens’s view, Russell’s change of heart regarding propositions in 1919 prompted him to adopt a naturalistic standpoint and he was not a naturalist, Quinean or otherwise, earlier in

* I am grateful to Graham Stevens for writing up his thoughts about my paper. He has helped me to get clearer – at least in my own mind – about the complex relationship between Russell and Quine. In addition I should like to thank to Paul Forster and Peter Hylton for helpful comments.

1 Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly 128-129, 9-21.

2 Cited in context in the first paragraph of my paper.
the decade. But the trouble with this, as I see it, is that it assumes I place Russell in the empiricist camp as well as the naturalist camp and neglects that I reckon the empiricist elements of Russell’s philosophy to be secondary to his naturalism.

Like Stevens I think it wrong to read The Problems of Philosophy and Our Knowledge of the External World, as many commentators do, as empiricist works. No doubt in these works Russell takes there to be much in the mind that is not first in the senses – for one thing he thinks we apprehend relationships among universals. What I dispute is only the further suggestion that this excludes him from the ranks of the naturalist. There is a world of difference between holding that Russell’s thinking was empiricist in thrust or intent and holding, as I do, that it was naturalistic in inspiration and execution.

When considered without the surrounding text, my remark about Russell being “an empiricist in the Quinean mode” is doubtless misleading. But I think it fairly clear that I was emphasising that Russell construes the problem of the external world in much the same way as Quine, i.e., as a scientific problem about the relationship of scientific knowledge to its sensory basis. (Russell deemed the sensory basis of knowledge to be part of the physical world and took this to be revealed by scientific inquiry.) In the offending passage I was summarising how I read Russell. I was out to stress, as I put it in the preceding sentence, that “however much Russell differs from Quine about the nature of natural knowledge, he agrees with him in taking epistemology to be a branch of natural science and in regarding the problem of our knowledge of the external world as a scientific problem”.

Similarly in the only other remark I in which mention empiricism – “[Russell’s] empiricism is integral to his naturalism” – I was not implying that Russell was an empiricist pure and simple, still less equating his naturalism with empiricism. I was noting that, like Quine, he took the picture of knowers as surfaces across which energy travels to be a finding of empirical science. I did not, and would not, dispute that “Russell’s attitude to empiricism was variable and rarely resulted in unconditional subscription”. I would only add that Russell revised his views about what people know and how they know it in accordance with his understanding of the findings of natural science. My main contention was that in the 1910s, as well as later, he regarded his speculations as contributions to our theory of the world as a going concern.

Nor would I want to be thought of as believing the principle of acquaintance is “nothing more than an elaborate statement of empiricism”. I believe – and would attempt to show if pressed – that Russell took his view that we are directly acquainted with sense data, universals, and maybe ourselves to be, if not a clear-cut scientific result, a reasonable inference given what is known about human knowledge. Indeed, as I remarked in a footnote, I take Russell to have revised “his views about acquaintance along with his understanding of the deliverances of natural science” (p. 17). On my reading of the relevant texts Russell regarded acquaintance as a scientific notion comparable to absolute simultaneity and later discarded the idea because he came to think of it – as Einstein thought of absolute simultaneity – as scientifically problematic and superfluous.

In this connection I would take exception too to Stevens’s objection that I am wrong to discern an echo of Russell on meaning and acquaintance in Quine’s view of meaning as resting on sensory evidence. What I was after was the idea that there is a similarity between Russell’s conception of immediate knowledge and Quine’s conception of an observation sentence (as expressed in Word and Object). It was not my intention to deny the obvious – that Quine and Russell differ regarding meaning. Rather I was pouring cold water on the common assumption that acquaintance is antithetical to naturalism and pointing out that science is reasonably thought of as revealing the existence of two sorts of knowledge, direct and indirect.

4 This is perhaps clearest in Russell’s discussion of the (epistemological) problem of “mixed psychology and logic” (“Professor Dewey’s Essays in Experimental Logic”, p. 234). See also Theory of Knowledge, especially p. 46, and Our Knowledge of the External World, pp. 72-80. In his review of Dewey, Russell notes that he “agree[s] entirely” with Dewey when he says: “To make sure that a given fact is just and such a shade of red is, one may say, a final triumph of scientific method” but disagrees with him when he adds: “To turn around and treat it as something naturally or psychologically given is a monstrous superstition” (p. 235).
Stevens also intimates (see his note 6 and discussion of Russell on descriptions) that I fail to notice that Russell made significant use of set theory in the constructions in *Our Knowledge of the External World* and related works. In particular Stevens seems to think that I believe that during the years in question Russell’s universe was, “if slightly more populated than that envisioned by the nominalist, then nonetheless comparable to the ‘desert landscapes’ relished by Quine”. This doubly misses the mark. I take both Russell and Quine to be robustly Platonist in their thinking, and I do not presume that nominalism, or something close to it, is a prerequisite for naturalism – after all Quine, a naturalist if ever there was one, posits abstract objects and appeals to resources of set theory in his own constructions.5

In any event, I wonder how Stevens is able to square his picture of Russell’s taking “the naturalist turn” in 1919 with the remarks I quote from *The Problems of Philosophy*, Theory of Knowledge, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, and Russell’s 1919 review of Dewey’s *Essays in Experimental Logic*, a paper in which Russell restates his earlier thinking about empirical knowledge in an especially uncompromising fashion. In these works Russell commits himself unequivocally to naturalism, and there is, I would argue, every reason to regard him as developing his new view of propositions in 1919 within the context of his naturalism. Even if “overly hasty”, the shift in his thinking is one that would have come naturally to a naturalistic philosopher.

As for Stevens’s insistence that “Russell took the naturalistic turn when he looked to psychology to provide a new home for propositional content”, I think I see what he is suggesting and why. Taking Russell’s post-1919 “psychologised theory of content [to be] much more in tune with Quinean intuitions [than his earlier thinking]”, he concludes, none too surprisingly, that Russell “was only really engaged in a project that can be usefully labelled as ‘naturalistic’ after he abandoned the anti-psychologism that was central to his early philosophy”. For Stevens, Russell was antipathetic to psychology from early on and he embraced a naturalistic (Quinean) line only after he had made a place for psychology in his philosophy.

This is an attractive story but I remain unpersuaded. As I argued, before 1919 Russell treated epistemology as “contained in natural science” (to borrow a phrase from Quine) and viewed the problem of the external world as “a question of physics” (to put it as he does in a passage in his review of Dewey’s *Essays in Experimental Logic*, quoted in my article). Moreover, and more importantly, Russell’s anti-psychologism prior to 1919 did not extend as far as Stevens suggests.

In *Our Knowledge of the External World*, a work composed in 1913/1914, for instance, Russell not only observes that “psychologists . . . have made us aware that what is actually given in sense is much less than most people would naturally suppose” (p. 75), he also stresses that the distinction between hard and soft data, crucial to his discussion, is “psychological and subjective” (p. 79) and speaks of his “hypothetical construction” as effecting a “reconciliation of psychology and physics” (p. 104). Furthermore he avers in *Theory of Knowledge*, as I noted in my paper, that “it is impossible to assign to the theory of knowledge a province distinct from that of logic and psychology” and he devotes the first part of his Dewey review to “Logical and Psychological Data”.

Neither Russell nor Quine pay much attention to the distinctions and categories of contemporary philosophy, and it is important that they not be read as if they do. Stevens is right that “Russell’s epistemology . . . infiltretes his logic, his semantics, and even his metaphysics” – in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, for instance, he candidly acknowledges a “somewhat puzzling entanglement of logic and psychology” (p. 76). And Quine is equally cavalier regarding the divisions among subjects that good philosophers are

5 As an aside, I might mention that in *The Russellian Origins of Analytic Philosophy*, Stevens speaks of Russell’s pre-1919 philosophy as having “an empiricist flavour in the sense that [his] justification for admitting universals is that we have acquaintance with them” (p. 109).

6 Nor, incidentally, is it entirely obvious what Quine means when he says epistemology is “a chapter of psychology” (“Epistemology Naturalized”, p. 83). While he sees the problem of the external world as a problem for the psychology of human animals, he also treats it as one of rationally reconstructing how we manage to get from the stimulations of our neoreceptors to scientific discourse, something that can be “schematized by means of little more than logical analysis” (*Pursuit of Truth*, p. 2).
supposed never to transgress - in ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, for instance, he declares that “epistemology ... becomes semantics” and “merges with psychology, as well as with linguistics” (pp. 89-90). This may or may not be as deplorable as Stevens implies. But it is, I think, pretty uncontroversial that Russell would applaud Quine’s addendum that the “rubbing out of boundaries could contribute to progress ... in philosophically interesting inquiries of a scientific nature” (p. 90).

Finally regarding Stevens’s claim that Russell’s “greatest influence on Quine’s naturalistic project ... stem[s] ... from his semantics”, I shall only say this does not seem to be how Quine himself saw things. As far as I am aware, Quine never spoke of being influenced by Russell’s “semantics”, never mind extolled Russell’s “psychologising of propositional content”. Rather he dwelt on the problem of our knowledge of the external world, the theme I focused on in my paper. Thus in ‘Russell’s Ontological Development’ he refers to Russell’s attempt to construct the world from sense data (using the resources of logic and set theory) as “a great idea” (p. 83) and in ‘Homen to Rudolf Carnap’ refers to the task of “deriving the world from experience by logical construction” that Russell “talked of” and Carnap “undertook ... in earnest” as “a grand project” (p. 40).

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Significantly, ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, the paper in which Quine sets out his philosophical programme for the first time, and Word and Object, Quine’s greatest work, both begin with a discussion of Russell’s epistemological problem of the transition from sense to science. And in his last book, From Stimulus to Science, Quine again praises Russell’s attempt to realise “the dream of empiricist epistemologists: the explicit construction of the external world, or a reasonable facsimile, from sense impressions” (p. 10).
BOOK REVIEWS

REVIEW OF POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS BY BERTRAND RUSSELL, ADELPHI, 1939

GEORGE ORWELL

Introduction by Peter Stone

First published in 1938, Power: A New Social Analysis is one of the few books by Russell dealing with political affairs that did not focus on questions of war and peace. Alongside a handful of other works— notably Human Society in Ethics and Politics (1954)— it also represents one of his few attempts to talk about politics in a systematic and theoretical way. And like Human Society, Power is generally not judged a success in terms of its theoretical ambitions. "In the course of this book," Russell writes in the first chapter of Power, "I shall be concerned to prove that the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics." Few would say that Russell fulfilled this ambition. He was always more successful as a political polemicist than as a political theorist, and Power reflects this. In it, Russell reflects on some of the most important issues of the time— most critically, the rise of Stalinism and fascism— with his usual clarity, intellectual independence, courage, and wit. It is this virtue of Power that George Orwell noted in his review of the book. Orwell's review was first published in Adelphi in January 1939 and is reprinted below.

George Orwell review of Russell's Power: A New Social Analysis

If there are certain pages of Mr. Bertrand Russell's book, Power, which seem rather empty, that is merely to say that we have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the obvious is the first duty of intelligent men. It is not merely that at present the rule of naked force obtains almost everywhere. Probably that has always been the case. Where this age differs from those immediately preceeding it is that a liberal intelligentsia is lacking. Bully-worship, under various disguises, has become a universal religion, and such truism as that a machine-gun is still a machine-gun even when a "good" man is squeezing the trigger—and that in effect is what Mr. Russell is saying—have turned into heresies which is it actually becoming dangerous to utter.

The most interesting part of Mr. Russell's book is the earlier chapters in which he analyses the various types of power—priestly, oligarchical, dictatorial, and so forth. In dealing with the contemporary situation he is less satisfactory, because like all liberals he is better at pointing out what is desirable than at explaining how to achieve it. He sees clearly enough that the essential problem of today is "the taming of power" and that no system except democracy can be trusted to save us from unspeakable horrors. Also that democracy has very little meaning without approximate economic equality and an educational system tending to promote tolerance and tough-mindedness. But unfortunately he does not tell us how we are to set about getting these things; he merely utter what amounts to a pious hope that the present state of things will not endure. He is inclined to point to the past; all tyrannies have collapsed sooner or later, and "there is no reason to suppose (Hitler) more permanent than his predecessors."

Underlying this is the idea that common sense always wins in the end. And yet the peculiar horror of the present moment is that we cannot be sure that this is so. It is quite possible that we are descending into an age in which two and two will make five when the Leader says so. Mr. Russell points out that the huge system of organized lying upon which the dictators depend keeps their followers out of contact with reality and therefore tends to put them at a disadvantage as against those who know the facts. This is true so far as it goes, but it does not prove that the slave-society at which the dictator is aiming will be unstable. It is quite easy to imagine a state in which the ruling caste deceive their followers without deceiving themselves. Dare anyone be sure that something of the kind is not coming into existence already? One has only to think of the sinister possibilities of the radio, state-controlled education and so forth, to realize that "the truth is great and will prevail" is a prayer rather than an axiom.
Mr. Russell is one of the most readable of living writers, and it is very reassuring to know that he exists. So long as he and a few others like him are alive and out of jail, we know that the world is still sane in parts. He has rather an eclectic mind, his is capable of saying shallow things and profoundly interesting things in alternate sentences, and sometimes, even in this book, he is less serious than his subject deserves. But he has an essentially decent intellect, a kind of intellectual chivalry which is far rarer than mere cleverness. Few people during the past thirty years have been so consistently impervious to the fashionable bunk of the moment. In a time of universal panic and lying he is a good person to make contact with. For that reason this book, though it is not as good as Freedom and Organization, is very well worth reading.

Adelphi, January 1939

When School Interferes with Education

Chad Trainer


Schools have not necessarily much to do with education....[T]hey are mainly institutions of control where certain basic habits must be inculcated in the young. Education is quite different and has little place in school.

Winston Churchill

The man who does not read good books has no advantage over the man who cannot read them.

Mark Twain

Bertrand Russell had not attended school until he was a student at Cambridge. But he, along with his wife Dora, ran a school for young children and he authored two books on the subject of education. Chris Shute, self-described "cog in the machine of state education" for twenty-five years in Britain, explains that, some time after leaving his career, he attained a sufficiently detached perspective to appreciate the accuracy of Russell’s insight that “children need teaching far less than they need exposure to interesting new knowledge, and the opportunity to interact with it freely.”

A professional schoolteacher taking the trouble to study Russell’s philosophy of education is remarkable enough. But the marvel is compounded by the fact that Shute is “a Christian of the evangelical variety” who is not afraid to concede his sympathy with Russell’s approach to religion and who sides with Russell against the strict application of religion’s “old-fashioned, harsh attitudes.”

Shute’s mission in Bertrand Russell: “Education as the Power of Independent Thought” is not so much to provide an exposition of Russell’s philosophy of education. Rather, it is to show that Russell, notwithstanding the standard image of him as a “utopian leftie”, was a penetrating and lucid analyst of the human race’s true needs as well as a master at presenting such analyses in an accessible and enduring way. Shute defends Russell's analysis of the defects in the education system with many examples of its inadequacies. As such,
the book is a lamentation of formal education peppered with anecdotes and examples substantiating Russell’s insights. It makes a compelling case that significant improvements of schools are in order. The biggest disappointment with the book, though, is its lack of advice on how to go about instituting such enhancements. The present writer was himself a victim of compulsory schooling who has yet to outgrow his pre-pubescent convictions that it is possible to learn things informally and in a fashion much more nearly resembling recreation than regimen. Consequently, Shute’s disparagement of compulsory schooling resounded for me and was of special interest.

While Shute exhibits a competent grasp of Russell’s philosophy of education, he is not one to subscribe to it uncritically. Toward the beginning of Roads to Freedom’s final chapter, Russell comes out in favor of compulsory schooling to, at least, age 16. And Russell deems the argument for compulsory education “irresistible” toward the close of Principles of Social Reconstruction’s second chapter. For Shute, by contrast, compulsory education is to be opposed categorically. He is willing to take libertarianism to extremes not dreamt of by Russell.

Russell had certainly been interested in children’s freedom and having their well being as the primary focus of education, but he disapproved of the lengths to which the likes of A.S. Neill went to grant children autonomy. Russell believed, instead, that children should be compelled to learn the fundamentals in subjects like mathematics and English, geography and history. As Shute sees the matter, though, there is plainly and simply no traditional school subject that is to be considered “essential”: “We British have still a long way to go before we feel really safe with a curriculum which is a catalogue and not a prescription.”

Shute and Russell are at one, however, in the conviction that “the grim-faced, repetitive, lackluster rote-learning so common in the early days of state schooling, and the heavy-handed, competitive driving of knowledge into young minds which is still promoted by the government through its League Table and ceaseless testing was an offence against the very soul of our youth, and should be eliminated at all costs.” Shute speaks of how “the State system ... limits its vision to the nineteenth century idea that all children need to be dragged into classrooms and stuffed with undigested and disjointed knowledge. It cannot allow teachers and pupils to pursue learning in their own chosen rhythm, because to do so would interrupt the ‘delivery’ of the curriculum, the whole curriculum and nothing but the curriculum which has become the sole purpose of schooling, as much now as it was in the late 1800s.”

While Shute decries “repetitive, lackluster rote-learning”, he is not one to lose sight of memorization’s genuine value in authentic education. In an era when computer literacy is celebrated more than traditional literacy, Shute makes an observation that cannot be overemphasized in our so-called Information Age:

We have, perhaps, lost our taste for knowing things well enough to be able to recite them from memory. We can easily recall information from databases, without even the inconvenience of looking it up in books. We tend to see memorization as ‘rote-learning’, and less valuable to youngsters than being able to find information from established sources when and where it is needed. There is a lot to be said for our adaptation to an information-rich environment, but to lose entirely the mechanisms by which we furnish our minds with permanent resources in the form of memorable ideas and beautiful words would be a sad loss of intellectual independence.

Shute speaks of how Russell “would not have had much time for our present school system in which the only imperatives are smooth organization, efficient control and the certainty that if anything goes wrong no adult in the school can be blamed for it”. Such a defective culture can hardly be expected to foster progressive thought, let alone progressive action.

For Shute, education, as currently practiced, amounts to no more than the oppression of children by coercing them to conform uncritically to “our tribal mores”, and he cites as ample evidence the philosophies that are the products of the last century’s educational practices. “Critical thought in children is not valued, despite the fact that the aim of all education is to produce adults who, supposedly, can ‘think for themselves’.” Rather, for all too many “educators”, “if school pupils decide for themselves to take an independent line of some question of school policy they become on the instant bad, rebellious, dangerous and subject to severe punishment.”

Shute explains that “Since most people, even in 21st century Britain, think that the main purpose of ‘good’ teachers is to show children that life is often unpleasant, and that they must not expect everything to happen as they wish it to, the education system which
adults will vote for is unlikely to correspond very closely to that which reason suggests is best.”

In a day and age when parents say with straight faces that they are happy with their children’s education because their children are on the honor roll, are excelling on standardized multiple-choice tests, and/or being accepted to “gifted and talented programs”, Shute, like Russell, is bound to sound utopian. Both men are to be respected for believing that accreditation is worth much less than actual education and that education is to be valued primarily as leisure rather than as regimen. But their writings here tend to assume these tenets rather than provide reasoned defenses of them.

As critical as Shute is about British schooling, the mind reels at what Shute would have to say of the American system. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, the United Kingdom has 100% literacy while only 25% of the population has more than secondary schooling. What does it say about the United States when it boasts a full 50% having at least some post-secondary schooling but a literacy rate of 85%?

Shute, like Russell, does not address the substantial problems posed for youngsters who might very well be in wholehearted agreement with their philosophies of education but find themselves trapped in the one-size-fits-all Simon-says approach of mass-produced compulsory “education”. These youths live in an establishment that is all too eager to punish those who have exhibited the effrontery to simply not play the game. Such budding contrarians regularly have their prospects of attaining a self-supporting livelihood threatened because of their “audacious” irreverence toward the system.

Shute’s book is at its best when it comes to criticizing current practices. It is short, however, on concrete suggestions for reform, unlike his earlier book Compulsory Schooling Disease which devotes its eighth chapter to such improvements. The present reviewer is in full agreement with Shute’s criticisms of formal education but is not optimistic that Shute can sell them to the establishment. Overall, though, Shute’s book, while not quite the roadmap to improvement for which one may have been hoped, is exquisite in its expressions of indignation and criticism.

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DOUGLAS ADAMS’ LAST BOOK

PETER STONE


Douglas Adams, a radical atheist who passed away in 2001, is best known for creating the humorous science fiction masterpiece The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, which has been incarnated in books, radio and television series, and recently film. Though Salmon of Doubt shamelessly capitalizes on publicity generated by Adam’s death to publicize a film well worth avoiding, the book contains much of value. Besides a collection of Adam’s published fiction and nonfiction, Salmon contains chapters of his last unfinished novel from which the collection gets its name. Much additional unpublished material was fished from Adams’ fleet of Macintosh computers in which lie some 2,579 pieces of writing. Monty Python’s Terry Jones thoughtfully provides an introduction to the new edition as well as an introduction to his introduction (to the new edition). Naturalist Richard Dawkins gives a tribute in which he describes finishing an Adams’ novel only to flip to page one and read it all over again.

The Salmon is a fitting tribute to Adams’s views. Worth noting is an interview conducted by American Atheists in which Adams discusses his views in no uncertain terms. Some memorable lines in the book are these:

The agenda of life’s important issues has moved from novelists to science writers, because they know more. (p. 160)

The whole business of religion is profoundly interesting. But it does mystify me that otherwise intelligent people take it seriously. (p. xxvii)

America is like a belligerent boy; Canada is like an intelligent woman. Australia is Jack Nicholson. (p. 45)

In England it is considered socially incorrect to know stuff or think about things. It’s worth bearing this in mind when visiting. (p. 69)
THE 33RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY convened this past May 26-28 at the University of Iowa, at the invitation of Gregory Landini. The University of Iowa spreads across several blocks of pleasantly wide streets with the Iowa River flowing through its center and several bridges connecting the two halves. The river and a narrow footbridge across it lie behind the Iowa House Hotel, where some of the Russell Society members stayed. Between the hotel and the bridge stands a beautiful, futuristic early building by the California architect Frank O. Gehry, the prosaically named Iowa Advanced Tech Lab (see cover). Going out the front door of the Iowa House and through the park in front of it and along the river beside it bought us to the English and Philosophy building, where the conference was held. The Old Capital Building, which is now part of the university, stands across the road from the park facing the river, and its gold dome, which rises above the campus, serves as a marker for the area as well as point at which the university and its life passes into that of the town. And the town does have a life. Iowa city is energetic and eclectic, with an indisputable college-town feel, a fabulous bookstore, and streets tightly packed with pubs, stores, open squares, street music, deadbeats and out-of-town gawkers — such as myself.

Though I arrived too late for it, the Russell Society's Friday evening dinner was at The Cottage, a restaurant in the middle of town (and hence in the middle of a small music festival) and the first of two BRS board meetings, which I also missed, was held there after dinner. Some of the business requires explanation. The Board needs to be able to vote on issues by email and postal mail between annual meetings, and prior to the meeting a committee had been appointed to propose bylaws allowing for this, but after discovering that laws for non-profits prohibit just this thing, the committee found itself at an impasse on this issue, but proposed bylaws covering that law for non-profits prohibit just this thing, the committee found itself at an impasse on this issue, but proposed bylaws concerning several other issues, which the Board approved. These included creating the position of Board Vice-President so Board meetings can run more smoothly when the Chair is absent, creating a membership category of life couple membership and rewriting the bylaws in gender-neutral language.

However, the real business of the annual meeting — which I did attend — began later that evening in the auditorium of the English and Philosophy building, when Gregory Landini kicked off the talks with ‘Solving the Russell Paradoxes’ to an audience comprising regular BRS members as well as new faces, including two very advanced undergraduates. In his talk, Landini (University of Iowa) defended the controversial thesis that Russell’s paradoxes of attributes and classes did not refute logicism (the view that arithmetic truth is logical truth), because, though not well known, Russell had in fact solved the paradoxes, and there is an available for the solution of them within Frege’s early system as well. Thus Fregean and Russellian logicism is successful, Landini concluded, “relative to their respective ontologies”.

On Saturday, Peter Stone (Stanford University) opened the morning session with ‘Russell, Mathematics and the Popular Mind’, addressing Russell’s views on the value of a mathematical education and using those views to critique misperceptions of mathematics in such recent movies about mathematics as ‘Good Will Hunting’, ‘A Beautiful Mind’, ‘Pi’, and most recently, ‘Proof’. Following Peter, Tim Madigan (St John Fisher College) spoke on ‘Arthur James Balfour: The Anti-Russell’, describing Balfour — who authored books on philosophy of religion and the paranormal and ran as Conservative Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1902-1905 and was Foreign Secretary in 1917 when he wrote the famous ‘Balfour Declaration’ — as Russell’s “bête noir”. Emilio Reyes Le Blanc (University of Toronto) then spoke on ‘Russell on Acquaintance and de re belief’ in which he developed a Russelian analysis of de re belief. Before breaking for lunch, Dorothea Lotter (University of Central Arkansas) spoke on ‘Frege and Russell on the Justification of a Logical Theory’, in which she gave a fascinating account of the differences in Frege’s and Russell’s views on logic that are suggested by Frege’s assertion that arithmetic is a branch of logic and Russell’s assertion that logic is a branch of mathematics.

Lunch was downtown, and for many meant a long table in an Indian restaurant, with quite delicious food served buffet style. After lunch, a second Board meeting was held to discuss the location of the next Annual Meeting, and the talks resumed at 2 pm with Matt McKeon (Michigan State University) reading a paper titled ‘A Plea for Logical Objects’. McKeon looked at a problem first raised by John Etchemendy for the modern Tarskian semantic account of logical truth: that the Tarskian account cannot be correct because it
makes the extension of logical truth turn on the cardinality of the world, which is claimed to be a non-logical fact. McKeon appealed to Russell’s early conception of logical objects to respond to this objection. Following his discussion, Christopher Pincock (Purdue University) spoke on ‘The Scientific Basis for Russell’s External World Program’, arguing that in Our Knowledge of the External World, rather than attempting to reconcile physics with his views on acquaintance, Russell was trying to remove conflicts between the sciences of psychology and physics. After Pincock, Max Belaise (University of Martinique) spoke on ‘Russell on Science and Religion’, using Russell’s essay Religion and Science as his point of departure to explore the relation between science and religion. In ‘On Denoting with Denoting Concepts’ Francesco Orilia (Università di Macerata), the final speaker of the afternoon, defended Russell’s ‘On Denoting’ approach to semantics and ontology against neo-Meinongian objections.

The Society met for dinner on the second floor of a local bistro – the One Twenty Six - filling it to the bursting point with people and conversation. It is the first time in my memory that the society ate dinner in public, but this detail seemed to have little impact on its members’ pleasure in good food and company. After dinner, the party trooped back to campus to enjoy a presentation by David Blitz (Central Connecticut State University) on ‘Bertrand Russell Audio-Visual Project: the Andrew Wyatt Interviews’. In his presentation, David showed recent digitalizations of old television interviews of Russell by Andrew Wyatt.

On Sunday, Chad Trainer (Independent Scholar) gave a talk called ‘In Further Praise of Idleness’, in which he argued that Russell, who insisted that “there is far too much work done in the world, [and] that immense harm is caused by the belief that work is virtuous” in his 1935 book In Praise of Idleness, if he were alive today, would have even greater cause for concern about our current lack of idleness than he did for the lack of idleness in the world of 1935. After Chad’s talk, Allan Hillman (Purdue University) discussed ‘Russell on Leibniz and Substance’. Concluding the weekend came a master class hosted by Alan Schwerin (Monmouth University) on ‘Russell, Hume and the Idea of Self’. – RC
Business of the meeting included: election of officers, choice of a site for the 2007 annual meeting, a discussion of whether the Society’s bank balance, or a significant part of it, should be invested in a reasonably secure but interest-earning account (this was Ken Blackwell’s suggestion), whether a Nominating Committee for Board positions should be created (Peter Stone, Ken Blackwell, and Dave White’s suggestion), whether a statement to Iran (Dennis Darland) should be adopted and whether the BRS position on the U.S. invasion of Iraq should be reaffirmed (Ray Perkins’ suggestion). Due to lack of time, the last four issues were not voted on.

The following officers were duly nominated, seconded and unanimously elected for the 2006-2007 year: President: Alan Schwerin; Vice-President: Ray Perkins, Jr.; Secretary: David Henehan; Treasurer: Dennis Darland; Chair: Chad Trainer; Vice-Chair: David White.

For the site of the 2007 annual meeting, it was decided that it would be either hosted by David White in Rochester or by Alan Schwerin at Monmouth University with the other person hosting the meeting for 2008. David and Alan were to decide between themselves which of them would host the meeting first. (They later decided that it would be Alan who hosted it at Monmouth in 2007 with David hosting it in Rochester in 2008.)

The meeting adjourned at 2 pm.

David Henehan, Secretary, BRS
**The Greater Rochester Russell Set**

Writers and Books’ Verb Café
740 University Avenue, Rochester, NY
7 pm
$3 to Public - Free to Members

- **Apr. 12** Alan Bock on Russell’s essay ‘The Value of Free Thought’
- **May 10** Howard Blair on Bertrand Russell and quantum physics
- **June 14** John Belli on advice from Bertrand Russell
- **July 12** George McDade on Russell’s essays ‘Ideas That Have Helped Mankind’ and ‘Ideas That Have Harmed Mankind’
- **Aug. 09** Phil Ebersole on Russell as a guild socialist
- **Sept. 13** Gerry Wildenberg on Sam Harris’s book *Letter to a Christian Nation*

**BARS**

**The Bay Area Russell Set**

The next meeting will be in celebration of Bertrand Russell’s birthday (May 18)

Time and place - TBA
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