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articles on the history of analytic philosophy, especially those pertaining
to Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of
recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the Quarterly are
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IT'S TIME TO RENEW YOUR MEMBERSHIP TO THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

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IN THIS ISSUE

The editors' preoccupation with writing a Russell book has resulted, as you may have noticed, in a certain amount of procrastination in the production of the Quarterly over the past year. The need has therefore arisen for a quadruple issue. We expect the issue's quadruplicity to drink up, it might be said, the backlog in the production of the Quarterly, relying, that is, on the editorial truism that quadruplicity drinks procrastination.

Noam Chomsky, honorary member of the Russell Society, well known admirer of Russell, and author of the sentence "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously", is the featured subject in this issue of the Quarterly. Not only is Chomsky, like Russell, a linguistic theorist, he is also, like Russell, a political polemicist of the left, a pamphleteer, a speaker and an activist for causes promoting greater happiness and decency for humanity. In this issue, we have an interview with Chomsky by Russell Society member Brandon Young. In Russell-L, the internet discussion group devoted to Russell studies, questions recently arose about comments attributed to Chomsky by a political journal concerning Russell’s Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal. Brandon contacted Chomsky to clarify the matter; Chomsky, himself an early critic of the Vietnam War, replied with some interesting observations about the Russell Tribunal and similar tribunals, setting the record straight about his views on them. We are glad to be able to publish his comments. Peter Stone’s review essay on some recently published political works by Chomsky follows this interview. Peter compares Chomsky’s ideas on socialism and anarchism with Russell’s in an enlightening discussion of their respective views.

William Everdell, author of The First Moderns and member of the BRS, reviews Matthew Stewart’s new book, The Courier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World in this issue of the BRSQ. Russell’s own study of Leibniz is first rate history of philosophy that influenced several generations of Leibniz scholars. Stewart’s account elaborates on Russell’s in the light of 100 years of Leibniz and Spinoza research and publishing, with a fresh retelling of the tale of Spinoza and Leibniz’s meetings in 1676. Not only did Russell respect Leibniz’s work in mathe-
matics and mathematical logic, he also claims, in his *History of Western Philosophy*, that the *Monadology* is a useful picture of subjective and objective space and of the relation between perception and physics, if one rejects the view that monads are windowless, for then each monad is a subjective perspective and the totality of their points of view is objective space. This, of course, sounds suspiciously like Russell's own construction of space and time in his 1914 book *Our Knowledge of the External World*. In fact, Russell begins his construction of the external world in OKEW by saying: “Let us imagine that each mind looks out upon the world, as in Leibniz's monadology, from a point of view peculiar to itself....” (94) and then proceeds to construct his own “monadology”. Concerning Russell’s views on Spinoza, it can be simply be said that Russell found Leibniz's best work, which he admired, to be largely Spinozistic. Ken Blackwell has further argued that there is a strong Spinozistic aspect to some of Russell's ethics. Everdell's review of Stewart’s book is thus on a most Russellian subject.

**WHAT IS ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY? – TAKE TWO.** In a previous issue of the Quarterly, Aaron Preston argued that analytic philosophy was not a single school of philosophy because there is no set of doctrines that all analytic philosophers ever shared that can thus be taken to define ‘analytic philosophy’. This presupposes, of course, that to be a school of philosophy, all or almost all of the people in it must share a set of common philosophical doctrines. Several people have protested Aaron’s claim, for example, in the internet Russell studies discussion group, russell4, though they have not done so by arguing that there are too unifying doctrines shared by most analytic philosophers. Rather, they have protested that Aaron's criterion unfairly limits what might be called a “philosophical school” and that philosophical schools can also be unified, and so defined, by non-doctrinal criteria, such as a shared method or shared problems or shared influences. In this issue, BRS member Mike Beaney also objects to this idea in Aaron’s thesis, but more than that, he argues that Aaron tries to go beyond that view to claim that there is no such thing as analytic philosophy at all. Beaney tries to clarify what that might mean, while also arguing that Aaron has unwarrantedly limited the idea of what may count as a philosophical school. But read Mike’s comments for yourself. Aaron’s reply follows.

**SOCIETY NEWS**

**IT'S TIME TO RENEW YOUR MEMBERSHIP** to the Bertrand Russell Society! If you have not yet done so, we hope you will renew your membership now, using the form enclosed with this issue of the Quarterly. For those wishing to pay their dues online using a credit card, you can now pay via PayPal at https://www.paypal.com. New users may open a free account at that page. Then, after entering the amount being sent, and, when prompted for the recipient’s email address, enter b.rr-pp@hotmail.com. PayPal is free of charge, and – foreign members take note – transactions are handled in US dollars. When prompted for a message to send to our treasurer, Kenneth Blackwell, state the purpose of the payment and any change of address but do not include your credit card information. Ken will send you an email receipt and update the membership records accordingly.

**WHO KNEW?** The Bertrand Russell Society has a library. If you’re not familiar with it, you can acquaint yourself with its holdings by going to its website at http://www2.webneg.com/brslibrary. Click on any of the links there to visit a section of the library. Current and out-of-print books by and on Russell are offered at a significant discount – sets of Russell postcards, available at US$6 per dozen, are currently on sale. There is also a lending library for members with a full list of books for loan at the website. But books are only the beginning: cassettes of speeches, debates and interviews by Russell are also available for lending. Finally, there is a members’ area where audio and video files of Russell's speeches, debates, and interviews are available for download. This can make for a pleasant Friday evening – pour a glass of wine, sit back, and click on a particular speech or interview: it's a great way to relax and enjoy yourself after a long and busy week. Right now, there are about fifty audios and a few video clips, including ‘Reflections on my Eightieth Birthday’, ‘The Humanist Approach’, an interview of Russell by Studs Terkel, Russell on Einstein, A.J. Ayer on Russell, and much more. Email Tom Stanley, the Russell Society librarian, at tjstanley@verizon.net for a user name and password to obtain access to the members area of the library. Similarly, you should contact Tom to borrow from the lending library and to obtain cassettes or purchase the discount books and postcards.
REPORT ON THE 2007 BRS ANNUAL MEETING

While much of northeastern America can be a little too warm for comfort in June, the proximity of Monmouth New Jersey to the Atlantic Ocean provides it with cool breezes and a pleasantly moderate climate in that month. With Monmouth University already closed for the summer, we had the campus to ourselves, and the availability of pleasant walks around its attractive surroundings was conducive to both solitary and social reflection. It was in this environment that the Bertrand Russell Society held its 34th annual meeting last year from June 8 to June 10, thanks to the hospitality of Alan Schwerin, President of the Bertrand Russell Society, and his wife, Helen Schwerin. (Alan and Helen also hosted annual meetings at Monmouth in 1999 and 2000.) The Turrell boardroom in Bey Hall served as the Society’s home base that weekend, with dormitory space for its members available just several buildings away.

Following registration late Friday afternoon, the Society met for dinner on campus at “The Club”, after which they returned to Bey Hall for a board meeting of the Society. Following the business meeting, we relaxed in the boardroom while David Blitz updated the Society on the progress the Bertrand Russell Audio-Visual Project is making. David and four of his students (Soitzing, Rutkowski, Cavallo and Notaro) then provided us with some quite interesting audio-visual samples of Russell. Friday closed with members enjoying the Greater Rochester Russell Set’s hospitality suite/salon.

The first presentation Saturday morning was Marvin Kohl’s “Bertrand Russell on Fear” (to be published in the next issue of the Quarterly). Kohl discussed Russell’s idea that all fear, whether it be unconscious, conscious, or attitudinal, is bad and ought to be eliminated. Contra Russell, Marvin argued that the deserving target is not fear per se, but panic fear and those human ideas and practices that tend to produce it. Tim Madigan then gave a talk on “The Bertrand Russell Case Revisited”. As all Russellians know, after being denied a position at the College of the City of New York, Russell taught for a time at the Barnes Foundation in Philadelphia. However, Russell and Barnes had a bitter falling out a few years later, and in 1943, Barnes self-published a pamphlet entitled “The Case of Bertrand Russell versus Democracy and Education.” In that pamphlet, Barnes argued that Russell had nothing but derision and contempt for democracy and education, and had betrayed the ideals of Barnes’ friend and associate John Dewey. In his talk, Tim critiqued Barnes’s claims and arguments.

Russell archivist Kenneth Blackwell of McMaster University followed with a presentation on Russell’s Electronic Texts. Ken explained that many of Russell’s texts are now available electronically, some freely on the web, some at login websites, and others purchasable through e-publishers. Details of sites were offered. He then pointed out that the availability of the e-texts raises the prospect of being able to search them, perhaps altogether in a “federated” search. McMaster’s Digital Commons, where the back issues of Russell now reside (and are accessible in their entirety to BRS members on the internet at digitalcommons.mcmaster.ca/russelljournal/), may provide an approach to accomplishing this. The last presentation before lunch was by Ilmari Kortelainen on “The Compositional Method of Analysis”. Kortelainen used Russell’s philosophy to demonstrate the relationship between the method of analysis and contextuality by addressing the question: how can the principle according to which a sentence gets it meaning from its context be understood when one also accepts the principle of compositionality, that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its constituent elements? From the viewpoint of contemporary theory of meaning these two semantic principles seem to be incompatible.

After lunch, there was a general meeting of the Society, followed by a panel discussion by Alan Bock, Tim Madigan, Thomas Riggins, and Peter Stone on Russell’s book “Understanding History, 50 years later”. Following the panel discussion, Phil Ebersole presented a paper for David White, who was unable to attend the meeting. David’s paper was entitled “Russell and Horace Liveright” and described how the publishing firm of Boni & Liveright was founded in 1916 to bring modern and controversial literature to the American readers, and how it went out of business in 1930. The company specialized in authors whose material was considered improper, immoral and indecent. Boni & Liveright are less well remembered today, but the Modern Library series, which evolved out of their publishing program, is universally known. Russell became involved with Boni & Liveright through three books, Education and the Good Life (1926), Marriage and Morals (1929), and The Conquest of Happiness (1930), all published in the later years of the firm’s history. White’s main focus was on Russell’s personal and professional
Dealing with Horace Liveright (1884-1933), in particular, Russell's difficulties with the fast and loose lifestyle of drink, women and song associated with the firm. The last speaker of the day was David Blitz, on "Russell's Little Books", a series of pamphlets by Russell that were published in Girard Kansas by Emanuel Haldeman-Julius.

Dinner consisted of a banquet (from 8:30 to 10:00 pm) at a local Japanese Restaurant. The evening was then topped off again with the Greater Rochester Russell Set's hospitality suite.

Sunday's talks opened with Gregory Landini on "The Number of Numbers". Gregory argued that though Frege's later work offered a theory of numbers as objects, what is shared by Frege and Russell is a conception of numbers in terms one-one correspondence relations, and that on this view natural numbers are not objects and the infinity of the natural numbers may well not be necessary. Following this was a talk by Michael Garrall on "Russell: Between Deism and Atheism". Chad Trainer then read a paper entitled "Russell's Empiricist Propensities: Empiricism's Survival of Russell's 'Last Substantial Change'". Trainer began by pointing out that according to Nick Griffin, the years in which Russell came closest to being an "empiricist" are the years 1912 to 1914. Trainer then discussed the limits to Russell's empiricism during the same period, and concluded by proposing an alternative view that, regardless of where one places Russell on this sliding scale between rationalism and empiricism, we should see Russell as more empiricist after 1914 than during the 1912-14 period.

The final paper of the annual meeting was Chris Russell on "Kant and Russell's Logicism". Chris argued that what appears to be a change in view for Russell on the question of whether arithmetic is analytic or synthetic a priori was actually more simply due to a change in the meanings of the terms. Concluding the meeting was a fine lunch at the home of Alan and Helen Schwerin.

— Chad Trainer, RC

**HUMANIST NOTE.** Marc Carrier, Canadian humanist, has written on the religious agenda behind the façade of intelligent design and the Discovery Institute. Based on exclusive interviews, his essay will appear in *The American Atheist* in July.

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**INTERVIEW**

**ON THE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL**

**AN INTERVIEW WITH NOAM CHOMSKY**

**BRANDON YOUNG**

Last year marked the 40th Anniversary of the commencement of the International War Crimes Tribunal, initiated by Bertrand Russell and known popularly as the Russell Tribunal. It was an organization of civilians acting to hold world leaders accountable for what they viewed as grave violations of international law in the conduct of the Vietnam war. The Russell Tribunal further aimed at gathering testimony and documents showing the massive violence perpetrated by the United States against the Vietnamese people. Not an actual jurisprudential undertaking, it was rather an exclamation intended to break the silence, and an affirmation of the responsibility that people of free democracies have to be liable when international and national institutions fail.

Nearly forty years later, the legacy of the Russell Tribunal continues to be an influence in world affairs, most recently by the formation of the World Tribunal on Iraq (WTI), another citizens' tribunal set up to assert international law by making clear the disparity between world citizens' opinion and the action of international institutions regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Like the Russell Tribunal, it challenges the justificationist orthodoxy of western governments and media alike by condemning preventative war as nothing more than a euphemism for a crime of aggression. But unlike the Russell Tribunal, which at least received ridicule in the press, the WTI has been ignored by the Western media where it could have its most effect. Interestingly, many of its participants and leading organizers are women, a striking contrast to the Russell Tribunal, which the WTI acknowledges as its model.

In the last chapter of *At War with Asia* (1970), Noam Chomsky addresses the subject of war crimes and the Russell Tribunal. Prompted by a discussion in the Russell studies group, russell4, of a purported account of his views, I recently asked Chomsky about his thoughts on the Russell Tribunal, its legacy, and the new WTI. The following is an edited transcript of that correspondence.
BY: In a recent issue of the Radical Philosophy Review (v. 8, no. 2), you are quoted as saying that you refused to take part in the tribunal and that it engaged in “self promotion” on the part of elite intellectuals, of which, I presume you are including Russell. You are also quoted as saying that “…it had virtually no effect. It was just marginalized and vilified.” Can you give some comment on this, on how the tribunal was perceived at the time, and on various people’s adherence to its legacy since then?

NC: I admire Russell very greatly. One of the main organizers of the Tribunal, Vlado Dedijer, was a close personal friend, also a person I admired greatly, as I did many of the participants and witnesses. The Tribunal itself was, in fact, marginalized and vilified and that is not contested to my knowledge. Just take a look at the press and journal coverage at the time, and since. You’ll find out the extent to which it was vilified – to the extent that it was mentioned at all. If you are interested in the vicious treatment of Russell himself in the American press, particularly the New York Times, have a look at the South End book Russell in America.

The people’s tribunals and others since that time, including now, vary in character. Some involve small groups of intellectuals; others have a more popular base. Some are hailed by elite opinion – specifically, the People’s Tribunal on Russian Crimes in Afghanistan. It even got a report in the New York Times, if I recall correctly. Elite opinion is always very eager to focus on someone else’s crimes, particularly when we can do little about them. But there is no potential cost associated with posturing before the cameras. Those that focus attention “the wrong way” – namely, on crimes for which we are responsible and can definitely do something about – continue to be ignored or vilified. These are simply aspects of intellectual culture, and the reaction to principled dissent, that trace back to the earliest recorded history and are close to historical universals, to my knowledge.

There are very well-publicized international tribunals today, some condemned as not being harsh enough in their judgment of the criminals, some praised for creating a larger audience for their crimes. Their crimes, not ours. That’s crucial. In a typical case, the ICJ [International Court of Justice] just a few days ago condemned Serbians for not doing enough to stop the massacres in Bosnia, with a toll of 70,000 Muslims killed according to the most respected recent analyses. But there is no judgment condemning Americans for providing crucial support for and direction of massacres in El Salvador at about the same time, with about the same toll: perhaps 75,000. Obviously that is vastly more serious than not doing enough to stop them, and it was only one part of the Central American slaughters (themselves only one part of huge crimes around the world, at the time) for which responsibility lies in the hands of the present incumbents in Washington or their immediate mentors, and the president who has since been deified in one of the most vulgar and embarrassing propaganda campaigns I can recall this side of Kim il-Sung, reaching as far as left-liberal opinion (recently the New York Review of Books). In fact, such a judgment, which would be unimaginable, unthinkable, at other times, is another sign of the moral depravity of the reigning intellectual culture.

As for the legacy of the Russell Tribunal, I wish it had turned out to be an important step in history. I doubt that it did.

BY: Why did you decide not to take part in the Russell Tribunal when asked?

NC: It’s true that I rejected the invitation to be one of the “judges,” for the same reasons I have in all other such cases. Worthiness of a cause depends on assessment of likely consequences. My judgment at the time – and since – is that for me at least, continued active participation in resistance and other popular efforts against the war was more important than participating in the Tribunal, which would have meant terminating these efforts for a considerable time, right at a critical period. Of course it all gets vilified, but that’s not the criterion: [it is], rather, [what are the] likely consequences of this as compared with other efforts that it naturally displaces.

BY: And the World Tribunal on Iraq?

NC: I did not accept requests to participate in that either. I felt, and feel, that my time could be more effectively spent. Others have to make their own calculations. But although, to its credit, it acknowledges the privatization of the economic resources as a crime, there is no mention in its declaration of that of the use of private mercenaries, e.g., Blackwater USA and others, who are accountable to no
People are quite right to be concerned about the creation of a mercenary army. It is somewhat surprising that it has taken the US this long to adopt the standard imperial pattern: French foreign legion, Gurkhas and sepoys, Hessians, etc.


The recent publication of three books by BRS honorary member Noam Chomsky – Problems of Knowledge and Freedom (2003), Chomsky on Anarchism (2005), and Government in Our Future (2005) – provides an excellent opportunity to revisit the relation between his ideas and those of Bertrand Russell. The reason for this is not that Chomsky says something fundamentally new in these works. Indeed, virtually all the content of these three books has been available in one form or another for some time. But together, they collect most of Chomsky’s writings relevant to an assessment of the relation of his ideas with Russell’s.

The relation between Chomsky’s and Russell’s ideas is worth exploring because of their similar reputations. Both are leading intellectuals who earned their reputations through their work in highly technical fields. Both became radical critics of the existing social order and made use of their reputations to help get their criticisms before a wider audience. As a result, both have had to face the accusation that they are nosing around in areas outside their areas of expertise. Why should their social criticisms be regarded as anything

1 These three works will be cited here as PKF, CA, and GF, respectively.
2 Problems of Knowledge and Freedom was originally published by Pantheon Books in 1971 and Chomsky on Anarchism is a collection of previous essays and interviews that includes both well-known classics and more recent and lesser-known pieces. Only Government in Our Future is available here for the first time, but it is based on a talk given at the Poetry Center in New York City 1970, being the first complete published transcription of that lecture.
but mere carping? Is there something more to their ideas than that? 3

In these three works, Chomsky displays a keen awareness of what meaningful social criticism, as opposed to mere carping, requires. “Social action,” he writes,

must be animated by a vision of a future society, and by explicit judgments of value concerning the character of this future society. These judgments must derive from some concept of the nature of man, and one may seek empirical foundations by investigating man’s nature as it is revealed by his behavior and his creations, material, intellectual, and social (C4, 113-114).

Social criticism – or, for that matter, a defense of the status quo, or any kind of social action in between – thus rests ultimately upon some conception of human nature, a conception that “is usually tacit and incoherent, but it is always there, perhaps implicitly, whether one chooses to leave things as they are and cultivate one’s garden, or to work for small changes, or for revolutionary ones” (C4, 190). It is the development of a meaningful and defensible account of human nature – and through it the development of a compelling social vision – that distinguishes positive social criticism from merely negative hectoring.

In all three books under consideration, Chomsky lays out his vision of a better society along with the conception of human nature that he believes underlies it. The most concise statement of both the vision and the conception appears in Government in Our Future. Here, Chomsky contrasts four visions of what government in the future might look like – classical liberal, libertarian socialist, state socialist, and state capitalist, the last of which is meant to represent the American political system at present. The core of Chomsky’s argument is twofold. First, the classical liberal and libertarian socialist visions each have the same basic conception of human nature at their core, and libertarian socialism is the vision that would do most justice to that conception in complex and technologically ad-

anced societies such as our own. Second, the state socialist and state capitalist visions – represented by V.I. Lenin in the first case and Robert McNamara in the second – share fundamentally the same conception of human nature, a conception that is markedly inferior to, and less inspiring than, the conception underlying libertarian socialism.

The conception of human nature that Chomsky sees underlying both classical liberalism and libertarian socialism is complex. Human beings have a natural need to control their own lives, an “instinct for freedom,” as Bakunin famously put it. 4 This need expresses itself individually through the need for meaningful work and collectively through the need for democratic association. Healthy people leading healthy lives are free people, and free people both engage in creative work and relate to each other as equals. People are not free to the extent that they must obey the orders of others; when people relate to one another as master and servant, especially in the workplace, they are both alienated from their powers of creativity and denied the meaningful connection with others that democracy makes possible. 5

To derive a vision of modern society from this conception of human nature requires some understanding of how society works, of how people who act in accordance to the conception will be affected by different forms of social organization at a given time. Here, Chomsky argues, classical liberalism did not so much go wrong as become outdated; social conditions changed, and with them changed the nature of the fundamental threat to human freedom. In the past, state power could reasonably be described as the gravest threat to freedom; in the modern era, private power poses just as big a threat, if not a bigger one. The classical liberal vision is thus antiquated.


4 Quoted in C4, 155.
5 Of course, not all master-servant relations are alike. In capitalist workplaces, but not authoritarian regimes, workers have the right of exit, even if they lack a voice in how both sorts of organizations are run. Chomsky does not believe that the existence of an exit option can meaningfully compensate for the lack of a free and equal voice in the government of any organization. For an interesting effort to contrast exit and voice in organizations of all sorts, see Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
and requires updating. Chomsky’s argument on this point is worth quoting at length:

To summarize, the first concept of the state that I want to establish as a point of reference is classical liberalism. Its doctrine is that state functions should be drastically limited. But this familiar characterization is a very superficial one. More deeply, the classical liberal view develops from a certain concept of human nature, one that stresses the importance of diversity and free creation, and therefore this view is in fundamental opposition to industrial capitalism with its wage slavery, its alienated labor, and its hierarchic and authoritarian principles of social and economic organization. At least in its ideal form, classical liberal thought is opposed to the concepts of possessive individualism, that are intrinsic to capitalist ideology. For this reason, classical liberal thought seeks to eliminate social fetters and replace them with social bonds, and not with competitive greed, predatory individualism, and not, of course, with corporate empires – state or private.

“Classical libertarian thought seems to me,” he concludes, “to lead directly to libertarian socialism, or anarchism if you like, when combined with an understanding of industrial capitalism (22-3).

The collection Chomsky on Anarchism covers much of the same ground as Government in the Future. It does, however, stress two other points that are worth noting. First, his argument depends on the assumption that human nature is not a tabula rasa, that is has certain fixed features that it brings to the table in interacting with the world. Second, the state and capitalism are not the only threats posed today to human freedom. Indeed, it is impossible to compile a list of possible threats that will be valid and relevant for all time. Rather, the conception of human nature that he endorses prescribes a method for formulating social vision, the results of which will change as social conditions change and as social knowledge advances. Chomsky relates both points together in the following passage:

Looked at in this way, the empty organism view is conservative, in that it tends to legitimate structures of hierarchy and domination. At least in its Humboldtian version [Chomsky relies heavily on Wilhelm von Humboldt’s work, especially his book The Limits of State Action], the classical liberal view, with its strong innatist roots, is radical in that, consistently pursued, it challenges the legitimacy of established coercive institutions. Such institutions face a heavy burden of proof: it must be shown that under existing conditions, perhaps because of some overriding consideration of deprivation or threat, some form of authority, hierarchy, and domination is justified, despite the prima facie case against it – a burden that can rarely be met. One can understand why there is such a persistent attack on Enlightenment ideals, with their fundamentally subversive content (CA, 174).

The innatist view of human nature that Chomsky endorses implies that all possible threats of human freedom should be challenged and, if possible, overcome. Note that while in Government in the Future Chomsky uses ‘anarchism’ and ‘libertarian socialism’ interchangeably, in Chomsky on Anarchism he restricts the latter to the specific social vision he has in mind for modern societies, while the former refers to the general method of challenging threats to human freedom that he recommends. Chomsky is thus both an anarchist and a libertarian socialist; the latter commitment depends heavily on his understanding of social conditions, whereas the former commitment depends only on his conception of human nature itself.

The social criticisms made by Russell and Chomsky are similar in many ways. Does that mean that Chomsky’s social vision is Russell’s as well? And do they share the same conception of human nature? Chomsky greatly admires Russell and discusses his ideas frequently.6 “To several generations, mine among them,” he writes, “Russell has been an inspiring figure, in the problems he posed and the causes he championed, in his insights as well as what is left unfinished” (PIKF, x). It is his concern with what Russell has left unfinished or unsatisfactorily resolved that motivates Chomsky’s views on Russell. Chomsky does not approach Russell as an intellectual historian, determined in getting precise about what Russell had in mind. Rather, he approaches Russell as a source for intellectual inspiration, for ideas that may be of use in formulating his own positions. Thus, the similarities between Chomsky’s and Russell’s ideas about human nature and social vision are there, but the differences are there as well.

6 See, e.g., CA, 156, 194-195, 205.
Chomsky's most systematic engagement with Russell's thought is in *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom*. Based on the Russell Lectures delivered by Chomsky at Cambridge University a year after Russell's death, this book takes up Russell's mature views on knowledge and freedom with an eye for their relevance to contemporary concerns. One of the lectures is devoted to questions of knowledge and the other to questions of freedom. Chomsky perceives some unifying threads in Russell's writings on the two topics and draws them out, not coincidentally relating Russell's conception of human nature and his social ideals to Chomsky's own (*PKF*, x-xi).

Chomsky takes Russell's 1948 *Human Knowledge* as representative of Russell's mature (in fact, final) position on questions of epistemology. He sees the mature Russell as recognizing that pure empiricism alone could not account for the knowledge human beings obtain. Both prescientific knowledge, the knowledge people obtain naturally without scientific reflection, and the philosophical study of the relationship between knowledge and experience require specific fixed cognitive mechanisms for knowledge acquisition. It cannot just be bald induction from experience plus generalized reasoning capacity, not least because the principle of induction itself, which is necessary to derive anything from experience, seems hard to ground in reason alone. In Russell's words, "Either, therefore, we know something independently of experience, or science is moonshine" (*PKF*, 4). Chomsky believes that this insight suggests the existence of a human nature with certain fixed capacities that it uses to derive working knowledge from a relatively information-poor environment (although he concedes that Russell might not have agreed with him on this). Chomsky sees his own work on the nature of human language as providing insight into how one particular human capacity works; this insight might be used as a starting point for the study of other, less accessible human cognitive systems.

This view of human nature as having certain fixed capacities that determine how we are capable of interacting with the world has certain implications. It suggests, for example, that there might be limits to the kinds of knowledge that human beings can have. "We might say," Chomsky writes,

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latter, Russell views humans as free agents whose natural development requires opportunities for individual creativity and self-expression along with egalitarian and democratic relationships with others. Chomsky describes this as “a humanistic conception of man, with due respect for man’s intrinsic nature and the admirable form it might achieve” (PKF, 54). With regard to the former, Russell endorses a form of social organization similar to those advocated by anarchists Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin. These two anarchist thinkers, writes Chomsky,

had in mind a highly organized form of society, but a society that was organized on the basis of organic units, organic communities. And generally they meant by that the workplace and the neighborhood, and from those two basic units there could derive through federal arrangements a highly integrated kind of social organization, which might be national or even international in scope (CA, 133).

The social vision offered by Russell as appropriate to the modern age—grounded in his “humanistic conception of man”—also turns out to be strikingly similar to the libertarian socialism advocated by Chomsky, a social vision informed by a conception of human nature very similar to Russell’s.

Any attempt to assimilate Russell’s political vision to Chomsky’s, however, must deal with two potential stumbling blocks. First, there is the matter of the rationalist model of human beings, in which people are born with certain cognitive abilities that do far more than simply compile data from the environment. Chomsky endorses this model, identifies elements of it in Russell, and links it to his vision of human beings as free creatures that require both creative self-expression and egalitarian social relations. But the link is not as clear as Chomsky would have it. Granted, a conception of human beings as totally malleable could not support a vision of a free society, or any other social vision for that matter. But the basic insight that people have inborn capacities of one sort or another could be developed in many different directions, some humane and enlightened, some not. It could be used, for example, to justify a patriarchal society on grounds that women are “built” differently than men. (Needless to say, this is not a hypothetical scenario.) Indeed, the unenlightened uses of the idea of a fixed human nature throughout history have arguably outnumbered the enlightened ones. It was recognition of this fact, I suspect, that led Russell himself to perceive a relationship between empiricism (i.e., a conception of human nature that attributed much more to social environment than to inborn capacity) and liberal democracy—for example, in his essay “Philosophy and Politics.” This fact does not demolish Chomsky’s case, but it does suggest that the link between Chomsky’s philosophical work on language and the mind and the conception of human nature he needs to sustain his libertarian socialism is even more tentative than he has so far admitted.11

Second, there is the matter of anarchism. As noted before, Chomsky’s vision of the appropriate form of social organization for a modern industrial society is very similar to that advocated by Russell. But while Chomsky employs the term ‘anarchism’ to describe his approach to social vision, Russell’s relationship to the term is ambiguous. On the one hand, he once described anarchism as “the ultimate ideal to which society should approximate” (cited in PKF, implications from rationalism and nefarious political implications from empiricism, see John Searle, “The Rules of the Language Game,” Times Literary Supplement, September 10, 1976 and Bernard Williams, “Where Chomsky Stands,” New York Review of Books, November 11, 1976.
11 Chomsky is on firmer ground when he links the possibility of creativity and self-expression with a mind fixed within certain limits. “The principles of mind,” he writes, “provide the scope as well as the limits of human creativity. Without such principles, scientific understanding and creative acts would not be possible. If all hypotheses are initially on a par, then no scientific understanding can possibly be achieved, since there will be no way to select among the vast array of theories compatible with our limited evidence and, by hypothesis, equally accessible to the mind. One who abandons all forms, all conditions and constraints, and merely acts in some random and entirely willful manner is surely not engaged in artistic creation, whatever else he may be doing” (PKF, 49-50). A completely unconstrained mind, then, would have difficulty creating or learning anything. For further discussion of the link between constraints (self-imposed or otherwise) and creative expression, see Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 3.
On the other hand, he perceived the social system he advocated—a decentralized, federated system of democratically organized communities and workplaces—as an alternative to, and not an embodiment of, anarchism. (‘Guild socialism’ was his term for it, as Chomsky acknowledges; see PKF, 60.) The difference may be more or less terminological; still, Russell’s complex relationship to the word should make one pause before equating his political position with that of an avowed anarchist like Chomsky. 12

Neither of these stumbling blocks, however, need prove fatal to Chomsky’s endeavor. His goal, after all, is less to assimilate Russell’s political position to his own than to identify political ideas in Russell’s writings that may be of use to social critics today. These ideas have been developed by Chomsky in ways that would seem strange to Russell, and they certainly require further development in light of the questions and difficulties posed by them. In the end, however, anyone interested in understanding Russell the social critic would do well to consult these three books. In doing so, one might not only learn something about the ideals underlying Russell’s social criticism, one might also learn something about which elements of those ideals are worth preserving for use by today’s social critics.

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12 To some extent, the word ‘socialism’ plays a role in Russell’s thought similar to that played in Chomsky’s by ‘anarchism’—designating less a concrete political system and more a way of formulating social ideals. Indeed, Russell takes anarchism to be a concrete political system while Chomsky takes it to be a way of formulating social ideals, and Russell takes socialism to be a way of formulating social ideals while Chomsky takes it to be a concrete political system. “Russell believed,” Chomsky writes, “that ‘socialism, like everything else that is vital, is rather a tendency than a strictly definable body of doctrine.’ It should, therefore, undergo constant change as society evolves” (PKF, 58). This fact goes a long way toward explaining why they agree on so much but have different assessments of anarchism.

BOOK REVIEW

THEMES SPINOZISTIC, LEIBNIZIAN, AND RUSSELLIAN

WILLIAM EVERDELL


How can a book on two seventeenth century rationalists by a businessman who retired early to study philosophy be important for Russell studies? Let’s begin by recognizing that it is an excellent introduction to the history of philosophy, nearly as enticing—though hardly as comprehensive—as Russell’s own. A longer answer would have two parts: first, that Russell’s most notorious legacy to the non-philosophical reader has been arguments for atheism anticipated first by Baruch Spinoza and later by the “Spinozists” of the radical Enlightenment. Second, Russell’s greatest intellectual breakthrough, his refounding of ontology on mathematical set theory and logic, followed immediately on his thorough revaluation of seventeenth century philosophy in general and particularly of the philosophy of Gottfried Leibniz, which was a major inspiration for him. Indeed, two other early influences, Louis Couturat and Charles Sanders Peirce, were Leibniz editors.

Russell’s first book was about German Democratic Socialism, his second about Geometry, but his third was about Leibniz, written after he took over J. M. E. McTaggart’s introductory historical lectures on philosophy in 1899. (“Accident led me to read Leibniz, because he had to be lectured upon.”) The writings of the prolific, polymathic German rationalist were scattered, many unpublished, and in three languages, but Russell knew all three and became a good editor. (They are less scattered now; the first real attempt at a complete edition, begun in 1923 in eight series, reaches the twentieth printed volume of Series One, the second of Series Seven, and soon begins going direct to the internet.) Russell was excited to find in the available texts a sort of Rorschach for his own emerging intellectual concerns, especially on the foundations of mathematics.

In Leibniz he saw, first, an extreme example of the seventeenth century's faith – almost an alternative religion – in the apodeictic certainty of mathematics, and the hope that it could be applied in ways that would bring all intellectual conflict to an end.

The other aspect of Leibniz's thought that seems to have fascinated Russell was the German's lifelong struggle with what Leibniz called "the labyrinth" – the antimony of continuity/discontinuity – and the fact, which is reinforced by the calculus that Leibniz co-invented, that the numbers on the real number line, and possibly the parts of anything (but never the integers) succeed each other without any "between." So arbitrarily small was the separation from a real number's predecessor and successor that Leibniz and his contemporaries baptized it "infinitesimal." Much of analysis, or the post-calculus study of functions, has depended on proofs that some sets with an infinite number of elements sum to a finite number – especially those whose elements are infinitesimal. The acceptance of this continuity of number, and perhaps of space, was unavoidable; but did that imply that the material universe was similarly composed of inseparable parts? Or were there places in space that were empty of matter?

Much of physics since Leibniz's time has depended on the assumption, as old as Leucippus and Democritus, that the universe is composed only of matter and void. We – scientists, philosophers and twenty-first century laypersons alike – still believe that all matter is made of separable particles, small but never infinitesimal, called molecules or atoms (later split, to the confusion of Democritus, into yet more integral and separable particles like hadrons or leptons), which have nothing at all between them. That doctrine, called atomism, was an obvious threat to religion as far back as Epicurus, and seventeenth century European thinkers wrestled continually with the on.

Leibniz's remarks on continuity which are cited by Russell in his Philosophy of Leibniz (1900) come from Leibniz, Die philosophische Schriften (ed., Gerhardt, Berlin, 1875-90): v1, pp335, 403, 416; v2, pp77, 98, 261, 278, 279, 282, 300, 304, 305, 315, 379, 475, 515, 517; v3, pp583, 591; v4, pp91-93, 394, 491; v5, pp142, 144, 145, 209; v6, pp629; v7, pp18, 404, 552. Repeated, in the order Russell took them up in his Philosophy of Leibniz, 1900: v2, p98, 77; v1, p403; v5, p144, 145; v6, p629; v1, p335; v5, p209; v2, p305, 315; v4, p91-93, 394; v2, p379, 475, 278, 282; v3, p583; v4, p491; v5, p142; v1, p416; v3, p591; v2, p279; v7, p18; v2, p515, 300, 304; v7, pp404, 552; v2, pp261, 517, 304.

...to the consequences of encounters of atoms, and if, as Epicurus and Lucretius had argued, there was a random element, or "swerve," in atomic motions, there was no necessity for God or gods to intervene in the cosmos at all. On this great quest Pascal went one way, Spinoza the other, and Leibniz clung to the middle of the road.

For Matthew Stewart, the great issue in Leibniz's life is neither mathematical logic nor continuity, but whether he is capable of acknowledging the atheistic implications of virtually all his philosophical work. Matthew sets up Spinoza as the lone climber defending the heretical proposition (nearly unthinkable in his time) that there is no God separate from the material universe, nor any scripture or other supernatural self-revelation of its being or activities. Leibniz he suits up for this bout as "the courtier," a paradigmatic compromiser of truth for community – even conviviality – trying to negotiate a theist peace among the warring theologians and the disdainful atheists. The only meetings between Spinoza and Leibniz were in November 1676, when Leibniz visited Spinoza in The Hague; during that month the two had frequently discussions together. These meetings serves Stewart as the fulcrum of his narrative, and what the two said to each other, which is almost completely undocumented, is teased out of other sources and woven into a paradigmatic confrontation between the lonely courage of atheism and the busy hypocrisy of religious diplomacy.

In the process, the reader gets a good introduction to the philosophical interests and achievements of both men, as Stewart skillfully attaches them to their memorably described characters. For Leibniz, in Chapter 5, "God's Attorney," Stewart gives a summary of the aims set forth by the 25-year-old Leibniz in his ultimately successful attempt to secure the lifetime patronage of the Elector of Hannover. He had already achieved some of them: a universal mathematical language, proof of the existence of the vacuum, a mathematical account of motion, a calculating machine, three new optical devices, a means of measuring longitude, a submarine, an air compressor pump, a summary of natural law jurisprudence, a solution to the mind-body problem, two arguments for the Catholic doctrine of
transubstantiation, and proof of the two principles that everything has a sufficient reason for being, and that the ultimate reason for all things is God (pp 89-90).

Spinoza’s philosophical career is to be found largely in the even-numbered chapters. He began it by publishing a laudatory critical summary of Descartes. He then followed the modest success of this work with a book that was to resonate through the next century and a half as the first comprehensive and thoroughgoing attack on scripturalism, or what Americans would call the fundamentalist reading of the Bible: The Tractatus Theologo-Politicus [Theological-Political Treatise, 1670]. Discussed at length in Chapter 6, “The Hero of the People,” the Tractatus maintains that the Bible, especially the Hebrew Bible, is to be read as history – the fragmentary history, corrupted by myth and wishful thinking, of a people foolishly convinced that they were favorites of God. The Ethics, published posthumously in 1678, escapes the careful attention Stewart gives the Tractatus, but it is not misrepresented, least of all its remarkable materialist pantheism, expressed in the famous phrase, “Deus, sive Natura.” (“God or Nature.”) The poet Novalis may have thought Spinoza, “a man drunk with God,” and Einstein may have “believe[d] in Spinoza’s Gods who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with the fates and actions of human beings,” for the “Spinozists” of the French and later Enlightenments, Spinoza was simply the first thoroughgoing scientific atheist.

For Bertrand Russell both Leibniz and Spinoza were monuments of Western Philosophy. For Matthew Stewart, they are just as monumental, but Spinoza, who influenced Russell less, is a persecuted hero in Stewart’s story, and Leibniz, who influenced Russell much more, is a convivial, compromising coward. I doubt Russell was either of those, and I think Stewart exaggerates his characterizations; but the reader will enjoy the argument and should judge for himself, as my high-school juniors and seniors have this year.

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Einstein to Rabbi Herbert S. Goldstein (1929) in answer to Goldstein’s telegraphed question whether he believed in God.

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DISCUSSION

IS ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AN ILLUSION?
A REPLY TO PRESTON

MICHAEL BEANEY

In his paper on ‘The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy’, Aaron Preston offers a sketch of the history of conceptualizations of analytic philosophy and argues that the genre of “analytic philosophy” is an illusion. Preston is right to point out some of the problems that face attempts to define ‘analytic philosophy’, but he draws the wrong conclusion from his historiographical investigations. Indeed, that conclusion undermines the value of his investigations. There may be no set of views accepted by all and only those who have traditionally been regarded as analytic philosophers, but that does not mean that analytic philosophy does not exist; it just means that we need to conceptualize it more carefully. Preston’s paper has three sections. I shall comment on each in turn.

1 APPROACHES TO THE HISTORY OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

In the first section of his paper, Preston distinguishes three stages in the history of conceptualizations of analytic philosophy. The first he calls “proto-history”, involving first-hand accounts by those working in the formative period of analytic philosophy. The second is “new wave history” (seen as pursued by Nicholas Griffin, Peter Hacker, Peter Hylton, and me, among others), which challenges the received views, and seeks to offer accounts more faithful to the actual history of analytic philosophy. The third is “analytic history” (exemplified, most notably, by Michael Dummett and Scott Soames), which provides rational reconstructions of the history of analytic philosophy.

Preston is right to identify a “proto-historical” stage, since first-hand accounts do indeed constitute important data without adding up to an historical story in themselves. But Preston fails to stress the multifarious and often inconsistent nature of this data. The period Preston has in mind runs from roughly 1900 to 1950, but there were

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1 Preston 2005. In what follows, page references are to this paper.
significant developments within this period, mostly notably, in relation to the linguistic turn, which was arguably only properly taken by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. According to Preston, the “tendency among proto-historical authors” was to treat the view that the analysis of language was the method of philosophy as “the central doctrine of analytic philosophy” (p. 12). But as Preston later recognizes (p. 16), this was not the view of Russell and Moore in the early phase of analytic philosophy, and indeed, even in his later work, Moore rejected the view. Yet in talking of this as the “received view”, Preston persists in regarding the proto-historical stage as being far more unified than it actually was.

I also find it surprising that Preston treats “analytic history” as a third stage, suggesting as it does that it is a response to “new wave history”. Admittedly, Dummett’s *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (1993) was published after the pioneering work of Hylton (1990) and Griffin (1991) on Russell, and Soames’ two volumes on *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century* (2003) have only recently appeared. Yet these are retrograde works, taking us back to the historiographically primitive days of “rational reconstructions” of the kind illustrated by Dummett’s first book, *Frege: Philosophy of Language* (1973). Preston acknowledges the deficiencies of Dummett’s and Soames’ contributions to the history of analytic philosophy, but provides no justification for regarding them as in any way evolving out of new wave history. If anything, I would have reversed the order: the genre of analytic history came into being before new wave history. At the very least, it would have been better to have seen analytic history and new wave history as just two approaches to the history of analytic philosophy. The former has its merits, but in my view, the latter is far more sophisticated, historiographically, and takes seriously the aim of getting the history right.2

Preston admits in fn. 1 that “Some works may occur out of sequence and others may not fit precisely into a category but be transitional stages with characteristics of several stages”. Nevertheless, he claims, “These are exceptions … the general trend of development is well represented by this three stage schema”. As far as his second and third stages are concerned, however, I think he is mistaken. Most of those working on the history of analytic philosophy today want to go beyond mere “rational reconstruction”. Dummett and Soames have been widely criticized for getting the history wrong. For criticism of Soames, for example, see Kremer 2005, Beaney 2006.

2 Preston admits in fn. 1 that “Some works may occur out of sequence and others may not fit precisely into a category but be transitional stages with characteristics of several stages”. Nevertheless, he claims, “These are exceptions … the general trend of development is well represented by this three stage schema”. As far as his second and third stages are concerned, however, I think he is mistaken. Most of those working on the history of analytic philosophy today want to go beyond mere “rational reconstruction”. Dummett and Soames have been widely criticized for getting the history wrong. For criticism of Soames, for example, see Kremer 2005, Beaney 2006.

In the second section of his paper, Preston takes the taxonomy of definitions of analytic philosophy offered by Hans-Johann Glock (2004), and claims that only doctrinal definitions are of the right kind to identify a philosophical school. Preston dismisses, in other words, topical, methodological, stylistic, genetic, and family resemblance characterizations of analytic philosophy. But I find his reasons for this dismissal unconvincing. Even if we allow that philosophical schools are individuated by their doctrines, this does not exclude consideration of other features, since, for any characterization in terms of some other feature, a corresponding doctrine can always be formulated. Assume, for example, that a certain method of analysis is distinctive of analytic philosophy. Then a corresponding doctrine can be formulated to the effect that this method is a central method of philosophy. Even in the case of genetic or family resemblance characterizations, corresponding doctrines can be formulated. Analytic philosophy might be (partly) defined, say, by the view that Frege’s and Russell’s work is an essential point of reference in discussions of fundamental issues in the philosophy of language, logic and mathematics.3

Preston suggests that what unites a *philosophical school* is its set of defining doctrines. But if this is how ‘philosophical school’ is to be understood, then analytic philosophy should not be thought of as a philosophical school. There have been periods in the history of analytic philosophy when philosophical schools (in something like the sense Preston has in mind) were important parts of it – most notably, during the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the Cambridge School of Analysis (so-called at the time) and the Vienna Circle were active.4 But as ‘analytic philosophy’ has come to be used today, it has a far broader sense, encompassing a range of subtraditions, as I would describe it. This is precisely what makes it appropriate to consider topical, methodological, stylistic, genetic, and family resemblance features in characterizing analytic philosophy. In this respect, analytic philosophy might be compared to the religious movement we call...
'Christianity', regarded as composed of the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the Methodist Church; and so on. Analytic philosophy is no more a single school than Christianity is a single church. Of course, we might say that Christianity is united in its belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ, but this is manifested in so many different ways that a full characterization requires specification of the different conceptions, creeds, practices, etc., that define the constituent churches. In assuming that analytic philosophy must be construed as a philosophical school, Preston has misunderstood the nature of what it is he is attempting to explain.

3 PRESTON'S ILLUSIONISM

Having rejected "non-doctrinal" (descriptive) definitions of analytic philosophy, Preston offers an alternative (evaluative) taxonomy in the third and final section of his paper. Under the general heading of doctrinal definitions, he first distinguishes between "traditional" and "revisionist" definitions, and then divides the former into "benighted" and "illusionist" definitions. Traditional definitions he simply characterizes as "doctrinal definitions that keep to the received view", that is, the view that analytic philosophy is primarily concerned with the analysis of language (p. 23). He takes these definitions to have been undermined by new wave history. This leaves revisionist definitions, which reclassify philosophers according to some alternative definition. Ray Monk, L. J. Cohen and Dagfinn Føllesdal are given as examples of revisionist historians of analytic philosophy. But by reclassifying, Preston argues, revisionism fails to explain "first, analytic philosophy's meteoric rise to power in the twentieth century, and, second, the fact that, even if there never was any real philosophical unity in analytic philosophy, it was for a long time thought that there was, and that it consisted in a metaphilosophical view according to which the nature of the philosophical enterprise was linguistic" (p. 26).

I agree that an account of analytic philosophy must explain its rise and the various conceptualizations of it (including its own self-images). But I was puzzled by the corner that Preston seems to have painted himself into. For in rejecting both non-doctrinal and revisionist definitions, all Preston finds himself left with is the traditional doctrinal definition - the "received view", as he alternatively calls it. But this, too, he describes as "not accurate" (p. 23). So where are we left? This is where his distinction between "benighted" and "illusionist" definitions comes in. According to Preston, benighted traditionalists accept the received view, but fail to realize its inadequacy; illusionists, however, do realize its inadequacy, but still manage to "accept" it. What the illusionist rejects is the following assumption:

(1) Analytic philosophy is a philosophical school.

But in rejecting (1), he claims, the illusionist is not thereby committed to finding a non-doctrinal definition. Preston writes:

the illusionist does not pretend, as those who offer non-doctrinal definitions do, that the lack of defining doctrines doesn't matter to analytic philosophy's nature as a philosophical school, and that the group represented by the received view can be recast as something lacking philosophical unity without destroying its philosophical nature and legitimacy. Instead, recognizing the centrality of the received view to the actual, historical developments associated with the name "analytic philosophy" (and vice-versa), illusionists allow it to exercise total control over the definition of analytic philosophy: for the illusionist, analytic philosophy is exactly what the received view says it is.

In this respect, the illusionist view endorses a traditional definition. However, while other traditional definitions conflict with (the results of new wave history), the illusionist is saved from this precisely by treating analytic philosophy as an illusion. Thus, the illusionist is a traditionalist concerning what analytic philosophy is supposed to be, but differs from other traditionalists concerning whether analytic philosophy exists at all. (p. 27)

According to Preston, then, 'analytic philosophy' does indeed mean what the received view says it means; it is just that there is nothing answering to that description. Denying the existence of analytic philosophy, however, cannot be the right conclusion to draw from new wave history, and is inconsistent with Preston's own talk of analytic philosophy in his paper. For if analytic philosophy does not exist, then what is Preston doing in writing about the history of

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5 The diagram that Preston offers on p. 22 in introducing his taxonomy is misleading, for it suggests that the final subdivision is a division within "revisionist" definitions, whereas Preston says on p. 27 that the subdivision is within "traditional" definitions.
analytic philosophy? He stresses the need—quite rightly—to explain the rise of analytic philosophy and the various conceptualizations of it; but what, then, is being explained? Clearly, there must be something that is the object of all the (productive and legitimate) work that is currently being done on the history of analytic philosophy. That object may not constitute a "philosophical school", as Preston understands it, but there are certain figures widely regarded as analytic philosophers, such as Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and Carnap, whose work is the source of the variety of interconnected approaches and subtraditions that fall under the general umbrella of 'analytic philosophy'.

The inconsistency in Preston’s position is reflected in a crucial ambiguity in his talk of rejecting (1). That ambiguity can be brought out if we construe ‘analytic philosophy’ as a definite description and interpret (1) along the lines of Russell’s theory of descriptions:

\[(1^*) \text{ There is one and only one thing that is analytic philosophy and whatever is analytic philosophy is a philosophical school.}\]

This can be false in three different ways, if either of the following is true:

(a) there is no such thing as analytic philosophy, i.e., analytic philosophy does not exist at all;
(b) there is more than one thing that is analytic philosophy;
(c) whatever is analytic philosophy is not a philosophical school.

Preston fails to distinguish the three different ways in which (1) might be regarded as false—ironically, given the status of Russell’s theory of descriptions as a paradigm of analytic philosophy. There may be grounds for rejecting (1) because (b) is true, i.e., because there is more than one thing denoted by ‘analytic philosophy’. But the key contrast, as far as Preston’s paper is concerned, is between rejecting (1) because (a) is true and rejecting (1) because (c) is true. On Preston’s view, new wave historians reject (1) by taking (c) as true. But Preston himself seems to slide between rejecting it by taking (c) as true and rejecting it by taking (a) as true. Or rather, what seems to be happening is that he takes the rejection of (1) because (c) is true to imply rejection of (1) because (a) is true. But this is clearly a non sequitur. Analytic philosophy may not be a philosophical school, but that does not mean that it does not exist at all.

Preston would presumably reply that what is really doing the work here is his definitional argument. Once one accepts the “received view” as the definition of analytic philosophy, one seems forced to conclude that there is nothing answering to it (or nothing like what one wanted). But in my view, given the widespread use of ‘analytic philosophy’ today, any such implication constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of the definition. Preston himself talks freely of analytic philosophy in his paper, and provides no reason for accepting the received view, other than that it is the received view. This makes me suspect that he is also relying on new wave history to support his rejection of (1). But as I have shown, one can reject (1) without denying the existence of analytic philosophy altogether. What is illusory is the received view itself.

The main metaphilosophical argument of Preston’s paper seems to boil down to this. ‘Analytic philosophy’, if it means anything at all, must refer to a philosophical school; and the only candidate is a school defined by its endorsement of the doctrine that the method of philosophy is linguistic analysis. But there is no such school. Therefore there is no such thing as analytic philosophy. The objection to this argument can be stated with equal brevity. There is no reason to accept the assumption that analytic philosophy must be a school, just as there is no reason to accept the received view as the definition of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy, as it has developed and ramified from its sources in the work of Frege, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, is a complex movement; and the task is to make sense of this with the help of all the conceptualizations—doctrinal, topical, methodological, and so on—that have been offered throughout its history. Dismissing all but doctrinal definitions, and then endorsing just the “received view”—in effect, defining analytic philosophy away—is a perverse way to understand such a complex historical movement.

Of course, this is not to say that there are no illusions about the nature of analytic philosophy lurking in its history. On the contrary, there are all sorts of misconceptions and confused self-images, not least about its supposed unity, and Preston is quite right to draw our attention to these. But an exposition of these misconceptions can proceed alongside a satisfying account of the history of analytic phil-
osophy which does not undermine itself by denying the existence of analytic philosophy. Fortunately, Preston's own practice belies his theory. In his paper, and no doubt in his ongoing work, Preston presupposes that there is a movement worth exploring. I am sure that his historiographical investigations will make a useful contribution to our understanding of the history of analytic philosophy. But I am even more sure that this can be pursued without taking analytic philosophy itself to be an illusion.6

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REPLY TO BEANEY

AARON PRESTON

I. BEANEY ON MY HISTORY OF CONCEPTIONS OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

In my article 'Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy', I argue that among histories of analytic philosophy we should recognize an initial stage of "proto-history" made up of "contemporaneous first-hand accounts of analytic philosophy in its early and middle stages (approximately 1900-1950), and near-contemporaneous, memoir-like accounts of the same." A notable feature of this work is the convergence of opinion in a "received view" of analytic philosophy, according to which it originated around the turn of the 20th century, in the work of Moore and Russell, in a revolutionary break not only from British Idealism but from traditional philosophy on the whole, all because of the metaphilosophical view that philosophy just is the analysis of language.

While Michael Beaneey agrees that we should recognize a proto-historical stage in histories of analytic philosophy, he disagrees with me about the existence of a received view. Beaneey objects that "in talking of this as the 'received view', Preston persists in regarding the proto-historical stage as being far more unified than it actually was", and that I "fail to stress the multifarious and often inconsistent nature" of the proto-historical data. As a counterexample to my claim, Beaneey cites the fact that, whereas I claim that "the 'tendency among proto-historical authors' was to treat the view that the analysis of language was the central doctrine of analytic philosophy' ... this was not the view of Russell and Moore in the early phase of analytic philosophy, and indeed, even in his later work, Moore rejected the view" — facts that I myself acknowledge.

However, this is not a counterexample to my claim — though neither Moore nor Russell accepted the linguistic view of philoso-
AARON PRESTON

phy and Moore explicitly disavowed having ever held that view, these facts do not count as proto-historical data on my view. Again, proto-history consists in contemporaneous first-hand accounts of analytic philosophy in its early and middle stages, and near-contemporaneous, memoir-like accounts of the same. The texts from which the current, nonlinguistic understanding of Moorean and Russellian analysis are derived, texts like 'The Nature of Judgment', 'The Refutation of Idealism', 'On Denoting', and 'The Principles of Mathematics', are not accounts of analytic philosophy, nor is Moore's disavowal in the Library of Living Philosophers such an account. All of these are data for histories of analytic philosophy, of course, but they are not themselves histories of analytic philosophy.

In order to qualify as proto-history as I use the term, a text must involve explicit reflection on analytic philosophy as such, conceptualized as a movement attached to some philosophical views. That is, to count as a reflection upon analytic philosophy as such, a reflection must have to do with either the movement or the views of the movement explicitly recognized as such. And so, not even Moore's 1942 disavowal counts; for while it is a reflection on philosophical views and methods, these are presented only as Moore's own, not as the views and methods of a movement, let alone the movement then dominating academic philosophy in the English speaking world. Though Moore acknowledges that his metaphilosophical and methodological views had been widely misunderstood, the notion that a movement had been founded on this misunderstanding is hardly even adumbrated in Moore's disavowal.

Even less do the early works of Moore and Russell (1898-1915, say), in which they developed their views about or at least their techniques of philosophical analysis, count as proto-history in my sense. While there are plenty of reflections on philosophical views and methods to be found in these early works, these are not reflections on analytic philosophy as such. Indeed, they could not be, since the category 'analytic philosophy' seems to have emerged only around 1930. To treat these early works as containing reflections on analytic philosophy in any sense at all requires that we read them anachronistically, in light of the fact that, several decades after they were written, they came to be understood as belonging to the textual canon of a school called 'analytic philosophy', and as involving reflections on that school's views and methods.

To sum up, the sources which reveal diversity in analytic philosophy in its early to middle stages do not also reveal diversity of opinion about analytic philosophy during those stages, for the simple reason that they do not contain any reflection about analytic philosophy as such. On the other hand, every text prior to 1970 — and a great many thereafter — that does contain reflection on analytic philosophy as such represents it along the lines of the received view.

Beaney also finds it "surprising that Preston should have treated 'analytic history' as a third stage, suggesting as it does that it is a response to 'new-wave history'.... If anything," he objects, "I would have reversed the order: the genre of analytic history came into being before new-wave history. At the very least, it would have been better to have seen analytic history and new-wave history as just two approaches to the history of analytic philosophy."

This is a legitimate objection. The proper sequence of these two types of history is difficult to determine, and there are good reasons for preferring either of Beaney's suggested alternatives. However, I think there are also good reasons for thinking that the new-wavers conditioned the emergence of analytic history — for instance, without the challenge to the traditional analytic self-conception brought about by the new-wave historians, there would have been little motive for hard-core analytic philosophers to chronicle the history of their own movement — and that is why I placed analytic philosophy third. Ultimately, however, I don't think that much of significance hangs in the balance between my way of characterizing the relationship between these two types of historiography and either of those suggested by Beaney. All three perspectives allow us to pick out analytic history as a distinct type in order to highlight its deficiencies, and that, I take it, is the most important reason for making the distinction between it and new-wave history.

II. WORRIES ABOUT DOCTRINAL DEFINITION

In the second section of my paper, I offered a metaphilosophical argument for the view that philosophical schools should be defined doctrinally, to which Beaney objects that non-doctrinal criteria should be allowed as well. I agree. My view is that doctrines are necessary but not always sufficient for defining a philosophical school, so that non-doctrinal features can form part of the content of a school's definition. However, this may have been obscured by
the rigid delineation of the taxonomic categories employed in my article. The taxonomy served the purpose of framing a concise discussion of the varieties of definition that have been proposed, but it did not allow for the possibility of hybrid definitions containing both doctrinal and non-doctrinal elements. Consequently, by arguing for doctrinal definitions over against all other "pure" types, I'm afraid it may have seemed that I was arguing that nothing but doctrines should show up in a definition for a philosophical school. To the contrary, I think that non-doctrinal features may be helpful, even indispensable, in discerning what a given figure or group's doctrines (views) really were, and also that they may themselves serve as part of a school's definition. However, among the "pure" categories of the taxonomy, I still think that only doctrinal definitions are suited to pick out philosophical schools, because philosophy is essentially a theoretical enterprise. Even in a hybrid definition, doctrinal elements will count as more fundamental than non-doctrinal ones, since the doctrinal elements are necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) for the school to be a philosophical one.

Beaney also offers a second objection, saying that, if a philosophical school is to be a thing of doctrines, "then analytic philosophy should not be thought of as a philosophical school". His argument is based on the current use of 'analytic philosophy': as 'analytic philosophy' has come to be used today, it has a far broader sense, encompassing a range of subtraditions, as I would describe it. This is precisely what makes it appropriate to consider topical, methodological, stylistic, genetic, and family resemblance features in characterizing analytic philosophy.

I will put off commenting upon this "argument from current use" until the next section, for it reappears in Beaney's argument against illusionism.

III. WORRIES ABOUT THE ILLUSIONIST THESIS

Beaney points out that there is "a crucial ambiguity" in my claim that on the illusionist view analytic philosophy is not a real philosophical school, and he does a nice job of disambiguating the claim by applying Russell's theory of descriptions. Rephrasing the view I claim is false as,

(I*) There is one and only one thing that is analytic philosophy and whatever is analytic philosophy is a philosophical school.

Beaney explains that it can be false in three different ways:
(a) there is no such thing as analytic philosophy, i.e., analytic philosophy does not exist at all;
(b) there is more than one thing that is analytic philosophy;
(c) whatever is analytic philosophy is not a philosophical school.

Now, Beaney is correct to note that I did not distinguish these three ways in which the claim could be false. And he is also correct to say that my own talk of analytic philosophy seems to oscillate between (a) and something like (c). On the one hand, in the context of presenting the illusionist view, I claim (a); but, as Beaney notes, in setting up the argument that leads me to the illusionist view, "Preston himself talks freely of analytic philosophy," in such a way that I seem to presuppose the existence of some reality designated by the name. And, of course, lots of people talk about analytic philosophy in this way. Thus, he concludes, "there must be something that is the object of all the (productive and legitimate) work that is currently being done on the history of analytic philosophy." But if there is something that is the object of all this work, and it is not, as I claim, a philosophical school, then the "analytic philosophy" of which I speak must be something other than a philosophical school, just as (c) has it.

I agree with Beaney that there is something that is the object of all the productive and legitimate work that is currently being done on the history of analytic philosophy, in the sense that claims made about "analytic philosophy" in the context of this research frequently have referents, and sometimes even a common referent. I take it that the referent of 'analytic philosophy' is some subset of the vast network of persons, ideas, and events in philosophy from the late 19th through (so far) the early 21st centuries (hereafter "the subset"). For example, work in the history of analytic philosophy investigates the relationships among Moore, Russell, and the British Idealists; it traces the development of Russell's or Wittgenstein's thought, or the relationships between their thought and Frege's; it reconsiders the nature and aims of logical positivism; and so on. These figures, their thoughts, the relationships of influence among them, the events in which they were involved - all of these are real, and a great many of
them, by convention and by tradition, fall under the heading ‘analytic philosophy’.

However, while I grant that the subset can serve as the object/referent of ‘analytic philosophy’ when the term is used in the context of productive and legitimate historical work, I would not want to define ‘analytic philosophy’ in terms of it, as Beaneys seems prepared to do when he says:

Once one accepts the ‘received view’ as the definition of analytic philosophy, one seems forced to conclude that there is nothing answering to it (or nothing like what one wanted). But in my view, given the widespread use of ‘analytic philosophy’ today, any such implication constitutes a *reductio ad absurdum* of the definition.

Here again we are confronted with an “argument from current use”. This type of argument first confronted us in section II, where Beaneys was prepared to deny the need for doctrinal definition on the grounds that (i) current use is sufficient to define analytic philosophy, and (ii) current use reveals ‘analytic philosophy’ to be an umbrella-term designating “a range of subtraditions” exhibiting no thoroughgoing doctrinal unity, but only a “family resemblance” of belief and practice. Now he argues that current use nullifies the illusionist approach on the basis of the additional assumption that (iii) since people talk so much about “analytic philosophy” today, there must be something non-illusory answering to this talk.

But there are problems with this approach to defining ‘analytic philosophy’. By way of explanation, let me first note that (iii) is by no means clearly true. Contra Beaneys, it is far from clear that there *must* be an object answering to all the current talk of, and work on, analytic philosophy. As the later Wittgenstein showed us, discourse about a non-existent object might easily be carried-on in the context of an established “language game” without anyone expressly realizing that the object under discussion is non-existent (e.g., the “beetle in the box”). So long as ‘analytic philosophy’ has a use in some language game – which it does – it is possible (in principle) to talk about analytic philosophy till the cows come home without there actually being any such thing. In such a case, the question to ask is not “what is analytic philosophy?”, but “why did people start speaking of analytic philosophy?”, that is, “why does this language-game exist in the first place?”

Still, it makes good sense to suppose that all the contemporary talk about analytic philosophy corresponds to something non-illusory, as Beaneys’ (iii) has it. I am happy to affirm this and to say that this is the subset. However, only the correct subset will do, and correctness here can only be judged in light of a preferred way of carving up the socio-historical landscape of philosophy. Indeed, by limiting the relevant portion of that landscape to the late 19th century and after, I have already imported part of this preferred way into my description of the subset. But this preferred way will in turn depend upon a prior conceptualization of analytic philosophy: it is because I take analytic philosophy to be *this* and not *that* that I associate it with just *these* bits of the socio-historical landscape of philosophy.

Because demarcating the correct subset requires a prior conception of analytic philosophy, our ultimate sense of what analytic philosophy is, our definition of analytic philosophy, cannot be framed solely in terms of the subset. Nor can we let current use carry the weight of demarcation, for several reasons. First, if Beaneys’ sense of current use is correct, the term picks out “a range of subtraditions”; but this is just another way of saying that it picks out the subset (or several subsets of the subset). Thus, just as we cannot define analytic philosophy in terms of the subset, we cannot define it in terms of “a range of subtraditions”, since we will have to justify our selection of some range as the correct range.

To this, Beaneys may reply that current use itself is what justifies the selection: since *this* is what everyone today means by ‘analytic philosophy’, *this* just is what the term means today. However, second, current use is not sufficiently uniform to demarcate a common conception of analytic philosophy. This is demonstrated most vividly by the existence of radical revisionist definitions of analytic philosophy that make Aquinas or Husserl analytic philosophers. Unless we exclude these from current use, we will not be able to find a common conception of analytic philosophy in current use. But we can’t simply choose to exclude these definitions without begging the question against them. So, Beaneys’ assumption (ii) seems to be false as well.

Third, even if current use was sufficient to provide a common conception, it would still be legitimate – and historically necessary – to ask why and how the “analytic philosophy” language-game
began and why it is as it is. This is a question about the history of analytic philosophy that cannot be answered just by looking to the term's current use. Rather, the question has a historical answer. In my book, I outline the answer as follows:

...the very fact that AP [analytic philosophy] exists as something to be discussed under a single name is historically and hence unalterably – I am tempted to say necessarily – connected to ... the early success of a particular philosophical outlook in securing both (1) the attention and (2) the loyalty of academic philosophers both (3) in places that mattered (and so at prestigious intuitions) and (4) in numbers large enough to generate the kind of regular and widespread discussion that would both (5) require the coining of a new term and (6) explain that term's subsequent entrenchment as one of the most familiar in the philosophical lexicon....

And, so far as the historical record is concerned, the philosophical outlook in question was the linguistic thesis, the metaphilosophical view that philosophy just is the analysis of language, and its corollaries – just as the "received view" or "traditional conception" has it.

Fourth, and finally, since the origins of the "analytic philosophy" language-game can be traced back to around 1930, and since the rules of the game have developed and been modified over time (indeed, current use simply represents the most recent modifications), a definition based on current use alone would not be historically illuminating and could easily be historically misleading.

...So, it seems that a definition framed in terms of current use will not be adequate for saying what analytic philosophy is simpliciter, since it is a historically extended entity whose status as a subject of conversation depends in various ways upon the received view. Nor will such a definition be legitimate for guiding historical work on analytic philosophy. Consequently, Beaney's assumption (i) is false, and his arguments from common use fail to undermine my views.

Let us return now to Beaney's main objection, raised at the beginning of this section: namely, that I failed to disambiguate (1*) by not saying which of (a), (b), or (c) I meant. Earlier, I clarified that I meant (a) in the context of presenting the illusionist view, and that I meant something like (c) in setting up the argument that leads to it.

Beaney suggested that my meaning (c) was necessary since, otherwise, there would be no object for the talk of analytic philosophy that I engaged in. Though an object is not required for meaningful talk, but only an established language-game in which the term has a use, I nonetheless agree that there is an object of such talk: "the subset". However, I would not call this "analytic philosophy" simpliciter, or say that analytic philosophy just is this subset. Consequently, I am going to resist acceding to Beaney's (c), "whatever is analytic philosophy is not a philosophical school". This might be taken to mean "there is something that is analytic philosophy, and it is not a philosophical school", but, given my reluctance to define 'analytic philosophy' in terms of the subset, I take this to be false, historically misleading, and explanatorily inadequate. Instead, I submit that the following is sufficient to justify talk of analytic philosophy both in setting up the case for illusionism, and in all other legitimate and productive work on analytic philosophy:

(c*) there is something that 'analytic philosophy' refers to, and it is not a philosophical school.

Beaney's claim, that "analytic philosophy may not be a philosophical school but that does not mean that it does not exist at all" (my emphasis) is misleading. Instead, what we should say is that the fact that analytic philosophy never was what it was originally thought to be does mean that it doesn't exist at all, but this fact doesn't imply that there's nothing to which the term 'analytic philosophy' can legitimately be taken to refer.
Traveler's Diary / Conference Report

THE CENTRAL APA is as predictable as a spring cold – almost every year it meets in April in Chicago at the Palmer House. This year, I roped a colleague, Michael Garral, into attending, and made my way through the old-money ambience of the hotel as if a proud homeowner showing off her property. But to do so I’d first had to get to Chicago, which I did by flying to Pittsburgh, then renting a car to drive to Chicago. I had reserved an economy car, but they were out when I got there, so they charged me the economy rate for a steroidal monster SUV they did have. Not a novice to driving, my “car” was all the same a challenge to drive, especially in Chicago, where I could have squashed pedestrians flat without being any the wiser and where threading the nearby parking garage required the concentration of Buddha.

But, still, I got there – hungry. Sad to say, the APA bulletin’s section on dining in downtown Chicago is outdated, a fact my friends and I only discovered after walking many, many blocks. Achieving a meal nevertheless and moving along Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, I subsequently desired sleep, which I accomplished in a room in the Palmer House somewhat smaller and less well appointed than my vehicle. Still, I chose the hotel room over the SUV, and woke in the morning looking forward to the quartet of talks ahead of me at the combined session of the Russell Society and History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society.

James Connelly, the first speaker of the day, spoke to the approximately 16 people there on a new, and to his mind simplified, reading of Wittgenstein’s private language argument. At the heart of that argument, he sees a rejection of Leibniz’s principles of identity. Following this was a talk by Joongol Kim comparing Wittgenstein and Frege on the concept ‘object’. Frege rejected the possibility of a concept of ‘concept’ because he found it to be paradoxical, but retained a concept of ‘object’. Wittgenstein rejected both. Joongol explained why they diverged in their thinking on this.

Another talk on Wittgenstein followed, this time by Tuomas Manninen, on “A Bipartisan Interpretation of the Tractatus”. While Wittgenstein acknowledged his debt to both Russell and Frege in the Tractatus, interpreters of that work tend to read it either as influenced primarily by one or the other of these two men. Manninen finds elements of both in the Tractatus, to wit, Russell’s eliminative program and Frege’s notion of elucidation. Viewing the Tractatus in these terms provides Manninen with what he takes to be a decisive argument against the “new Wittgensteinians” who view the propositions of the Tractatus as nonsense. Finally, Sandra Lapointe gave a talk on Bolzano’s conception of scientific proof; arguing that it rested upon epistemological and pragmatic principles overlooked by Bolzano’s successors, including Alfred Tarski.

During the discussion that followed these talks, an elderly lady across the aisle from me caused an awkwardness by thumping her cane and demanding an account of Russell’s substitutional theory, which we were discussing. Claiming that some had even called her “the last Russellian”, she said she had never heard of Russell holding such a theory. Chris Pincock obliged her with an explanation and she seemed satisfied as well as totally indifferent to the possibility of having committed an intellectual faux pas. My curiosity was aroused: who was this person who claimed to have been called “the last Russellian”? What a thought! If that were true, then what the hell were we? As the session came to an end, I popped over to her chair and peered at the words `Ruth Barcan Marcus’ on her name-tag, greeting a lady as dignified as the queen of England, but a good deal more interesting. I provided her with more details about Russell’s substitutional theory and promised to send her some articles about it. Perhaps she might come to the annual meeting if invited!

After the excitement of meeting RBM, I returned home feeling a certain malaise that devolved into a cold as the day wore on. Misfortune followed misery, as it came to pass that Jet Blue misplaced my bag. I waited all day in JFK, sick as a dog, only to go home bagless and defeated. Delivery came slowly. Days later a chagrined Jet Blue representative came to my door with bag in hand for a weak and slightly wobbly claimant.—RC
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
2008 1ST QUARTER TREASURER’S REPORT

BALANCE 1/1/2008 $14,535.96

INCOME
Contributions
BRS 86.00
TOTAL Contributions $86.00
Dues
New Members 70.00
Renewals 1,332.00
TOTAL Dues $1,402.00
Interest Income 98.01
TOTAL INCOME $1,586.01

EXPENSES
Bank Charges 32.56
Bay Area Expenses 74.50
Conversion Expense 14.11
Library Expenses 93.42
PayPal Fees 20.26
Russell Subscriptions 1 4,209.40
TOTAL EXPENSES $4,444.25
OVERALL TOTAL $2,858.24

BALANCE 3/31/2008
US$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) 1,368.20
Cdn$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) .89
US$ term deposit (Toronto Dominion) 10,308.63
OVERALL BALANCE $11,677.72

Plus: to be transferred from US$ PayPal a/c $95.74

Ken Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackwl@mkmaster.ca)

US and Cdn. dollars are treated as equal. 1 The Russell invoice was paid first with available Cdn. funds. The total charge was US$4,225.00.

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
2007 ANNUAL TREASURER’S REPORT

BALANCE 1/1/07 $13,456.52

INCOME
Contributions
Bay Area 100.00
BRS 1,775.29
TOTAL Contributions $1,875.29
Dues
New Members 797.35
Renewals 4,528.15
TOTAL Dues $5,325.50
Interest Income 283.11
Library Income 73.00
Meeting Income 1,912.00
Other Income [T-shirts] 131.00
TOTAL INCOME $9,599.90

EXPENSES
Bank Charges 164.48
Bookkeeping Expense 440.00
BRS Paper Award 200.00
BRS T-shirts 280.00
Conversion Expense 28.44
Library Expenses 167.78
Meeting Expenses 3,043.81
BRS Quarterly 687.34
Other Expenses [Quicken] 38.93
PayPal Fees 88.68
Russell Subscriptions 3,381.00
TOTAL EXPENSES $8,520.46
OVERALL TOTAL $1,079.44

BALANCE 12/31/07
US$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) 3,669.68
Cdn$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) 655.66
US$ term deposit (Toronto Dominion) 10,210.62
OVERALL BALANCE $14,535.96

Plus: to be transferred from US$ PayPal a/c $86.48

Ken Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackwl@mkmaster.ca)

Note: US and Cdn. dollars are treated as equal.
The Greater Rochester Russell Set

Writers and Books’ Verb Café
740 University Avenue, Rochester, NY
7 pm
3$ - Free to Members

Apr. 12 Alan Bock on Russell’s essay ‘The Value of Free Thought’
May 10 Howard Blair on Bertrand Russell and quantum physics
June 14 John Belli on advice from Bertrand Russell
July 12 George McDade on Russell’s essays ‘Ideas That Have Helped Mankind’ and ‘Ideas That Have Harmed Mankind’
Aug. 09 Phil Ebersole on Russell as a guild socialist
Sept. 13 Gerry Wildenberg on Sam Harris’s book Letter to a Christian Nation

The Bay Area Russell Set

May 15 A celebration of Bertrand Russell’s birthday
June 16 On Humanistic Education
July 18 Report on the BRS Annual Meeting

Time and Place – 7 pm, Szechwan Café, 406 S. California Ave, Palo Alto, CA – ph: 650-327-1688
The
Bertrand Russell
Society
Announces Its
35th
Annual Meeting

St. John Fisher College
Rochester, NY
June 27-29, 2008

Abstracts are online at:
http://bluehawk.monmouth.edu/%7Easchweri/Bertrand_Russell_Society_Annual_Meeting.html

For further information,
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