RUSSELL AND NIETZSCHE

CONTENTS

In This Issue
Society News 3

Features

Nietzsche's Anticipation of Russell  STEPHEN J. SULLIVAN 9
Frege and Husserl on Signs and Linguistic Behaviour  SANDRA LAPOINTE 19

Reviews

Not Fade Away: Review of The Greater Generation  TIMOTHY ST. VINCENT 29
Argument, Evidence and Religion: Review of God and the Reach of Reason  MARVIN KOHL 32

Reports

BRS 22 Year Membership Report: 1988-2009 35
Traveler's Diary/Conference Report 37

Russell Letter

Note on C.D. Broad Article  BERTRAND RUSSELL 39

Cover: Friedrich Nietzsche and Bertrand Russell
IN THIS ISSUE

This issue of the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, the “Russell and Nietzsche” issue, deals with a topic that might at first surprise the reader. “Russell and Nietzsche? What on earth could be the connection there?” In fact there is probably more than one interesting connection between the two, and the one focused on in this issue will, we hope, be of special interest to many of the Quarterly’s readers. In his article “Nietzsche’s Anticipation of Russell,” Steve Sullivan puts his finger on a surprising identity between the two. Like Russell, Nietzsche endorsed Hume’s view of the soul — that there is no unchanging, unperceived substratum that is the metaphysical subject of all the varying mental qualities that we experience (e.g., perceptions, memories, or emotions). But more than this and also like Russell, Nietzsche attributed the belief that there is such a substratum at least in part to the misleadingness of subject-predicate grammar.

Russell is famous for criticizing subject-predicate grammar as misleading. He is, in fact, usually thought by analytic philosophers to have originated the view. For example, Peter Hylton claims:

After “On Denoting”, [Russell] comes to assume that analysis of a sentence will generally reveal that it expresses a proposition of a quite different logical form.... A consequence of Russell’s new view is that he comes to take it for granted that our ordinary language is generally misleading.... Here we have a crucial contribution to an important theme in twentieth century analytic philosophy quite generally: the idea that language is systematically misleading in philosophically significant ways. (Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, 2003, pp. 223-4)

No hint is given of this being a standard subject of discussion before Russell. But what the correlation between Russell’s and Nietzsche’s views suggests is that in fact there is an intellectual iceberg to be discovered of which these two points are only the tip, a historical movement or tradition of thought some time in the nineteenth century in which the misleadingness of grammar, and in particular, subject-predicate grammar, was a common subject. Nietzsche, being a trained philologist, would of course be as privy to such a discussion as Russell.
A first suggestion of what that discussion might have been and where it might have occurred can be found in Pieter Seuren’s book *Western Linguistics: An Historical Introduction*. In it (secs. 2.6.3, 7.1.3 and elsewhere) Seuren discusses what he calls “the great 19th c. subject-predicate debate” in which the differences between the grammatical, logical, psychological, and semantical structures of a sentence are debated. Grammar is indeed misleading, these people claimed; what is meant, implied, or psychologically suggested by a sentence may be something quite different from what is indicated by the surface grammar. However, in Seuren’s book, there is no explicit discussion, as there is in Nietzsche and Russell, of the subject of a sentence misleadingly suggesting that there is some unsensed substratum in which the qualities of things “inhere.” Further evidence for this suspected tradition of thought is required, but Sullivan takes the first large step in this work of finding Russell’s predecessors in the view that subject-predicate grammar is misleading by pointing out the identity between Russell and Nietzsche on just this point, indicating the existence of a tradition connecting the two.

Following Sullivan’s article is one by Sandra Lapointe providing another comparative historical analysis with her article on Frege’s and Husserl’s views on the nature of linguistic signs. This will be of special interest to those curious about Russell’s later views of meaning, after 1920, when he begins looking carefully at the physical properties of language itself, and not just the meaning of these physical marks or utterances.

Following these articles are books reviews by Timothy St Vincent on Leonard Steinborn’s book *The Greater Generation: In Defense of the Baby Boom Legacy* and Marvin Kohl un Eric: Wielandberg’s book *God and the Reach of Reason: C.S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell*. Concluding the issue is a membership report with data and graph of the ups and downs of the Society’s membership since 1988. And as always, there is a Traveler’s Diary/Conference Report, with the annual treasurer’s report of the Bertrand Russell Society for 2008 included at the end. JO

---

1 I am grateful to Matt Davidson for pointing this book, and its discussion of the 19th c. subject-predicate debate, out to me. Seuren bases his own account of this debate on pt. 2 of Elffers-van Ketel’s 1991 book *The Historiography of Grammatical Concepts*.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS ELECTION RESULTS, 2009-2011. The Russell Society holds elections each year to select one third of the directors to its board for a three year term. Once elected, directors carry out the duties of running the Society, conducting Society business requiring a vote at the annual meeting and taking care of other Society business by means of committees and email contact. Nominations for the board occur in October and elections (by mail and email) take place in November and December. Any member of the Society may stand for election, and the Society encourages all who wish to participate to do so.

This year’s election results are as follows: Nicholas Griffin 34 votes, Peter Stone 34, John Ongley 33, Cara Elizabeth Rice 31, David Goldman 30, Gregory Landini 29, Marvin Kohl 28, Justin Leiber 24, Billy Joe Lucas 23, with the first eight – Griffin, Stone, Ongley, Rice, Goldman, Landini, Kohl, and Leiber – thus being elected. We thank all these people for participating in this year’s election.

THANK YOU FOR SUPPORTING THE BRS! The Society welcomes gifts of all sizes and kinds. In 2008 we gained our most recent LIFE MEMBER, Justin Leiber, who joins the nine others who have contributed by means of taking out a life membership.


LIBRARY NEWS. The Bertrand Russell Society’s Library website will soon have a new web address: www.russellsocietylibrary.com. Members are urged to take advantage of the many audio/visual materials available in the members’ area at the Library website. These include radio and television interviews with Russell on the humanist approach, liberty, religion, human nature, the atomic bomb, and a wide variety of other subjects. Just email Russell Society Librarian Tom Stanley at his new email address, tjstanley@myfairpoint.net, for a username and password to the site’s ‘members only’ area of either the current or future site and spend tonight listening to and watching Russell speak his mind!

WRITING FROM THE PHILIPPINES. A new humanist newsletter has arrived – The Freethinker’s Reader. Published in the Philippines, this reincarnation of an earlier effort by the late Joachim Po is now under the editorship of Joshua Lipana, president of the Center for Inquiry, Philippines. The first issue features a devil’s advocate essay on democracy, a page of quotes (ranging from Voltaire’s “Crush the infamy” to Obama’s “Yes, we can”), an essay on Nietzsche, and an especially good one by Poch Suzara, in honor of Jose Rizal. No Russellian could object to what is clearly intended to be a venue defending the secularist position, but a better newsletter would result with better overall writing and a clear idea, once and for all, of how to write Russell’s name: with two l’s, as in ‘spell.’

Matters improve with the second issue – the newsletter is quick on its feet. In essays that focus, e.g., on the battle over reproductive rights in the Philippines, the issue takes aim against religion and sometimes aims low, as in a jokey piece on “natural planning” that recommends practicing a kind of sex it imputes to priests. Despite an uneven tone, the newsletter conveys clearly the frustration experienced by embattled secular Filipinos, giving voice to the dismay of atheists and freethinkers living in the Philippines. The newsletter can be found online at http://afreethinkerslife.blogspot.com/ or you can order a copy by contacting philippines@centerforinquiry.net.

NEW AND RECENT BOOKS. Russell Society member Timothy Madison’s new book, W.K. Clifford and “The Ethics of Belief,” (Cam-
SOCIETY NEWS

bridge Scholars Publishing, Jan 2009), has just been published. The book is on the noted mathematician W.K. Clifford, who, in his essay "The Ethics of Belief," argued that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one to believe anything on insufficient evidence." Madigan describes the historical background and context of this essay, along with its influence (William James’s "Will to Believe" was a response to it) and its continuing relevance.

ALSO NEW IN PRINT. The Historical Dictionary of Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy (Scarecrow Press, March 2009), by Quarterly editors Rosalind Carey and John Ongley, which has also just been published, has several hundred entries to provide the reader with access to everything from Russell’s logic and mathematical philosophy to his moral, religious, and political views.

DECEASED. Chicago radio personality, oral historian and author, Studs Terkel passed away on October 31, 2008 at the age of 96. A much loved and energetic man, Studs wrote numerous books — including Hard Times: An Oral History of the Great Depression, Working: People Talk About What They Do All Day and How They Feel About What They Do, and the 1985 Pulitzer prize winner, The "Good" War — and conducted regular interviews on his daily radio show with people from all walks of life, including, in 1962, one taped in England with Bertrand Russell. Mr. Terkel visited the Russell Society at its 2003 annual meeting in Lake Forest, Illinois on the occasion of his accepting the Bertrand Russell Society award. He will be remembered with affection.

FEATURES

NIETZSCHE'S ANTICIPATIONS OF RUSSELL*
STEPHEN J. SULLIVAN

The time is perhaps close at hand when it will once again be understood what has actually sufficed for the basis for such imposing and absolute philosophical edifices as the dogmatists have hitherto reared: perhaps some popular superstition ... [or] a deception on the part of grammar.

"Preface", Beyond Good and Evil, Friedrich Nietzsche

The philosophies of Bertrand Russell and Friedrich Nietzsche might appear to have very little in common, indeed to be antithetical. Although Russell praised Nietzsche’s literary style, he had little positive to say about Nietzsche’s thought. He focused almost exclusively on Nietzsche’s ethical/political views, which he characterized as proto-fascist, and on his critique of religion, and rejected out of hand his ontology and epistemology. And I suspect that Nietzsche in turn would have dismissed Russell as an English “blockhead” in the broadly liberal, empiricist tradition of John Stuart Mill, on whom Nietzsche famously bestowed that epithet. But in fact these two philosophers expressed some remarkably similar views about knowledge, language, and mind — so similar as to raise the possibility that Russell was significantly influenced by Nietzsche on these matters.

The connection between Nietzsche’s thought and 20th century analytic philosophy has not gone entirely unnoticed by Nietzsche commentators, especially Walter Kaufmann and Arthur C. Danto. But it remains a neglected topic, and the relation between Nietzsche and Russell even more so, and I hope to make a start on remedying that situation.

* Thanks to Richard Findler and Andrew Colvin for their responses to an earlier version of this paper.

1 The translation is a combination of those by Zimmern and Hollingdale.
2 Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 760, 162; 772-3.
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 21. ‘Blockhead’ is my translation.
4 Kaufmann: Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ, 422-423; "Introduction" to The Portable Nietzsche, 18; Existentialism, Religion, and Death, 30. Danto: Nietzsche as Philosopher, 82-89. See also Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative, 71; and Friedrich Waismann, "How I See Philosophy", Logical Positivism, 350.
Arguably the most striking overlap between Russell and Nietzsche lies in their treatment of Descartes’ famous elemental certainty *cogito ergo sum* (“I think, therefore I am”). Each of them argued, and in much the same way, that ‘I think’ goes beyond the data of immediate experience in positing a mental substance or enduring self. And more significantly, both Russell and Nietzsche criticized ordinary language for embodying metaphysical errors, especially an unwarranted commitment to substance by the grammatical subject of a sentence.

I. RUSSELL ON THE COGITO AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE

In his classic 1912 work *The Problems of Philosophy*, Russell accepted—though as only probably true—the Cartesian view that each person is directly aware of her own self as the thinker of her own thoughts: as the I of ‘I think.’ But by 1913 he had given up somewhat cautiously on direct self-acquaintance, and by the 1920s he reached the firm conclusion that the ‘I think’ of Descartes’ *cogito ergo sum* goes beyond what one is entitled by experience to assert. Here are Russell’s own words in *An Outline of Philosophy* (1927):

> What, from [Descartes’] own point of view, he should profess to know is not ‘I think,’ but ‘there is thinking’.... I think we ought to admit that Descartes was justified in feeling sure that there was a certain occurrence, concerning which doubt was impossible; but he was not justified in bringing in the word ‘I’ in describing this occurrence.

And later, in *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945):

> ‘I think’ is [Descartes’] ultimate premise. Here the word ‘I’ is really illegitimate; He ought to state his ultimate premises in the form ‘there are thoughts’. The word ‘I’ is grammatically convenient, but does not describe a datum.

Russell denied that thinking, or thoughts, entail a thinker, and he explained the temptation of inferring a thinker from the occurrence of thoughts by appealing to what he regarded as the questionable metaphysical commitments of ordinary language. Again, in his own words:

> And the broader theme that ordinary language, and especially subject/predicate grammar, are laden with metaphysical errors concerning substance and the ego was a constant in Russell’s philosophy from the 1920s until his final years. For example, in his 1945 *History of Western Philosophy*, he was concerned to argue that the concept of substance, though grammatically useful, “is a metaphysical mistake, due to the transference to the world-structure of the structure of sentences composed of a subject and a predicate.” And he was surely aware of the theological significance of this point: that we have no knowledge of the existence of the soul. In *An Outline of Philosophy* the argument against substance goes like this:

> The notion of substance, at any rate in any sense involving permanence, must be shut out from our thoughts if we are to achieve a philosophy in any way adequate either to modern physics or modern psychology. Modern physics, both in the theory of relativity and in the Heisenberg-Schrodinger [quantum-physical] theories of atomic structure, has reduced “matter” to a system of [very brief] events.... And in psychology, equally, the “ego” has disappeared as an ultimate conception, and the unity of a personality has become a peculiar causal nexus. In this respect, grammar and ordinary language have been shown to be bad guides to metaphysics.... And it must be understood that the same reasons which lead to the rejection of substance lead also to the rejection of “things” and “persons” as ultimately valid concepts.

8 *Outline of Philosophy*, 202.
9 However, as early as the 1913 *Theory of Knowledge* Russell maintained that subject/predicate grammar suggests a mistaken view of substance (93-4).
10 See *History of Western Philosophy*, 567, 663.
Note that Russell’s grammatical case against substance was linked to his defense of an event ontology – a point to which I shall return in section 2.

Late in his career, somewhat embittered by the dismissal of his work by the then dominant ordinary-language school of analytic philosophy, Russell made some withering comments about that school, which he labeled “the cult of common usage.” Not only did he criticize its anti-science tendencies, but he also said that “it makes almost inevitable the perpetuation among philosophers of the muddle-headedness they have taken over from common sense,” and that it “seems to concern itself, not with the world and our relation to it, but only with the different ways in which silly people can say silly things.” Although Russell did not quite live long enough to witness the displacement of ordinary-language philosophy by a broadly Quinean naturalism as the dominant version of analytic philosophy, he would certainly have been heartened by the strong naturalist commitment to the philosophical importance of scientific knowledge and the limitations of common speech.

II. NIETZSCHE ON THE COGITO AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE

In the late 1880s, the final years of Nietzsche’s career, he wrote two of his most important works: Beyond Good and Evil and The Will to Power, the latter incomplete and published only posthumously. Each of these works contains not only striking passages on the cogito that are in some respects reminiscent of Russell’s views but also other passages that go beyond them.

In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche offered some interesting reflections on ‘I think.’ He began by denying in Section 16 that it is known with direct certainty:

There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are “immediate certainties”: for example, ‘I think’... But that “immediate certainty”... involves a contradictio in adjecto, I shall repeat a hundred times; we really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words!... The philosopher must say to himself: When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence “I think,” I find a whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible to prove: for exam-


ple, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an “ego,” and, finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking... In short, the assertion ‘I think’ assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; [thus] it has... no immediate certainty for me.

He went on in section 17 to add that ‘It thinks’ is the most that one is entitled to claim possesses immediate certainty:

With regard to the superstition of the logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small terse fact... namely, that a thought comes when “it” wishes, not when “I” wish, so that it is a falsification of the facts of the case to say that the subject “I” is the condition of the predicate “thinks.” It thinks; but that this “it” is precisely the famous old “ego” is... only a supposition... and assuredly not an “immediate certainty.” After all, one has even gone too far with this “it thinks” – even the “it” contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the grammatical habit: “Thinking is an activity; every activity requires an agent; consequently”... Perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves, including the logicians, to get along without the little “it” (which is all that is left of the honest little old ego).

Finally, in section 54 he linked belief in a referent for the grammatical subject of ‘I think’ to belief in the soul:

Formerly, one believed in the “soul” as one believed in grammar and the grammatical subject: one said, “I” is the condition, “think” is the predicate and conditioned – and thinking is an activity to which thought must apply a subject as cause.... The possibility of a merely apparent existence of the subject, “the soul” in other words, may not always have remained strange to [Immanuel Kant] – that thought which as Vedanta philosophy existed before on this earth and exercised tremendous power....

Clearly Nietzsche shared Russell’s doubts about the immediate certainty of ‘I think,’ the validity of inferring a thinker from thoughts,

13 Andrew Colvin suggests that in this last passage Nietzsche confused Vedantic or Hindu thinking with Buddhist thinking about the self, since it is Buddhists who maintain that there is no (substantial or enduring) self.
and the reality of the ego or enduring self. The passages also suggest a grammatical diagnosis of the errors of the cogito. Although Nietzsche went beyond Russell in explicitly connecting the problems of the cogito with belief in the soul, Russell was certainly aware of the connection (as noted earlier), and they both clearly agreed on the faultiness of this belief.  

But in *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche stopped short of dispensing altogether with a substantive subject for ‘thinks’ and settled — albeit provisionally — for ‘it thinks’ rather than ‘there is thinking.’ Nor did he clearly blame the concept of substance for the difficulties with ‘I think’. Finally, in rejecting all immediate certainties Nietzsche was more radical than Russell, who was too much of a traditional empiricist to give up on direct certainty concerning first-person, conscious thought and experience. Indeed, a few years earlier in *The Gay Science* Nietzsche referred to “that impetuous desire that today discharges itself among large numbers of people in a scientific-positivistic form.” (288)  

The differences between the two philosophers’ analyses of the cogito narrow considerably, however, in *The Will to Power*. In section 484 Nietzsche abandoned a grammatical subject for ‘thinks’ in just the way Russell did: “There is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks’: this is the upshot of all Descartes’ argumentation.” And in the very next sentence he also connected the flaws in ‘I think’ with the concept of substance:  

But that means positing as “true a priori” our belief in the concept of substance — that when there is thought there has to be something “that thinks” is simply a formulation of our grammatical custom that adds a doer to every deed. In short, this is not merely the substantiation of a fact but a logical-metaphysical postulate — along the lines followed by Descartes one does not come upon something absolutely certain but only upon the fact of a strong belief.  

Finally, Nietzsche gave a grammatical diagnosis of the metaphysical problem of substance:  

The concept of substance is a consequence of the concept of subject: not the reverse! If we relinquish the soul, “the subject,” the precondition for substance in general disappears.

admirably conquerors, whose glory is cleverness in causing men to die.... Nietzsche despises universal love; I feel it is the motive power to all that I desire as regards the world. His followers have had their innings, but we may hope that it is rapidly coming to an end. (772-3)

It is tempting to suppose that Russell was in fact influenced at least by Beyond Good and Evil and that he consciously or subconsciously refused to admit it. But I think that there are good reasons for regarding this explanatory hypothesis as unjustified, though not necessarily false. They lie, perhaps unsurprisingly, in the radical empiricist thought of David Hume, and also, unexpectedly, in the work of the 18th century German thinker Georg Christoph Lichtenberg.

Hume is famous for his doctrine that we lack any direct awareness of the self and any good reason to believe in mental substance – a doctrine in obvious agreement with Russell and Nietzsche’s claim that ‘I think’ goes beyond the evidence of immediate experience. And as is well-known, Russell came to accept Hume’s doctrine. There is also little doubt that Nietzsche – perhaps from Immanuel Kant or Arthur Schopenhauer – was acquainted with Hume’s philosophy. So at least this much of Russell and Nietzsche’s common doubts about ‘I think’ could be due at least in part to Hume’s influence on both. And even if Nietzsche were unacquainted with Hume’s views on the self, the effect of those views on Russell would still undermine the explanatory hypothesis that Nietzsche influenced Russell. For in that case there would be an adequate historical account of Russell’s doubts about ‘I think’ that made no mention of Nietzsche’s similar doubts.

As for Lichtenberg, he is best known for the often philosophically interesting aphorisms – which were admired by some eminent thinkers – in his lengthy notebooks. Here is his aphorism on the cogito: “We should say, ‘It thinks,’ just as we say, ‘It thunders.’ Even to say cogito is too much if we translate it with ‘I think.’ To assume the ‘I,’ to postulate it, is [merely?] a practical need.” Shades of Nietzsche – who indeed was one of the eminent admirers of Lichtenberg’s work! Another such admirer was Ludwig Wittgenstein. And according to Roger Kimball, Wittgenstein “made Lichtenberg one of his causes ... and pressed copies of his work on friends, including Bertrand Russell.”

Let me be clear about this: I am not implying that Lichtenberg definitely influenced Nietzsche’s and Russell’s critiques of the cogito. We don’t even know whether Russell actually read Lichtenberg, much less whether he was acquainted with the latter’s aphorism on the cogito. But such a chain of influence, with Lichtenberg as “common cause,” is certainly a possible explanation of the similarity between those critiques. And it seems to me that this possibility – along with the high probability of Humean influence on Russell and the possibility of Humean influence on Nietzsche – is serious enough to render unjustified the hypothesis that a direct influence of Nietzsche on Russell best accounts for the similarity.

It might be objected that there is more to the overlap I have documented between Nietzsche and Russell than their common rejection of ‘I think.’ What about their claims that a false metaphysics of substance is built into ordinary language? But once again Hume’s radical empiricism, with its repudiation of mental as well as physical substance, could well be a common source of influence on Nietzsche and Russell.

I conclude that at least at the present time, it is doubtful – albeit possible – that Russell was influenced by Nietzsche. There remains the interesting question of why Russell, despite having read Beyond Good and Evil, failed to acknowledge (or even notice?) the striking similarities between their views on the cogito. I have suggested that the answer lies in the substantial differences in their ethical and political perspectives. But that is a different issue altogether.

20 Stern, 270.
21 See Marion Farber, “Introduction” to Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. xv.; Kimball, 316-317; and Stern, 222. Stern also compares and contrasts the two thinkers (222-226).
22 See Kimball, 317 and Stern, 161. Once again Stern compares and contrasts the two thinkers (159-162).
23 Kimball, 317. I have not yet found any corroboration of Kimball’s claims here; he cites no sources.
REFERENCES

———, *A History of Western Philosophy* (Simon & Schuster, 1945).

Department of Philosophy
Edinboro University of PA
Edinboro, PA 16444
ssullivan@edinboro.edu

FREGE AND HUSSERL
ON SIGNS AND LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOUR

SANDRA LAPOINTE

ABSTRACT. Halfway between linguistics and speech act theory, Edmund
Husserl’s philosophy of language shares many concerns with analytic phi-
losophers, in particular with Gottlob Frege. One concern he shares with
Frege is the way in which we recognize linguistic signs as signs and how
we recognize them as the particular signs they are.

0. INTRODUCTION

The views of Frege and Husserl on the conditions that make linguis-
tic communication possible both rely heavily on an account of the
way in which occurrences of a linguistic sign are identified as oc-
currences of the same “sign-type.” Both attempt to describe the role of
mental acts, such as intentions, in recognizing particular signs as oc-
currences of the same sign type, but their accounts differ in basic
ways. This paper compares their respective theories.

1. FREGE

In addition to theories of meaning and denotation, Frege also ex-
pressed views on linguistic signs and how they function in linguistic
communication. According to Frege (1903, §99), signs would be use-
less if they could not be understood to denote the same thing at dif-
f erent times and in different contexts. In order to fulfill this purpose,
Frege claims, the different occurrences of the same sign type must
have sufficiently similar figures. Frege also believes that we cannot
recognize two instances of a sign as being of the same type solely
on the basis of their physical characteristics. Frege does not himself
provide any concrete examples – and he considers only written signs
– but he argues that considering the imperfect nature of human per-
ception and the fact that two tokens of the same sign are seldom, if
ever, exactly the same physically, we cannot rely on two signs be-
ing physically identical to decide whether they are instances of the
same type – indeed, they may have quite different physical proper-
ties. Frege also thinks that abstraction cannot be used to recognize
signs as instances of the same sign type, arguing that “different
things cannot be made to coincide by abstraction.” (1903, §99)
But then how do we recognize signs as being of the same figure? According to Frege, in order for signs to denote the same thing at different times and in different contexts, they must be sufficiently similar. How similar? Frege answers:

... nothing else is required but that there be present the intention of producing a sign which is similar to the one that had been made previously and this need only to succeed inasmuch as the reader correctly recognizes this intention. In what follows, we understand by "signs of same figure" those which, following the intention of he who writes, are supposed to be the same so as to designate the same thing. (1903 §99)

As for how we recognize that two signs have the same figure, Frege answers: because we recognize the authors' intentions of producing similar signs in order to denote the same thing in each case, where these intentions we recognize are a particular type of mental act.

Frege thus appeals to our ability to recognize the mental acts of others as the basis of language use. But is this consistent with his notorious anti-psychologism? Given the significance of the topic in the literature on Frege, this may be an important question. It is not however my purpose to address it here. Rather, in what follows, I'll consider whether Frege's view that recognizing the intention of a speaker can do the job of determining the type to which a given instance of a sign belongs. To a certain extent, this depends on what Frege's "intentions" are and Frege says little about them.

There are, I think, two plausible ways to understand Frege's appeal to our capacity to recognize A's intention of producing figures in order to designate things; a weak one and a strong one. On the weak interpretation, what a reader recognises is A's (unspecified) intention to communicate. Pierre can recognise that Marie uses a sign only if he recognises that she has a mental state about $y$'s being so-and-so. Frege needs something stronger.

On the strong interpretation what the observer recognises is the particular sign-type A intended to make, and so the particular thing A meant to denote by the sign. The strong interpretation does not exclude the weak one. In fact, the strong interpretation makes sense only when it is already clear to the agents involved that they are involved in a situation of communication.

Furthermore, I take it that Frege would agree with the following: Marie does not go around in the world with the purpose of denoting objects. Marie believes things about certain objects, and typically she denotes objects only insofar as she expresses or voices her beliefs (or fears, wishes, etc.) about them. That is, some of the words Marie uses denote objects, but only in so far as they are part of more complex expressions, e.g., assertions that express some of her mental states, her beliefs for instance. I take it that Frege would also agree to say that Pierre can only recognise Marie's intention of denoting $y$ if he recognises that she has a mental state about $y$'s being so-and-so.

This interpretation enables us to preserve the idea that Frege's theory of sign recognition rests on certain mental states, what he calls "intentions," speakers have — what is intentional here is Marie's use of the sign-token for expressing her belief — without committing him to the view that Marie's having the mental state about $y$'s being

1 My translation. "Wenn nämlich die Zeichen nur den Zweck haben, der Verständigung der Menschen untereinander... zu dienen, braucht beim Schreiben nur die Absicht vorhanden zu sein, ein dem früher gemachten ähnlichen Zeichen herzustellen, und das braucht nur soweit zu gelingen, dass der Lesende die Absicht richtig erkennt. Wir wollen im Folgenden unter « gleichgestalteten Zeichen » solche verstehen, welche nach der Absicht des Schreibenden gleichgestaltet sein sollen um dasselbe zu bezeichnen".

2 Cf. Frege 1903, §98
so-and-so, nor her using a sign to refer to y, are her primary intention when she seeks to engage in linguistic behaviour. On the strong interpretation, once Pierre has recognised that Marie intends to communicate, in order for him to determine the sign-types of the signs she uses, he needs to recognize her intention to express a particular thought.

The strong interpretation rests on the idea that if Marie utters “I’d like to eat chocolate mousse,” typically it is appropriate for Pierre to ascribe to her the desire to eat chocolate mousse. Of course, it may be the case that Pierre ascribes an intention to Marie although there is nothing intentional in Marie’s action: she may be talking in her sleep. Nevertheless, this interpretation, which introduces the idea of using the ascription of a mental state, namely, the intention to express a thought, to recognize the sign-type that a sign is an instance of, enriches the Fregean conception of linguistic communication and tackles a problem that has recently become central in speech act theory and theories of communication, and will be discussed at length in the following sections. However, mental state ascription does not solve the problem of determining the type to which a sign belongs but, as we will see in the conclusion, more plausibly presupposes it.

2. HUSSERL

The idea the strong interpretation brings forward is that an adequate theory of language should account not only for the fact that words denote objects and concepts, but also for the fact that they “intimate” the mental states of an agent, as well for the fact that these two functions of language fulfill complementary purposes: denotation relies on intimating mental events and the intimation of mental events implies denotation. To my knowledge, this idea was first brought up in the Brentano school and was shared, with different levels of sophistication, by at least three of Brentano’s students: Marty, Twardowski and Husserl. Of the three, Husserl is the one who offered the clearest account of the distinction between these two functions as well as of their connection.

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl notes that in addition to being used to denote objects and concepts and make statements that are true or false, words are also used to inform us of, or intimate, mental states of speakers or writers. In intimation, Husserl thinks that words function in a way similar to what he calls “indication.” Smoke, for instance, is called a sign or indication of fire, scars may be said to indicate a healing wound, and A’s pout will indicate A’s displeasure. Similarly, on Husserl’s account of intimation, A’s assertion that p intimates A’s belief that p. According to the Logical Investigations, intimation is similar to the relation of indication we find in the three previous examples but also differs from it in substantial ways. On the one hand, unlike a scar or smoke, but like a pout, understanding what an utterance intimates implies our recognizing some of the speaker’s mental states. But when it comes to mental state ascription there is also, according to the Logical Investigations, an important distinction to be made between bodily and linguistic behaviour.

Marie’s nodding accompanied by an avid smiling in the presence of an appetizing hypercaloric dessert will indicate to Pierre that Marie has a certain mental state, namely, the desire to eat this dessert. But the connection between Marie’s bodily behaviour and the exact content of the mental state ascribed to Marie is the result of Pierre’s interpretation, not the result of his recognizing something communicated as an intended meaning. Marie’s bodily behaviour could as well indicate her unrepentant gluttony or her hypoglycaemic condition or yet some other state of affairs. What is indicated by bodily behaviour is thus subjective: it depends on the observer’s background knowledge and assumptions, which will vary from one individual to another. But, according to the first Investigation, whenever Pierre understands Marie when she says “I would like to eat chocolate mousse,” Pierre will typically believe that she would like to eat chocolate mousse. He may or may not ascribe other mental states to her on the basis of his having understood this (or on some other basis), but if he understands what she says, he will typically ascribe at least this desire to her.

So what is the difference between the two cases? Husserl claims that a connection will be made between a person’s linguistic behaviour and her mental episode by any competent observer. The connection will furthermore be “systematic” in the following sense: from the observer’s standpoint, the utterance and the mental act

---

3 See, for instance, Kemmerling 2002
4 Cf. Marty 1873, Twardowski 1894
5 My remarks in this section are based on Investigations 1 and 5 in Logical Investigations
have the same content. This is, as far as the *Logical Investigations* are concerned, what makes the difference between the way we understand speech and the way we merely interpret bodily behaviour. Thus, linguistic communication is not subject to interpretative variations the way bodily behaviour is. But what leads the observer to believe that the content of the utterance and the content of the mental act are the same?

### 3. Pierre and Marie

Although the theory of meaning Husserl puts forward in his *Logical Investigations* has similarities with Frege's theory of sense and reference, it also differs from it in certain important respects. The differences are brought to the fore when we compare their views on the role of mental state ascription and sign recognition. According to the *Logical Investigations*, what explains Pierre's understanding of Marie's utterance is a complex network of relations between:

(i) Marie's mental state $p$
(ii) Marie's utterance of the sentence $p$
(iii) the thought $p'$ (caused by Marie's utterance) in Pierre
(iv) the abstract content of (i) and (iii), i.e. *that $p$*

Marie's utterance 'I would like to eat chocolate mousse' intimates a certain mental state, a desire she has. This desire to eat chocolate mousse has a "quality" (roughly, its propositional attitude, in this case, a desiring) and a "matter" (what she desires). The matter of Marie's desiring is the aspect of it that makes it *about* eating chocolate mousse. As the diagram shows, the desire, and so its matter, is different from the meaning (i.e., "content") of the expression. It is also not a cause of Pierre's understanding of Marie's utterance.

In uttering 'I would like to eat chocolate mousse,' Marie causes Pierre to hear the sentence, which causes him to understand the sentence, i.e., to have a corresponding mental state that is however not itself a desire. Husserl, however, remains undecided as to the explanatory role of causal relations in his theory of language perception and understanding. What is explicit however is that what explains Pierre understanding Marie, according to Husserl, is the fact that the mental state Pierre has upon hearing Marie's utterance (upon perceiving the sounds she produces) and the mental state Marie has *have the same content.* And the two thoughts have the same content because their respective matters are instances of the same objective meaning.

So in the *Logical Investigations*, the possibility of communication is explained by there being objective entities, meanings ("contents") which certain aspects of mental states, the matter, are instances of, and that can be instantiated in different speakers simultaneously or in the same speaker at different times. Note that the semantic properties of the sign (meaning and denotation) are not the same as the mental properties of the thought (having a matter, intending an object). What is original in Husserl is the way he reconciles the two sets of properties, semantic and mental: the mental state, by virtue of its matter, is an instance of the meaning. Husserl's view clearly commits him to some conception of objective meaning; so his semantics is anti-psychologistic — yet he still holds that mental states are intrinsically involved in language.

But what, exactly, is the role that the intimation of mental states plays in this model? Although Husserl is adamant that the relation between the meaning of an utterance and the matter of the thought the utterance intimates is systematic and that the latter is invariably involved in the former, the nature of this relation is not made clear. Rather, his theory of meaning in the *Logical Investigations*, that thoughts instantiate meanings, leaves the question of this relation's nature unanswered.
Husserl was not satisfied with the theory of meaning he put forward in his unpublished *Sign and Expression* (1913-14), he explored in the later manuscripts on *Expression and Sign* that the recognition of the meaning of what a speaker says becomes a special case of a more general explanation of the interpretation of (psycho-physical) actions. In this explanation, intimation plays a central role. Husserl describes linguistic behaviour as a complex and sophisticated form of voluntary bodily movement that must be perceived as voluntary in order to be understood. This involves an elaboration of the idea that one of the conditions of linguistic understanding is the recognition of communicative intentions: Husserl now says that Pierre's perceiving Marie's linguistic behaviour as voluntary has a "motivational" effect on Pierre. Husserl introduces a technical term to designate this motivational effect: Marie's voluntary action seeks to engage Pierre to perform a corresponding voluntary (psycho-physical) action.

On Husserl's new view, when Marie asserts "Alonzo is an admirable logician," she is not simply producing sounds meant to be perceived by Pierre and that may cause him to have a certain thought; rather, she is seeking to engage him to do something. Behaviour and context will typically provide an important part of the information Pierre needs in order to find out what Marie wants from him. This will restrict his range of possible responses. For instance, on the basis of Marie's tone, Pierre can recognize whether she is asking him a question or ordering him around or just stating something. (Husserl 1913-14b, 90) Typically, what she minimally seeks to engage Pierre to do when she asserts something to him is that he co-believe whatever she herself believes. So if Marie asserts "Alonzo is an admirable logician" to Pierre, then, excluding instances of irony, sarcasm, theatrical productions, etc., what she seeks to engage Pierre to do is acquiesce and co-believe that Alonzo is an admirable logician. Of course, Pierre is in no way compelled by Marie's demand. He is free to believe or not to believe that Alonzo is an admirable logician. (He can, for instance, doubt it, deny it, etc.)

Contrary to what Frege suggests in the *Grundgesetze 2*, on Husserl's view, mental state ascription is not the only thing that enables
us to determine what a speaker says. Indeed, what precise mental state a person has in a certain situation of communication can often only be determined on the basis of the type of the linguistic signs she uses. Although Husserl does not have a full-fledged answer to the question of how this is achieved, what he has to say interested the linguists of his time. Roman Jakobson, for example, explicitly pursued the Husserlian semiotic project. Combining linguistics and speech act theory, logic and psychology, Husserl’s philosophy of language shares many concerns with contemporary analytic philosophy.

REFERENCES

---, 1903, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* 2, Jena, Verlag Hermann Pohle
Husserl, Edmund, 1913-14a, Manuscript A I 18, 5-44, *Die Konstitution des Ausdrucks im Sprechen und Verstehen.*
---, 1913-14b, Manuscript A I 17 II, 90, *Der Ton als Anzeige für die Satzart*
Marty, Anton, 1873, *Ursprung der Sprache*, Würzburg, Stuber
Twardowski, Kazimierz, 1894, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellung*, Wien

Department of Philosophy
Kansas State University
Manhattan, KS 66506
lapointe@ksu.edu

BOOK REVIEWS

NOT FADE AWAY
TIMOTHY ST. VINCENT


In his most recent book, *The Greater Generation: In Defense of the Baby Boom Legacy*, Leonard Steinborn argues that many features of “sixties” culture (or “counterculture”) are currently in effect in our daily lives and that this is a generally a good thing. He regards the prominence of right-wing rhetoric as the work of a loud and vocal minority.

Steinhorn opens by citing a list of unjust policies and practices from the fifties that were swept away by the “Baby-Boom” generation, for example, open and legal racism: There were “Jim Crow” laws in the South, but there was also open racism in the North. The General Manager of the Red Sox in 1960 openly proclaimed that there would be no Afro-Americans on the team as long as he was manager. In addition, there was widespread anti-Jewish bias, which was exacerbated by traditional sexual values: A newly married couple had to present a letter from their minister (not rabbi, etc) to the manager of any resort they wished to stay at. Many Jews changed their names or displayed Christmas decorations in order to hide their Jewish identities.

Of course, there was much more open bias against non-religious people than there is today. A poll in the fifties found that a majority of Americans thought that an atheist should not be allowed to teach at a college or make a public speech against religion. (An interesting tidbit: Steinborn also cites a 1955 poll showing that approximately 50% of Americans then couldn’t name a single one of the gospels. To me, this raises doubts about the claim that there has been a general decline in education and literacy during the last five decades.)

Bias against gays was much more blatant and it also targeted straights who didn’t conform to traditional gender roles: The Boise Iowa police interrogated hundreds of suspected gays during the early fifties, forcing some to “out” their friends. There was also an
official anti-gay witch hunt at the University of Florida that began in 1958 and lasted until 1962. In the early fifties, the Miami police chief openly proclaimed that his officers would harass effeminate men and make it clear that they were unwelcome on the beach.

In general, there was a rigidly-enforced conformity. Job applicants (almost always men then) had to take personality tests designed to weed out non-conformists: Steinhorn quotes the book *The Organization Man* as saying that the best advice is to answer "that you love your father and mother, but your father a little more, that you don't care much for books or music, and that you also love your wife and kids, but don't let them get in the way of company work."

The "Baby Boom" generation replaced this prejudice and strict conformity with a general "equality of personal worth", according to Steinhorn. Even though the US has a capitalist economic system, Steinhorn argues that it is currently a system of "economic democracy", at least compared to the way it was before the mid-eighties when baby-boomers took over the corporate world. Before then, there were no profit-sharing plans; workers dared not question their bosses or come up with their own ideas; there was virtually no flex time. In general, corporations are flatter, i.e., less hierarchical than they were then. Steinhorn argues that this democratization of the economy deserves much of the credit for the technological and economic boom of the late eighties through today, because it gave workers more outlets for their creativity and more of a sense of ownership of their work.

Steinhorn at least pays lip service to the point that "the greatest generation" deserves credit for surviving the great depression and fighting off the tyranny of Nazism and fascism. As for post baby boom generations, he argues that they tend to agree with baby-boomers about equality of personal worth, free expression, diversity and other values. However, they may resent baby boomers because this generation seems to be refusing to "give up the mantle of youth."

Some other interesting points from this book are:
— Even though there are more working mother’s today than in the forties and fifties, parents tend to spend more time with their children. This is due to factors such as flex time at work, looser gender roles that sometimes even include stay-at-home dads, and the fact that couples tend to have fewer children these days.
— There is less of a generation gap between baby boomers and their children, with the children often citing their parents as role models.
— Even churches have become more democratic in the baby boom era. For example, a recent poll of American Catholics found that approximately 40% believe that a good Catholic must be a "pro-lifer" whereas 60% believe that a good Catholic must have "concern for the poor." Steinhorn also quotes a Jesuit theologian as saying "if we insist that Catholics agree with all of the Church teachings, then I'm afraid we'll have no one for communion."
— Even though colleges offer much more diversity in literature and other subjects these days, he argues that students also have more opportunities to study the classics. (An interesting point here is that, in the early 20th century, Shakespeare was considered a low quality fad—scholars during this period advocated classics such as works of Plato and Aristotle). While disapproving of so-called "politically correct" speech codes, Steinhorn argues that there is much more academic freedom today than there was before the sixties.

I view this book as a good answer to the notion that there has been a general "decline in morals" since the fifties, but I have two main criticisms of it. The first is that Steinhorn does not address the fact that economic inequality has exploded since the seventies: the median (i.e., 50th percentile) income of American workers has declined since then, even though the average income has increased (because the wealthy are now much wealthier than the average citizen). Similarly, the ratio of the 90th percentile income divided by the 10th percentile income has skyrocketed during the last few decades. These factors would seem to testify against Steinhorn’s praise of the recent "democratization" of the economy.

My second criticism of this book is that Steinhorn, like Tom Brokaw and others, seems the gloss over the fact that there are really no such things as discrete "generations", unless you’re restricting the concept to a particular family: There are people being born every day throughout history. A 30 year old, for example, is in a slightly different generation from a 31 year old.

In spite of these criticisms, I enjoyed this book immensely and recommend it as a defense of the baby boomer legacy against all the recent talk about post-sixties moral decline.

Independent Scholar
Wakefield, Massachusetts
timsst@gmail.com
The past decade has witnessed an increase of interest in atheism that might also be described as an insurgency against belief in God. Under the banner of what may be broadly called the naturalistic point of view, critics have protested against arguments defending God’s existence and those concerning the need for, or utility of, theistic belief. The latter is discussed by Erik J. Wielenberg in his earlier book *Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe*, where he maintains that a belief in the existence of the Christian God is not necessary for life to have meaning or for the existence of morality and virtue, since there are objective ethical truths independent of religious belief.

In most of his new book, *God and the Reach of Reason*, Wielenberg deals with C. S. Lewis’s arguments for the existence of God by imagining a confrontation on the issue between Lewis, Hume and Russell. In the first chapter, Wielenberg analyzes Lewis’s solution for the “problem of pain” (or problem of evil, of how there can be suffering in the world with a good and almighty God), in the second, he analyzes several other arguments for the existence of God by Lewis, including his reworking of the argument from morality, an argument from reason, and argument from desire, and in the third, he considers Lewis’s argument from miracles. About these arguments Wielenberg concludes that “Lewis’s proposed solution to the problem of pain is incomplete, that his cumulative case for the existence of a Higher Power is, overall, not terribly weighty, and that (consequently) his effort to establish an adequate philosophical foundation for a historical case for the Resurrection of Christ fails.” (152) The fourth part of the book is concerned with finding areas of agreement between Hume, Russell, and Lewis on the relation of reason and faith, the argument from design, and the nature of true religion.

Philosophers of religion may find the discussion of Lewis’s weak fideism rewarding reading because, unlike the extremist, Lewis is content to argue that what may first be accepted on faith may subsequently find rational support. The book also includes a discussion of the problem facing atheists of giving an evolutionary account of human intentionality and of the claim that moral truths are necessary truths, important but all too brief discussions of happiness and love, and an attempt to coax the Owl of Minerva off her perch by suggesting that philosophy of religion might more fruitfully explore kinds of agreement between believers and non-believers, all written with subtle argument combined with a wonderful tolerance for disagreement.

One area in which Wielenberg finds agreement between Lewis, Hume, and Russell is in what he views as their common passion for evidence and argument. All three, he says, believe “in the importance of following the evidence and on the difficulties humans face in doing this.” However, it seems to me that Lewis has two different epistemologies: a proximate one that reveres evidence and an ultimate one that does not. From the perspective of the ultimate epistemology, a Christian should intuitively seize upon the truth on the basis of understanding and celebrating human nature and the history of its culture. It is on the basis of this intuition that Christians are and will continue to be convinced of the verity of “mere Christianity” (Lewis’s term for core Christian doctrine). If this is true, then it is misleading to suggest that “all three thinkers share a common perspective: Follow the evidence” (202). Lewis, Hume, and Russell may each have a burning passion for the truth and evidence. But having a passion is one thing; having the same degree of commitment to evidence is another.

According to Russell, it is almost always a mistake to believe without evidence. Respect for evidence is not to be simply tacked on after a faith commitment. So to say as Russell continually does that evidence is the heart of rational belief is tantamount to saying that one also must begin with this kind of critical scrutiny. For Russell, a mere Christianity common to nearly all Christians, a Christianity based on intuition is, at best, the abnegation of having a passion for truth and, at worst, ludicrous or even evil.

---

Expressed differently, and this time from Lewis’s perspective: For a truly religious person, belief in the existence of God is not quite like belief that Bertrand Russell was born in 1872. Truth for him is ultimately other than provability. Truth, from this perspective, involves a sagacity that answers the human need for hope and genuine Christian understanding. This is why the British philosopher J. R. Lucas holds Lewis to be “the twentieth-century’s 139th psalm.” With a subtle elegance, the 139th psalm reflects many of Lewis’s sentiments and reads as follows:

O Lord, Thou hast searched me, and known me.
Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising,
Thou understandst my thought afar off.
Thou measurest my going about lying down,
And are acquainted with all my ways.
For there is not a word in my tongue,
But, lo, O Lord, Thou knowest it altogether.
Thou hast hemmed me in behind and before,
And laid Thy hand upon me.
Such knowledge is too wonderful for me;
Too high, I cannot attain unto it.

Indeed, for Lewis, knowing it all is beyond us, but an acquaintance with and acceptance of mere Christianity is not. By way of sharp contrast, Russell would remind us that, while we may be historically aware of the Christianity Lewis holds so dear, we are not, in any genuine cognitive sense, acquainted with it.

State University of New York, Fredonia
mknyc@rcn.com


Included in this article below is a graph of BRS membership data for the past 22 years – from 1988 to 2009 – showing membership in the BRS rising to a high of 315 in 1990 and then falling to a low of 143 in 2003, while gradually rising again since 2004. Chart data are from Ken Blackwell’s Russell database giving the number of BRS subscriptions to Russell for each year, and from copies of the BRS database saved by John Ongley from 2003 to 2009.

Russell data (dark bars) count couple memberships as 1 (because couple members receive only one copy of Russell) and thus undercount the true number of Society members. BRS database data from 2003 to 2009 (light bars) count couple memberships as 2 and so are more accurate, but incomplete. Data for 2009 are as of May 19, 2009. Both sets of data include honorary members. Since March 2009 we have surpassed 2008’s total.

Dark bars: Russell data (couples = 1). Light bars: BRS data/actual members (couples = 2).

Additional data were gleaned from the Russell Society Newsletter by Ken Blackwell. (These data are not included on the graph and do not include honorary members.) Members: 1973: 0; 1974: 72; 1975: 145; 1977: 164 (from RSN nos. 5, 10, 17).

3 139th Psalm, King James Version
TABLE OF BRS MEMBERSHIP BY YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>166.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>143 (+ 13 uncounted couple members = 156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>151 (+ 14 uncounted couple members = 165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>167 (+ 14 uncounted couple members = 181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>160 (+ 12 uncounted couple members = 172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>169 (+ 10 uncounted couple members = 179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>157 (+ 9 uncounted couple members = 166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>165 (+ 8 uncounted couple members = 173)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of members, as counted by BRS Russell subscriptions (where couple memberships count as one), immediately follows year. The data in parentheses for 2003 – 2009 are from the BRS database and include the couple members for that year not counted by the Russell subscriptions data and so are more accurate, but incomplete. Data for 2009 are through May 19, 2009, and so incomplete for 2009.

INTERPRETATION. Why the rapid rise and then fall in Society membership around 1990? A likely explanation is this: Member recruitment for the BRS was then headed by the legendary Lee Eisler, who had spent his adult life working in advertising in New York City. His methods of recruitment are known – they were the professional ones he had used all his life, that of placing ads (in this case, classified ads for the BRS) in various magazines and keeping track of those that produced the most responses and most new members. He then calculated the cost spent in recruiting each new member and recommended to the membership committee that it continue placing ads in those magazines that were most productive of new members, cease placing ads in those least productive, while suggesting new advertising venues. This method seems to have been highly successful in finding new members for the Society, but less successful in retaining them, hence there was a rapid falloff in membership when Lee ceased being editor of the RSN and became less involved in Society activities. Since 2003, recruitment efforts have primarily focused on retention and encouraging past members to rejoin.

JO, KB
the *Tractatus* in a paper titled “Russell and Wittgenstein on Logic and Mathematics in their August 1919 Correspondence.” In addition to making a substantial response to this paper, Kevin Klement (University of MA) gave the paper “Re-reading A.J. Ayer’s Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage,” in which he draws on his introduction to the new reprint of A. J. Ayer’s book *Russell.* Michael Garral (Baruch College) concluded the session by speaking on “Russell v. Hume, Atheist or Agnostic,” addressing the coherence of the kind of knowledge claim made by atheists, as he thinks Russell understands them, and revising a position he first took in a similar paper read at the BRS annual meeting the previous summer.

In an ideal world, scholars would simply talk to each other in the quiet way we did, but at length, without the tension of conflicting appointments, until no ambiguity remained. But this is not an ideal world, and so the session concluded as scheduled, some Going on to other talks and others to the booksellers, finally open for business. RC

### NOTE ON C.D. BROAD’S ARTICLE IN THE JULY *MIND*

(Below is a note by Russell published in the January 1919 issue of *Mind.* It is made in response to an article by C.D. Broad, “A General Notation for the Logic of Relations,” published in the July 1918 issue of *Mind.* The article by Russell referred to below as occurring in *Peano’s Revue de Mathématiques,* v. 7 can be found in English in *Logic and Knowledge* as “The Logic of Relations.” The article occurring in v. 8 can be found in English in v. 3 of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* as “The General Theory of Well-Ordered Series.”

Mr. Broad’s interesting article in the July *Mind* on “A General Notation for the Logic of Relations” attributes to me (for what reason I cannot guess) a number of notations employed in *Principia Mathematica.* As far as my memory serves me, all these were invented by Dr. Whitehead, who, in fact, is responsible for most of the notation in that work. My original notation, before he came to my assistance, may be found in *Peano’s Revue de Mathématiques,* vols. vii and viii.

BERTRAND RUSSELL

*Mind,* n.s., vol. 28, no. 119 (Jan 1919), 124

---

1 Location of English translations provided by Ken Blackwell.
## THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
### 2008 Annual Treasurer’s Report

**BALANCE 12/31/2007**
- USS a/c (Toronto Dominion) $3,669.68
- Cdn$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) 655.66
- USS term deposit (Toronto Dominion) 10,210.62
- **OVERALL BALANCE** $14,535.96

### INCOME
- Contributions $903.00
- Dues
  - New Members 498.00
  - Renewals 4,433.00
- Total Dues $4,931.00
- Interest Income 184.61
- Library Income 18.95
- **TOTAL INCOME** $6,037.56

### EXPENSES
- Bank Charges 163.36
- Bay Area Expenses 74.50
- Bookkeeping Exp 700.00
- BRS Book Award Exp 62.89
- Conversion Exp –120.12
- Donations 1,000.00
- Library Exp 233.05
- BRS Quarterly 1,352.35
- PayPal Fees 77.24
- Russell Subscriptions* 6,484.40
- **TOTAL EXPENSES** $10,027.67
- **OVERALL TOTAL** $3,990.11

**BALANCE, 12/31/2008**
- USS a/c (Toronto Dominion) $1,051.69
- less o/s checks 483.38
- adjusted USS a/c $568.31
- Cdn$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) 1,977.54
- USS term deposit (Toronto Dominion) 8,004.34
- **OVERALL BALANCE, 12/31/2008** $10,545.85

* Includes payment for 3 issues: 27,1, 27,2 and 28,1

Ken Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackwk@mcmaster.ca)

Note: US and Cdn. dollars are intermixed

## THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
### 2009 First Quarter Treasurer’s Report
Cash Flow January 1, 2009 – March 31, 2009

**BALANCE 12/31/08**
- USS a/c (Toronto Dominion) $1,051.69
- less o/s checks 483.38
- adjusted USS a/c $568.31
- Cdn$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) 1,977.54
- USS term deposit (temporarily in USS a/c) 8,000.00
- **OVERALL BALANCE** $10,545.85

### INCOME
- Contributions $874.00
- Dues
  - New Members 233.00
  - Renewals 3,023.50
- Total Dues $3,256.50
- Interest Income 47.34
- **TOTAL INCOME** $4,177.84

### EXPENSES
- Bank Charges 29.70
- Conversion Exp –232.43
- Library Exp 21.93
- BRS Quarterly 158.83
- PayPal Fees 43.24
- Russell Subscriptions* 2,952.00
- **TOTAL EXPENSES** $2,973.27
- **OVERALL TOTAL** $1,204.57

**BALANCE 3/31/09**
- USS a/c (Toronto Dominion) $3,318.81
- less o/s checks 650.11
- adjusted USS a/c $2,668.70
- Cdn$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) 1,034.38
- USS term deposit (Toronto Dominion) 8,047.34
- **OVERALL BALANCE** $11,750.42

* Includes payment for issue 28,2

Kenneth Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackwk@mcmaster.ca)

Note: US and Cdn. dollars are intermixed
GRRS: The Greater Rochester Russell Set
7 pm, Writers & Books Literary Center
740 University Avenue
$3 or Free to members of Writers & Books

April 9
Phil Ebersole: Russell’s “Philosophy for Laymen”

May 14
Ted Lechman: The Philosophy of Leibniz

June 11
Jim Judkins reading Russell’s “The Fate of Thomas Paine”

July 9
Howard Blair: Great Feats in Mathematics: Russell v Poincare

Aug. 13
Bill Drumright: Russell’s Logical Analysis as Applied to The Conquest of Happiness

Sept. 10
Newcomers’ Night: Bertrand Russell for Beginners

Oct. 8
John Novak: Why I Am a Deweyan and Not a Russellian

Nov. 12
Discussion of Paul Edwards’ book God and the Philosophers

Dec. 10
Lewis Neisner, Tim Madigan, and David White: “Elementary, My Dear Russell: Bertrand Russell and Sherlock Holmes”

Jan. 14
Discussion: Tim Madigan’s W.K. Clifford and ‘The Ethics of Belief’
Contact Phil Ebersole at 585-482-4729 or phil@frontiernet.net

BARS: The Bay Area Russell Set
7 pm, Szechwan Cafe
406 S. California Avenue
Palo Alto, CA 94301

March 19

April 16

May 21
Happy Birthday Bertie! Come with a favorite Russell quote or story to share as we celebrate Russell’s 150th Birthday

June 23
Report on the BRS Annual Meeting at Central Connecticut State University, June 5-7

July 16

August 20
The Virtue of the Oppressed. Read: Bertrand Russell, “The Superior Virtue of the Oppressed,” in Unpopular Essays

NEW from Routledge

THE ANALYTIC TURN: Analysis in Early
Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology

This collection, with contributions from leading
philosophers, places analytic philosophy in a
broader context, comparing it with the methodology
of its most important rival tradition in twentieth-
century philosophy.

Michael Beaney

is Reader in
Philosophy at the
University of York, UK

The Analytic Turn
in Twentieth-Century Philosophy

www.routledge.com/philosophy

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

an informa business

The Ethics of Belief

W.K. CLIFFORD

AND "THE ETHICS OF BELIEF"

In this book, Timothy J. Madigan examines the continuing
relevance of "The Ethics of Belief" in epistemological and
ethical concerns. He places the essay within the historical
context, especially the so-called "Victorian Crisis of Faith" of
which Clifford was a key player. Clifford's own life and interests
are dealt with as well, along with the responses to his essay by
his contemporaries, the most famous of which was William
James' "The Will to Believe."

Madigan provides an overview of modern-day critics of
Cliffordian epistemology, and also examines thinkers who have
positively influenced him, including Bernard Russell, who was
perhaps Clifford's most influential successor as an advocate
of intellectual honesty.

The book ends with a defense of "The Ethics of Belief" from a
viewpoint approach, and argues that Clifford utilized an "as if"
methodology to encourage intellectual inquiry and communal
truth-seeking. "The Ethics of Belief" continues to provoke and
substitute controversy, which is perhaps Clifford's own finest
heft, although he had not right to believe it would do so.

This work is extremely well-written, lucid and well-organized.
Madigan gets the reader into the subject with an account of
Clifford's life and equally important, a vivid description of
the intellectual climate of the time. Through this, and other means,
he conveys the importance of the subject and of Clifford's
contribution. The last two chapters illustrate, convincingly, that
the subject is still important and not just historical interest.
The views of contemporary philosophers are discussed and
perceptively dealt with."

—Richard Taylor, former Professor of Philosophy
at the University of Rochester and author of Good and Evil,
Restoring Pride: The Lost Virtue of Our Age, and Metaphysics,
among many other works.

"Madigan's study of Clifford's best-known work is unusually
well-written, is cogently argued, and raises important issues in a
thought-provoking way. He shows a discerning appreciation of
scholars who do not agree with him. In short, this is a treat to
read and ponder."

—Rolff Handy, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy,
State University of New York at Buffalo

Timothy J. Madigan teaches Philosophy at St. John Fisher
College in Rochester, NY. The former editor of Free
Inquiry magazine, he is on the editorial board of the London-
based Philosophy Now magazine and is a frequent lecturer on
topics related to applied ethics, philosophy and popular culture,
and the relationship between ethics and epistemology.

ISBN 978-1-4094-5855-7
Hardback, £20.99 / US$44.99

J.K. Clifford (1845-1879) was a noted mathematician
and supporter of science in the Victorian era. Although he made
some contributions in the field of geometry, he is perhaps best
known for a short essay he wrote in 1876, entitled "The Ethics
of Belief", in which he argued that "it is wrong always,
everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon
insufficient evidence."

Delivered initially as an address to the
Metaphysical Society (whose members included such
philosophers as Alfred Lord Tennyson, William Gladstone, T.H.
Huxley, and assorted scientists, clergymen, and philosophers
offering metaphysical views), "The Ethics of Belief" became a
stinging cry for freethinkers and a beacon of reason for
religious apologists. It continues to be discussed today as an
example of what is called "evidentialism": a key point in current
philosophy of religion debates over justification of knowledge
claims.

Order online at www.c-s-p.org
By e-mail at orders@cs-p.org or by fax at +44 191 265 3056
For general enquiries, contact us at admin@cs-p.org
GSP, PO Box 302, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 3WF, UK.
ESSENTIAL REFERENCES ON PHILOSOPHERS

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY
Rosalind Carey and John Ongley

This is the only dictionary to date of Bertrand Russell's ideas. It is a guide to the many elements of Russell's philosophy. Many are classics, several require technical expertise, and together they address dozens of separate disciplines and domains. A glimpse at Russell's work shows instantly why such a title is needed.

March 2009 • 336 pages • 978-0-8108-5363-8 • $85.00 cloth

ALSO OF INTEREST...

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF LEIBNIZ'S PHILOSOPHY
Stuart Brown and N. J. Fox

"In the case of Leibniz a well-constructed dictionary can do nothing but good... There is real strength in entries... A well established series... Snap it up."
—REFERENCE REVIEWS

"The net of references to Leibniz' writings appears to be carefully crafted... This is a very useful volume." —PHILOSOPHY IN REVIEW

2006 • 392 pages • 978-0-8108-5464-2 • $85.00 cloth

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY
Kenneth R. Merrill

"Merrill offers an excellent resource for anyone interested in David Hume, and modern era British philosophy more generally... Intended for non-specialists, this dictionary is accessible to a wide audience. Highly recommended." —CHOICE

The Historical Dictionary of Hume's Philosophy is the only Hume dictionary in existence. The book provides a substantial account of David Hume's life and the times in which he lived, and it provides an overview of his philosophical doctrines.

2008 • 376 pages • 978-0-8108-5361-4 • $85.00 cloth

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF HUSSERL'S PHILOSOPHY
John J. Drummond

"Clear and scrupulously informative... Drummond strikes an impressive balance between rigor of content and accessibility that should serve the needs of readers of widely varying backgrounds... Highly recommended." —CHOICE

2007 • 288 pages • 978-0-8108-5368-3 • $80.00 cloth

The Scarecrow Press, Inc.
An Imprint of the Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group
To order visit www.scarecrowpress.com or call 800-462-6420