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IN THIS ISSUE

COVER ART. THOSE DRIVING TO LAST YEAR’S ANNUAL MEETING from the south and west traveled there a good part of the way on the famed Merritt Parkway, which cuts across southern Connecticut. The illustration on the cover gives some sense of this remarkable highway. A pet project of Robert Moses, the Merritt has beautifully designed art deco and beaux-arts bridges and exit and entrance ramps; the curves of the highway themselves are art deco. Traveling on it to and from the Society meeting in New Britain was an elegant beginning and ending of an excellent weekend conference.

THIS ISSUE’S FEATURE ARTICLE is (we promise you) an action-packed interview with Nicholas Griffin by Jolen Galaugher and Ilmari Korvalnen. In it, Griffin shares his views on all aspects of the history of analytic philosophy and on the history of the history of analytic philosophy as well (its “historiography” for those preferring ambiguous technical terms), providing us with bold conjectures and startling insights into the now major movement of the history of analytic philosophy, as well as into Bertrand Russell’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s own philosophies. Historians and historiographers alike will not want to miss this interview.

Just as important, Griffin gives us a good idea of what is in store for us next May 21-24 at the PM@100 conference (celebrating the centenary of the publication of volume 1 of Principia Mathematica) at McMaster University. As might be guessed, it is logic, history of logic, philosophy of logic, and then for variety, mathematics, history of mathematics, and philosophy of mathematics. For talks of a more humanistic nature, there will be the Bertrand Russell Society’s own annual meeting occurring in conjunction with the PM@100 conference at McMaster May 21-23, just down the hall.

THE WINNER of the 2009 Bertrand Russell Society book award last year was Omar Nasim for his book Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Constructing the World. In this issue of the Quarterly, Samuel Lebens reviews Nasim’s award-winning book, providing us with a clear understanding of Russell’s relations with the Edwardian philosophers, especially of their debate over the nature of sense-data. An important document in the Edwardian debate on the nature of sense-data is Russell’s 1915 letter to the Journal of
Philosophy clarifying his view that sense-data are physical, not mental. That letter is reproduced in full in this issue. Accompanying this letter is a substantial introduction to it by Omar Nasim, telling us the background to the letter, the contemporary context in which it occurred, and the role this specific letter played in Russell’s contribution to the Edwardian’s debate on sense-data.

Following the Russell letter of 1915, we indulge in some editorial quibbling over the interpretation of another Russell letter, this one a letter by Russell to Newsweek in 1967. This in turn is followed by the Traveler’s Diary, which in this issue reports on the Russell Society’s last annual meeting. Finally, there are the meeting minutes of both the 2009 annual BRS board of directors meeting and 2009 BRS membership meeting, published in the back along with the treasurer’s reports. Note that these minutes have not yet been approved by the board or members. The minutes can now be found online. Indeed, the BRS board of directors and membership meeting minutes for every year going back to 1990 can be found online at users.drew.edu/~lenz/brs-minutes.html. Minutes of still earlier meetings will be put online as they are transcribed for the web.

SOCIETY NEWS

It is time to renew your membership in the Bertrand Russell Society. Memberships run from January to January, so it is time to renew your membership. Please take a minute to do so now. Details for renewing can be found in the ad on p. 2.

The last (2009) annual meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society itself took place June 5-7 at Central Connecticut State University in New Britain, Connecticut, hosted by David Blitz. It was a rich and rewarding weekend. See the full report beginning on p. 41 for details of the event.

The next annual meeting of the BRS, the Society’s 37th, will take place at McMaster University May 21-23, 2010. This will be the 7th time that the Society has met at McMaster. The annual meeting will occur in conjunction with another Russell event – the PM@100 conference, which is the centenary celebration of the publication of volume 1 of Principia Mathematica. The PM@100 conference will occur on May 21-24, 2010, also at McMaster University – and just down the hall from the BRS conference. The alignment of the annual meeting with another stellar Russell conference is a rare event, and when it occurs, it is a big affair. For this reason alone members should start making plans now to attend this year’s BRS annual meeting, especially if you have never been to one before; it will have double the talks, double the people, and double the excitement. And since the Russell Archives are at McMaster, this is another good reason to attend this year’s meeting. Go a day early and visit the archives, or if you have research to do there, kill three birds with one stone (your research and two conferences) and go several days early. Details of the meeting program, talks and abstracts, registration, housing, food, and fees, with regular updates, will soon be online at http://russell.mcmaster.ca/brsmeeting.

Next spring’s PM@100 conference. It’s full title is “PM@100: Logic from 1910 to 1927,” it is taking place May 21-24, 2010 at McMaster University in conjunction with the May 21-23 Bertrand Russell Society annual meeting, it is hosted by the Bertrand Russell Research Centre, and it will be a big affair. Its purpose is to celebrate the centenary of the publication of the first volume of White-
head and Russell’s *Principia Mathematica*, a landmark in the development of logic, the foundations of mathematics, and the use of logic in philosophy, and talks presented there will aim to evaluate the contributions it made, or failed to make, to these fields. You should start making plans now to attend this conference. Further news of the PM@100 conference, including the program, accommodations, food and fees, will be posted at: http://pm100.mcmaster.ca/ as these details become known.


**Future APA Activities of the BRS.** The BRS will host a session of talks at the Central APA this year, which meets at the Palmer House Hilton Hotel in Chicago once again. The Russell Society session will be on Thursday, February 18th from 5-7 pm. Speakers include Jolen Galaugher on “Russell’s Logical Approach to Analysis,” Richard Schmitt on “Russell’s Understanding and Reception of Wittgenstein’s Argument,” and Dustin Olson on “Russell’s ‘Limits of Empiricism.’” A BRS session will also take place this year at the Pacific APA in a combined session with the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society. The Pacific APA conference will be from March 31 - April 4, 2010 at the Westin St Francis hotel in San Francisco. At the BRS/HEAPS session there Peter Baumann will speak on “Ful-

fillment or Satisfaction? Russell and Wittgenstein on the Content of Desires,” Reshaf Agam-Segal will speak on “A Splitting Mind-Ache: The Case of Self-Legislation,” and Russell Wahl will speak on “Analysis and Acquaintance.” Finally, Peter Stone may, if his schedule permits, present a paper there titled “Russell on Mathematical Education.” Further information about the APA meetings is at: www.apaonline.org/divisions/schedule.aspx. Members of the BRS living in or visiting these areas are urged to come to the sessions!

**Report on Election for BRS Board of Directors.** This year a near record number of candidates were nominated in the 2009 election for BRS board of directors (serving 2010-2012), and what seems to be a record number of votes were cast: 61 votes for 11 candidates running for the 8 empty board positions, though the number of candidates is still short of the 14 candidates who ran in 2000. On the ballot were: Kenneth Blackwell, Howard Blair, David Blitz, Jolen Galaugher, Kevin Klement, Chris Pincock, Thomas Stanley, Russell Wahl, Billy Joe Lucas, David White, and Robert Zack, with the first eight being elected to the board. We thank everyone involved for taking part in this fine election and hope to see an equally large turnout both of candidates and voters in next year’s election for the BRS board.

**Russell Quiz.** Where does Russell refer to an okapi - and what is an okapi anyway? (Answer is at the end of Society News.)


**In the Past Year, Numerous Members Have Generously Contributed to the Bertrand Russell Society by sending more than nec-
SOCIETY NEWS

necessary for membership dues. They are: CONTRIBUTORS ($50): Mark Adams, M.D., Dong-in Bae, Alan Bishop, Ken Blackwell, Howard Blair, Ricardo Flores & Sylvia Pizzi, Mario Helman, David Henchens, Fred McColly, Thomas Stanley, Thom Weidlich, and David & Linda White, SUSTAINER ($75): Peter Stone, and SPONSORS ($100): William Bruneau, James Bunton, Robert K. Davis, John Fitzgerald, Mark Fuller, Carol Keene, Marvin Kohl, Gregory Landini, Stephen Reinhardt, Richard Schmitt, Peter Stanbridge. We thank them for their support of the BRS!

FORTHCOMING BOOKS OF INTEREST AND MORE CALLS FOR PAPERS. BRS member Dr. Seyed Javad Miri, Visiting Professor of Philosophy and Sociology at the Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies in Tehran, will be publishing a collection of essays on Russell. Those interested in submitting an essay for the collection (essays may be on any aspect of Russell’s life or works) should send abstracts of the paper to Dr. Miri at seyedjavad@hotmail.com no later than May 2010 and the completed paper no later than December 2010.

Dr. Miri and the Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies (IHCS) are also planning to publish a collection of essays that explore religion and spirituality in a postmodern world, focusing in particular on globalization’s impact on perceptions of secularism and the relevance of post-secularism. Those interested in contributing to this volume should contact Dr. Miri at seyedjavad@hotmail.com by sending an abstract of a paper by March 2010 and a complete paper by June 2010.

RUSSELL CITINGS. What counts as a philosophical or religious belief? A recent Guardian article (Tuesday, November 3, 2009) reports that a judge in the UK has ruled that “a belief in man-made climate change, and the alleged resulting moral imperatives, is capable, if genuinely held, of being a philosophical belief for the purpose of the British 2003 Religion and Belief Regulations” which prohibit discrimination on the basis of deeply held religious or philosophical beliefs. But what counts as a “philosophical belief”? For an answer, the defense cited Russell on the subject, with the judge in the case referring to it as “what must be the first appearance in a bundle of legal authorities of the History of Western Philosophy by Bertrand Russell.” Russell’s view is that “philosophy … is something intermediate between theology and science.” But for the purposes of law, the judge finally decided that by legal precedent a philosophical belief is: (1) “a belief … genuinely held,” (2) “not an opinion or view based on the present state of information available,” (3) “a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life,” with (4) “a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance,” and (5) one “worthy of respect in a democratic society, not incompatible with human dignity and not in conflict with the fundamental rights of others” – not a bad definition and perhaps even one Russell would have endorsed. See www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/03/tim-nicholson-climate-change-belief to read the Guardian’s story of the trial and www.employmentappeals.gov.uk/Public/Upload/09_0219rfhLBZT.doc for the transcript of the proceedings and judgment itself.

GRRS/BARS REPORT. Upcoming talks of interest in Rochester NY can be found at the monthly meetings of the Greater Rochester Russell Set. On February 11, Gerry Wildenberg will speak there on Under the Banner of Heaven, Jon Krakauer’s account of recent murders committed, according to the murderer’s, under direct orders from God, and March 11, Tim Madigan will speak on his new book W.K. Clifford and the Ethics of Belief. Meanwhile, out in San Francisco, the local chapter of the BRS, the Bay Area Russell Set, will be discussing Russell, Moore, and Darwin on February 16, and the Bertrand Russell comic book Logiconix on March 16. For details on locations and further talks, see the ad for the GRRS and BARS talks in the back of this journal.

ANSWER TO RUSSELL QUIZ. Russell uses the word “okapi” in Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, chapter 3; it refers to a giraffe-like mammal in Central Africa.
IN MEMORIAM. Theo Meijer, long-time member of the Bertrand Russell Society, died this past June 20th from cancer. He had been a member of the Russell Society since 1978 – over 30 years! Theo was born in Amsterdam in 1935 and moved to Vancouver in 1960. He was an educator (an instructor in the International Baccalaureate Program at Abbotsford, BC), as well as a freelance court interpreter/translator, life long humanist, president of the British Columbia Humanist Association from 1996 to 1999, and active member of the Victoria Humanists group.

Theo was a regular contributor to the Canadian humanist magazine *Humanist Perspectives*, and was known for writing carefully reasoned articles in a clear and accessible style on such subjects as “Evolution and Education,” “Teaching Theory of Knowledge in Secondary Schools,” “Modern Humanism,” “The War on Science and Reason,” “Eco-Humanism,” “Euthanasia in The Netherlands,” “Democracy and the Media,” and many other issues.

Passages representative of his views include this one on evolution and education: “It is difficult to object to the idea of creation being mentioned in social studies classes, when discussing comparative religious mythologies, but introducing such views in science classes perverts the very essence of the scientific process” (*Humanist Perspectives* no. 54).

Theo was also a member of the British Columbia Society for Skeptical Inquiry, which aimed at providing a reliable source of information to the public and media on claims of the paranormal. As well, he coordinated lecture series on modern humanism for several colleges and universities. We are sorry he is gone.

FEATURE

NICHOLAS GRIFFIN SPEAKS HIS MIND

Interview with NICHOLAS GRIFFIN, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster University, by JOLEN GALAUGHER and ILMARI KORTELAINEN.

JOLEN GALAUGHER: We can see posters here already printed for the upcoming PM@100 conference, to be held May 21-24, 2010. It’s our understanding that the Bertrand Russell Research Centre is hosting the conference to celebrate the centenary of the publication of the first volume of Whitehead and Russell’s *Principia Mathematica*. What sorts of philosophers is the conference likely to attract and what issues do you think will get priority?

NICHOLAS GRIFFIN: I think mainly logicians and people interested in the philosophy of mathematics – it will be quite a technical conference – but also people interested in the history of logic and the history of analytic philosophy in the early years of the 20th century. The sorts of issues that will get discussed will be things like the viability of Russell’s revision of the second edition of the *Principia*; the tenability of logicism in any form at all – that was the doctrine that the book was written to promulgate and it’s an open question, I think, whether logicism can survive or not – what contribution the book made to the development of logic, the importance of some of the doctrines it introduced, like type theory. Those are some of the issues.

JG: In interpreting the revisions to the second edition and the question of whether logicism is defensible, do you think that people are more interested in setting the historical record straight about the text or appraising its actual contribution to logic.

NG: I think both. There’s a serious movement now to try to get the history of early 20th century philosophy right in a way that no one paid any attention to for most of the 20th century, so that’s certainly one thing that will happen. But there’s also an attempt to quarry some of these older works for ideas which are important still today. One example is the way that Frege’s *Grundgesetze* is being quarried to create neo-logicism, a revision of that earlier theory. Nothing comparable has come from *Principia Mathematica* yet. Maybe it
I've heard of computer scientists who have found inspiration in *Principia*’s relation-arithmetic. We're still in the early days of really paying detailed attention to *Principia*.

**ILMARI KORTELAINEN:** What about Russell’s other works? He was certainly prolific in the philosophy of mathematics, logic, in the theory of knowledge and in metaphysics, but also in areas of social and political philosophy. Has interest in his writings on social and political topics declined, in your opinion?

**NG:** Yes, I think it has and I think it’s quite natural, because Russell was never a great theorist in political and social philosophy. He was always more practically involved in social and political campaigns, so his effort wasn’t devoted to creating major theories in political philosophy. And as the political issues that he was concerned with have receded into the past, obviously the contributions that he made to them have become of more historical interest, so I think there has been a tailing off of interest in his socio-political ideas, especially the political ones; the social ones, less so. The broad social issues – for example, the balance between organization in society and freedom – those big issues go on for ever and ever so Russell’s opinions on them remain of interest, but I think what he said about the First World War, what he said about the Second World War, or the Vietnam War, or the situation in China – that’s become a historical issue now and not of much relevance to people apart from historians.

**IK:** So research in this field is mainly historical?

**NG:** Yes, the historians are working in that area, but the one exception to that, though it’s not exactly political or social philosophy, is his contribution to ethics. It was thought for a long time that his contribution to ethics was quite minor and then in the last few years, thanks mainly to the work of Charles Pigden, he has turned out to be quite a significant contributor to 20th century ethics and that’s come as a surprise, I think, to a number of us. Maybe there will be similar surprises once the political and social writings are studied in detail.

**JG:** Returning to the question of his social and political thoughts, woefully under-theorized though they may have been, they also weren’t always popular. In some sense, his notoriety in that regard had something to do with McMaster’s acquisition of the archival materials, did it not?

**NG:** Yes, there’s a funny story connected with that. Russell wanted to sell his papers in order to make money to support his political work, and the natural place to sell them was in the United States, and the natural university to buy them in the United States was the University of Texas, which had a major collection of humanities and mathematical papers and apparently a huge acquisitions budget. So Russell had an agent negotiating with the University of Texas to sell the papers to Texas and while this was going on a little article appeared in *Newsweek* saying that the negotiations were underway and that Russell, when he got the money from Texas, was going to send it to North Vietnam to support the war effort. As soon as that came out it became impossible for Russell to sell his papers in America. There was no truth in the story whatsoever: Russell was selling his papers to support his political work, he wasn’t selling them to support the Vietnamese war effort. Where the story came from, I’m not sure. It’s hard to think that *Newsweek* would have invented it out of nothing, so they were quite possibly set up for it, but it made the papers unsaleable, not just to Texas, but in the whole of the United States. And into that vacuum McMaster stepped, and I suspect that little one-inch story in *Newsweek* probably saved McMaster 100,000 or 150,000 pounds. It was really quite a good deal for McMaster.

**IK:** And since then you have had these archival materials. Who, by the way, was the first director of the archives?

**NG:** To go right back to the beginning: actually before McMaster knew about them, Ken Blackwell was working on the papers, cataloguing them, working on them in Russell’s house in Wales, and when McMaster discovered that the papers were up for sale it was the catalogue that Ken had created that was the basis for the sale. So when the papers were bought and they came over to Canada, Ken came with them – it was a package deal! The librarian at McMaster who acquired them was William Ready, who was a very enterprising librarian. Ken Blackwell came over with the papers and became the Russell archivist, a position that he held for many years.

**JG:** Anyone who knows of Ken Blackwell’s capacious memory could understand why he may have come over with the materials, but perhaps not why he needed a head start.

**NG:** That’s true.

**IK:** As a part of the Russell Research Centre’s ongoing project of collecting and digitizing Russell’s papers, you edited volume two of
the Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, which contains some of Russell's earliest writings, where we see him first breaking with idealism or the neo-Hegelianism that dominated Cambridge even in the last few years of the 19th century, but you have also edited the Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, which spans several decades of the development of Russell’s thoughts. Do you still find his earliest writings the most interesting or which of Russell’s works, published or unpublished, do you find yourself returning to?

NG: The one I return to the most is the Principles of Mathematics – to my mind, his greatest work, certainly to me his most interesting published or unpublished, do you find yourself returning to? his earliest writings the most interesting or which of Russell’s works, decades of the development of Russell’s thoughts. Do you still find Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, which spans several idealism or the neo-Hegelianism that dominated Cambridge even in work. So I would say it is not his very earliest writings that I find most interesting, but the ones that come shortly after from about 1900 to about 1910: the work on philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. I think his greatest works come in that period.

That is certainly not an unexpected answer; it is a quite conventional one. But I do think that much later in his writing, there are extraordinarily good things. For example, even in his last major philosophical book, Human Knowledge, there are extraordinarily important ideas which have been almost completely overlooked. So, the big surprise is how much of interest there is in the later stuff, but that I still prefer the earlier stuff shouldn’t really surprise anyone.

JG: Over the years, in returning to the Principles of Mathematics and to these earlier works in the period prior to and just up to the Principia, what unpublished materials or archival materials have been the most significant or surprising to you in interpreting or re-interpreting those works?

NG: When I first started, it was the neo-Hegelian stuff, because it just seemed so bizarre. I mean, Russell was a philosopher whom you thought you knew: you had been taught him as an undergraduate, you thought you knew a fair bit about him, and then you came upon this material that was written in a wholly alien idiom. It was like discovering that he’d had a Japanese phase or something like that and had written just in Japanese. I remember finding one manuscript “Can We Make a Dialectical Transition from Punctual Matter to the Plenum?” and I thought “What on earth is going on?” I had no idea what he was doing there, so that was really quite surprising for me. It seems less so now because I spent a long time trying to understand it and now it seems quite familiar and quite natural that he should have written those things, but I remember when I first discovered it I was absolutely astonished.

JG: What, in your opinion, are some of the most important issues in Russell scholarship being discussed now and what unpublished manuscripts do you suspect might contain some gems for resolving those issues?

NG: There are big ongoing issues, for example, about the tenability of logicism. There is a lot of stuff to be discovered, I think, in the later philosophy. The climate in philosophy nowadays is much more sympathetic to the sort of work that Russell did than it was thirty or forty years ago; the sorts of metaphysical issues that Russell was concerned with are once again of central concern in philosophy. The bundle theory of particulars, for example – I’ve a graduate student who has just finished a thesis on it – is a topic about which very little has been written and which anyone doing philosophy in the 1940s or 1950s would have thought a very old-fashioned topic, because it’s straight metaphysics, it’s traditional metaphysics, and that was very unfashionable then. But it’s a topic which looks much more in tune with the way philosophy is done now and is the sort of topic that modern philosophers would take seriously.

Concerning which unpublished manuscripts are still of interest, one collection that I am particularly interested in at the moment is Russell’s correspondence with Whitehead, which covers, of course, the period when they were working on the Principia together. But it starts just after Russell graduated from Cambridge – Whitehead had been his teacher and Russell would occasionally write to Whitehead for advice on philosophical issues – so that is a very important correspondence. There is much more of Whitehead than of Russell among the papers, but an edition of both sides of the correspondence is one thing that I’m just starting to work on in collaboration with Sébastien Gandon.

IK: Whitehead is not as well known a philosopher as Russell is nowadays and his work is not studied as much.

NG: It’s certainly studied, but by an entirely different group of people. I hesitate to say it, but among certain philosophers Whitehead is almost a religious cult. His later philosophy, his process philosophy, has been tied into a certain type of theology and a certain view of God and religious matters. This makes it seem antithetical to Russell, except that the basic metaphysics behind it is not so radically different from Russell’s neutral monism. But those philosophers who study Whitehead’s process philosophy have hardly any in-
terest in the earlier logical works of Whitehead or even in his work on the philosophy of science. He did interesting work on the theory of relativity, for example, in the 1920s.

NG: I think they are separate. Both are going on and different people are doing different things. Those, like myself, who are heavily involved in the history of philosophy are trying to find out what he actually believed and to give a coherent account of his actual philosophy. But I think there are other people who are using his philosophy. One example was Gareth Evans, who plundered the notion of a "Russellian proposition" from Russell, admitting that it probably wasn't what Russell meant by a proposition, but wanting a label to give it, and acknowledging that there were affinities between the notion that Evans wanted and the one that Russell previously had. Another example is a book that came out recently on causation by Huw Price and Richard Corry, which again looks back to Russell, notion that Evans wanted and the one that Russell previously had.

JG: Does the correspondence with Whitehead contain materials relevant to Russell's early attempt to classify relations or, for instance, to the ways that he interprets the methods from the Universal Algebra in his Principles of Mathematics?

NG: I'm only just beginning the work, so I'm not really in a good position to say what exactly the correspondence contains. It is extraordinarily technical and some of the letters are very hard to construe because they're often speaking in symbols to each other and they're using symbols which, in some cases, don't appear in print. This is Principia notation before Principia was published, so they know what they mean by the symbols, but we sometimes have to work it out. Part of what they were doing was creating the notation for the Principia and, at a deeper level than that, they're talking about issues that they each understood very well -- they didn't have to explain anything to each other. I think that of all the material that we know exists, if this correspondence is not going to tell us important stuff about the creation of Principia Mathematica nothing will. There is nothing else that we know exists that is going to have anything like that importance for understanding Russell's early logic.

IK: Do you think that philosophers are looking to Russell's work to uncover the precise nature of his contributions to the history of so-called "analytic philosophy" or to see how an understanding of his texts might be informative for solving contemporary problems in philosophy, and in your opinion are these separable tasks?

NG: I think they are separate. Both are going on and different people are doing different things. Those, like myself, who are heavily involved in the history of philosophy are trying to find out what he actually believed and to give a coherent account of his actual philosophy. But I think there are other people who are using his philosophy. One example was Gareth Evans, who plundered the notion of a "Russellian proposition" from Russell, admitting that it probably wasn't what Russell meant by a proposition, but wanting a label to give it, and acknowledging that there were affinities between the notion that Evans wanted and the one that Russell previously had. Another example is a book that came out recently on causation by Huw Price and Richard Corry, which again looks back to Russell, but appropriates him for contemporary work. I think both approaches are legitimate, but it is important to know which one you're doing and not to pass off appropriated stuff which you're using for contemporary purposes as if it were the historical truth about what Russell actually believed.

JG: It seems that if you're intending to attack a view, it wouldn't make sense to misattribute that view to Russell and if you're going to defend a view that was never Russell's, why in that case....

NG: It may well be a defensible view and you may want to defend it and you might find that even though it wasn't Russell's view, you might find arguments for defending it in Russell and that's all quite legitimate. That sort of scrapping and recycling of positions in philosophy goes on all the time, but there ought to be due care taken with getting the historical philosophies correct.

JG: That makes me wonder whether historians of early analytic philosophy have a role to play -- and, if so, what that role is -- in solving contemporary problems in philosophy or metaphysics.

NG: I don't think that's the justification for their endeavour. As historians of philosophy, they are trying to understand the thought of the past and that is an important task in itself. So saying "Will it help us solve contemporary problems?" -- it might, but in the same way that the reason for an historian to try to understand the causes of the First World War is not necessarily to ensure that it never happens again or to solve current political problems, but to understand what went on in the past.

JG: Isn't there something distinctive, though, about doing the history of philosophy, apart from doing "intellectual history" as it might be carried out by more social scientific means within history.

NG: Yes, that's true and you notice the difference. There are some books published like that which do history of philosophy from a sociological point of view. The authors hardly ever make judgments as to whether positions are coherent or arguments are valid, and that, I think, is the key difference between that sort of work, the sociological work, and the philosophical work on the past. So I think an historian of philosophy is interested in what was actually believed and whether it was coherent to believe it or whether it was, in the terms of that time, justified to believe it.

IK: If we are doing only the history of early analytic philosophy are we really doing philosophy, are we doing analysis or just researching views in context?
NG: There's a book on the reception of logic by German philosophers at the end of the 19th century and the early 20th century, by a Finnish scholar, Jarmo Pulkkinen. He isn't a philosopher, but an historian who works in the history department at Oulu University and he did this extraordinarily interesting book in which he, apparently exhaustively, catalogued all the responses that German philosophers had made to the emerging field of formal logic from the time of Frege to, basically, Principia Mathematica. In all of that book, he never offered a single thought as to whether any position that was held by any of those philosophers was correct, or justified, or even coherent. He was just prepared to record it, but in recording it he produced an extraordinarily interesting book. He was interested not that philosophers might have held these views because they were the correct views, but that they might have held them because they worked in technical high schools and not in universities and if they'd worked in universities, they would have held different views about the importance of logic. I found that a fascinating book, but one almost completely devoid of philosophical content. It was purely historical or sociological.

JG: In considering the impact that Russell's works have had over several decades and in looking back at the emergence of the history of early analytic philosophy as its own field of study, where do you think that Russell's work had a remarkable, but perhaps short-lived or culturally contingent impact? And where do you think his work has exhibited a significant and sustained — maybe even warranted — even if unacknowledged influence?

NG: On the first question, a key example is the notion of a sense-datum. If you ask what people know about Russell's theory of knowledge, they say "Russell was the philosopher who believed that physical objects could be constructed out of sense-data." Now this was a view that in fact Russell held for five years in a career of about sixty years, but it had a huge impact and is what people nowadays know about Russell.

On the other question, where did he have an important impact which is unacknowledged: here there is one important doctrine which has dominated the philosophy of language through the second half of the 20th century from the later Wittgenstein on and this is the view, usually attributed to Wittgenstein, that meaning is derived from use. Or as Wittgenstein in fact says in the Philosophical Investigations, that the meaning of an expression is its use. This was actually a doctrine that came from Russell. Russell was putting it forward in the Analysis of Mind at the very time Wittgenstein was publishing his notorious picture theory of language. So at the time Wittgenstein is putting forward a view of language that he later comes to think is fundamentally flawed, Russell is already, I think, seeing the flaws of that model of language and is looking at a completely different one. He is not particularly interested in it, because Russell was not particularly interested in the philosophy of language, but nonetheless he was wondering what meaning could be and was putting forward a use theory of meaning which we know Wittgenstein read, because there is massive evidence that Wittgenstein got all sorts of things from the Analysis of Mind — usually things that he went on to criticize. An exhaustive list of the things that Wittgenstein criticized in that book is to be found in Garth Hallett's massive compilation A Companion to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. But the one thing that Hallett doesn't mention is the use theory of meaning which you find in the Analysis of Mind. It's close to plagiarism, in fact, for Wittgenstein to have taken that idea and not credited it, though of course he didn't credit the ideas he criticized either. But that is, I think, one place where Russell had, indirectly through Wittgenstein, an enormous impact. Whether Wittgenstein would have ever thought of it on his own, I don't know, but there is every reason to suppose that he got it from Russell.

JG: That is significant for understanding Russell's influence on Wittgenstein and something perhaps that we don't have a good excuse for not understanding, given that the Analysis of Mind is an accessible work.

NG: It's just that Russell doesn't say very much about it. It is a by-product of that work, so he doesn't emphasize it and for that reason it can be overlooked. But Wittgenstein certainly didn't overlook it.

JG: Is there anything in the archives that elaborates the view?

NG: Not very much, because Russell was not concerned about language itself or not very much. And he thought that how words were related to meaning was a contingent, empirical matter that linguists would deal with. It wasn't a philosophical issue of any great importance for him.

IK: I guess we could say that when Russell differentiates logical form and linguistic form, even though he is not explicitly doing the
philosophy of language, he has influenced philosophers who are doing the philosophy of language.

NG: Yes, the theory of descriptions is obviously one of the most important contributions to the philosophy of language in the early part of the 20th century. It’s just that when Russell was creating it, he didn’t think of it as a contribution to the philosophy of language, because he didn’t think that the philosophy of language was terribly important.

IK: The question can only be incompletely answered: What direction do you think work on Russell is taking and what trends do you think are emerging more broadly in the history of early analytic philosophy now that the field is established and is perhaps more reflective about its aims?

NG: I think on the second question, there is a new emphasis on getting the history right, whereas before, the idea of getting an interesting story was more dominant. Basically the idea was to show how people had begun there and ended up here; how they’d begun with the positions held at the turn of the century and then by 1940 had come up with some kind of neo-logical positivism. The purpose was to try to tell that story in a way that would make it inevitable that philosophers would end up believing what philosophers in the 1940s believed. So one thing that is being demolished is that view of the history, that there is some sort of grand inevitability such that if you start with Hegelianism and show that that is false, then you go through these steps until you go through logical positivism and then you realize that that won’t work and so you end up with a logical empiricist or an ordinary language philosopher, one of those two options. That sort of inevitable, a priori history just doesn’t pass muster anymore. Some philosophers still do a priori history, but most people think that the history of philosophy is a contingent empirical matter and you actually have to pay attention to what people said and believed.

JG: How would you describe the enterprise now: is it more like tracing Ariadnean threads?

NG: [laughs] Yes, it is. It is. The past is much more labyrinthine than people believed it to be. They told a nice story that was easy to teach to undergraduates, which was its great virtue, and it was easy to discuss at the dinner table, which was another great cultural virtue of it — it was clear, straightforward, and it seemed virtually inevitable. You had a few set positions, you could describe them succinctly, and each one had a defect which lead to the next one, so it was a very Whiggish view of history and you ended up inevitably with views just like those which you and your other colleagues at the dinner table held. I’m imagining a modern symposium of philosophers in the 1940s sitting at a dinner table: they all agree on certain things, about how metaphysics is not very satisfactory, they’ve got a certain range of positions that they hold in common, and they have a certain story about how it was inevitable that they ended up holding that set of rational beliefs and that no other beliefs would have been rational.

JG: To belabour the point, how do the roundtable discussions of the history of analytic philosophy societies or Russell societies differ from those dinner-table conversations?

NG: I think, when they’re serious at any rate, they’re much, much more complicated. There’s no doubt that the story that we’ve got is less satisfying than the one that they invented — a priori history has its advantages and its great advantage is simplicity, because you’re not constrained by what actually happened in the past, you can tell a nice simple story about it.

JG: Could that be alleged of Russell?

NG: Yes, it certainly could. It could be alleged of Russell in The History of Western Philosophy. I don’t think it could be alleged of Russell in his book on Leibniz, where he really did pay — and I’m not saying he got Leibniz right — but he did pay a lot of attention to what Leibniz actually believed and it was notoriously difficult to get Leibniz right. The history of work on Leibniz exhibits exactly the same sort of duality that I’ve just mentioned: one the one hand, there is a nice simple story that you can teach to undergraduates about the Monadology and it seems, as Russell said, “just like a fairy tale”; no reason to believe it true, but it’s a nice story.

JG: And what did Russell say about the value of the true?

NG: Oh, the value of the true! He had a lovely remark about the value of truth: he said that it was “dull, complex, and unedifying.” And then he acknowledged that that remark about it was not dull, complex, and unedifying, so there was sort of a paradox. And I think that that is largely true. The truth about the great dead philosophers is often dull, complex, and unedifying, but at the same
time the intricacy of it has its interest, and the a priori view is too simple to command your interest. If actual history were like that, you wouldn’t want to do the history of philosophy for long, because it’s too simple a story — you’d just teach your undergraduate course in it and pass on. But when you think “what did Leibniz actually believe” or “what did Russell actually believe” — what they believed was much more complicated, much more difficult to pass along to undergraduates, and not at all the sort of thing that you would want in a sort of Rortian after-dinner conversation.

JG: And to the extent that it was aimed at simplicity, it wasn’t aimed at simplicity of that kind or at that cost.

NG: You don’t want to sacrifice the truth for the sake of simplicity. In a way, Russell’s remark about the truth makes me think, by way of the opposite to it, of Rorty’s view that the important contribution to philosophy is in the next smart thing to say in the conversation, whereas Russell’s view was that what philosophy should be saying is the truth, which is “dull, complex, and unedifying” and not the sort of thing that you’d want in a Rortian conversation.

JG: There’s a kind of cynicism in the Rortian view.

NG: Well, certainly a cynicism in my account of it.

JG: Rightly so, I think, but that cynicism has been attributed to the later Russell and I wonder about the extent to which you think that’s true.

NG: I don’t think it’s correctly attributed to Russell. It strikes me as interesting that Rorty, who believed that what passes as the truth will be the next smart thing in the conversation, went on basically saying the same thing for thirty years, as if it were the absolute truth and he had a religious revelation to convey, whereas Russell, who believed the truth was dull, complex, and unedifying, managed to find different things to say, which intrigued both a popular and a professional audience for decades. There’s something very odd about that. People do criticize Russell for unduly popularizing philosophy: there’s Wittgenstein’s famous remark that Russell wrote two series of books, the philosophy ones like *Principia* which should be bound in red, which everyone should read, and the other ones, like *Marriage and Morals*, which should be bound in blue and which no one should be allowed to read. Russell was certainly not being cynical in writing *Marriage and Morals*. It’s not in my mind a great book. It was perhaps an influential book; it was influential enough to get him banned from teaching at the City College in New York. There are complaints you may make about it — simple-mindedness or naiveté — but not cynicism. He genuinely thought that this was the right thing to say about sexual morality and was stuff that needed to be said. In the 1960s the book came to seem quite conservative. I think Russell probably thought that it was going to be more provocative than it actually was. It came out when he was lecturing in America and he was fearful he’d get banned from the Bible Belt because of it. But that didn’t happen. He gave his talks all over America despite it. Oddly enough, it was only eleven or twelve years later, and in New York not the Bible Belt, that it created a scandal, which is ironical. The American Bible Belt in the 1920s didn’t give a damn about it, but New York in the 1940s was up in arms against it. But it was very much an engineered outcry: it wasn’t that people were horrified by this infidel in their midst, it was that the Catholic bishops were and the school board that tried to defend Russell’s position got no political support, even from the liberals, because they were scared of losing electoral support from the Catholics.

JG: As you said, the decline in interest in the social-political views has something to do with the fact that the controversy that once surrounded them no longer surrounds them.

NG: Yes, that’s true.

JG: That said, it’s not necessarily desirable to read all of Russell’s works even if it were possible. So, what do you think are the most valuable overlooked unpublished materials or is there anything in particular that you’re digging for at the moment?

NG: What I’m digging for is in the Russell-Whitehead correspondence. That’s my next big project and I think that is some of the most, potentially the most, interesting material still unpublished in the archives. There’s been a huge amount of material there that was unpublished when Russell died, but a lot of it has now been published and a lot of it has been studied quite closely. It seems to me that the Russell-Whitehead correspondence is the one, large undiscovered landmass that hasn’t been explored.

JG: Now that a lot of the materials have been published, what can we look forward to seeing from the Bertrand Russell Research Centre in terms of its upcoming or ongoing projects?

NG: What I’m hoping that you will see in the next two years is 30,000 of Russell’s letters, or thereabouts, put up on the web. We’re working on an edition of his complete correspondence and the first
step to that is to put up just the images of the letters linked to a directory of them, so that people will be able to access them. Eventually we hope to transcribe them and annotate them and do a proper critical edition of them, but in the meantime, the image will be better than nothing – Russell’s handwriting is quite legible. So that is the main task and I’m hoping that that might happen in the next two years. We’ve been working on it for a long time and money has been in very short supply, but I’m hoping that in two years, we should be able to have those up on the web.

IK: And this is a large project, because Russell wrote a huge number of letters.

NG: He wrote an enormous number of letters. He didn’t keep copies of them all and so we’ve got only a small fraction of the ones that he did write. The complete catalogue of his correspondence, both sides, is well over 100,000 letters and that’s only what we have in the archives. 40,000 were written by Russell himself and of those we’ll put about 30,000 up.

JG: If the work to date on the unpublished correspondence is any indication, these letters would seem an inexhaustible resource for generating new insights into the development of Russell’s ideas, his interactions with his contemporaries, and points of intersection with other developing areas of philosophy, so it would be nice to see this project come together.

NG: Yes, it would. There’s a huge amount of material there on everything under the sun from the philosophy of arithmetic to the politics of Zambia. There are letters to every sort of person from presidents and heads of state to ordinary people who just wrote sometimes asking him his advice on who they should get married to. He almost had a sideline for a while as an agony aunt. People would write him to ask: should they marry the girl they had fallen in love with, should they have children – it’s really astonishing.

JG: So there’s something for everyone: for the dinner-tables or roundtables.

NG: For everyone. Yes, exactly. And there are letters to Einstein, letters to T.S. Eliot, letters to D.H. Lawrence, letters to John Lennon, just a huge range. It is hard to imagine any philosopher having that range of connection.

JG: I wonder then, why is there this obstacle to securing funding? Is it just that people are unaware that these letters exist or contain those things of interest which they do?

NG: No, I think part of it is that the arts in Canada are very substantially underfunded and it’s not easy to... I was going to say that it isn’t easy to turn this into new technology, but we in fact have turned it into new technology.

JG: And very successfully.

NG: Yes, because we’ve devised an extraordinarily wide-ranging editing program for the transcription and editing and annotating of these letters. So this publishing project will be automated, or a lot more than any previous editing project – and automated by software that we’ve created for ourselves. But the support for humanities research in Canada is rather slight and at McMaster it is rather slight as well. Hopefully when they see what we can do that might change.

JG: And they have seen some of that already.

NG: I hope so.

JG: Thank you very much for your time, Professor Griffin.

NG: Thank you.
BOOK REVIEW

RUSSELL AND THE EDWARDIANS

SAMUEL LEBENS

In his book, *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers*, Omar Nasim applies considerable scholarship and clarity of expression to an important yet neglected subject: Russell’s place among his most immediate contemporaries between 1911 and 1915. Nasim concentrates on Russell’s earliest attempts to construct the external world from sense-data — for example, in “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” and *Our Knowledge of the External World*, both published in 1914 — and challenges the orthodox view that Russell’s epistemology was “simply a direct descendent and response to the Empiricists of old” (Nasim, 169).

In the period Nasim focuses on, Russell was a professional philosopher “participating in symposia, colloquia, writing for English academic and non-academic periodicals, [and] keeping in touch both in person and in letters with many of his colleagues” (14). The orthodox view of Russell’s epistemology in this period, though it captures part of the picture, diverts Russell from his historical context by making him merely a descendent of the empiricists. Nasim attempts to right that wrong. In so doing, he hopes to arrive at a better understanding of Russell’s early attempts to construct the external world. More radically, Nasim alludes to a future reconstruction of our historical account of the birth of analytic philosophy — a reconstruction in which G.F. Stout and the Edwardian philosophers take their rightful place.

I. RUSSELL, STOUT AND NUNN ON SENSE-DATA

Walking around a table, it seems to change shape and colour; and as you move nearer to and further from it, it seems to get larger and smaller. Because we assume that the real table, if there is one, does not frequently change its colour, shape, or size, we are seemingly
forced to conclude that if it exists, it is not what we directly experience. Russell was therefore forced to distinguish between sense-data that we immediately perceive and ordinary objects, for example, the table, in his 1912 Problems of Philosophy.

Russell’s appeal there to sense-data was borrowed from G.E. Moore. Russell used Moore’s lecture notes to prepare Problems of Philosophy, where he develops a broadly Moorean theory of perception. (Moore’s lecture notes became Some Main Problems of Philosophy, published in 1953.) But Moore wasn’t working in a vacuum, and Nasim pays little attention to him. Moore and Russell were both appealing to sense-data while a philosophical controversy was waged about sense-data between G.F. Stout on the one hand and Samuel Alexander and T.P. Nunn on the other. According to Nasim (3), the roots of this controversy are planted in Stout’s 1904 article “Primary and Secondary Qualities,” and the debate rumbled on for many years. Nunn was still actively engaged in his dispute with Stout in his 1916 paper “Sense-Data and Physical Objects.”

The controversy centred on the nature of sense-data: both sides adapted a distinction between sense-data and ordinary objects, but were sense-data psychological or physical, did they persist when not being perceived, and how did they give rise to knowledge of the ordinary objects that they were said to represent, if indeed they do give rise to such knowledge? Nasim presents Russell’s extraordinary attempts to construct ordinary objects out of sense-data in 1913-14 against the backdrop of two postulates fought over in the controversy: Stout’s and Nunn’s. This influence resulted in a reversal by Russell of his earlier position, inherited from Moore, that sense-data and ordinary objects are distinct.

In his 1909 article for the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, “Are Presentations Mental or Physical?”, Stout attacks Alexander’s account of sense-data as physical entities that Alexander had argued for in his article “Mental Activity in Willing and in Ideas” published in the same issue of the Proceedings. Nasim sketches all of Stout’s concerns, though only one will be focused on here.

Consider the following example: Adam puts his hand into a bucket of water and feels a cold sensation; simultaneously, Brenda puts her hand into the same bucket of water and feels a hot sensation. Could the very same thing have two contrary qualities inhering in it at the same time and place? “No,” Stout answers “for this ‘would involve a contradiction’” (Nasim, 55). Stout’s reaction is based on what Nasim calls “Stout’s postulate,” which states that contrary qualities cannot inhere in the same thing at the same time and place. This line of reasoning leads Stout to conclude that sense-data are mental and subjective, “so that Adam’s experience of a cold sensation is a distinct psychical existent from Brenda’s hot sensation” (ibid).

In a 1910 article, Nunn leapt to Alexander’s defence. Nunn simply denies Stout’s postulate. Nunn’s postulate, its replacement, says that “a thing actually ‘owns’ all the qualities that may be offered to sense-experience under different circumstances and conditions” (Nasim, 75). Nasim quotes Nunn’s explanation:

There is no difficulty in the case of the water which appears warm to A and cold to B. To me it seems true, not only that both the warmth and the coldness are really experienced, but also that, under the appropriate conditions, both are there to be experienced. (Ibid.)

Stout thinks it impossible for a thing to instantiate contrary qualities at the same place and time. Nunn thinks that contrary qualities can be located in the same place and time. Russell is able, in his construction of the external world, to adopt both postulates by distinguishing two senses of the phrase ‘in the same place.’

In Our Knowledge, Russell begins his construction of the external world with the claim that no two perceivers ever share an identical world of sense-experience. If we both look at the same table, however similar our experience will be, there will certainly be differences forced upon our experiences given our distinct points of view. Russell maintains that these “private worlds” or “perspectives” exist even when nobody perceives them. And there are, he claimed, an infinite number of existent perspectives.

Russell is now able to adopt both Stout’s postulate and Nunn’s postulate. The place at which an object appears is a single perspective. In such a place no object instantiates contrary properties. This accords with Stout’s postulate. The place from which an object appears is charted in Russell’s six dimensional space. Objects do instantiate contrary properties at the places from which they appear: this allows you to experience the water as cold while I experience it as hot. This accords with Nunn’s postulate. However, Russell
forges this compromise, not to find a middle path between Stout and Nunn, but to refine Nunn's position and maintain, against Stout, that sense-data are not psychical. The mere fact that you experience something as cold while I experience it as hot is not enough to demonstrate that our sense-data are mind-dependent.

By this view, then, Russell's work on sense-data and the external world was intended to take its place within the Edwardian controversy. But perhaps Nasim is reading Russell's work into a debate that Russell cared little for or knew little about. How do we know that Russell was really responding to these features of a debate between the Edwardian philosophers? We know it because Russell said so to Nunn. This conversation was reported by Nunn to Alexander in a letter dated 10 July 1914 that Nasim reproduces (119).1

In addition to clarifying the historical context of Russell's views on sense-data, Nasim provides his readers with the clearest exposition I have ever seen of Russell's somewhat baffling 1914 construction of the external world. Russell's six-dimensional space, in Nasim's hands, becomes relatively easy to comprehend, this, in turn, allows Russell's genius to shine. Once this six-dimensional space is in hand, and we have grasped the distinction between the place at which a thing appears and the place from which a thing appears, we can see how Stout's postulate and Nunn's postulate, mutually exclusive though they initially seem to be, can both be accommodated. Stout's postulate is true, when we consider the place at which an object appears, and Nunn's is false. Nunn's postulate is true, however, when we consider the place in six-dimensional space from which an object appears, and Stout's is false. The limited truth of Stout's postulate in no way entails that sense-data must be psychical.

II. OTHER ISSUES THAT INFLUENCED RUSSELL

Russell's accommodation of Stout's postulate with Nunn's postulate is not the only line of influence that Nasim sketches from the Edwardian philosophers to Russell. Russell's distinctive conception of a sense-datum is best understood, Nasim argues, in the light of the raging debate between Stout, Nunn and Alexander. We have already seen how Russell's conception of mind-independent and persisting sense-data arose from his engagement with these thinkers. Furthermore, contrasting Russell's 1914 logical construction of the external world with Stout's "ideal construction" (Stout, 1905) uncovers a hidden motive to Russell's whole epistemological project: Russell wanted to separate philosophy from psychology more distinctly than Stout had managed to - Russell's construction of the external world wasn't merely responding to scepticism, as it is often claimed, it was responding to Stout. Stout thought that psychology would help us bridge the gap between sense-data and the external world. Russell thought that this job should and could be done only by logic: the logical form of our statements about the external world can be analysed in terms of sense-data and logical constructions out of sense-data.

Nasim (ch. 6) also presents an analogy between Russell's earlier construction of irrational and imaginary numbers and his construction of the external world. Russell had considered many ways of constructing these peculiar species of number from less peculiar species of number. Nasim goes to great length to show that the various options open to Russell on this issue correspond to the various ways that the Edwardian philosophers sought to construct the external world from sense-data. It's no wonder, Nasim goes on to conclude, that Russell, who had already provided us with a logical construction of these controversial numbers, would address this Edwardian controversy with a logical construction of the external world.

Nasim's book begins the important and long overdue task of delineating the influence of figures such as Stout, and through him, Brentano, in the emergence and early development of analytic philosophy. Russell has no "philosophically simple and direct link ... with the British Empiricists of the Early Modern period" (169). A more fine-grained picture emerges when we place Russell in his proper historical context. For example, Russell's sense-data, unlike the sensations of the empiricists, are real and existent physical appearances. Furthermore, we are acquainted with sense-data, but we are also acquainted with relations. This is no simple empiricism.

Nasim's focus on Russell's philosophy between 1911-15 is appropriate - it is an important period in Russell's work, during which the influence of the Edwardian philosophers was most keenly felt.

1 The letter is housed at the John Rylands University Library, Samuel Alexander Papers, University of Manchester.
But even within this narrow focus, key areas are left untouched. Nasim notes that before arriving at his logical construction of the external world, Russell had avowedly adopted Nunn’s position—that sense-data are properties belonging to ordinary objects (114). This view, assimilated into Russell’s philosophy, would have had major ramifications. If sense-data are properties, then Russell would not have had to distinguish between acquaintance with sense-data and acquaintance with universals. In fact, he would lose all acquaintance with particulars because, during the period Nasim deals with, Russell thought that sense-data are the only particulars with which we’re acquainted. I’m not denying that Russell may have held this view during the rapid development of his epistemology—Nasim’s arguments seem conclusive—but its ramifications for Russell’s account of the particular-universal distinction deserve spelling out.

Similarly, towards the end of the book, Nasim contrasts Russell’s view of philosophy in this period with Stout’s. Russell’s view, as presented by Nasim, is that all distinctively philosophical questions can be reduced to questions of philosophical logic, and can be answered by logic. This is an interesting view, but in order to assess it, we would need an account of what Russell thought logic to be. This account is missing, as is the role of Russell’s theory of descriptions and the notion of an incomplete symbol in his logical constructions. A final criticism: the clarity with which Nasim explains Russell’s construction of the external world is sometimes lacking from his earlier exposition of the Edwardian philosophers. At times, long and difficult passages are left quoted at length, when they might have been better broken up and explained.

Putting these points to one side, Nasim’s book is an important start on a much needed programme: locating Russell’s work in its proper historical context. A great deal has been said about Russell’s relation to his predecessors. It is time to concentrate more on his relation to his contemporaries. Nasim’s book is well worthy of attention and will surely repay careful study.

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REFERENCES
RUSSELL LETTERS

RUSSELL’S JULY 1915 LETTER ON SENSE-DATA

I. INTRODUCTION, by OMAR W. NASIM

The following letter by Bertrand Russell was written to the *Journal of Philosophy* (then called the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*) to correct a misrepresentation of his views on the nature of sense-data that were first reported anonymously in the *Athenaeum* and then repeated in the *Journal of Philosophy*. The Athenaeum report, published April 24, 1915, is a summary of a session of the Aristotelian Society, held twelve days earlier, at which C.D. Broad read a paper on “Phenomenalism,” later published in vol. 15 (n.s.) of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. Russell was present at the session and opened the discussion to which others, such as H. Wildon Carr and R.M. McIver, contributed. Russell’s letter to the *Journal of Philosophy* was written on June 7, 1915 and published just over a month later.

In this letter, Russell is at pains to emphasize that his view, in opposition to what is stated in the *Athenaeum* and *Journal of Philosophy* reports, is that sense-data are not mental, but physical. In fact, Russell asserts, “my whole philosophy of physics rests upon the view that the sense-datum is purely physical.” But this was not always so clearly the case for Russell. In his 1912 *Problems of Philosophy* (*PP*), Russell argued that sense-data are non-mental and private – this is his doctrine of “physiological subjectivity.” But as in G.E. Moore’s lectures of 1910-11 on sense-data, perception, and the external world (published in 1953) from which Russell borrowed some of his views on sense-data for *PP*, nowhere does Russell say in *PP* that sense-data are physical, and this is for at least two reasons. First, he took for granted that whatever is physical may persist unchanged even when not perceived – a key assumption to his distinction between physical objects and sensible objects at that time (*PP*, 20-1). And second, it was by way of an important paper he wrote in 1912 soon after *PP*, but never published, called “On ter” that he was led to seriously engage with the writings of T.P. Nunn and Samuel Alexander. Both of their works not only revealed to Russell the problems associated with taking the persistence of
physical objects to the extreme – partly demonstrated in their own insistence on the non-mental nature of sensible objects – but who also provided the very vocabulary and notion of sensible objects as being physical. It is only in his 1913 manuscript *Theory of Knowledge* (TK), written after this first engagement with Nunn and Alexander, that Russell expresses the claim that sense-data are physical (TK, 22), later so essential to his work of 1914. And it was only two months before Broad’s presentation, in an address to the Philosophical Society of Manchester on February 15, 1915, and later published as “The Ultimate Constituents of Matter” (UCM) that Russell clearly points out two common errors prevalent in relevant discussions at the time: “the first of these is the error that what we see, or perceive through any of our other senses, is subjective: the second is the belief that what is physical must be persistent.” (UCM, 128). A sense-datum may therefore be physical without thereby implying that it persists when unperceived – something that would otherwise already assume too much about an external world, as Nunn, Alexander, and Russell of *PP* did assume.

Finally, it is significant to note that when Russell comes to characterize in the letter what it might mean for something to be mental he directly borrows a characterization advanced by G.F. Stout against Alexander (Stout 1909). Stout was a philosopher who struggled to make sense of the connection between the mental act, or relation, of perceiving, sensing, enjoying, etc, a mental sensible object, and an extra-mental object. On the one hand, the removal of mind for Stout would involve not only the “annihilation” of mental relations, but would also thereby necessitate the loss of its relata, the sensible object, thus demonstrating, due to this dependence, the latter’s mental nature. Russell, on the other hand, suggests that what is lost in such a removal is only the relation of perceiving, believing, remembering, etc, and not any particular object which may be a relatum in such a fact. What is fundamental therefore for Russell’s philosophy of physics, matter, and the external world, is that a mental relation of sensing, perceiving, etc, has for its object something physical – we are thus directly connected, as subjects with minds and bodies to the domain of physics. There is a lot going on in Russell’s letter, and thus much I have left out, but considering the context and all those implicated, it is no wonder that he wished to publically correct the report’s misconstrual of his position on the nature of sense-data.

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II. THE LETTER

To the Editors of the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*:

In a quotation from the *Athenaeum* printed in this *Journal*, I am represented as having said, “there may be perspectives where there are no minds; but we can not know anything of what sort of perspectives they may be, for the sense-datum is mental.” I did not see the *Athenaeum*, and do not remember what I said, but it can not have been what I am reported as having said, for I hold strongly that the sense-datum is not mental – indeed my whole philosophy of physics

1 Volume XII., page 308.
rests upon the view that the sense-datum is purely physical. The fact of being a datum is mental, but a particular which is a datum is not logically dependent upon being a datum. A particular which is a datum does, however, appear to be casually dependent upon sense-organs and nerves and brain. Since we carry those about with us, we can not discover what sensibilia, if any, belong to perspectives from places where there is no brain. And since a particular of which we are aware is a sense-datum, we can not be aware of particulars which are not sense-data, and can, therefore, have no empirical evidence as to their nature. This is merely the “egocentric predicament”; it is a tautology, not a “great truth.” It is for this reason, and not because “sense-data are mental,” that we can not know the nature of those perspectives (if any) which belong to places where there are no minds.

I do not know what the definition of “mental.” In order to obtain a definition, I should first inquire what would necessarily be removed from the world if it were what one would naturally call a world without mind. I see no reason why colors or noises should be removed, but facts which involve such relations as perceiving, remembering, desiring, enjoying, believing would necessarily be removed. This suggests that no particulars of which we have experience are to be called “mental,” but that certain facts, involving certain relations, constitute what is essentially mental in the world of our experience. (I use the word “fact” to designate that which makes a proposition true or false; it includes, I think, everything in the world except what is simple.) The term “mental,” therefore, will be applicable to all facts involving such relations as those enumerated above. This is not yet a definition, since obviously these relations all have some common characteristic, and it must be this characteristic which will yield the proper definition of the term “mental.” But I do not know what this characteristic is.

Very truly yours,

B. RUSSELL
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
June 7, 1915

Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method vol. 12, no 14 (July 8, 1915), 391-2

APRIL 17, 1967 NEWSWEEK REPORT and RUSSELL LETTER OF APRIL 24, 1967 IN REPLY

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1967, Bertrand Russell was in the process of selling his papers to pay for the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal and to generally fund the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, which had gone into debt to help finance the Tribunal. The story continues, as related in this issue’s interview, as well as in the Blackwell and Ruja Bibliography of Bertrand Russell, Griffin Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell, and Perkins Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell, that the April 17, 1967 Newsweek reported that the proceeds of the sale were to go to “Communist forces in Vietnam.” Russell then replied in an April 24, 1967 letter to Newsweek, saying that it was false that he was giving the proceeds of the sale to the Communist forces in Vietnam. But by that time the damage was done and Russell could not sell the papers in the United States, nor get the price for them that he otherwise would have gotten.

This version of the story, however, though told in three standard reference works on Russell, is not entirely accurate as it stands. For what Newsweek reported was that the proceeds would go to aid Communist forces in Vietnam, not that they would go to the forces themselves, though it is true that Russell wrote back saying that it was false that the proceeds would to the “Communist forces in Vietnam.” But going to aid the communist forces is not the same as going to those forces directly, a possibility Russell ignored in his letter. And it is likely that many viewed, and would view today, the Vietnam Tribunal as indeed aiding North Vietnam’s forces. The Newsweek report and Russell’s reply are on the following page. JO

II. REPORT AND LETTER

A. THE NEWSWEEK REPORT

“LORD RUSSELL, TEXAS AND THE VC”

Delicate negotiations are underway for the sale this summer of Bertrand Russell’s collection of private papers, a sale that may well be the largest of its kind in history — $3 million or more. The collection includes 100,000 letters from such correspondents as G.B. Shaw, T.S. Elliot and N.S. Khrushchev (represented by a 30-page missive). One prospective purchaser, as yet unidentified, may donate the collection to the University of Texas. Note: this isn’t likely to please the White House. Russell has indicated that all proceeds will go to aid Communist forces in Vietnam.

Newsweek, vol. 69, no. 16 (April 17, 1967), 25-6

B. THE LETTER

“LORD RUSSELL’S DENIAL”

The item published by NEWSWEEK (THE PERISCOPE, April 17) stating that I intend giving the proceeds of the sale of my private papers to the “Communist forces in Vietnam” is totally false.

BERTRAND RUSSELL
Penrhynedraeth, Wales

Newsweek, vol. 69, no. 17 (April 24, 1967), 4

REPORTS

TRAVELER’S DIARY /
BRS 2009 ANNUAL MEETING REPORT

Part of the delight of the annual meetings is seeing how its familiar patterns, rituals, and people play out in different venues. Central Connecticut State University (CCSU), the 2009 location of the annual meeting, is a very modern, thoroughly new campus, with computer stations sprinkled about, well-designed auditoriums, and eerily polite staff. Against this comfortable backdrop, Friday’s light supper of sandwiches segued into a presentation by CCSU students Tom Toomey and Kris Notaro of videos from the Bertrand Russell Audio Visual Project, with David Blitz, who is in charge of the project, commenting. A members’ meeting ended the evening, marred only by the discovery of certain supposedly implacable campus rules: zero tolerance towards alcohol and careful segregation of males and females to different floors of the dormitory in which we were staying. As with most such rules, these were immediately ignored by some, as they probably are throughout the school year.

The conference proper began Saturday morning, after an early breakfast of coffee and rolls, with a brace of talks criticizing Russell’s interpretations of other philosophers. Alan Schwerin led the day with “Russell on Hume’s Views on the Self,” in which he discussed Russell’s interpretation of Hume in the History of Western Philosophy. Russell, he said, attributes to Hume the view that “there is ... no impression of the self, and therefore no idea of self,” but Schwerin was not so sure the evidence supports Russell’s interpretation. The audience was divided. Following Schwerin was Thomas Riggins, speaking on “Bertrand Russell on Karl Marx’s Theory of Value.” Riggins thought that Russell got Marx wrong in German Social Democracy, and that in fact, it looked as though Russell had never read Capital at all! Again, the audience did not entirely go along with this.

Albert Shansky, a newcomer to the annual meeting, spoke next on “A Buddhist View of Russell’s Opinions on Religion.” Shansky compared Russell’s negative views of Christianity with the teachings of Buddha and found them to be remarkably similar; for example, like Russell, Buddhism does not profess belief in a God, a soul,
or a hereafter and both emphasize the need for benevolence. Andrew Cavallo, a student at CCSU, then spoke on Russell and the concept of simplicity. One kind of simplicity Russell often appealed to is Occam's razor, which, Cavallo argued, is a way of using simplicity for theory choice ("pick the simplest theory; that is what we mean by 'truth'"). Cavallo did not think simplicity is a good criterion for theory choice. Marvin Kohl ended the morning session "Upbraiding Russell on Love." While Russell thought love essential for the good life, Kohl finds that Russell was also wary of it, placing constraints on it for fear it would "usurp the place of reason." A richer conception of love, Kohl argued, can be found in a less constrained love.

After a quick lunch, the members of the board met to discuss old and new board business (minutes of the board meeting follow this annual meeting report). Past minutes were approved, Treasurer and Quarterly reports were presented, and officers were elected. The board then discussed the location of the next annual meeting and decided to meet at McMaster University on May 21-23, so that it would overlap with the PM@100 conference meeting there at the same time. The issue of raising fees was discussed, but though we are now losing a little bit of money on every member, a fee hike was postponed for at least another year. The meeting was then adjourned until 5:40 pm, to follow the membership meeting scheduled for that time.

At 1:30 the afternoon session of talks began with John Lenz discussing "Russell as an Anti-Utopian Utopian Thinker." Lenz finds Russell was both utopian and anti-utopian throughout his career, criticizing utopians from Plato and Thomas More to 20th century communists as unrealistic idealists, yet being committed himself to changing or rechanneling human behavior in his WWI writings on possessive versus creative instincts, his proposals for reform in education, and his campaigns for peace and one-world government.

With Jolen Galaugher's talk on "Russell's 'Decompositional' Approach to the Logical Analysis of Propositions," the discussion shifted back to metaphysics and epistemology, brought up earlier by Andrew Cavallo. Galaugher argued that while the sort of analysis Russell advocated and often used after 1905 was a transformational analysis, as in his theory of denoting, where one translates a statement into a correct logical form that is often different from the logical form of the original statement, Russell's earlier form of analysis, learned from Moore, was decompositional, that is, one that defines a concept in terms of component concepts without redefining the logical form of the statements in which it occurs.

With Sarah Stebbins' and Kevin Klement's talks, which followed Galaugher's, the discussion shifted again — this time to even more technical themes in Russell's logical theory. In her talk on "Russell and Brouwer: The Law of the Excluded Middle," Stebbins explored the relations between various alternatives to Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica logic. Klement in turn, in his talk on "The Functions of Russell's Having No Class," countered Scott Soames's claims as to the inadequacy of Russell's no-classes theory — Russell's theory that avoids paradoxes resulting from the assumption of classes by re-interpreting talk of classes so as to avoid reference to them. Soames had argued that there is no adequate account of propositional functions, on which the no-classes theory rests. Klement argued that there is an adequate account.

For the last talk on Saturday afternoon, the discussion shifted back to political themes with Peter Stone's master class on Russell's theory of "Social Cohesion and Government" from Authority and the Individual. Stone presented a lucid account of Russell's theories of group cohesion for different human societies, from primitive societies to the most advanced and large-scale ones.

After the afternoon session of talks was the BRS membership meeting (minutes of the membership meeting follow this annual meeting report), where Ken Blackwell announced that the next annual meeting would be held at McMaster University on May 21-23, 2010, in order to coincide with another conference there celebrating the centenary of the publication of volume 1 of Principia Mathematica. Rosalind Carey discussed the upcoming BRS session of talks at the eastern and central meetings of the American Philosophical Association, and John Ongley reported on BRS membership trends from 1989 to 2009, noting that membership had declined from 1990 to 2003 and then began to climb again from 2004 on. It was also announced that the BRS website had been redesigned.

Following the membership meeting, the board reconvened and finished business from the afternoon meeting. The Society itself then regrouped for its traditional "Red Hackle" Hour and then Ban-
quet. (The CCSU policy on alcohol was suspended during the Red Hackle Hour, perhaps by special dispensation from several college administrators who were enjoying themselves at the event.) At the banquet, people enjoyed a fine meal and got to know each other better. Stefan Andersson entertained the gathering with an original version of “Take Me Out to the Ballgame,” and Ray Perkins announced the winner of the 2009 BRS Book Award, who was Omar Nasim for his book *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Constructing the World.* (See review in this issue.)

Sunday morning the talks began with epistemology and logic, as Ilmari Kortelainen presented “Some Remarks about Russell’s Analysis and Contextual Definition in ‘On Denoting.’” Then breaking away from Russell, but not too far, Chad Trainer spoke on “A U.S. Senator’s Adolescent Reflections on Russell’s Politics.” But it was also a talk by Chad on Senator Daniel Moynihan on Russell, with Chad recounting, among other things, how, when he was lobbying in Congress for his union, a rapt conversation with the Senator about Russell, starting in the hallway, concluded when he discovered himself to have walked with the Senator right onto the Senate floor.

Ken Blackwell followed this with a discussion on “Misunderstandings of the Westminster Speech on War, 1948.” In order to understand Russell’s remarks in the 1948 Westminster speech, in which Russell was widely said to advocate dropping a nuclear weapon on the Soviet Union, Blackwell provided much background information on Russell’s views on war, pacifism, ethics in general, recent European history and NATO, and world government. On a similarly political note, Ray Perkins spoke on “Russell, the Bomb and ‘The Wickedest People Who Ever Lived.’” In April 1961, Russell remarked that the leaders of the nuclear nations (Kennedy, Khrushchev and Macmillan) were “the wickedest people who ever lived.” The press and Russell’s critics were outraged. But Perkins argued that in terms of the expected harm by the policy of nuclear deterrence in vogue at the time (“massive retaliation”), the statement made sense. The political theme continued in the final talk of the conference, where Stefan Andersson spoke on “The People’s Opinion and International Law” in which he described his project of writing a book on the background, preparation, implementation, and influence of, as well as the reaction to Russell’s Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal.

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**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY**

**2009 ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING MINUTES**

The 2009 annual meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society Board of Directors was held on June 6, 2009 at Central Connecticut State University at 12:30 pm chaired by Chad Trainer, Chair of the Board. Board members in attendance were: Kenneth Blackwell, David Blitz, Rosalind Carey, Philip Ebersole, David Henahan, Kevin Klement, Marvin Kohl, John Lenz, John Ongley, Ray Perkins Jr., Alan Schwerin, Peter Stone, Chad Trainer, and Thom Weidlich.

Treasurer Ken Blackwell presented the Treasurer’s report. The current cash balance was $11,900 with $900 owed to the Russell Centre for bookkeeping services. 2008 membership dues were approximately $4,900 and contributions $900. Ken reported that due to the economy and based on an email vote of the Board, the $10.00 dues increase was deferred through 12/31/09. On motion made by Ray Perkins, seconded by Alan Schwerin and unanimously passed, the Treasurer’s report was approved.

After discussion about the $10.00 increase in dues projected for 1/1/10, on motion made by Ken Blackwell, seconded by Phil Ebersole, and unanimously passed, it was decided that student dues would be increased by only $5.00 but otherwise the $10.00 dues increase would take place 1/1/10.

Kevin Klement proposed after further discussion that there could be different categories for student memberships with different dues, either including or excluding the Journal. On motion made by John Ongley and seconded by Phil Ebersole and unanimously passed, it was resolved that there would be no increase in the current dues structure through 12/31/10.

Minutes of the 2008 annual board meeting were reviewed and on motion of Ken Blackwell, seconded by Thom Weidlich and unanimously passed, the minutes were approved.

Nominations were sought for positions of officers to serve until the next annual meeting. On motion made, seconded and unanimously passed, the existing slate of officers was reelected as follows:

Chairman – Chad Trainer
President – Alan Schwerin
Vice-Chairman – David White
The location of the next BRS annual meeting was discussed. Ken Blackwell reported that a conference called “PM@100,” celebrating the 100th anniversary of the publication of Principia Mathematica, will be held at McMaster University from May 21 to May 24, 2010. Ken suggested that the annual meeting be held at McMaster concurrently with the PM conference and offered to host the annual meeting there. On motion made by Peter Stone and seconded by John Ongley, it was unanimously resolved that the 2010 annual meeting will be held at McMaster University May 21 through May 23, 2010, thus concurrent with the PM conference, but ending a day earlier.

The Lee Eisler Service award was given to Dennis Darland this year for his 27 years of service to the BRS as Society Treasurer. Alan Schwerin had a plaque made for Dennis to acknowledge this service to the Society.

At 1:30 pm the Meeting was adjourned until 5:40 pm after the close of the BRS membership meeting.

On motion made by Peter Stone, seconded and unanimously passed, it was resolved that Russell’s grandsons, Earl Russell and Honorable John Russell, be given honorary membership in the Society.

Chad Trainer suggested that the Board consider making Congressman Abercrombie from Hawaii an honorary member next year.

John Ongley made and Ken Blackwell seconded a motion that we establish a Service Award Committee. It was noted that we do already have a Lee Eisler Service Award Committee with the President as Chair and Peter Stone and Chad Trainer as the other current committee members.

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned.

David L. Henehan, Secretary
Bertrand Russell Society
Thursday, October 15, 2009

The 2009 Annual Bertrand Russell Society Membership Meeting was held on June 6, 2009 at Central Connecticut State University at 5:10 pm chaired by BRS President Alan Schwerin.

Among the members in attendance were: Stefan Andersson, Kenneth Blackwell, Howard Blair, David Blitz, Andrew Cavallo, Rosalind Carey, Giovanni de Carvalho, Philip Ebersole, Petar Forcan, Jolen Galaugher, David Henehan, Kevin Klement, Marvin Kohl, Ilmari Kortelainen, John Lenz, Jeffrey Ludwig, Ed McClanathan, Nancy Mitchell, John Ongley, Karen Perkins, Ray Perkins Jr., Stephen Reinhardt, Thomas Riggins, Ariel Robinson, Alan Schwerin, Peter Stone, Chad Trainer, Thom Weidlich, and Brandon Young.

Rosalind Carey discussed the upcoming Russell Society session of talks at the December eastern division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in New York City. She needs three commentators. She will send an email to BRS members asking for commentators.

Ken Blackwell announced the location and the dates of the 2010 BRS annual meeting: they are May 21 – May 23, 2010 at McMaster University. It is scheduled to coincide with the PM@100 conference, celebrating the centenary of the publication of volume 1 of Principia Mathematica, that will be held at McMaster from May 21 through May 24, 2010. The BRS annual meeting will thus begin on the same day as the PM conference and wrap up a day earlier.

John Ongley presented a report on membership trends from 1988-2009, noting that membership declined from a high of 315 members in 1990 to a low of 156 in 2003, and then gradually rose until it is around 183 at present.

John Ongley reported that he has just redesigned the Bertrand Russell Society website at http://users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html.

A recommendation was made for the next year’s Lee Eisler Service Award.

It was announced that Mario Bunge was given the 2009 BRS Award. He was not able to attend the conference but his video
statement accepting the award was shown at the conference on Sunday and will be available by email.

There being no further business before the meeting, it was adjourned.

David L. Henehan, Secretary
Bertrand Russell Society
Thursday, October 15, 2009

Note: At the banquet, Ray Perkins announced that the 2009 BRS Book Award had been given to Omar W. Nasim for his book *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers*.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
2009 Second Quarter Treasurer's Report
Cash Flow April 1 – June 30, 2009

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Ken Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackwk@mcmaster.ca)
Note: US and Cdn dollars are intermixed.
### 2009 Third Quarter Treasurer's Report

**Cash Flow July 1 – September 30, 2009**

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Ken Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackwk@mcmaster.ca)

Note: US and Cdn dollars are intermixed.
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