Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Growth (Work-in-Progress)

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Abstract

In 1916, shaken by the events of the Great War, Bertrand Russell published *The Principles of Social Reconstruction*, originally titled *Why Men Fight*, a work that contributed to his reputation as a pacifist and social critic. In it, Russell offers an account of what motivates human action, and in doing so, argues that a large part of human activity stems from *impulse*. The types of motivation typified by Russell’s concept of impulse are those of which are seldom conscious and are guided by the community in which we are embedded. For Russell, a society averse to war and injustice demands institutions that will cultivate impulses that are averse to war and injustice. We set out to demonstrate that his concept of impulse pervades a large part of his social and political thought, and also suggest further linkages to seminal works in peace research. In doing so, we will proceed along the following lines: 1. We will elucidate Russell’s concept of impulse as presented in his *Principles of Social Reconstruction*; 2. Identify how Russell’s concept of impulse is present in his anti-Soviet literature, his later anti-war writings, and his political writings that predate the Great War. 3. Examine how Russell’s theory of impulse links the mitigation of structural violence embedded in political and economic institutions with the foundation for an international setting of positive peace.
In *The Principles of Social Reconstruction*, Russell argues that there exist two impetuses that spur human activity: desire and impulse. As the “more conscious, explicit and civilized” form of motivation, desire refers to the conscious and rational drive towards attaining some end (2012, p.13). By contrast, impulses are primal instincts and represent types of motivation that can never be fully satisfied. Representing the “subconscious selectiveness of attention,” impulses often compete with desire, and at times, prompt us to act against our interests (p. 12). Russell came to view impulses as the “mainspring” of action, driving human action more often than desire.

Russell argues that desire and impulse are not necessarily antagonistic. Rather, they can work in tandem and proceed from a *central principle of growth*, which refers to the basic drive to improve upon our initial circumstances (2012). Impulses cultivate natural affinities, wants, and needs, and desires represent a conscious and rational articulation of basic affinities. These ends are considered essential to the self-fulfillment and growth of the individual, leading Russell to claim that “impulse is the expression of life,” as it defines that which makes life worth living (p. 21).

The total suppression of impulses is unachievable as impulses are inherent to the human condition. Attempts at suppressing impulses, which often manifest in the education system, cripples the individual’s capacity to obtain goals that are necessary for self-fulfillment (Russell, 2012). Moreover, as impulses can neither be erased nor fully satisfied, efforts to completely repress an impulse may result in the unintended effect of strengthening an individual’s resolve to
Russell acknowledges that growth would not be viable if all impulses could be indulged to no end (2012). Institutions ought to allow individuals freedom to grow on their terms while encouraging the cultivation of impulses directed towards the common good (2012). The actions spurred by impulses are not determined at birth but are “profoundly modified by the circumstances and … way of life” the individual is subject to, often defined by the community’s major social institutions (2012, p. 19). In this way, there is a possibility for the social guidance of the “subconscious selectiveness,” which determines actions motivated by impulse (2012). Through this guidance, a society can hope to harness the power of impulses for beneficial ends.

Russell contends that the principle of growth is hampered in individuals by institutions predicated on “injustice and authority” (Russell, 2012, p. 26). He concedes that historically such authority could have been tolerable, but it is essential to understand that “institutions have a life of their own, and often outlast the circumstances which made them a fit garment for instinct” (2012, p. 42). When the obsolescence of such authority begins to be widely realized, it ushers in a “universal strife” in which “tradition and authority are arrayed against liberty and justice” and that the latter aspects must be upheld if the society is to avoid catastrophe (p. 26).

According to Russell, institutions should be geared towards promoting instinctive liking, or “the feeling which makes us take pleasure in another” person’s company, which is essential for preventing prejudice while fostering an organic kinship towards others (2012, 34). Furthermore, institutions must promote a sense of common purpose and cooperation (2012).
Should we imbue institutions with instinctive liking and common purpose, everyone shall have “more freedom, more self-direction; more outlet for creativeness, more opportunity for the joy of life, more voluntary cooperation, and less involuntary subservience to purposes not their own” (p. 43).

Proposed Roads to Freedom

In Proposed Roads to Freedom (2002), Russell charges that the Great War took place in part owing to classical liberalism’s failure to handle international crises. As a result, Russell sets out to explore an alternative to classical liberalism, focusing on three radical ideologies: anarchism, marxism, and syndicalism (2002). In his evaluation of each system, Russell places significant value on liberty, prefacing his analysis with the statement:

“I do not say freedom is the greatest of ALL goods: the best things come from within and are such things as creative art, and love, and thought. Such things can be helped or hindered by political conditions, but not actually produced by them; and freedom is both in itself and in its relation to these other goods the best thing that political and economic conditions can secure”

(Russell, 2002, p. 75).

Liberty, then, refers not just to the absence of political oppression but also the extent to which the political and economic system permits citizens to pursue their creative, interpersonal, and intellectual goals unencumbered. Russell’s analysis of anarchism, marxism, and syndicalism is tied to how each system interacts with his conception of liberty.
Russell maintains that “government is in itself in some degree an evil,” mandating consistent social pressure to diminish and decentralize state power whenever possible (Russell, 2002, p. 76). Although he concedes the “best system would be one not far removed from that advocated by Kropotkin,” for the time being he concludes “there will be more liberty for all in a community where some acts of tyranny by individuals are forbidden, than in a community where the law leaves each individual free to follow his every impulse” (2002, p. 76). However, it is his disappointment with each of these systems to address social transformation and conflict resolution that highlights the pervasiveness of his continuing focus on the principles of impulse.

Examining anarchist, marxist, and syndicalist explanations for the causes of war, Russell expresses dissatisfaction, charging all three explanations of economic reductionism (2002). Russell holds that there are non-economic causes of war, but recognizes the important role economics plays in driving and intensifying international conflicts. The conflicts that emerge as a result of imperialism and colonialism are intimately tied to the drive held by the Great Powers to secure and expand foreign markets (2002). Furthermore, as the press requires large capital to run, it “necessarily belongs to the capitalist class” (2002, p. 96). Through this power, they decide what news is printed and what viewpoint it presents, cultivating the impulses that “they desire to stimulate, and suppressing such items as would” diminish the push to war (p. 93).

Russell believes the press are effective at stirring war fever because how they promote war is tantalizing to ordinary citizens. Echoing his assertions laid down in *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, he claims that “what a man believes upon grossly insufficient evidence is an index to his desires . . . desires of which he himself is often unconscious” (2002, p. 97).
Therefore if “he is offered something which affords a reason for acting in accordance with his instincts, he will accept it even on the slenderest evidence” (p. 97). Hence, the push for war by the state and the elite class is accepted because it fulfills these natural inclinations. The outlook of both socialists and anarchists seems to be “divorced from the fundamental instincts of human nature,” by their purely economic conception of war (2002, p. 97). Although he believes that the diminishment of the competitive instinct that will come about in a cooperative economy may “provide a real safeguard against war,” by expanding the constructive outlets for impulses and limiting the structural reasons for conflict.

Russell is adamant that war is not an activity inherent to human nature, but rather a product of how institutions shape impulses. The drive to war has its origins in major political and economic institutions, primarily the state, in that the state requires war, subjugation, and exploitation to preserve and expand its power (2002). This unending push for conquest inevitably has domestic effects of curtailing the liberty of citizens, criminalizing directly or through public opinion any anti-militarist propaganda (2002). Yet the key problem stems from the restriction through coercion of any behaviour which is deemed at odds with state power. The origins of popular war fever are found not from the structural incentives applicable to authority, but rather from the oppressive relationship of the state and economic power to the free action of individuals.

Russell’s Anti-Communism and the Early Cold War

As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union began to heighten following the end of the Second World War, Russell’s anti-communism and disdain for Stalin came to the forefront

Russell’s antipathy towards the Soviet Union predates the Second World War and is articulated in *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1921). To assess the post-revolutionary landscape of Russia, Russell likens the policies of the Bolsheviks to those of the Tsarist regime that they had displaced: actions that were ruthless and unpopular and exploitative (1921). The approach taken by the Bolsheviks emphasized brutality and punishment at the expense of promoting well-being, and in doing so, fomented fear and distrust. Russell (1921) writes:

> The Bolshevik outlook is the outcome of the cruelty of the Tsarist régime and the ferocity of the years of the Great War, operating upon a ruined and starving nation maddened into universal hatred. If a different mentality is needed for the establishment of a successful Communism, then a quite different conjuncture must see its inauguration; men must be persuaded to the attempt by hope, not driven to it by despair. To bring this about should be the aim of every Communist who desires the happiness of mankind more than the punishment of capitalists and their governmental satellites

A reading of this passage indicates a linkage between Russell’s analysis of the failures of Soviet doctrine and his belief, echoing his theory of impulse, that the path to justice hinges on
the promotion of hope and cooperation over fear and resentment. Remaining sympathetic to communism himself at the time of writing *The Theory and Practice of Bolshevism*, Russell suggests that a successful path to communism must rest on resisting the impulse to aggression.

The wrong-headedness of the Soviet approach was worsened by the fanaticism that Russell saw in the Soviet leadership. Recalling his meeting with Vladimir Lenin in 1920, Russell expressed the disappointment he felt from his interactions with him:

> I think if I had met him without knowing who he was, I should not have guessed that he was a great man; he struck me as too opinionated and narrowly orthodox. His strength comes, I imagine, from his honesty, courage, and unwavering faith—religious faith in the Marxian gospel, which takes the place of the Christian martyr's hopes of Paradise, except that it is less egotistical. He has as little love of liberty as the Christians who suffered under Diocletian, and retaliated when they acquired power. Perhaps love of liberty is incompatible with whole-hearted belief in a panacea for all human ills. If so, I cannot but rejoice in the sceptical temper of the Western world. (Russell, 1956)

Russell’s distaste for Lenin’s overzealousness is consistent with his general disdain for fanaticism. To be a fanatic is to forgo healthy skepticism and self-doubt, an outcome that impedes the acquisition of knowledge and opens the door to tyranny and exploitation. Russell’s admiration for the ‘skeptical tempter’ that typifies the Western outlook will prove to be an important factor in shaping his more aggressive tone against Soviet expansionism after the Second World War.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Russell’s distaste for the Soviet Union shifted towards a more aggressive tone, going as far as suggesting that a ‘preventative war’ against the Soviet Union is a possibility worth entertaining (Hayhurst, 1991). From 1945 to 1949, Russell remarked on numerous occasions that the Soviet Union ought to be ‘pressured’ into signing the Baruch Plan, which would grant an international body monopoly over all nuclear weapons (1991). Russell’s vehement anti-Stalinism is further evident in What Is Democracy and What is Freedom, works that lambasted Soviet-styled tyranny and called for the need to contain Stalin’s ambitions, albeit through peaceful means (1991).

There is a possibility that, shortly after the Second World War, Russell believed that Stalin could be convinced into acquiescing to international control of nuclear weapons (Hayhurst, 1991). But as Stalin showed little desire in entertaining such proposals, Russell grew increasingly pessimistic towards the idea that the Soviet leadership could be reasoned with (1991). Intimidation, and pressure by force if necessary, is the only means to compel the Soviets to seriously entertain proposals to establish international oversight over nuclear weapons. However, after the Soviets tested their first atomic bomb in 1949, Russell’s tone, while remaining vehemently anti-Stalin, moved in a less aggressive direction and towards talk of instituting approaches to containing the Soviet Union that were short of war (1991).

The hostile position that Russell takes against the Soviet Union in this period is reflective of his belief that a democratic world government could be realizable through American hegemony (Hayhurst, 1991). Before 1945, Russell took his desire for a world government as an abstract and distant ideal (1991). After the Second World War, with the United States emerging
as a major power that could only be challenged by the Soviets, he began to see a Western-led world government as a concrete possibility.

At the time, Russell hoped that the liberal ideals and democratic norms embodied in American institutions could provide a blueprint for gradually reforming society (Hayhurst, 1991). What is more, the Western Bloc, led by the United States, must lead ‘by example’ and offer a framework for constructing global democratic institutions:

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\text{It is up to us in the West to behave in such a manner as to make the merits of our system obvious even to those who have the least desire to admit them. This is a slow, patient, and undramatic policy.} \quad \text{(Russell, 1953)}
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Russell’s transition towards a more conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union is further evident in *Is a Third World War Inevitable?* (1950), with the caveat that the Western Bloc must appear militarily stronger to the Soviets as he believes Stalin cannot be reasoned with. It is evident that Russell’s reputation as a cold warrior stems from his belief that Soviet containment is the only option available, and if a genuine detente between both powers was possible, it would be the preferable option (1950).

Several factors might have accelerated Russell’s transition from his belief in Soviet containment to his firm desire in finding peace between the Western and Eastern Blocs. In 1949, the Soviets tested their first atomic bomb, which put to rest the hope that the West could maintain a monopoly over nuclear weapons (Hayhurst, 1991). It was Stalin’s death, however, that accelerated Russell’s belief in the necessity of nuclear disarmament and East-West cooperation (1991). In a BBC broadcast titled *A New Russian Policy*, Russell expressed hope that an effective dialogue could exist with the Soviets in solving international disputes, including the
Soviet policy towards Berlin (1991). Furthermore, in 1956, Russell held that the Soviets had undergone a process of liberalization and remarked that Western liberals have been caught up in an anti-Soviet frenzy (1991).

In *Why I Am Not A Communist*, Russell remarks that an assessment of any political doctrine relies on two considerations (1956). First, one must consider whether the doctrine’s theoretical tenets are true, and second, whether its practical implications will lead to an increase in human happiness. Soviet doctrine fails on both accounts. Russell’s recommendations, however, are of vital importance: the non-communist world must lead by example and demonstrate progress in eliminating poverty and hatred.

**Bertrand Russell and Nuclear Disarmament**

There are various themes that pervade *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare* that connect to Russell’s theory of impulse and principle of growth. There is Russell’s persistent view that fostering hope and cooperation is a crucial step towards achieving peace and averting war (2009). Likewise, actions that foment fear and mistrust will only strengthen the chances of the outbreak of war. Even if the Eastern and Western blocs agree to denuclearization, a climate of fear and mutual distrust will obstruct cooperation efforts. If a climate of fear and mutual distrust persists, the chances of a nuclear war erupting increases.

In addition to Russell’s views on hope and cooperation, there is the context of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, which could, if tensions rise, devolve into a full-scale nuclear war. Russell emphasizes what he sees as a common-sense interpretation of the nuclear arms race: that the threat of a full-scale nuclear war is an existential threat to all. It is in everyone’s rational self-interest to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. The possibility of a
widespread nuclear war trounces ideological differences, and anti-war activists need not appeal to “higher ideals” to persuade others of the destruction a nuclear war would unleash (Russell, 2010). The aim is to spread awareness — make the facts known — about the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear calamity (2010).

The seriousness with which Russell treats the threat of nuclear war marks a shift in priorities for him: preventing nuclear destruction is a goal antecedent to that of, say, fighting the spread authoritarianism. This shift in perspective might have strengthened Russell’s belief that the nature of warfare has been forever altered following the advent of nuclear weapons. Russell believes that now that nuclear weapons exist, all armed conflict, however conventional, could eventually lead to nuclear destruction (Russell, 2010). A conventional war between the Soviet Union and the United States is likely to escalate into nuclear war; likewise, a limited nuclear exchange is likely to escalate into a full-scale nuclear war. Even if nuclear warheads were abolished, a conventional war would only incentivize the re-introduction of nuclear weapons. Since all wars increase the chances of a nuclear war, Russell’s primary aim is to end war as a means of resolving international disputes (2010).

As a practical step towards his aim of disarmament, Russell expresses the immediate need to persuade officials on both sides that the threat of nuclear warfare supersedes their geopolitical and ideological objectives (Russell, 2010). The Soviet Union and the United States must approach the threat of nuclear war as a common threat, in that they would share “the same interest, in fact, as they would have in combating a new black death” (Russell, 2010, p. xxx). This task, however, remains monumental, given the extent to which ideological differences blind high-ranking public officials.
Persuading the Soviet Union and the United States to perceive nuclear war as a common threat is of paramount importance. A notable outcome of persuading both parties that nuclear war is a common threat, as long both parties are genuine in their efforts to cooperate, is that doing so would foster cooperation over competition between both parties (Russell, 2010). Russell believes that maintaining an atmosphere of mistrust and competition between the Soviet Union and the United States will serve as an impenetrable obstacle to nuclear disarmament. Not only is an atmosphere of mistrust and competition an obstacle, but such an environment makes ripe the chances of the outbreak of nuclear war.

Russell maintains that powerful countries have two primary aims: to pursue domestic prosperity and to seek ideological, political, and economic domination over other countries (Russell, 2010). To exact domination over other countries, powerful nations tend to subjugate other nations through armed conflict. If anti-war activists could convince powerful nations of the implications of nuclear weapons, powerful nations ought to avoid armed conflict. To safeguard domestic prosperity, all nations must treat the threat of nuclear war as a national security problem. Addressing the threat of nuclear war as a national security threat would compel nations to cooperate with one another, given that nuclear war, by its nature, is an international issue (Russell, 2010).

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According to Russell, denuclearization will require three fundamental shifts in outlook. First, moderation must replace fanaticism. It is fanaticism, Russell maintains, that can blind individuals to common sense. Second, mutual toleration must exist in place of ultra-nationalism. Third, the education system must cultivate impulses that are averse to war and aggression. In elaborating on education, Russell holds that there are “three spheres of contest in the gradual approach of man towards wisdom (Russell, 2010).” There are contests with nature, of which humankind has made significant strides through technological development. Second, there are “contests between men,” including armed conflict. Russell writes that “it should be one of the tasks of education to make vivid in the minds of young both the merits of a civilized way of life and the needless dangers to which it is exposed by the survival of competitive ideals which have become archaic.” Finally, there are “inner conflicts between impulses.” To address these inner conflicts, Russell believes that we must adopt a moral system applicable to the present day. We must see one another as “possible cooperators, rather than probably competitors.” It is here where Russell’s theory of impulse becomes most apparent. Russell writes:

*What the world needs, in education as in other departments of human life, is the substitution of hope for fear, and the realization of the splendid thing life may be if the human family cooperatively will permit itself to realize its best potentialities* (Russell, 2010, p. 63)"
Men are capable, not only of fear and hate, but also of hope and benevolence. If the populations of the world can be brought to see and to realize in imagination the hell to which fear and hate must condemn them...and the comparative heaven which hope and benevolence can create...the choice should not be difficult (Russell, 2010, p.11)”

Russell, Galtung, and Peace Research

Russell’s social and political philosophy, heavily informed by his theory of impulse and growth, shares significant parallels with leading voices in peace research, including the sociologist and pioneer of peace and conflict studies, Johan Galtung. In particular, there are meaningful connections one can draw between Galtung’s conception of violence and Russell’s theory of impulse and the principle of growth.

In his analysis of conflict, Galtung identifies three types of violence. The most recognizable form of violence, direct violence, includes warfare and physical harm. Structural violence, characterized by the harm inflicted by institutions and social structures, is more indirect, with “exploitation as its centre-piece” (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 37). Institutions and social structures exhibit structural violence by giving privileges to some while discriminating against others, often by depriving them of necessities (2013). The final form of violence, cultural violence, represents apparatuses that manipulate individuals into approving extant forms of direct and structural violence. Galtung holds that violence owes its origins to the injustices committed by authoritative bodies, including state and non-state institutions (Galtung & Fischer, 2013).

Russell’s conception of how institutions shape harmful impulses resemble Galtung’s understanding of how institutions exhibit cultural and structural violence. Authoritative bodies,
including state and religious institutions, promote harmful impulses, often for self-serving ends. Similar to Galtung’s idea of cultural violence, Russell believes that institutions manipulate individuals into approving, or worse, glorifying, extant forms of injustice. This type of manipulation involves the production of narratives and symbols that stir feelings of passion and loyalty among the public, many of which are strong enough to cultivate the impulse to aggression.

Cultural violence exhibits what Galtung describes as the “discolouration of moral perception,” in which values and concepts are distorted to reinforce violence (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 39). Similarly, Russell believes that the state can distort the public’s perception of virtue and vice. The state can distort the public’s perception of courage by disseminating propaganda to make ‘courage’ emblematic of the loyal soldier willing to kill and die for the nation. Insofar as the state can do this allows it to influence the “subconscious selectiveness” within an individual to favour impulses beneficial to state power, namely war (Russell, 2012). In this way, the state utilizes cultural violence to promote ends that benefit its authority.

Galtung’s solution to violence begins with the elimination of the sources of violence, which are found in powerful institutions. The process of eliminating violence requires the construction of novel and creative conflict resolution processes that do not reproduce violence and are geared towards peace-building. The building of novel conflict resolution processes must be a cooperative process and must aim to give each citizen the capacity to affect change for their well-being. This has the potential to create what Galtung terms “cultural peace,” whereby aspects of culture do not seek to preserve injustice but “legitimize direct peace and structural peace” (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 42). Conflict must be voluntarily undertaken and participatory for
“the temptation to institutionalize that culture… would already be direct violence against identity” and would be counterproductive if the goal is to eliminate structural violence, which is predicated on non-consensual imposition (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 3).

Galtung’s idea of cultural peace draws stark similarities to Russell’s blueprint for building peaceful conflict resolution processes. According to Russell, “everything that intensifies political life tends to bring about a peaceful interest of the same kind as the interest which leads to desire for war (Russell, 2012, p. 97).” The processes that drive the impulses towards aggression must be reoriented to guide impulses averse to aggression. In doing so, actions that nurture democracy and peace-oriented institutional reform are of fundamental importance. The egalitarian distribution of social power and wealth would help blunt the rise of forces dedicated to producing a culture of violence.

A pacifist and prolific social critic, Russell sought institutions and forms of social transformation that could nurture a culture of peace and promote peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms. Russell provided an account of human motivation that emphasized the importance of social structures and institutions in shaping what motivates human action. The need to transform institutions to cultivate a culture that values peace, solidarity, and democracy is crucial to Russell, sharing significant parallels to Galtung and his theory of violence and social transformation. In 2020, fifty years since his death, Russell’s hope for a more peaceful world and his vision of social transformation could not be more timely. From the mass protests surrounding police brutality to the challenges wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic, examining Russell’s social and political outlook can provide us with important insight into how to navigate these tumultuous times and build a better world.
Works Cited


